Mendelovici on Phenomenal Intentionality
The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality

- All intentionality is grounded in phenomenology (plus a bit).
- Intentionality of perception is grounded wholly in phenomenology.
- Intentionality of thought is grounded in phenomenology plus certain dispositions.
Conceptions of Intentionality

- Psychological intentionality: tied to explaining behavior.
- Truth-conditional intentionality: tied to reference and satisfaction conditions.
- Subjective intentionality: yield to what’s introspectible.
Mendelovici’s Target

• Mendelovici: Primary target is subjective intentionality.

• E.g. it’s more robust and more certain.

• May help explain the others.

• Q: Is this then a theory of the phenomenology of intentionality?

• Or at least: a theory of a different thing than theories of truth-conditions?
Explaining Truth-Conditions?

- Mendelovici doesn’t try to explain reference and truth-conditions until briefly in chapter 9.

- Reference = matching superficial features of phenomenology.

- More refined: reference grounded in descriptions involving Russell-style acquaintance?
Pluralism

• Could there be other non-phenomenal kinds of intentionality?

• E.g. psychological or truth-conditional intentionality, which unconscious states can have?
Reductive or Nonreductive

- Reductive PI: reduce I to non-I P.
- Nonreductive PI: reduce I to PI (some I is primitive).
- Mendelovici endorses nonreductive PI, reducing all I to PI but not further.
- Is this in the same game as reductive accounts?
Mendelovici on Thought

- Most distinctive: Mendelovici on the contents of thought.
- David Pitt: all occurrent thought have a distinctive and proprietary phenomenology that constitutes their content.
- Mendelovici: This is implausible, phenomenology is often gist-y.
Cashing Out

• (1) Immediate/phenomenal content of judgments is often thin

• (2) Full/derived content of judgments is fine-grained

• (3) The full content derives from the phenomenology of the thought plus dispositions to have cashing-out thoughts.
Cashing Out Thoughts

• Cashing out thoughts: e.g. By <knowledge>, I mean <justified-true-belief-+>
Intellectualism?

- (1) Do most people think about their representations, experiences, etc?
- (2) Do most people think about cashing out?
Rich Phenomenology?

• Does this require that there be a rich Pitt-style phenomenology for every concept — it’s just that we only sometimes have the full phenomenology?
Descriptivism?

- Will this be a cashing out thought: *By ‘Gödel’ I mean the prover of incompleteness*?
- If yes, won’t this get the content wrong?
- If no, will we need a highly restricted and idealized class of cashing-out thoughts?
Inferentialism?

• Is there an inferentialist version of the view?

• E.g. the content of knowledge is determined by what one is disposed to conceptually infer (justification, belief, etc).

• Just first-order inferences needed, no higher-order representation.