I wanted to thank Durrell Bowman, Steven Horwitz, Ed Macan, Bill Martin, Robert M. Price, Peter Saint-Andre, and Thomas Welsh for their thoughtful responses to my Fall 2002 *Journal of Ayn Rand Studies* essay, “Rand, Rush, and Rock.” In this brief rejoinder, I hope to address some of the issues raised by the respondents.

**Rand: Radical or Reactionary?**

In his reply, Bill Martin (2003) draws a parallel between the Canadian progressive rock band Rush and philosopher Ayn Rand. He argues that Rush and Rand are “secondary” rather than “major” figures in their respective fields. This doesn’t prevent us from appreciating their contributions, however. Though Rand is not “a ‘major figure’ in the philosophical canon,” Martin suggests that she has “made important contributions [that] are worthy of attention” (190). He remarks that the same can be said of Rush—“a very good band” (193) that would have been better served if its chief lyricist, Neil Peart, had sought inspiration from such real-life figures as composer Ludwig van Beethoven and architect Frank Lloyd Wright, rather than the Randian protagonist Howard Roark (201).

But two of our respondents make clear that Rand has been one of many influences from whom Peart has drawn inspiration. As I pointed out in my original essay (Sciabarra 2002b, 180 n. 11), Rush was never strictly Randian in its philosophical orientation. Both Bowman (2003) and Horwitz (2003) observe correctly that Rush’s explicitly “Randian” compositions constitute only a small percentage of its overall catalogue. Peart himself appropriates lessons from the
works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Ernest Hemingway, Carl Jung, John Dos Passos, and many others. Because “the vast majority of Rush’s 135 ‘songs with words’ (1974–2002) have nothing to do with Ayn Rand,” Bowman (2003) believes that critics have blown the connection “disturbingly out of proportion” (153).

Still, Bowman, like Horwitz, admits that Peart’s lyrics are more broadly individualist and libertarian. Horwitz (2003) extends this argument in his provocative and persuasive contention that “Rush’s output from 1975 through 1978 constitutes a legitimate, post-socialist contribution to the progressive rock tradition” (169). Informed by a keen historical sense, Horwitz defends the progressive character of libertarian ideas—which took on a new urgency in the period after 1974, as the works of F. A. Hayek, Robert Nozick, and Rand flourished. For Horwitz, Rush’s lyrics, inspired by this libertarian Zeitgeist, reflect “a less totalizing and more individualistic conception of the good society” (161), keeping “the core values of progressive rock, such as virtuosity, complexity, and utopianism, but chang[ing] the form of the music by moving from the long, overarching song form, to a shorter, more, as it were, ‘decentralized’ approach to getting their musical and lyrical ideas across” (169). This “de-totalizing” of prog rock and its “de-linking” from leftist politics are points echoed by Ed Macan (2003), who challenges the belief that “progressive rock is somehow inextricably linked to left-wing ideology” (173). On this basis, too, Saint-André (2003, 222–23) stresses the contributions of Rand’s “humanistic individualism” to a nascent post-socialist “oppositional culture,” a “truly radical and progressive” movement that is influencing everything from popular literature to political life.

But Martin will have none of this. For Martin, Rand lacks any notion of “individualism that is . . . co-implicated in mutuality and a fabric of basic social obligations” (2003, 191). Her “Robinson Crusoe”-like conception, says Martin, advocated with “missionary zeal,” is a “rather weak” form of atomism, in which fully-grown individuals exist external to any proper notions of “society” or “collectives” or “gender relations, parent-child relations, a certain level of productive technique, class relations and divisions of labor,” and the colonial-imperial domination that marks contemporary “capital-
ism” (192). This acontextual view of individuals is similar to Rand’s own *sui generis* self-conception as a modern goddess of wisdom, who had sprung “fully-formed” as if from the head of Zeus (192–93). Among the “ideologists of capitalism,” Rand sees the architect as the paradigmatic actor in “a relatively benign” market economy, substituting her own peculiar notion of capitalism, the unknown ideal, and its reified conception of private property, for an uglier, known reality (209). Whatever the “existentialist feel” (197) of Rand’s work, Martin indicts her dismissal of rock music and her narrative focus on “white, northern Europeans” (201) as suffering from “overtones of racism and Eurocentrism” (199).

But the textual invisibility of African Americans in Rand’s work, for example, is not proof of racism. Rand (1964, 126) opposed racism as “the lowest, most crudely primitive form of collectivism.” Her critique of racism is an extension of a broader, dialectical approach to social theory. In *Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical*, I reconstruct that critique (see Sciabarra 1995b, 343–48) and give expression to the very proposition that some critics (e.g., Long 2002, 403) resist: That Rand’s investigation of one social problem often led her to the investigation of others precisely because she sought to uncover their systemic basis. Such problems are interconnected preconditions—and effects—of the statist social system she sought to transform. She viewed the mixed economy—“the new fascism” (Rand 1967, 202–20)—as the “political cause of tribalism’s rebirth” (1989, 123), just as she viewed tribalism as the “reciprocally reinforcing cause and result” (1982, 51) of a long history of statist intervention. This system of global interventionism made possible every form of social distortion, from inflation and depression to racism, social fragmentation, imperialism, and war.

Thus, Rand’s approach was not reactionary; it was genuinely radical insofar as it sought to get to the philosophic roots of social problems, while tracing the systemic relationships among them. As Saint-Andre points out, my tri-level model of Rand’s analysis of social relations focuses on the personal (the psycho-epistemological, psychological, and ethical dimensions), the cultural (the linguistic, aesthetic, ideological, and pedagogical dimensions), and the structural
(the political and economic dimensions). Just as relationships of power operate through each of these reciprocally reinforcing levels, so too must any movement toward freedom: “Intellectual freedom cannot exist without political freedom; political freedom cannot exist without economic freedom; a free mind and a free market are corollaries” (Rand 1961, 25). Ultimately, Rand emphasized the essential link between theory and practice; “ideas divorced from consequent action are fraudulent,” says Rand, “action divorced from ideas is suicidal” (51). She would have agreed with Karl Marx’s maxim: “The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it” (Marx [1845] 1967, 402).

Moreover, Rand’s vision for capitalism, “the unknown ideal,” did not rely on an atomistic conception of individuality. While Rand’s fiction was very much in the Russian tradition of Dostoyevsky, who constructed characters as embodiments of ideas, and while many of her ideal characters are presented in ways that might obscure the technology by which one becomes an autonomous individual, the same cannot be said of her mature vision as expressed in the totality of her corpus. As I argue in Russian Radical, Rand was keenly aware of the systemic context within which individuals lived and developed; one of the most insightful aspects of her work is her understanding of how social structures affect the potential for human survival and flourishing. In We the Living (Rand [1936] 1995), for example, we are shown how the “airtight” social conditions of dictatorship destroy any attempt by human beings to live rationally, honestly, or cooperatively. Statism engenders conflict, and destroys the possibility for any genuinely human community, one based on shared common values.

From We the Living to Atlas Shrugged, it took Rand two decades to enunciate fully an enriched conception of the ideal human individual and an enriched conception of the ideal human society that made the individual’s flourishing possible. Martin (1998, xv) argues, in Listening to the Future, that “[g]reat art engages in ‘poiesis,’ the creation of worlds.” Whatever Martin’s evaluation of Rand’s art or her ability “to recognize great art,” surely her projection of ideal men and women living in an ideal society fulfills the poietic function. Rand recognized that ideal individuality could not exist external to ideal social relations.
In this regard, her literary goal has a certain affinity with the counterculture of progressive rock.

**Rand and the Counterculture**

The basis of that affinity lies in their shared anti-authoritarianism. Even as Ed Macan defends the “countercultural” roots of progressive rock, he argues persuasively that its typical left-wing politics “were never monolithic, or without self-contradictory tendencies.” Indeed, the counterculture’s anti-authoritarian elements transcended traditional left-right categorization. Macan notes that “a strain of libertarianism analogous to Rand’s was probably present in incipient form in the hippie movement,” though “it was not fully evident until after the dissolution of the hippie movement around 1970, that is, after progressive rock had already emerged as a full-blown style” (183). It is this same “incipient” libertarian streak that led writer Jeff Riggenbach (1982; 1998) to identify the counterculture as among the “disowned children” of Ayn Rand—disowned by Rand largely because of what she perceived as their nihilism and subjectivism. Of Rand’s renunciation of New Left counterculture, I wrote in *Russian Radical*

Rand criticized the student movement for its acceptance of Hegelian and Marxian theoretical constructs; however, Rand recognized that many students ran to the Marxist camp because it was more intellectual and systematized than its social science counterparts. She claimed that if the students had been offered the *Wall Street Journal* and Southern racism as examples of capitalist politics, they were correct to sense hypocrisy and to move further to the left. But the New Left did not embrace the more reputable Marxist synthesis, which had retained some respect for reason, science, and technology. The New Leftists rejected ideological labels, and proclaimed the supremacy of emotionalism and immediate action. Nourished on a poisonous diet of Kantianism, pragmatism, logical positivism, linguistic analysis, and
existentialism, the New Left mounted an anti-ideological assault on a system that was fundamentally anti-ideological as well. (Sciabarra 1995b, 327–28)

Educated in the halls of Progressive education, the New Leftists thus reflected the bankruptcy of the Establishment they despised; for Rand (1975a, 77), they were “the distilled essence of the Establishment’s culture, . . . the embodiment of its soul, . . . the personified ideal of generations of crypto-Dionysians now leaping into the open.”

Interestingly, however, Riggenbach (1998) argues, like Macan, that the student movement was not monolithically New Leftist. In fact, Riggenbach finds that “the student political activists of the 1960s were never except briefly and incidentally, fighting for the values and ideals of the Left. The problem was, the values and ideals they were fighting for no longer had any generally agreed-upon name of their own at the time” (21–22). For Riggenbach, those ideals were fundamentally libertarian. It is therefore no surprise to discover that Rand herself was “one of the central figures in the youth rebellion of the ’60s” (51).

For example, in the 1978 “Woodstock Censuses” survey of attitudes among people who were students in the 1960s, Rand was ranked number 29 out of 81 individuals named as among those who had most influenced—or who were most admired by—that generation. Among authors, she was tied for sixth place with Germaine Greer, behind Kurt Vonnegut, Kahlil Gibran, Tom Wolfe, Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert Camus (tied for fourth), and Allen Ginsberg (58). Riggenbach concludes that the survey results make “obvious how little influence the leaders of the New Left actually exercised over their supposed followers” (85).

To what was the counterculture responding in Rand’s works? Riggenbach maintains that Rand’s novels, filled with youthful characters, routinely attacked social authority figures and the “drivel” of contemporary education. *Atlas Shrugged*, for example, “contains perhaps the most acid-etched portrait of establishment intellectual-doom ever published in America” (60). Moreover, says Riggenbach, Rand paints a portrait of a corrupting nexus of government, big
business, and a scientific establishment hellbent on “employ[ing] stolen resources in the invention of loathsome weapons of mass destruction” (61)—something against which the counterculture had reacted with great ferocity. And even though Rand had rejected the concept of anarchism in her nonfiction writing, *Atlas* presented an alternative utopia steeped in human creativity and “without government of any kind” (63). The hippie rebels who were casual readers of Rand’s fiction, says Riggenbach, had applied her anti-authoritarianism to the context of their own lives. They presided over a form of *decadence* embodied in the *decay* of authority and the *decay* of the traditional—a decay to which Rand’s works contributed. It is no coincidence that their countercultural “revolution,” which called for individual autonomy and authenticity, was manifested in a style of music that was a “hybrid genre,” an “eclectic” blend of jazz, classical, and folk, transcending the racial divide of black and white (99).

What Riggenbach identifies as musical eclecticism, Macan (2003, 185) views as progressive rock’s dialectical “Hegelian synthesis,” fully “in keeping with its Romantic ethos of transcendence,” and incorporating elements of romanticism, modernism, and individualism. Macan suggests correctly that Rand would have disapproved of all forms of Hegelian synthesis (see, for example, her comments in Rand 1961, 33). But Rand’s rejection of Hegelianism was not a rejection of dialectics. Indeed, Rand’s fundamentally *dialectical* project aims to conquer oppositional dualities by embracing the wider context within which they exist. It is true that, for Rand, contradictions *do not* and *cannot* exist. It is also true that in Rand’s “black-and-white” ethos, there is no room for “the cult of moral grayness” (see Rand 1964, 75–79). Yet, her embrace of noncontradiction did not always translate into an acceptance of the “true” among “two competing premises,” as Macan puts it. Much of her philosophizing takes place through a triadic prism: if tensions and paradoxes exist between two apparently opposite doctrines, Rand would implore us to “check our premises.” Through a dialectical embrace of the full context, Rand was able to locate the common premises uniting any number of “false alternatives,” including rationalism versus empiricism, intrinsicism versus subjectivism, idealism versus materialism. She even called
herself a “Romantic Realist” (Rand 1975b, 167), thereby placing the value-orientation of Romanticism in the service of a this-worldly literary vision. For Rand (1961, 51), the future belongs to the integrated “new intellectuals” who will “break [the] vicious circle” of slave and master, of victim and destroyer, discarding “the soul-body dichotomy” and “its irrational conflicts and contradictions, such as: mind versus heart, thought versus action, reality versus desire, the practical versus the moral.”¹⁶

So much remains unexplored in the affinities between Rand and the counterculture from which progressive rock was born, affinities that challenge the very distinctions between left and right. It is my hope that this forum will have contributed toward the advancement of this long-overdue exploration. That Rush and other progressive bands have embraced a visionary libertarian lyricism gives expression to Rand’s ultimate hope for the unity of those “homeless refugees” of American political culture: the “non-totalitarian liberals” and the “non-traditional conservatives” (Rand 1989, 88). In their shared repudiation of authoritarian social relations, freedom beckons.

Notes

1. With regard to Thomas Welsh’s (2003, 226) speculation about a “complementary connection between Peart and the writings of psychologist Nathaniel Branden, Rand’s associate for nearly two decades,” I can only confirm that Peart subscribed to—and read—Objectivist periodicals, wherein both Rand and Branden were chief contributors. But Durrell Bowman tells me (in a personal correspondence, 27 November 2002) that he does not recall Peart ever mentioning Branden explicitly in any interviews as among his inspirations.

2. Quoting from the Prices’ Mystic Rhythms (Price and Price 1999, 77) in my original essay (Sciabarra 2002b, 166), I listed a composition entitled “Red Alert” as among Rush’s “songs with words,” which were inspired by Rand’s philosophy. Bowman (2003, 157) points out correctly that there is no such song title in the Rush corpus, though that phrase does appear in the lyric of “Distant Early Warning” (Grace under Pressure, 1984).

3. It is difficult to place “libertarianism” on any political spectrum that conceives of nothing outside the liberal “left” and the conservative “right.” Given the problematic contemporary classification of American political ideologies, Robert M. Price (2003) clarifies his use of the “conservative” label to describe aspects of Rush’s politics, for which I had mildly criticized him (in Sciabarra 2002b, 166). I am also thankful for his brief discussions of the relationship between Randian individualism and the “Hero-Myth,” and of Rand’s impact on popular culture, including the world of comics (especially the comics of Steve Ditko, Frank Miller, and Alan Moore). I am working on a forthcoming Journal of Ayn Rand Studies article entitled, “The Illustrated Rand,” which will discuss this popular impact in greater
4. This aspect of Horwitz’s thesis is very attractive to me. His contention echoes my own perspective on the relationship of Rand to dialectical method. As I have argued (Sciabarra 1995; 2002a), Rand kept the core values of dialectical method (in her stress upon context-keeping and perspective), while changing the form of the politics to which it was wedded. In a sense, both Rush and Rand mirror each other’s post-socialist radicalism. I also agree wholeheartedly with Horwitz’s Hayekian point that “utopia” does not have to be “a totalizing concept.” It can be a way of clarifying one’s thinking and critically challenging the status quo (Horwitz 2003, 164). On the relationship between “totalistic” utopian desires and “contextual” epistemic strictures, and the relationship between “utopianism” and “radicalism,” see Sciabarra 1995a, especially chapter 3.


6. I should point out that I, myself, have criticized this notion of Rand as sui generis. Rand, of course, fully acknowledged an intellectual debt to Aristotle (see Rand [1957] 1992, “About the Author,” 1171), and, with heavy qualifications, to Friedrich Nietzsche as well (see Rand [1943] 1993, x). In truth, however, her profound debt to Nietzsche has still not been fully appreciated, despite the revealing posthumous publication of her Journals. See Rand 1997, especially Parts 1 and 2. My own studies provide a much more complex picture of Rand’s early intellectual development in the Nietzschean-influenced cultural milieu of Silver Age Russia (Sciabarra 1995b; 1998, 135–39; 1999). In many ways, I depict her as “standing on the shoulders of giants”—precisely what Martin (2003, 193) believes is lacking in Rand’s self-conception.

7. Rand even repudiated any vestiges of racism that might seep into the very process of concept-formation. She argued, for example, that “[t]he concept ‘man’ can be subdivided according to special characteristics, such as racial (anatomical) descent: ‘Caucasian,’ ‘Negro,’ ‘Mongolian,’ etc.—or national (politicogeographical) origin: ‘American,’ ‘Englishman,’ ‘Frenchman,’ etc.—or professional activity: ‘Engineer,’ ‘Doctor,’ ‘Artist,’ etc. (which involve concepts of consciousness) or even according to such characteristics as the color of hair: ‘Blonde,’ ‘Brunette,’ ‘Redhead.’ In all such cases, the distinguishing characteristic of ‘rational animal’ is retained but narrowed by specified characteristics which represent specified categories of measurements” (Rand [1966–67] 1990, 25–26). Rand rejects definition-by-nonessentials, and impugns the “epistemological principle,” “practical consequences” and “psychological motive” of those “who define man as ‘a Christian (or Jewish or Mohammedan) animal’ or ‘a white-skinned animal’ or ‘an animal of exclusively Aryan descent’ etc. . . .” (49). Thanks to Robert Campbell for pointing to these passages in Rand’s work.

8. For a discussion of Rand’s radical view of U.S. foreign policy as an extension of its neofascist domestic policy, see Sciabarra 2003b.


10. Since I view dialectics as the art of context-keeping, it is an orientation that is used typically for examining and transforming systems. To suppose that any action, institution, process, or element within a system is so thoroughly disconnected from any other action, institution, process, or element is to do violence to our understanding of what a system is. In keeping with Rand’s emphasis on the importance of cognitive purpose to the framing of any investigation, a Randian dialectic-in-action aims to distinguish between those relations that are essential (i.e., “internal”) to a fundamental alteration of the system, and those that are nonessential (i.e., “external”). This does not mean that epistemic context and cognitive purpose
determine the internal or external character of a relation. Rather, our identification of the character of a relation will frequently depend on our shifting levels of generality (as might occur in Rand’s analysis of “the personal,” “the cultural,” and “the structural”) and our shifting vantage points within these levels (e.g., the psychocultural, psychological, ethical, linguistic, ideological, pedagogical, aesthetic, political, economic, and so forth). Such perspectival shifts bring certain kinds of relationships into—or out of—focus.

For one illustration of how relations can be perspective-dependent, see Sciabarra 2000, 220–23, wherein I examine the relationship between the “coercive” and the “voluntary.” Both Murray Rothbard and Ayn Rand suggest that, from one perspective, the coercive is in stark opposition to the voluntary: they are externally related. But, from another perspective, they are internally related, because coercion requires the “voluntary” sanction of the victim. Coercive social relations cannot be what they are in the absence of this “voluntary” sanction. (And there is no contradiction between these observations; the law of noncontradiction tells us that A cannot be both A and not-A at the same time and in the same respect. Clearly, by altering the perspective on a relation, both Rand and Rothbard are changing the respect—the context—of the analysis.) Understanding this internalist dynamic is therefore revolutionary in its implications, since the removal of the victim’s sanction helps to de-legitimize and overturn coercive social relations.

11. It is instructive that Macan (2003) draws parallels between what he calls the bricolage of composer Richard Wagner’s epic music, with its “dramatic panache and profound aesthetic and musical unity,” and progressive rock, which “drew on disparate but complimentary elements of romanticism and modernism to develop a coherent aesthetic stance that emphasizes specific notions of individuality, idealism, authenticity, and art-as-transcendence” (180). Interestingly, in an earlier draft of The Fountainhead, Rand named Wagner as among those “martyrs” who suffered for their creations—a passage she chose to exclude from the final published version. During his climactic trial, Howard Roark mentions “Richard Wagner, [who was] writing musical comedies for a living, [and was] denounced by the musicians of his time, hissed, opposed, pronounced unmusical” (quoted in Milgram 2001, 17). Rand retains one reference to Wagner in the published version of the novel, however. She refers to various cultural debasements of so-called “highbrow” art; the character Gail Wynand, now a broken man, walks “past the door of a saloon,” where a “juke box played Wagner’s ‘Song to the Evening Star,’ adapted, in swing time” (Rand [1943] 1993, 661). Thanks to Robert Campbell for this reference.

In later years, Rand may have changed her view of Wagner’s early trials and significance. She had been asked by Opera News to write an article on the nature of heroism in Wagner’s Ring of the Nibelung cycle, the very work Macan mentions in his reply. Rand told the assistant editor Ethan C. Mordden (in a letter dated 20 June 1974) that “Wagner’s idea of heroism and his image of the hero are not mine. In fact, they are the opposite of mine” (Rand 1995, 664).

12. For Rand’s views on the hippie movement and the counterculture, see Rand 1975a, especially chapters on the student rebellion and the environmentalists.

13. There is a deeper historical dimension to Rand’s characterization of the New Left as “crypto-Dionysian”—given the fact that she was born and raised in Silver Age Russia. As I argue in Russian Radical:

Rand had witnessed the same emotionalist, orgiastic, Dionysian elements in the Russian Symbolist movement of the Silver Age. In their exaltation of the cultic loss of self, the Symbolists had internalized the flagrant mysticism and collectivism of the Russian cultural milieu. Despite a revolutionary aesthetic, the Symbolists reflected their Russian roots. In
Rand’s view, the New Left was no different. It was a pure by-product of its cultural context. (Sciabarra 1995b, 328)

14. On Rand’s dialectical project, and its use of the doctrine of internal relations, I have written much. Since I have not replied formally to Roderick Long’s (2002) rejoinder to Sciabarra 2002a, a few brief remarks are necessary here for the purposes of further clarification. I reject the view that my “attempt to ground an epistemologized conception of internal relations on Ayn Rand’s theory of contextual essence” fails to “fully extricate [the] theory from an internalist metaphysics” (Long 2002, 401), and I still believe that dialectics subsumes both synthetic and analytic aspects. When Long suggests that “it would be pointless to try to understand X in terms of its relation to Y if X were merely externally related to Y, [since] external relations are not necessary for understanding” (403), he misses the point. As I suggest in note 10 above, one of the needs of inquiry is to determine the nature of the relations at hand. Discovering that a specific relation is external in any given context will help us to determine the relative importance of that relation to the wider scheme of our investigation. Dialectics remains ontologically neutral; it assumes the same minimalist metaphysic that Rand herself endorsed: that all the elements of reality are interconnected somehow. One cannot specify the nature of any relation before one has actually performed the investigation. And one must always define the context within which that specification proceeds.

Long appreciates my criticisms of “atomistic compartmentalization,” but he is also wary of “spurious integration; failing to see relevant connections is a common vice,” he says, “but seeing connections that aren’t there is equally common” (410). Yet there is nothing in dialectics that demands spurious integration or spurious abstraction. And if attending to context helps us to determine whether context is even relevant, as Long insists, then dialectics is precisely the “all-encompassing methodology” on a meta level that Long seeks to deny. That doesn’t make the concept vacuous; if anything, it makes a dialectical “moment” essential to any inquiry. I should note that any other disagreements I have with Long—including our different interpretations of Aristotle, Hegel, Marx and Rothbard—are nonessential, i.e., “external,” to our fundamental agreement “that dialectics is an indispensable methodological tool,” even if we remain at odds on the definition of its scope.

15. On the relationship of the law of noncontradiction to perspectival analysis, see note 10.

16. On the Objectivist view of the reason-emotion dichotomy, in particular, much work needs to be done. See, for example, Davis 2002 and Enright 2002. At its best, Rand’s emphasis on rationality does not involve a diminution of the “emotional” or of the “intuitive.” I have long held that those who focus exclusively on Rand’s Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology ([1966–67] 1990) are missing a serious component of her larger philosophy of mind, which includes a recognition of the tacit dimensions of consciousness. In her posthumously published works on fiction-writing (Rand 2000) and nonfiction writing (Rand 2001), and in her writings on aesthetics, one finds remarkable discussions of the “implicit”—ranging from her examination of the habitual methods of awareness that fall under the rubric of “psycho-epistemology” to her explorations of “sense of life” and the various practices entailed in creative production. In addition to my own discussions in Sciabarra 1995b, particularly chapters 7 and 8, see Campbell 2002.

References
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