Mapping ‘Globality’: A Processual Account

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Substance is indeed a kind of illusion, like the relation of the infantile body to its objects: it is both inside and outside, subjective and objective, as in the chance coincidence of a fantasy and the external world. --Levin quoted in Kroker and Kroker, 1987: 115
I would like to thank my sister, Eva, my parents, and my advisor, Christine Harrington, without whose support I could not have accomplished what follows. I would also like to thank Christine Harrington and Jo Dixon for their helpful comments and suggestions on the first draft of this essay. This paper is dedicated to Quinn Gabriel Jackson, born March 2, 2001. May he and all children be healthy (above all else) and experience our exquisite world as a single place during the years to come.
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I. Preface: Beyond the “Inter-” (national, state, disciplinary) and towards the Global?

The proliferation of Constructivist, Transnational Activist, Globalist, Feminist, and other such so-called postmodern accounts in the field of international relations in the Post-Cold War era (1990-present) is sometimes vaguely understood as an injection of “ideas” into the “materialism” that seems to have dominated the study of international relations thus far.¹ Though some scholars explicitly suggest that “ideas” have standing,² what is perhaps most interesting about the way that many academics have approached a re-theorization of international relations is the recurrent focus (during at least-- and especially-- the past decade) on describing the world as a whole. While some scholars have embraced globalization as the ‘opening up’ of representational space,³ others maintain that inter-state or inter-national actions form the basis of global dynamics, and still others contend that globalization is equivalent to global “Westernization” or some form of homogenous and/or domineering “Americanization” of the world either via multinational corporations, the International Monetary Fund and/or the World Bank, or the US.

It is in this permeable 21st century that I—a child of the late 80’s and early 90’s and of immigrant parents— having studied and lived abroad in the Czech Republic during Fall 2000, find myself in a position to contribute to globalization discursively. In particular, I am would like to animate future work on the re-mapping of social relations in

¹ Such assertions presuppose that “ideas” were and could ever be severed from any academic (or human for that matter) endeavor/activity, however “scientific” it might imagine itself to be. It is perhaps not surprising that many accounts that have tried to bring ideas “back” into IR theory do so materialistically/substantialistically and/or instrumentally, if only because they retain the “ideas” v “real” dichotomy. Some theorists have tried to qualify this by asserting that not all “ideas” matter the same way. See Wendt, 139-190.
² See, for example, Ruggie, “What makes the world hang together”?

Central Europe during the post-Cold War. Since I part company with those aforementioned scholars who essentialize “the West” and perhaps even pronounce the inevitability of the globe as lived and perceived today, it is necessary to dispense with any ambiguities regarding the narrative that I sketch during the course of this essay.

As a former orthodox Marxist I know all too well the ills of determinism in social theorizing, and so what follows is not a set of instructions by which the reader should understand the world and all interfaces in between.\(^4\) As a trained political scientist, I am also all too mindful of the problems associated with binary conceptions of phenomena as they apply to theoretical work (ontologies and methodologies), so the basis of this exposition is not “ideas” as opposed to “material” phenomena, nor is it “reality” as opposed to “myths” or “ideology” (I expressly try not take any such dichotomies-- ie East/West, North/South, core/periphery, internal/external, domestic/international etc—for granted). As a self-proclaimed child of the hyper-modernist age I am by no means claiming that my position here is novel or intuitive. I chose to open with the Levin quote (circa 1987) for precisely the fact the theoretical work of suspending substantialism\(^5\) (in mid-air, as it were) upon which the paper builds has been done (long) before.\(^6\)

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\(^3\) I borrow the term ‘representational space’ from Agnew and Corbridge, 7.  
\(^4\) This charge is levied against the underpinnings of Wallersteinian-type world-systems theories, as well as, some other theories for which the current conception of global is inevitable or determined by the spread of capitalism. The difference between my narrative is not that I do not recognize that inequalities have been manifestly globalized (imposed globally) especially in the 20\(^{th}\) Century, but that I do not see this process as an inherent byproduct of the capitalist mode of accumulation (production/consumption). Global capitalism is not the raison d’etre for globalization, although it certainly is part of the current understanding and experience of the world as global.  
\(^5\) The term ‘substantialism’ is a neologism which Nicholas Rescher utilizes in Process Metaphysics, and which refers to the metaphysics of ‘substance philosophy’; a point of view in philosophical discourse that privileges things, entities, events, or in general ‘substances’ over-- and sometimes without even acknowledging-- ‘processes’ (activities, interactions, relations, etc.).  
\(^6\) Rescher notes that processists include Heraclitus, Leibniz, Hegel, C.S. Pierce, William James, Henri Bergson, John Dewey, A.N. Whitehead, and W.H. Sheldon, (Rescher, 7-26). Lumping these thinkers together is by no means to suggest that these process philosophers espouse and practice the same sort of processism. On a discussion of nuances between “causal processism” and “conceptual processism” see Rescher, 29-82.
Having said all this, it is important to note that much of the focus of this essay is on “the West” and how this currently charged notion relates to the deployment and/or practice of the term “globalization”. Albeit American/Euro-centered and centric, this is meant to emphasize the trajectory by which globalization, as we now know it, was made possible.\(^7\) I deliberately introduced globalization via the field of international relations despite the observation that cultural practices and symbols tend to be misappropriated (if at all considered) in this field and in spite of the fact that the definition of globalization that I adopt here was unraveled by Robertson, a sociologist.\(^8\) My reasons for this are that as far as I am concerned globalization as a “discourse” and “lived experience” extends to quite possibly every academic discipline and every aspect of organized life, something that I will argue is especially apparent during the post-Cold War. It is necessary to recognize this if we are to look at (and study) globalization as being constituted by shifting processes, practices, and conceptions rather than considering globalization as having distinct domains or containers (ie, economic, cultural, political, etc).\(^9\)

Der Derian has noted the difficulty associated with philosophical historian Arnold Toynbee’s reference to the emergence of a “postmodern” period in volume nine of Toynbee’s 1954 *Study of History.*\(^10\) Der Derian instead prefers to use the term “late

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\(^7\) The emphasis is therefore *not* those people and/or indigenous identities at whose expense this global project was undertaken, but rather to understand why a set and/or sequence of world-wide developments/projects were chosen over or in addition to other available (possibly extant) arrangements at any particular moment of history.

\(^8\) It is interesting to consider that perhaps because international relations (or international studies) was initially and traditionally the discipline whereby the world as a whole has been studied, the first sociological study of the world as a whole undertaken during the 1960’s was understood as the sociology of international relations. See Nettl and Robertson, 1968.

\(^9\) Of course, this is not to say that different developments (*each* of which was necessary though not sufficient for the current conception of the globe) have always been equally relevant or apparent both in and across particular places and positions during the course of globalization. This is also not to say that we could (at this point) *talk* about “globalization” and its *effects* without deploying such disciplinary terms as “economic”, “political”, and so on.

modernity” rather than “postmodernity” to describe the shifting and emergent social condition within which globalization has sprung. This conceptual marker is both to avoid a sterile historic periodization that separates modernity from late modernity, as well as, to better distinguish a historical social condition (“late modernity”) from a theoretical response (“postmodernism”). What is “late modernity/postmodernity” then? Der Derian writes (pre- or post- maturely?) in 1989:

“Increasingly postmodern world politics is very much in need of poststructural readings. The basis for this claim, and our written response to its implications can be traced to an overdetermined (yet underdocumented) “crisis” of modernity, where foundational unities (the autonomous subject, the sovereign state, grand theory) and synthetic oppositions (subject-object, self-other, inside-outside) are undergoing sustained challenges…With these tectonic shifts, new epistemological fault lines develop: the legitimacy of tradition is undermined, the unifying belief in progress fragments, and conventional wisdom is reduced to one of many competing rituals of power used to shore up a shaky (international) society.”

It is this dialogic blend of “old” and “new” epistemological fault lines—an example of which is the plural-ism (literally) of contemporary debates in Central Europe—that prompts my own reading of the link between post-Cold War politics and the increased deployment of “globalization” in common parlance and as a rhetorical term in politics. In many curious ways, globalization as a discourse parallels Der Derian’s distinction between late modernity and postmodernism, where the discourse of globalization is something of a response to and engagement with the current experience of the world as a whole.

At this juncture it is perhaps useful if not altogether necessary to delineate the structure and further clarify the substance of this paper. In the following section I briefly sketch part of Robertson’s framework for analyzing the process by which we have come to conceive of the world qua global, laying out a typology of ideal types of ‘globality’ and some corresponding empirical examples. Afterwards, I delve into methodological issues more directly, at first with the objective of critiquing “substantialism”, which, in
International Relations as in other fields, corresponds to the traditionally practiced assumption that entities (actors; each with “identities” and “interests”) precede relations (inter-action). In the context of the discourse of globalization this largely translates into the assumption that 1) entities understood in terms of discrete units should be the basis for empirical work (the comparative method of analysis), and the conclusion that 2) states are actually the units of analysis because they are officially and juridically equal.\textsuperscript{12}

Following Jackson and Nexon, I then outline the basic contours of a “relational approach”, which argues that social entities as relatively (and not exclusively) stable substances should be conceived as processes and relations that come together to compose ‘projects’. The argument here is that entities are constructed by way of a process that is best conceptualized by the notion of what Andrew Abbott calls “yoking”, and that yoked ‘substances’ are mapped metageographically to produce projects such as ‘the state’, and ‘the globe’.

I then move away from methodological and/or ontological issues to describe the mapping aspects of the project of the globe from largely the 20\textsuperscript{th} Century up to the present time. I adopt Robertson’s “Minimum Phase Model of Globalization” in order to place this recent history of the globe within a wider context of the history of globalization and its Colonial/Imperial roots, which I date back to roughly the European (Spanish) Conquest of America (Aztecs).

My argument is that the state project, coupled with the project of the Cold War, and in the context of the world wide prospects of nuclear warfare, expanded at the same time

\begin{itemize}
\item My underlying argument is that such closed conceptions of causality have prompted some theorists to confound the “international” with the world wide experience and rhetorical salience/deployment of “globalization” in the late 20\textsuperscript{th} Century, as well as, at the same time, to underestimate the ways in which globalization in its current phase represents a primary shift in the mapping of economic and political processes (the metageographic-- spatially practiced and lived-- assumptions of the world as a whole).
\end{itemize}
that it contained the image of the world as a whole as global. The end of the Cold War thus is significant for the deployment and intersubjective understanding of “globalization” not in Realpolitik terms of whether the Soviet Union poses a “threat” for US “security”, but rather in terms of the structurational uncertainty that is presently associated with world order and without which the current conception of the globe as a single and contested place could hardly be practiced and lived.

The post-Cold War world of “globalization” is thus confronted by not only the displacement of the bipolar identity practices of the US and the SU, but also by the emergence of “Central Europe” both discursively and on the political landscape, not to mention other ‘global’-centered/conscious social movements and projects such as those waged in the name of countries compromised by the (so-called) development projects, to name but one example. I conclude by suggesting that shifting spatially lived and practiced metageographic assumptions about the world as a whole in the context of the practice of world politics are a central feature of globalization which could not have emerged were it not for the end of the Cold War. Although the focus of this paper is not on the appearance of “Central Europe” per say, I offer this as an example of an area in the world within which the outlined metageographic analytics of mapping ‘globality’ are needed and indeed called for.

II. Robertson’s Representation of the World as a Whole

Robertson defines globalization as the process by which we have come to experience the world as a single—albeit contested—place; what he calls the “simultaneous institutionalization of the universalization of the particular and the
particularization of the universal." This focus on the form of world order (unification of the world) is by no means the same thing as arguments suggesting that the world is or is becoming undivided. Accordingly, Robertson concentrates both the discourse and concept of globalization on the unsettled problem of making and patterning the world as a whole—including opposition to globality (what Robertson calls the politics of the global-human condition).\footnote{Robertson, 1992; 100.}

Drawing on (and to a considerable degree following) Robertson, I argue that what Der Derian above considers the “crisis” of modernity is more precisely grasped as a continuation of the world politics of modernity (the problem of the rejoinder to modernity) during the aftermath of the Cold War, which is situated within a relatively deeper, tangled, and much more interconnected world. It is my contention that—and I cannot emphasize this enough-- the Cold War served as a break from and partial freezing of what Roberston calls the world-cultural politics of modernity, perhaps in spite of the fact that, as Parsons has pointed out, both communism and ‘democratic capitalism’ are alternative forms of an admission or affirmation of modernity.\footnote{For example, the “problems” of resistance that tend to be associated with globalization in its current form are actually very much a part of the making of the world as a whole or discreet entity (globe). It is in this way that globalization entails a consciousness or awareness of the rise of images of globalization at the same time that globalization is a diffusion of a particular conception of the globe. See Robertson (1992), 29-30, 104.}

It is important to point out that Robertson’s argument—and mine—by no means suggests that the world as a whole could not have become global in the contemporary sense by way of different trajectories.\footnote{Parsons, T. “Communism and the West: the Sociology of Conflict”, in A. Etzioni and E. Etzioni (eds), \textit{Social Change: Sources, Patterns and Consequences}. New York, Basic Books, 1964.} Some alternative possibilities include the imperial hegemony of a single (or two or more) nation(s), the submission of nationalism to ‘free trade’, the global achievement of communism, the world-wide achievement of a
corporation, the global victory of a particular organized religion, and the attainment of world-federalism among others.\textsuperscript{17}

Still it is noteworthy to underscore that, Robertson-- noting the rise of the great religiocultural traditions during what Karl Jaspers (1953) calls the Axial Age-- explicitly recognizes that the universalism-particularism issue is a basic feature of the idea of humanity. At the very same time, however, Robertson suggests that the two “have become united in terms of the universality of the experience and, increasingly, \textit{the expectation of particularity}, on the one hand, and the experience and, increasingly, \textit{the expectation of universality}, on the other,” (101, 102; emphasis in original).

It is with this in mind that I now turn to a description of Robertson’s typology of ideal type images of the global-human condition (globality). First, however I find it necessary to emphasize the sort of analysis for which ideal-types are constructed. Because an ideal-type is not meant to correspond to and cannot be fully embodied by concrete reality, ideal types are analytical tools that enable one to construct hypotheses and link them with the conditions that brought a phenomenon or event into distinction, or with consequences that follow from a phenomena’s emergence. I understand Robertson’s typology as one in which ideal types under consideration should each be treated as processes to which concrete responses to globalization (themselves processes; or, more precisely, micro-processes) can then be considered in terms of the way that they act out to produce observed outcomes.\textsuperscript{18} In Robertson’s own words, the “primary concern here is simply to map, describe and provide a \textit{rationale} for the very \textit{idea} of analyzing major general responses to globalization,” (Robertson, 1992, 78; emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{17} The assumption outlined here is thus distinguishable from models of path dependence because by understanding history as a series of closed or linearly related events, such theories might suggest that some sort of preordained path exists along which phenomena conform. This obscures the contingency of “events,” as much as it obviates a fluid and textual understanding of history.
**Gemeinschaft 1**  
“Community”= Closed (societal wide)  
Individual Focus  
Cultural Axis

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**Gesellschaft 1**  
“Society”= Open (socio-cultural exchange among societies)  
National Societies Focus  
Civilizational Axis

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**Gemeinschaft 2**  
“Community”= Open (globe wide)  
Human Species Focus  
Cultural Axis

**Gesellschaft 2**  
“Society”= Planned/Organized  
World System Order Focus  
Civilizational Axis

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**Figure 1.**

*An Ideal-type Typology of “Globality” (Roland Robertson, 1992)*

The first of Robertson’s ideal type images is what he calls “Global Gemeinschaft”, an image which basically “insists that the world should and can be ordered only in the form of a series of relatively closed societal communities,” (Robertson, 78). Robertson suggests that there are *symmetrical* and *asymmetrical* versions of this community-culture nexus. For example, ‘global relativism’ falls into the

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18 I will return to this processual treatment, later, when discussing ontological issues.

19 *Gemeinschaft* refers to ‘community’ and *Gesellschaft* refers to ‘society’ in traditional sociology as in Robertson’s typology. According to Robertson, the discourse on modernity in the 1960’s turned on the sociological analysis of the shift from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft* (Robertson, 1992; 11). Also according to Robertson, sociology formed as a response to and thematization of “what has come to be called the problem of modernity on the one hand, and to the mode of operation of the nationally constituted society on the other—with the society-individual problematic being central to both,” Robertson, 109. Thus Robertson’s choice in naming the ideal-types that make up his typology is not desultory. As Robertson suggests, “The Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft theme has been a primary focus for the critique of modernity (most directly in Germany). It is now increasingly interwoven with the discourse of globality in the sense that it has been ‘upgraded’ so as to refer to the general relationship between the particular and the communal, on the one hand, and the universal and the impersonal, on the other,” (Robertson, 1992; 103).
symmetrical category, while claims that a society is ‘the society of destiny’ fall into the asymmetrical category. This conception is particularly concerned with the relationship between the ‘dangers’ of globalization and the ‘homelessness’ of individuals.

Empirical examples during the 20th Century include-- for the symmetrical Gemeinschaft 1-- world wide ethnic revivals, and-- for the asymmetrical Gemeinschaft 1- - the rise of politicoreligious fundamentalist movements (such as the Palestinian fundamentalist group HAMAS), (Robertson, 80,81).

Robertson calls the second ideal type “Global Gemeinschaft 2”, a conception that primarily “maintains that only in terms of a fully globewide community per se can there be global order.” Robertson suggests that the centralized and decentralized forms of this image correspond to the symmetric/asymmetric categories outlined in the Global Gemeinschaft 1 above, and which, taken together, very nearly resemble a ‘global village’. Emphasizing the human species as the starting point of the world as a whole, both centralized and decentralized versions are concerned with ways in which a commitment to the ‘global community’ can overcome the ‘dangers’ of globalization. The former understands ‘global community’ as a ‘conscience collective’ that spans the globe, while the latter is a more diffuse and pluralistic understanding of what constitutes the communal unity of the human species.

Empirical examples of Gemeinschaft 2 during the 20th Century include—for the centralized Gemeinschaft 2— new religious movements (such as that of the Unification Church or some recent East Asian movements), and—for the decentralized Gemeinschaft 2—the environmentalism movement (including ecofeminism) and advocates of romantic Marxism (Williams, 1983).

The third of Robertson’s ideal type images is “Global Gesellschaft 1”, which basically “involves seeing the global circumstance as a series of open societies, with
considerable sociocultural exchange among them.” Here too there are symmetric and asymmetrical versions but these are concerned with what I call a society-civilization nexus. The symmetric form commands a consideration of each society as politically, materially, and culturally consequential, while the asymmetric type emphasizes the necessity of hegemonic societies that are strategically important to the maintenance of world order. Here national societies are considered to be the defining characteristic of modern global order, where globalization is tackled either as a collaborative effort or in terms of hierarchical types of inter-societal relations.

Empirical examples during the 20th Century include—for the symmetric Gesellschaft 1— advocates of global consociationalism (such as recent efforts to adopt the Kyoto Accords across both industrialized and industrializing countries, as well as, those advocates/movements/politicians who wish to undermine the reach of multinational corporations and their ability to sidestep national policies), and—for the asymmetric Gesellschaft 1— politicians/rulers/intellectuals (such as traditional International Relations practitioners of Realism) and or institutions or social movements that advocate a great-power arrangement of the world (such as revived fears on the threat of post-Soviet Russia, for example, or “bipolar” type arguments against the proliferation (or democratization) of nuclear weapons).20

In “Global Gesellschaft 2” Robertson suggests that “this conception of world order claims that it can only be obtained on the basis of formal, planned world organization,” (Robertson, 1992, 79). Taking the world system as the primary focal point of the global-human condition, both centralized and decentralized forms center on

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20 For a brief but interesting discussion on the difference between the Cold War “‘necessity’ for widespread societal self restraint” versus the post- Cold War multiplicity or possibility for this especially with regard to the use of nuclear, as well as, biological and chemical weapons, see Robertson, 1992; 118-121. See also, Stephen Mennell, “The Globalization of Human Society as a Very Long-term Social Process: Elias’s Theory”, Theory, Culture & Society, Vol. 7 (1990), 359-371.
globalization as a phenomena whose dangers can only be dealt with by systematic organization. The centralized version champions a strong supranatural polity, while the decentralized version advocates a global level federation of sorts.

Empirical examples during the 20th Century include—for centralized Gesellschaft 2— liberal (such as Ruggie’s “embedded liberalism”) or alternatively, Marxist or even socialist proposals for strong world governments, and--- for decentralized Gesellschaft 2—world federalists (including Wallersteininan views of the present world system).

Robertson’s aforementioned emphasis on mapping as describing or controlling ‘globality’ in many ways underscores that the four—or, more precisely, if we consider the different forms, eight-- ideal types described above are by no means meant as discrete descriptions of the phenomena of the global-human condition. In other words, at a particular point in time there may be observed phenomena that correspond to several different and seemingly disparate ideal types/shapes of globality. There is a way in which traditional notions of comparative analysis in both international relations and sociology are unable to accommodate such a variegated image of the contemporary global world as a single-contested place. It is to this issue of methodology and mapping via the traditional comparative (and largely international relations) method that I now turn.

III. Methodology, Take One: the Illusive-ness of Substance

In a 1990 article sociologist Albert Bergesen explicitly links the sociologogical (world systems) and the political science (in international relations neo-realist) approaches to what he calls explaining the ‘international’ order. My purpose here is similar to this coupling although I seek to turn what Rescher calls substance ontology more generally-- not merely world systems theory or international relations-- on its respective head (Rescher, 1996). Still, it is instructive to offer Bergesen’s observation
that “Although they are antithetical political positions, there is a common neo-utilitarian basis to the sociologists of the world systems perspective (a Smithian division of labor) and the political scientists of the neo-realist IR perspective (a Hobbesian struggle for power),” (Bergesen 1990; 67).

Considerations resembling Bergesen’s have taken on many hues, and, not surprisingly, distinct names. These include— among others—the general danger in the social sciences of variable selection bias as outlined in Mill’s Method of Difference and Mill’s Method of Agreement (1874), critiques of structurationist reinforcement of the essential separateness of agents and structures (the notion that agents and structures are ‘mutually constituted’) as highlighted by Margaret Archer (1996), constructivist (and other) critiques of the neorealist/ neoliberal institutionalist/ subjectivist assumption of the state as ontologically and conceptually given, and critiques on the treatment of “norms”, “preferences”/“interests”, and/or “identity” as either dependent variables (“endogenous” to a model) or indepent variables (“exogenous” to a model).

Before I lay the basis for my claim that substantialism is ill-suited to illustrate the ways in which globalization is as much a discourse as it is a historic-conditioned experience, it is important to first point out that describing a thing as a ‘bundle’ of processes and relations’ is not to say that it does not manifest substance. Instead this is to suggest that the problems (in language and speech) associated with the reification of entities (as an example, when analytical claims are in danger of becoming ontological ones) and the inability of substantialist ontology to adequately account for a mechanism by which a process of ‘hanging together’ can transform the main attributes of social

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21 I borrow the term ‘bundle’ from Rescher, 53.
22 As Rescher elegantly explains, “Process philosophers do not, indeed, deny the reality of substances but merely reconceptualize them as manifolds of process. They are perfectly prepared to acknowledge substantial things, but see them rather in terms of processual activities and stabilities. They hold that even
actors, make a processual relational account better able to deal with both “endogenous” change, and the production and maintainance of entities, precisely because “exogenous” variables are not requisite, (Jackson and Nexon, 1999).

The most general problem that theorists face when analyzing entities as substances is the implicit assumption that “there is a moment of conception, an instant of origination prior to which the substance never existed and after which the substance as such always exists up to some subsequent time of its expiry,” (Rescher, 66). This in turn allows the supposition that “things remain self identical through time on the basis of their possession of certain essential features or properties that remain changelessly intact across temporal changes.” The problem of substantialism thus recalls Mills warning regarding variable selection where “it is somewhere between difficult and impossible to specify any such change-exempt descriptive properties or nonclassificating features that stably characterize the essence of things,” (Rescher 34, 35).

In order to better illustrate the analytical problems that substantialism poses I will outline a contemporary assessment of globalization, or what Robertson has considered to be “its problematic variant,” ‘internationalization’ (Robertson, 1992; 53) with the objective of teasing out why it is that Robertson considers inter-nationalization to be problematic. In light of recent discussions regarding the effects of ‘internationalization’ on national economies it is interesting to note that he, among others, should find this particular term unconvincing.\footnote{Perhaps this is a loaded remark. The actual words that make up the term—not only is national in there but also the sense of between nations—and the way that it is deployed are both problematic it would seem.}

A synopsis of a volume edited by Keohane and Milner entitled \textit{Internationalization and Domestic Politics} should suffice in order to understand why the above questions are intelligible at this point in time, as well as, to consider the
centrality of such questions to present day conceptions of the globe as a single-contested place.

As Keohane and Milner would have it there are three ways or “pathways” by which ‘internationalization’ can change domestic politics. Internationalization can trigger domestic economic and political crises, create new policy preferences/coalitions, or undermine government control over macro economic policy. Perhaps the most obvious inconsistency is the central presupposition of the volume that domestic politics happen within nations by way of some hierarchical structure where the national mediates between the domestic and the international. ‘Internationalization’ thus exists as an external constraint on national economies, which are in turn affected domestically by these international pressures.

Or so the argument goes. What at once becomes apparent is that the notion of certain boundaries and the linkages among certain “domestic” practices are taken for granted. “Internationalization” is thus understood by Keohane and Milner as the economic arrangements, examples of which include international trade, investment and currency trading, which occur across national boundaries (10). Indeed, this definition of ‘internationalization’ with an emphasis on its effects on nations clearly illustrates a reified demarcation of the national as opposed to the international. This begs the following question: how is it that international capital mobility understood as “external flows” can “reduce the autonomy and efficacy of government’s macroeconomic policy choices” and “generate [domestic] economic crises that [can] erupt into major political reforms,” (Keohane and Milner 257, 248, 246)? External how and for whom?

What might be considered a “contradiction” above emanates from the implicit assumption that the nation-state is territorially bounded. Needless to say, this consideration is important for what is at stake here. Why does this strike us as a
“contradiction” now? Why could such a claim (that national “boundaries” are not only permeable but also somehow being effaced) make or not make sense, say, during the Cold War?

Though significant, I will hold off on such empirically minded questions until I address these explicitly in the latter part of this paper. I would like to point out, however, the significance of this brief sketch, which was meant to illustrate that even when non-rational choice and non-neo-realist approaches (such as Keohane and Milner’s) try to show how international relations somehow undermine or challenge the resilience of national boundaries, this leads to an either/or entity situation whereby (as some have argued) the state is ‘dead’ or, alternatively, that domestic politics always give way to international ‘external’ pressure(s). This has also prompted others to suggest that the state never was real to begin with. What can be considered a ‘lumping together’ of analytical priorities and ontological assumptions is perhaps one of the most alarming features of substantialism at work.

IV. Methodology, Take Two: The Prior-ity of Processes: Boundaries Before Substance?

Because the stability of “actors” is that which warrants explanation, Andrew Abbott points to the priority of boundaries (over entities) and refers to these as “sites of difference”. Such “locations of difference” basically assume that there are differences that emerge from local cultural interaction that can be referred to and identified as different (not necessarily opposed) points in a social space, and which subsequently

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24 I borrow the heading “The Priority of Process” from Rescher, 42.
“emerge” as and are linked up to (or connected / “yoked” into) macro or micro ‘entities’ or ‘units’.

So “sites of difference” or what Abbott calls “proto-boundaries” are not boundaries of anything, but instead appear as locations of difference, which may or may not be stable over time. It is for this reason that Jackson and Nexon emphasize that “sites of difference are the raw material out of which potential boundary lines can be drawn,” (18; emphasis added). It is, of course, important to note that once a proto-entity takes shape within the social space, it must have causal authority and the ability to reproduce itself (ecologically or internally but always by way of rationalizing these proto-connections) in order to persist, and, quite possibly, endure in several different dimensions of difference, (Abbott; 872, 873).

This is not, to say that the persistent entity is in any way optimal, or that there is only one way in which the entity could have emerged given a set of proto-boundaries, (Abbott, 877). In addition, Abbott notes that as a subclass of events, entities are able to do social action (or author social causation) for the very fact that they are sites of causation within an ecologically bound yet potentially reconstructable social order. It is this sort of inside/outside definition of coherence that allows action to be carried in an entity’s name, or, alternatively, to suggest that an entity causes some consequence or another.

How exactly does all of this (literally) play out? According to Abbott when a social space is already filled with entities, yoking can change ordering within and in social space is to “delegitimize old differences or to emphasize new ones”. Alternatively, when social space is “unstructured” or perhaps it is better to say, unarticulated/ not yet
imagined, yoking “means a literal connection of boundaries,” (Abbott, 872). But how are entities *represented* in and as social space? It is to this that I now turn.

**V. Maps and Mapping as Constitutive of Space and Place: the Sovereign State**

Perhaps it would be useful to describe the process whereby the state as a ‘project’ is a set of processes by which an ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ are marked, sustained, and represented. In his seminal work on the sovereign state, Hendrik Spruyt perhaps best illustrates that the linkage between ‘the state’ and the “persons” residing within a particular space, would not be possible without a yoking of authority over people who claim ownership of a particular area of land. In other words, ‘the state’ as a temporally resilient entity could not persist without the notion of territoriality as mutually exclusive domains or spaces, and the associated codified spatial practices of legality within these constructed spaces.

For the modern state the appearance of an ‘exterior’ power (citizens are constrained by the laws of the state; or the idea that laws of the state are sovereign), requires the breaking down of ‘local’ domains and institutions *within* ‘the state’ by way of microphysical methods of power that Foucault calls *disciplines*, which are complementary to and help legitimate ‘external’ orders. To a certain extent disciplines produce, mark, and construct ‘institutions’ and the ‘individuals’ each of which could not cohere to or even resist organization in social space without the other, (Mitchell, 93-96; Foucault, 1977).

So how did ‘states’ come about, then? Although Spruyt has since changed his empirical interests and reliance on a traditional comparative method, it is instructive here to go over his 1994 two-staged model of state-formation. At the first stage, interaction
among “proto-states” during the late Middle Ages produced new types of institutions that subsequently became part of the external environment conceived of as all the possible institutional structures at that given point in time. These external institutional possibilities in turn (at the second stage) required “proto-states” to alter the external environment within which they and others operated such that interactions became structured. It should be apparent here that the internal/external position is problematic for the very fact that the very process that Spruyt describes is one whereby the internal produces the external and vice versa.

Yet taking leave of this discretely internal/external representation of social space requires acknowledging not only that entities are constructed through a rationalized and coherent connection of locations of difference across social space, but also that “Practices of mapping, which deploy spatial notions as part of an effort to make sense of the world, are parts of the project which an entity is,” (Jackson and Nexon, 2001; 18, emphasis in original). The argument here is that states were and continue to be (albeit in a slightly altered, perhaps more self-conscious shape) made into ‘entities’ through a mapping or configuration of social space as both politico-social practices and places, which articulate (literally) the possibility or permissibility of social action.

25 Note that Spruyt does not use the term “proto-state” and that I have here taken the liberty of using “proto-state” instead of “actor(s)” or “political institutions”. “Proto-state” is meant to describe the political institutions and practices that turned into ‘the state’ but also to indicate that there were other potential entities that could have taken shape and legitimacy instead of what we now refer to as ‘the state’. In particular, Spruyt notes that the sovereign territorial state, the city-league, and the city state were among those political institutions that developed as a result of certain realignments in Europe that effectively delegitimized the empire, the feudal lordships, and the theocratic church that had been dominant during the earlier part of the Middle Ages.

26 Also there is the likelihood that one might misunderstand such “internal” practices as opposed to (instead of constituted by) “external” ones.

27 For instance recall how Keohane and Milner take the inside/outside bounds of ‘the state’ for granted in order to show or (re)produce ‘the state’ as constrained by ‘the international/external system’, whose ability to erode the sovereignty of the state too is taken for granted.
Indeed as Jackson and Nexon explain, “A map of ‘geographical space’ is an arrangement of spatial practices which produce and sustain particular forms of social action,” (Jackson and Nexon, 2001). It is my contention here that the experience of the global world as a whole during late modernity and the post-Cold War affords a chance to identify that mapping (in general, as a practice of literally representing ‘things’ or ‘entities’) involves the process of producing and reproducing the social world (ordering it in and through specific practices). That such a spatialized conception of mapping/ maps as being intrinsic to social action/order was not apparent during the Cold War project should not be surprising if only because of the ways in which IR and other disciplinary uses of the comparative method served to sustain the cohesiveness of the state, the Cold War, and the logic of the comparative method itself.28

At the very same time, however, ‘the state’-- or more precisely the US---reproduced itself through the project of the Cold War and the rationalization and global projection of ‘international relations’ as a discipline.29 By acknowledging the constitutive role of mapping in social organization, globalization as a discourse and experience during the post-Cold War thus should strike us as a remapping of social relations in a very fundamental sense.30

In order to literally or historically leap to the construction of ‘entities’ so as to describe the marked difference between the experience and image (project) of globality

28 For a brilliant exposition see Jackson and Nexon, 2001.

30 In fact it is for this reason that I choose to underscore the emergence of globalization and “—ism” debates both in the world (often but not necessarily under the “postmodernism” label) and especially in the not so coincidental emergence of “Central Europe”.

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during early modernity, versus the Cold War, versus during contemporary times, it is first necessary to place my emphasis on globalization in its current form within a historical-temporal path that I borrow from Robertson. By no means is what follows meant as an exhaustive exercise. It is rather a “Minimum Phase Model of Globalization”, (Robertson, 56).

**Germinal**
(1400- 1750)

- humanity and individualism ideas in Europe
- projection of these through Spanish Conquest/Encounter with Aztec “Other”

**Incipient**
(1750- 1870)

- standardization of the citizenry (project of social communities as national)
- nationalism as particular to space

**Take-Off**
(1870-1920)

- problem of Modernity; alternative conceptions of national society
  - First World War
  - Speed and global communications growth; “time-space compression”

**Struggle for Hegemony**
(1920-1960)

- Holocaust
- Conflicting conceptions of Modernity; Cold War early phase (including arms race)
- emergence of “Third World”, Bretton Woods system, Marshall Plan, GATT
- atomic bomb on Nagasaki and Hiroshima

**Uncertainty**
(1960- present)

- Man walking on Moon; funding for NASA activities legitimized
- Rise of development discourse and cultural studies discourse
- stagflation and civil society uprisings during 1960’s in the US
- global awareness of civil rights issues; extension to human, political, economic, social
- rise of ethnic revolutions and nationalisms
- end of Cold War; dissolution of Yugoslavia, the USSR, and Czechoslovakia
Robertson identifies five phases, each of which built on one another to bring the present circumstance of globality. The first he calls “The Germinal Phase”, which lasted in Europe from the early fifteenth until the mid-eighteenth century, and of which ideas of humanity and the concept of the individual were a feature.\footnote{Although Robertson does not explicitly recognize the discovery of and subsequent conquest of the Indians by the Spaniards in what is present day Mexico during this time, I unduly emphasize that, following Tzvetan Todorov, since the year 1492 “the world has shrunk (even if the universe has become infinite),” Todorov 1982; 5). My point here is that the European/Spanish conquest of America/Aztecs—along with the corresponding ideas of and historical context of the Enlightenment—was fundamental to the way in which geopolitics was henceforth done, (Todorov, 1982).}

Phase two is termed an “incipient phase” which lasted (again according to Robertson) mainly in Europe from the mid-eighteenth century until the 1870’s, and within which the nationalism-internationalism issue, as well as, the standardization and administration of the citizenry was thematized.

Phase three Robertson calls the take off phase, which lasted from the 1870’s to the 1920’s, and which included 1) the early thematization of and responses to ‘the problem of modernity’, as well as, 2) the first World War, or more generally the first global conceptions concerning the legitimacy of alternative conceptions of national society, and 3) a sharp number and increasing speed of global communications.

The fourth phase in Robertson’s framework lasted from the mid-1920’s until the late 1960’s, and is called the “struggle for hegemony” phase. This included conflicting
conceptions of modernity, the Holocaust, the first use of the atom bomb, and the crystallization of the “third world”.  

Phase five, or what is referred to as the uncertainty phase, began in the late 1960’s and displayed crisis tendencies in the early 1990’s, according to Robertson. It is this phase within which I contend that we (the global virtual ‘we’) find ourselves, and within which the end of the Cold War, the proliferation of nuclear weapons around the world, the heightening of global consciousness (especially considering images of man walking in space and the corresponding images of ‘outer space’), the globalized awareness of civil rights and the extension of this to political, social, economic, or human rights, and the rise of ethnic revolutions and/or nationalisms are included.

VI. Mapping Imperialism and the Cold War: Beyond Great Power Politics?

Ruggie has recognized that what he calls the “terrain of unbundled territoriality” is “the place wherein a rearticulation of international political space would be occurring today,” (Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond” 171). There is a way in which Robertson’s aforementioned invalidating reaction to the term “internationalization” as a substitute for “globalization” mirrors Ruggie’s emphasis on the “negation of the exclusive territorial form,” albeit in a slightly different manner. Yet, why is the “recent” increase in capital and trade during the past three or four decades now linked to this image of ‘unbundled territoriality’?

I argue that this has much to do with the Cold War practices of producing an image of the world as a global whole. That the current increase in “international” interdependence been understood by many in contemporary global terms, is nevertheless

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32 I would argue that also included here are the beginnings of the development projects and discourses, as well as, the notion of bilateral aid such as the Marshall Plan. For more on the emergence of development as
curious considering that trade and finance market activity, as well as, technological change at the turn of the 20th Century are often considered as consequential if not more so than that which we are experiencing today. It is thus necessary to distinguish the contemporary experience of the world as a single-contested place from early 20th Century experiences of what David Harvey has called “time-space compression,” (Harvey, 1989).

Accordingly, I attempt here to describe how the Cold War became linked with the circumstance of the nation-state as a sovereign territorial entity, such that globalization for many at this point in time would be impossible were it not a seemingly national/international, and local/global phenomenon.

For someone unfamiliar with what Kern calls the “culture of time and space” it might be surprising to discover that at roughly the turn of the 20th Century “the whole idea of movement, of speed, was in the air.” (Kern 117). During what was the age of the telegraph, railroad, and telephone, a sense of compressed space and time, similar in thrust to many global themes experienced today, permeated social life so much so that both time and space came to be conceived of as empty, homogenous, and, perhaps most importantly, measurable. Time and space seemed compressed because novel modes of transportation afforded the ability to traverse space in shorter intervals of time, while new means of communication, specifically telecommunication, were introduced so that events across space could be experienced and conceived of as simultaneous (Kern 68, 177). The experience of time was thus considered in terms of distance (intervals/units of “space”), while the experience of space was understood in terms of (intervals/units of) “time.” The relationship between time and space was therefore mutually reinforcing since the

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experience of one of these as empty, homogenous, and determinable implicated the other as the same.

It might be said, then, that the relationship between space and time was and is rather self evident if not compelling. Nevertheless, such a conclusion would take the conceptual particularity of this interdependence for granted, just as much as it would conceal the role that nation-states played in its institutionalization and universal practice. Benedict Anderson has suggested that capitalism, and in particular print-capitalism, along with the experience of homogeneous, empty time allowed for the production of images of the nation as a contemporaneous community through the dissemination of newspapers, novels, and in general through the invention of print—languages, that served to fashion a sense of historical fatality and allow for the experience of simultaneity at the very same time (Anderson, 39, 80, 134, 146).

Yet the act of conceptualizing simultaneity in bounded yet open terms, what Agnew and Corbridge call the idea of a ‘closed world’, further crystallized with several control/conditioning projects, which served to alter conceptions of space, time, and their relationship (62). Such projects include the establishment of World Standard Time in 1890, Turner’s realization and the census declaration of the closing of the American frontier that same year, the founding of an International Committee for the Map of the World in 1904, and the closing of the world’s frontier with Robert Peary’s and Roald Amundsen’s charting of the North and South Poles in 1909 and 1911 respectively (Kern, 164, 166, 231, 213.)

The establishment of time as universal, public, and unchanging might seem inevitable or understandable in retrospect if only because the social coordinating and integrating function of timing devices is almost always “forgotten” in industrialized nation-states, (Elias 139). Still, the essentialness or solely physical existence of time
becomes less and less plausible once we begin to consider how we can conceive of the unconditional appearance (and measurability) of something that is not directly accessible to sense perception (Elias 102). Upon reflection it slowly becomes apparent that the objectification of time as a thing in and for itself cannot be separated from a consciousness of time, in so far as our contemporary experience of time is a means of orientation that shapes our conception/consciousness of time as reified (Elias 38).

Timing in general is a particular way of connecting events so as to resolve or address social problems (Elias 96, 103). Yet why is it that this sociocentric aspect of timing becomes less (if at all) transparent in societies where the links of interdependence are complex, (Elias 144)? Why is it that “Time as socially standardized relational sequences appears independent of specific sequences of events and timing instruments,” (Elias 104)? In attempting to grasp such a question one would have to consider 1) changes in the structure of human societies such as the processes of industrialization/urbanization, 2) the way in which human beings have historically understood nature (the subject of study of present day so called hard core sciences), and 3) the development of certain assumptions in European philosophy (especially as embodied by Enlightenment thought) regarding the appropriation of knowledge, (Elias 106, 123, 145). I will very briefly sketch the first of these here since the latter two are to some degree taken for granted in the former.

The basic gist of the link between the structure of societies, or more precisely, the civilizing process, and the experience of time has to do with what Elias calls the self regulation of people (societal and individual). It is because the “capacity for self-restraint remains inert unless it is activated and developed by learning” that self regulation in terms of time is an aspect of the social habitus (social personality structure) in “modern” or “industrialized” societies (Elias 151). Perhaps more importantly, though, this changing
directional pattern of self regulation (attention to “time”) is related to the process of increased internal pacification that is associated with the development of the territorial nation-state, (Elias 154).

And so the standardization of world time and the division of the world produced spatially precise and temporally ordered time zones. In 1914 world standard time was used by a German General by the name of Moltke in order to mandate that wrist watches become standard military equipment so that all men would be in the correct position at the same time (Kern 288). It is no accident that Kern calls the First World War “The simultaneous drama of the age of simultaneity,” (Kern 295; emphasis in original). Indeed, it is worth quoting Kern at length. “The sense of simultaneity experienced by diplomats during the July Crisis was magnified a thousand times during the war, as millions of soldiers were united by a chain of command, electronic communication, and synchronized watches and united in spirit by the commonality of events. And their struggle was in turn witnessed by the millions at home, who learned about these multifarious events almost the same time as they were happening, read about them in newspapers, viewed them in movie houses, and discussed them incessantly,” (295).

So it was that the mobilization and coordination of mass armies during the First World War was made possible via the temporal schematization and internal (military and social) discipline that standardized time provided and that the First World War in fact required. Still the experience of time as reified, moving, and ubiquitous was but one aspect of the way that the world was experienced at the turn of the 20th Century. Indeed the closing of the American and world frontiers (along with the very notion of a frontier) were very much a part of the notion of “empty” spaces, distance, and the “land grab” of the major imperialist powers, (Kern 166). It was during this time, part of what Agnew and Corbridge call the Second Geopolitical Order (1875-1945), that (the study and
practice of) geopolitics was understood within an evolutionary biological or otherwise "rational" framework, where the importance of both territorial control/boundaries and state size alike were fused with the then prevalent image of the state as an organism (23). Scholars like Friedrich Ratzel applied a somewhat disfigured picture of Darwinian natural selection to the seemingly natural and necessary geopolitical development (read: imperialist expansion) of a nation (Kern 224). The basic thrust of such arguments were to equate space with bounded territory and state size with national political strength and economic prosperity, (Kern 226). Indeed the image of the state as national (sovereign and territorially bounded) was exalted as “Internationalism and imperialism coiled around the staff of the new technology and around one another like the snakes of a caduceus,” (Kern 232).

Perhaps considering the colonial (specifically Creole) beginnings of the image of the nation-state it should not surprise us to find that nationalism fueled the ‘new imperialism’ of the late 19th and early 20th Centuries. As Agnew and Corbridge explain, “Whole regions inside and outside of Europe became specialized in the production of specific manufactured goods, raw materials, and food products. The new spatial division of labour saw regional industrial specialization within the national economies of Europe and the United States paralleled by regional specialization in raw materials production elsewhere,” (Agnew and Corbridge, 33; my emphasis). The circle of internationalized trade and finance was such that Britain invested and imported from industrializing countries like the U.S. and Germany, these industrializing countries imported raw materials and food from so called underdeveloped regions, and Britain exported manufactured goods to these regions (Latin America and China especially) so as to finance its deficits, (Agnew and Corbridge 34). Equally significant is that under the gold standard high finance was dependent on nation-states not the other way around, (Agnew
and Corbridge 60). The world economy may have been global in reach but its hue was distinctly national-imperialistic.

Of course, this is not to say that this global imperial image came unchallenged, nor to suggest that its national roots were somehow flimsy or unfaithful to its projection. Despite the initial challenges that came from socialist movements, which called for political and economic rights for workers and women, criticisms of such imperialistic visions were couched in nationalistic parlance, (Agnew and Corbridge 33). Classes “thus became increasingly rooted in the purely domestic sphere and its colonial extension. They confronted each other as nation-state against nation-state, empire against empire, alliance against alliance,” (Stephanson 72). Yet what was absent was not only a “‘global’ vision” (in terms of the world as a single-contested place) but in particular the notions that 1) the state is not necessarily national or sovereign, 2) the nation is not necessarily territorial and perhaps most importantly, 3) the world economy need not be understood by way of a centripetal national frame (Agnew and Corbridge 33).

Much like with the standardization of time, attempts to define a ‘national purpose’ during the pre-war period betrayed certain civilizing affinities. In America, whether understood as providential, historical, ‘rational’, or scientific, territorial/bounded expansion was inextricably linked to the fate of America as a nation.33 The closing of the frontier in America and in the world thus met with a curious apprehension of space. In spite of apparent disagreement, many opponents of expansion in America feared that the essential nature and particularity (read: superiority be it cultural, racial, civilizational, or whatever) of the nation would be marred, thus placing the choice of whether to expand

33 The distinction between ‘Civilizational’ and ‘Naturalized’ geopolitical orders identified by Agnew and Corbridge is not so clear at least as far as American destinarian thought is concerned, (52-65). See, Stephanson 95.
well within the framework of destinarian thinking that was pervasive at the time, (Stephanson 102).

This notion that America was a nation destined for greatness was not incompatible with the idea of the nation as an organic entity. Destinarian thought was not unique to America and it worked well with the distinctly international and quite often “openly” racist geopolitical discourse of the time. In so far as a destinarian outlook presupposed a particular conception of time it also embraced a spatial or, more precisely, geographical imagining. Although European destinarian thought might be considered more rational (in the sense that destiny was managed) compared to the more or less sacred prophetic sense of destiny that pervaded the American conception at the time, at the very bottom both notions projected a picture of the future that was marked by certain ways of thinking about and describing the world, (Stephanson 110).

At first civilizing and later “rational,” this picture of what the world looked like surfaced in the guise of world maps and in the study of geopolitics more generally-- both of which served to shape the way that individuals and societies alike encountered and experienced the world in terms of its supposedly manifest spatial order. Maps like Mackinder’s ‘heartland model’ (1904) organized the world in terms of ‘natural resources’, which were thought to determine the industrial prospects and subsequent Great Power potential of nations. (Agnew and Corbridge 64). Perhaps it was no accident, then, that the making of the first world map was an international scheme.

The national-imperial nexus that reinforced this destinarian imaging is perhaps most apparent when one considers that the “‘Scramble for [the then stateless] Africa’…produced lines on a map which had little relation to underlying cultural or economic patterns,” (Agnew and Corbridge 61). It is not surprising then that much of the academic geography at the time in nations like Germany and in much of the English
speaking world invented systems of accounting and classifying nations and regions in terms of racial, resource, economic, and political categories, (Agnew and Corbridge 64). As Kern explains, Mackinder’s vision of the globe expressed that “for the first time the world could, and indeed must be considered as a whole in which important national developments had worldwide ramifications,” (258). Mackinder’s widespread theme of empire driven economic nationalism- imperialism ultimately recognized no difference between spatial expansion and commercial economic “development.” Russia’s spatial bigness was thus not only locatable in Mackinder’s “Eurasian heartland” but was also understood as an unfettered temporal drive toward the future.

In short, the pre war period standardization of “time” in terms of the world as a whole was paralleled and bolstered by a similar map of “space” such that the global world was largely understood to be cut up into empty regions of potential imperialistic-national economic interest and nation-states with natural yet (somehow) swelling boundaries (a.k.a., the “civilized”/”modern” and “uncivilized”/”backward” “worlds”). Taken together each design reinforced the other.

Distance was equated with travelling time (much like “development” was equated with or measured by “overcoming” distance or “speed”), national territory/bounded was imagined within and around certain time zones, national bigness was equated with “the future” or at least with expected (national) economic greatness, and regulation according to reified time positioned and coordinated individuals “inside” the nation (civilized) and even on the battlefield. An increased “consciousness” of both space and time thus suggested a particular experience of the world in its entirety that suggests Robertson’s asymmetrical Gemeinschaft 2 ideal type. I now turn to how the Cold War helped to produce contemporary understandings of the world as a single-contested place.
After the First World War the nation-state emerged as the legitimate international norm. Anderson confesses that “even the surviving imperial powers came dressed in national costume rather than imperial uniform,” (113). Nationalism allowed for the repression of domestic dissent in America during the First and Second World Wars for the sake of “the national interest,” much the same way that Keynes’ formula for government management of “the national economy” in the arrangement of a national (macro) economic policy and the Brettan Woods system would take root in Britain and the United States during the 1930’s and 1940’s, (Stephanson 119), (Agnew and Corbridge 63).

Despite that the Second World War was part of what Agnew and Corbridge identify as “the geopolitical order of interimperial rivalry,” the aftermath of the war proclaimed an end to (civilizational) imperialism and saw the decolonialization of the Great Power colonial empires, (64). This provided the setting for the making of a unique post-war geopolitical discourse within which “the Cold War” was conceived. In what follows I will argue that the experience of the Cold War (at least in the United States) involved a distinct projection of the world as global. Relying heavily on Agnew and Corbridge, I will argue that the Cold War project for the United States engaged two seemingly dissimilar parts, which, taken together, have shaped the practice of globalization in its current form. First, the making of an ‘ideological’ framework within which ‘security’ and the practice of foreign policy were conceived of as national, and without which the globe as a whole (albeit a divided whole) could not have been imagined and/or produced in the manner that it was. Included here are the prospects of nuclear warfare and the diffusion of NASA images of the globe suspended in ‘outer space’. Second, the process of making a world economy into a global economy in terms of both the diffusion of the particular and territorially conceived (read: ‘national’)}
economic assets of states and the creation of non-national economic spaces for social action.

The Cold War can be seen as a period of time within which the reciprocal discursive realms of identity and security in the United States realized and sought to discipline the (internal/external) cultural threat of ‘communism’ that during the post-WWII era was (re)present(ed) in/as the body of the Soviet Union. The practice of U.S. foreign policy during this time manifested itself as distinctly national, non-territorial/bounded, and civilizing despite or perhaps in contradistinction to its global reach, (Campbell 132, 153). One might liken this to a desire for global ideological dominion but this is perhaps too simple a rendering if only because focusing on a desired state or goal might obscure the ways in which “ideology” is performed, (Agnew and Corbridge 66).

In any case, the U.S. emerged from WWII an economic, military, and political hegemon and despite the fact that the U.S. and the S.U. were allies during the war, mutual animosity emerged alongside the question of how to organize Western Europe politically and economically during what was then the immediate post-war period, (Agnew and Corbridge, 65). Yet, the Cold War project of (re)making the world was neither solely ‘cultural’ nor ‘economic’, it was both. The link between the cultural and economic practices of the United States during the Cold War is the projection of these in the world as global (implying a distinct way of thinking about the world as a whole).\textsuperscript{34}

The cultural dynamics of the Cold War lie within the boundary making “Self” v. “Other” identification practices that with the help of language and the art of objectification and externalization allowed for the ‘communist’ v. ‘capitalist’ bipolar

\textsuperscript{34} I will address each here separately but will return to the relationship between the two in my conclusion.
“divide” itself to arise. During the course of the Cold War the U.S. became equated with ‘capitalism’, just as the S.U. came to represent ‘communism’, such that each ‘side’ was defined as an inverse representation of the other. So it was that if the Soviet Union was “good”, the necessary conclusion was that the United States was “bad” and vice versa depending of course on which ‘side’ one was on. And, suffice to say, one had to take a side. The stock of such dichotomic terms is abounding: “West”/”East”, “civilized”/”barbaric”, “free (or democratic)”/ “authoritarian”, “safe”/ “threat”, “moral (or pure)”/ “immoral (or base)”, “domestic”/“foreign”, and so on.

The account is familiar and perhaps for some even mundane yet this should not obscure the way in which this distinctively bipolar discourse framed the geopolitical practices and spatial-temporal conceptions of the time. Perhaps I should also mention that the particularity of the Cold War is not so much the self/other dynamic, but rather the distinct ways in which this practice of state “identity” (re)production manifested itself in terms of both the choice of representations and their global (or, more generally, spatial) scope. Indeed, this bipolar imagining was realized in the spatial (dis)location of regions of the world and in the world qua global itself. Europe was thus halved into its Western and Eastern parts, and the globe was divided into three separate “Worlds.” Agnew and Corbridge explain the ‘logic’ or perhaps (dare I say?) heritage of this threefold partition well: “At a first cut, the modern ‘developed’ world is distinguished from the traditional ‘underdeveloped’ world (the Third World). At a second cut, the modern world is divided into two parts: a non-ideological (capitalist) or natural (free) First World and an ideological (socialist) Second World,” (71). Not surprisingly, the Cold War was ‘hottest’ in the (non-‘modern’) Third World. (Agnew and Corbridge, 70).

Perhaps the most elusive aspect of the way in which the bipolar (“self”/ “other”) discourse shaped spatial conceptions and geopolitical practices concerns its global
expression. In particular, despite both the manifestly national and distinct boundary drawing (“inside”/”outside”) and the perpetuation of the Cold War geopolitical order, the Cold War was less about territory per se than it was about situating a locale on the global (yet divided) map. During the Cold War the picture of this two-fold global frame of reference served not only as a means of defining geographical identities, but more importantly (for my purposes) realized an interdependence between the local and the global such that “conflicts with apparent local roots were thus read as local manifestations of the superordinate global one,” (Agnew and Corbridge, 72, 76). Needless to say, this local-global nexus was further reinforced with the widespread prospects of a nuclear war,\(^{35}\) and the production of ‘global’ images that portrayed the earth as a whole that was distinct from ‘outer space’.

It is in this way that the Cold War practice of geopolitics can be said to have turned the interstate focus away from local or national territoriality and towards global counterpoise. This, of course, was possible if only because national territoriality/boundaries was taken for granted. In addition, it should be noted that the nuclear pressures of this ‘bipolar’ frame allowed for a spatial-temporal stasis, such that political boundaries across the world as a whole remained frozen as they appeared in 1945. (Agnew and Corbridge, 73). This is not to say that there was no motion in the world as a whole during the Cold War, but rather that political movement was restricted for the very fact that international activity remained within this ‘bipolar’ geopolitical arrangement.

While territoriality (conceived of in terms of boundaries of nations) may have provided the background for the abstract cultural projection of the world in its entirety,

\(^{35}\) It is interesting to consider that it was in 1993 that a Global Missile defense program was first proposed, and that the Bush junior administration has begun to revive the project.
the same might be said about the economic practice of making the world global, albeit in a slightly modified, perhaps even perverse sense. As Agnew and Corbridge suggest, “the presumption that spaces are autonomous has enabled the power of topography to successfully conceal the topography of power” such that the imagined spatial exclusivity (national boundaries and complementary disciplines) of ‘the state’ is taken for granted, (87). What is perhaps most frustrating in the field of IPE is the corresponding claim that equates not only political but also economic sovereignty with this presumed (national) spatial exclusivity/territory.

Notwithstanding, while acknowledging that “capitalist relations have never been readily contained,” it would be an oversight to presume that during the time in which the welfare state emerged, the territorial state was a “container of society” somehow because “capital was relatively immobile beyond state boundaries,” (Agnew and Corbridge, 94). It is thus important to take into account not only changes in technology that are said to have made capital more mobile, but also to acknowledge the role that states (in particular the U.S. and Britain) have played in this regard. Indeed, the Bretton Woods Agreement that was fashioned by industrialized states not only tolerated but encouraged government adoption of capital controls, (Helleiner 25). Although the U.S. chose not to use capital controls during the 1940’s and 1950’s, within the context of the Cold War, the U.S. assumed the position of an obliging hegemon by allowing for and actively supporting the use of capital controls in Western European countries and Japan, (Helleiner 6).

Considering the charge that emphasizing the decision of whether or not to employ capital controls exaggerates the capacity of states to control such flows, it is important to mention the perhaps less obvious ways in which states have played a decisive part in the

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36 On information technology and the nature (fetish) of money: “Money..refuses all but the simplest of national identities,” and technological developments in telecommunications since the 1970’s have
deterritorialization and denationalization of economic activity. Briefly these include British (by allowing market location in London) and U.S. support (by allowing American banks and corporations to enter) of the Euromarket in London, and the prevention of major international crises (market failures) such as the international banking crisis of 1974, the international debt crisis of 1982, and the stock market crash of 1987, (Helleiner 11). Indeed, it was the development of the Euromarkets during the 1950’s and 1960’s, which undermined the principle of national monetary sovereignty that hitherto had been embodied in the Bretton Woods (“embedded liberal”) financial order, (Agnew and Corbridge 173).  

With regard to what I consider the changing image of the sovereign territorial nation-state, then, while readily agreeing that “the fusion of the territorial state with society…is not…an intellectual illusion,” it is important not to fall subject to the characterization of territoriality as *actual*, because this is to take the inside/outside process by which entities are yoked and mapped for granted, (Agnew and Corbridge 94). The question of whether or not states *actually* have ever been territorial or national or even sovereign, in the sense of there *actually* being unified, homogenous, and exclusive spaces, is thus not as fruitful as far as I am concerned, when compared to, say, questions concerning why (now) and how the representation of the state as national (territorial, homogeneous, and sovereign) is changing.  

“radically changed the nature of global production and locational possibilities,” (Agnew and Corbridge 177, 178).  

37 This of course is among several actions taken by the U.S. that eroded the Bretton Woods system. See Agnew and Corbridge, 171-173.  

38 The discussion above is by no means meant to camouflage the intellectual division of labor in the social sciences that has reinforced what Agnew and Corbridge correctly call the ‘territorial trap’, (93). Still, in as much as the theoretical discursive realm cannot be separated from social practice, theorists who apparently fall prey to the presumption of spatially exclusive territoriality are as much a part of the making of the globe as a single-contested place as those—like myself-- who are more obviously engaged in global imaging. One of the central “problems” of the global project as it is talked about today thus concerns questions regarding the ‘deterritorialization’ and ‘denationalization’ of, as well as, the production of the ‘the world economy’ more generally.
VII. Mapping “Central Europe”: the Globe as a Single-Contested Place

My argument regarding the post-Cold War practices and mappings of the globe seeks to emphasize the importance of the end of the Cold War, not in bipolar, state-centric, or national/international terms, but rather through the production of social spaces as responses to “late modernity”. Such projects include the emergence of “Central Europe” and “-isms” discourses both in and as an aspect of globality as currently produced. In what follows I sketch the contours of the emergence of “Central Europe” as a place of transition, and describe some ways by which such changes have been produced, discursively, and politically, taking primarily, the Czech Republic, as an example.39 My purpose here is merely to prompt further research regarding the emergence of “Central Europe” as an effective political entity on the global world political scene.

In the introduction of a piece entitled Central Europe in Transition, Jiri Priban and James Young describe how since 1989, the discourses of the rule of law, constitutionalism, pluralism, and civil society have emerged during “the period of transition [and] following the dramatic collapse of communism,” (Priban and Young, ). They begin by adopting the term and generating the concept of ‘Central Europe’, “rather than Eastern Europe” in order to link the shared political and cultural histories of Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia, which “both distinguishes them from the countries of Eastern Europe and unites them,” (Priban and Young, 1). They then go on to describe how “in spite of some shared history and common features, the concept of Central Europe does not have a single political and constitutional significance,” (Priban and Young, 3).

39 This is not an arbitrary choice, but rather a personal one since, as mentioned in the beginning of this paper, I studied in Prague for four months this past year.
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to illustrate the particular debates that are mapped out by the contributing authors to this volume, it is significant that these and other scholars deploy the terms “transition” and “Central Europe” to discursively represent the proliferation of “-isms” in the context of the politics of this emergent “Central Europe.” This assumed project of transition (from and towards what?) and presumed entity-ness of ‘Central Europe’ is thus taken for granted and inscribed in discursive exercises such as the one above. What is at stake here is not that the term ‘Central Europe’ beckons images of “romantic nostalgia for a non-existent ideal past” but rather that the boundaries of this Central Europe are linked with and practiced through the project of ‘transition’ which could not be produced or articulable without the end of the Cold War, and which effectively produces a past to which ‘Central Europe’ must strive to link itself.

This constitutive remapping (literally) is linked to globality not only because of the Cold War, but also because of the political rhetorical mobilization of “globalization”, that in some parts of “Central Europe” might recall the centralized version of Gemeinschaft 2 ‘globality’ projected via the civilizational terms of ‘the West’, or ‘Western Culture’. This is aspect of ‘transition’ is thus strikingly similar to post-WWII “reconstruction” efforts in Germany, where an appeal to what Jackson calls the rhetorical commonplace of ‘occidentalism’ allowed for the discursive formations that constituted (and made possible) the various policies of German reconstruction, (Jackson 2001).

In order to quickly point to what strikes me as an example of the political/rhetoric practice and construction of ‘transition’, I refer to a speech by Vaclav Havel, currently the President of the Czech Republic. The speech was delivered in an annual conference
entitled “Forum 2000” which I had the good fortune to attend, and whose general theme for the past four years has been that of globalization. Havel suggests that “Prague is a city which is, in a way, very suitable for these kinds of meetings. Actually, it is predestined for these kinds of meetings because, in the past or be it the very distant past, Prague was the true crossroads—which means a place of meetings—of diverse cultures, ethnic groups, traditions, civilizational streams, spiritual streams, social movements, and this multi-cultural and multi-polar tradition is the point from where Prague should continue.”

In many ways, ‘Central Europe’ is strikingly reproduced as and in whose name social action literally takes place. I have described two ways, one discursive, the other political/rhetoric, whereby this is done in the Czech Republic, in order to illustrate how the discursive practices of the post-Cold War are as yet constiuive of the social spaces that they (re)produce.

VIII. Concluding (Re)marks

I have attempted here to delineate the ways in which the contemporary framework within which globalization is practiced is shaped by and redefined by particular maps of the world as an ordered whole.

I have contended here that the contemporary experience of space as globality was similar to yet apparently different from that practiced during the turn of the 20th century--phase three of Robertson’s historic-temporal exposition. Although the ‘shrinking of the world’ was then, as it is now, experienced, the national-imperial geopolitical and geographical twist to the experience of the world as a whole is not, (perhaps if only

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40 I have attached an annotated bibliography that includes some of the “rights” debates in post Cold War Central Europe as an appendix for scholars who wish to take up the particular devices that facilitate the appearance of “Central Europe”, and the project of ’transition’ during the post Cold War.
because of the different images projected in such destinarian themes), (Stephanson, 81, 129).

I have also tried to depict the ways in which the Cold War geopolitical “inside”/“outside” practice and mapping of “ideology” served almost to freeze-frame the political and geopolitical discourses, such that territoriality was taken for granted, while the global ‘bipolar’ image was championed so much so that it obscured the particularity of local spaces and perhaps even (might we say?) glocal practices.

I began and concluded this essay with the claim that the apparent growth of “-isms” discourses and the emergence of ‘Central Europe’ cannot be understood without considering the delegitimacy of the Cold War project. I admit that though a primitive sketch, such metageographies of the post-Cold War prove instructive, especially in the context of a poignant sense of globality and “globalization” with which we (the virtual global ‘we’) are presently confronted. I hope that other scholars will follow suit and propose further ‘inter-disciplinary’ maps of the constitutive shifts that produce the world as a single-contested place.

References


Appendix: Some Contemporary “Rights” Issues In Post- Cold War Central Europe

“Promoting the Rule of Law Around the World” Trial; Washington; November 2000; J. Brady Anderson

Anderson describes the efforts of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) to help developing and transition countries establish the rule of law by providing programs designed to reform legal frameworks, strengthen the institutions and processes of the legal system, increase access to justice, and build constituencies for reform of the legal system. Examples of 1) structural reform (legislation oriented), 2) institutional strengthening (the processes and procedures of the judiciary, public defense, prosecutors, police, and legal educations institutions), and 3) constituency-building (cultivated within and outside the formal institutions of justice; the media, civil society, and the private sector) initiatives are offered in the international context of current or past USAID activities.


Aoki explores how the Internet’s notion of space as overlapping is currently transforming liberal assumptions about the Internet under the “Rule of Law” by changing traditional notions of sovereignty. Aoki argues that the Internet is a sign of not the death of the territorial sovereign nation-state, but of its transformation, the consequences of which are both distributive and political. To this end Aoki explores how both the legal sovereignty of US intellectual property owners and attempts at universalizing intellectual property protection make less and less sense as the discourse of globalization resonates with the discourse of difference in the context of what he calls the multiplication of space and the loss of place. Aoki further illustrates that efforts to establish ostensibly “neutral” converging standards of intellectual property protections via the “ideology of harmonization” have the effect of favoring the interests of the developed world. The recognition of industry-specific considerations and constraints with regard to different levels of intellectual property protection is thus compromised, according to Aoki, such that “the politics of global change in specific places” is marginalized and/or not dealt with. Aoki calls for an acknowledgement of the fact that the discourse of difference intersects with the discourse of globalization, and a corollary appreciation of the interactions between the local and the global.

“Reparations: Attention Must Be Paid” Baro

Baro argues for full public disclosure of past harms as a means of formally recognizing past injustices and calls for providing material reparations where possible.

“The Guarentee of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms” Sergio Bartole

Bartole outlines the trends apparent in many of the new constitutions in Central and Eastern European countries regarding citizenship eligibility criteria, and underscores the differences between these new constitutions and those that explicitly choose between civic and naturalistic approaches-- the written constitutions that are historically based on the principle of national sovereignty, that is. Bartole traces the interconnected histories of the idea of the nation and of the establishment of human rights and fundamental freedoms in order to illustrate that because of the fact that most of these new states do not have
specific rules regarding citizenship eligibility, there is a potential for the limitation of human rights and fundamental freedoms in these states. According to Bartole this can be prevented if these constitutions refer to general international rules and international agreements. It is in this way that Bartole points to the way that international legal instruments allow for the guarantee of constitutional rights that are historically based on the principle of national sovereignty.

“New Rights and old Rights, New Symbols and Old Meanings” Alexander Blankenagel

Blankenagel argues that constitutions are significant indicators of a society’s normative agenda, and attempts a comparison between the post-Soviet constitutions and constitutions of Western countries. Blankenagel observes that post-Socialist constitutions are generally marked by an ambiguity with the future that lends itself to the codification of positions that are controversial in the West in order to create a morally superior brand of capitalism. At the very same time, these constitutions exhibit an ambivalence towards the communist past, as illustrated by the inclusion of positive rights. Blankenagel suggests that despite the fact that a great constitution also requires its administration by social actors, constitutional forms are undoubtedly important in former socialist societies, especially since constitutions were hardly taken seriously under the communist era.

“The Concept of Group Rights in the Field of Protection of Minorities” Georg Brunner

Brunner traces the development of the concept of group rights in national and international contexts in terms of the legal notions of self-determination and the protection of minorities, both of which are contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Brunner argues against the introduction of the concept of group rights into international law, and instead argues for the current situation where individual rights in international law coexist with group (minority) laws on the national level. Brunner offers legal objections against the concept of group rights, namely that of the problems associated with determining the class of potential claimants as members of protected groups (or, more generally, the problems associated with defining the minority group as a legal entity). The election of trustees of community rights, the territorial autonomy of a minority group, and the establishment of minority self-governing communities are all explored but qualified by Brunner as possible solutions to the problem of substantiating legal rights for minority groups.

“On Doing What One Can: An Argument Against Post-Communist Restitution and Retribution” Jon Elster

Elster points to interconnected practical and ethical considerations in his argument against restitution and retribution. Elster’s argument rests on the assumption that retribution would be individual based and not position based. The problem of who to punish and how to assess responsibility in retribution is paralleled by a similar concern with restitution and the problem of assessing damage and victimization in a society where what is now considered criminal behavior was, at the time in question, the legally sanctioned norm. Elster is vehemently opposed to partial compensation especially when such proposals regard compensation of property. Confronted with what he likens to a sea of confusion, Elster argues for inaction.

“Germany (after Nazism)”
The various authors write about Allied power brief initial program to denazify, demilitarize, decentralize, decartelize, and democratize, the political, social, military, and
economic spheres in Western Germany after World War II, as well as, the subsequent efforts taken on by Germans themselves in the prosecution of Nazi criminals and in the denazification of positions of power. The problems associated with prosecuting Nazis include evidentiary issues (missing documentation and/or witnesses), time issues in terms of the duration of the judicial process, and leniency with sentencing. In terms of lustration laws, several authors indicate that not only was this (Liberation) law practically terminated in 1948 as international focus moved away from denazification and towards the Cold War, but perhaps more importantly, the 131 law of 1951, allowed for most Nazi officials to be reemployed in the civil service. Jurists were left mostly untouched by denazification, even during the Nuremberg trials. The viability of wholesale denazification in the judiciary is considered unrealistic by several of these authors. Compensation and restitution laws and administration, although largely considered successful, are also critiqued by several authors here.

“Lustration and Decommunization” Mark Gillis

Gillis examines the motivations for adopting lustration laws in general, and considers Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic in particular. Gillis identifies what he calls the transformation paradox whereby the state must institute changes but the people that constitute the state apparatus are either unwilling or unable to institute these changes. Gillis supports position-oriented lustration as a necessary means of facilitating the transformation process. Gillis calls for an examination the success of lustration in Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic in terms of the degree to which unreliable persons were in fact excluded from important positions, such that reform measures are implemented without political obstruction. Gillis argues against characterizations of lustration as being totalitarian in scope, calling instead for the contextualization of lustration in the history of the past and in light of the state abuses under communism. Gillis offers the Czech Republic as an example of a society where lustration was publically accepted, not considered undemocratic, and actually regarded as an appropriate means of transitioning to a democratic society.

“Can Weak-State Liberalism Survive?” Stephen Holmes

Holmes focuses on the Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia and underscores the fact that liberalism is not about state weakness but rather depends on the fortitude and authority of, and confidence in the state, for both the market system (protection of private property and contracts) and for the protection of human rights. In the context of a larger commentary about the dangers of a weak (albeit liberal) state, Holmes discusses the difficulties associated with the legitimation of property, the fact of corruption, and the need to protect minorities in post-Soviet countries.

“Globalization, Law, and the Transformation of Sovereignty” Kanishka Jayasuriya; Global Legal Studies Journal; (http://www.law.indiana.edu/glsj/vol6)

Jayasuriya illustrates how new emerging forms of global governance transform the traditional territorially circumscribed legal conception of the state as sovereign upon which globalization ultimately depends. Using a structuralist framework, Jayasuriya shows how domestic/state regulatory agents-- which are not constituted by formal treaties and yet are legally independent of the state-- undermine the traditional notions of international law that link sovereignty and legal jurisdiction to territory. Jayasuriya considers State sovereignty as enabling the formation of international economic activity and as conditioning the subsequent development of a global economy, as well as, of civil
society. It is in this way that for Jayasuriya state sovereignty is changing in response to what she calls “the changing social forms of capital”. Yet for Jayasuriya by no means does this imply that the process of globalization weakens the sovereignty of the state. Instead Jayasuriya points to the emergence of flexible notions of jurisdiction based on “effects rather than place of conduct”. Indeed, the development of transgovernmental networks of regulatory agents indicates that in the context of the global economy state sovereignty exists as fragmented, or in other words the globalization of economic relations creates “islands of sovereignty” within the state. Jayasuriya uses the EU as an example of the emergence of a polycentric legal order, as opposed to a monistic one, that exists as a function of the “operation of networks of public and private actors located at different levels of government”. Thus, for Jayasuriya, it is because the globalization of economic relations has necessitated the nationalization of international law that the role of the state as regulator and structure of government as regulatory governance/cooperation both emerge.

“Rights, Civil Society, and Post-Communist Society” **Krygier and Czarnota**

Krygier focuses on the meaning of rights and civil society in post-communist Poland and attempts to show that what he calls “political liberalism” in Poland developed and became manifest in counter-discourses articulating dissatisfaction with the communist status quo. This political liberalism contained local understandings of rights and of civil society that did not necessarily implicate the social arrangements and relationships considered to be “liberal” by the West. Krygier shows that in Poland, where the Solidarity (dissident) movement was marked by the significance of horizontal relationships among citizens, civil society intended to circumvent (not support) the state (as is purportedly the case in the West). Thus the communist civil society was largely illegal and underground. Furthermore, the lacking experience in and support of institutionalized laws and a legal system, widespread in Poland as in other communist countries, did not allow for the kind of social and impersonal trust to develop vis-a-vis civil society, the state, and individuals. Thus, despite the post-1989 diverging positions of its membership, the identity of the Solidarity movement was predicated on unity and on rhetorical demoralization of the “Other”. Nevertheless, Krygier argues that the inevitable cultural chaos of the transformation period necessitated the fragmentation of the communist civil society that was the Solidarity movement. Krygier suggests that the beginnings of legalism and the lack of rhetoric in Polish society signal the development of a different form of civil society that is predicated on social and institutional/procedural trust.

“The Rule of Law in Poland” **Jacek Kurczewski**

Kurczewski attempts to assess the progress of Poland in its attempt to establish what he considers to be the universal ideal of the Rule of Law during the period of transformation and as expressed by the reform of the Constitution that took place from 1989 to 1997. Kurczewski maintains that although successful economic reconstruction conditions both the viability of the Rule of Law and of democracy, in Poland the Ombudsperson is also a central mechanism by which the Rule of Law is maintained. Also important for realizing the ideal of the Rule of Law according to Kurczewski, however, is the degree to which citizen participation is facilitated by the constitution (for example, the provision allowing the citizenry to enjoy limited universal access to constitutional judicial review), as well as, the approach taken in reference to social, economic, and cultural rights in the constitution. Kurczewski argues that the realization of the Rule of
Law and the success of the democratic project depends on social and political deference and respect for the autonomy of law, the adequacy of the legal institutional infrastructure, and an understanding of rights as individual.

“Global Migration and European Integration” **Guy de Lusignan**; *Global Legal Studies Journal*;(http://www.law.indiana.edu/glsj/vol2/delusign.html)

Lusignan highlights the issue of global migration and its implications in the context of the EU integration project. Lusignan cites four trends--EU population decline in the context of global population growth, increasing unemployment within the EU, the instability of transition economies, and the growth of global income disparity--as reasons for the attention on and concern with immigration policies within the EU. Lusignan illustrates how, in the case of African immigrants to France, migration has emerged as a crises as a result of flows of illegal immigrants and of refugees who request political asylum but who are in fact “illegal economic workers”. Lusignan goes on to suggest that migration is a politically charged issue in the EU because western democracies are facing a dual crisis of confidence that concerns both democratic institutions and the constitution of the citizenry. By emphasizing the apparent inconsistency between calls for both a “European Consciousness” and the preservation of member State privileges, Lusignan seeks to underscore his contention that Europe will not only be economically different but also socially and economically changed in the twenty-first century. Lusignan calls for decentralized participatory democracy within the EU and comprehensive multilateral and bilateral aid as two parallel policies by which the EU can address the issue of worldwide economic and social disparities.

“National and International Copyright Liability for Electronic System Operators” **Charles J. Meyer**; *Global Legal Studies Journal*; (http://www.law.indiana.edu/glsj/vol2/no2/meyer.html)

Meyer explores the implications of the increasing copyright infringement that comes as a result of the unparalleled global access to information in the form of electronic media. Meyer describes the problems that systems operators face in their attempts to create access to information, while at the same time provide for copyright protection. Meyer traces the history of US and International copyright law and points to the need to balance the interest of fair compensation for authors and fair price for users, until the time at which low-cost global access and global copyright protections are both available.

“The Burdens of the Past” **Jiri Musil**

Musil argues that liberalism is far from dead but rather that the social, political, and economic legacy of communism presents challenges for the establishment of liberalism in Central Eastern Europe. Musil compares Eastern agrarian and Western industrialized societies and concludes that in the East the separation of church and state did not exist, the middle class was weak, opportunities in the state were more limited, a Protestant source of individualism was lacking, and geographic mobility was more limited. All these factors allowed for the creation of a large peasant mass dependant on the aristocracy. The differences among the countries of Central Eastern Europe are considered in terms of the emergence of a modern middle class and capitalist structures, but the general trend observed by Musil is that the national movements in the Hapsburg, Russian, and Ottoman
empires were largely anti-liberal and anti-capitalist. During the interwar period mistrust in liberal democracy was further deepened. Still, according to Musil, East Central European nations should utilize the collective memory regarding the ills of the communist period and use this to work towards the strengthening of liberalism.

“Social and Economic Rights in a New Constitution for Poland” Wiktor Osiatynski

Osiatynski proposes not only that constitutionalized social and economic rights are difficult to enforce, but also that constitutionalization of such rights does not necessitate their protection, much like the fact that not constitutionalizing socio-economic rights does not necessarily imply their abridgement. Osiatynski argues that social and economic rights be afforded different protections than civil liberties and political rights, such that the former are ultimately determined by the legislature, while civil liberties and political rights are in fact enforceable in constitutional courts. Although social and economic rights involve a government facilitated transfer of goods/services, this does not make them any less human rights. Osiatynski, however, argues that social policies should not be part of constitutions. Osiatynski reviews the constitutional approaches to social and economic rights in some Western countries, and then considers the specific needs of post-Soviet societies during market and democratic transition. Osiatynski presents arguments in favor of and against constitutionalizing social and economic rights, and considers the communist constitution in Poland as an example of constitutionalized socio-economic rights. In light of the public support accorded to social and economic rights in Poland Osiatynski recommends that few social and economic rights be included, that these are not deemed enforceable in the courts, and that such rights be separated from civil liberties.

“(Re)Building the Rule of Law in Hungary: Jewish and Gypsy Perspectives” Istvan Pogany

Pogany compares and contrasts the group experiences of Jews on the one hand and Gypsies on the other in relation to the rebuilding of the rule of law in Hungary during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Pogany describes how despite the culture of legalism that existed in Hungary during the latter half of the nineteenth century and the former half of the twentieth century, anti-semitic and racist legislation was nevertheless enacted during this time. Pogany offers similarities (both groups lack common European ancestry, both suffer racial stereotypes, both were targeted and eliminated by the Nazis, both are perceived as widely unassimilable) and differences (in Hungary Roma live in suburbs, while Jews inhabit urban areas), and also describes the different experiences of these groups prior to and during Nazi occupation (persecution of Jews was severe, while that of Gypsies was not as pronounced; both in terms of legislation passed and the attitude of the clergy before Nazi Occupation, as well as, in terms of the deportation practices of the Nazi’s). According to Pogany, although the rule of law exists in the constitutions of post-Soviet bloc countries, anti-Semitic and anti-Gypsy sentiment is on the rise in Hungary and other such states. The article lacks this or any other cohesive argument, yet as far as I am concerned it seems that what is at issue here is defining the rule of law and the different ways of going about this. Pogany also takes the meaning of “constitutionalizing” the rule of law for granted.

“Liberalism, Nationalism, and Identity” Ross Poole
Poole attempts to link liberalism to nationalism by positing that the personal identity realized by liberalism presupposes a context within which individuals are recognized as citizens of a nation state. Poole argues that this context is both historically and theoretically defined by way of the development of the modern nation state, as well as, by what Poole argues to be the current decline in the power of the nation state. By connecting personal identity, citizenship, and national identity Poole hopes to illustrate that nationalism the way that he conceives of it is not antithetical to liberalism but rather very much a part of it. His claim is that as the nation state declines in its significance (in terms of identity) so too will liberalism, although from this particular piece the implications of this purported breakdown are not clear.


Preuβ considers welfare rights in the context of a capitalist welfare state so as to determine the legal form of what he considers to be conceptually difficult welfare rights. Preuβ traces the historical development of rights as necessarily connected to the capitalist market, as rooted in the individual, and as non-reciprocal. Welfare rights, or distributive rights, on the other hand according to Preuβ, allow the government to intervene to change the benefit structure/conditions of the capitalist economy. This process of equalizing individual life situations, according to Preuβ, can be based either on mutuality and connection or abstraction and isolation, but redistributive rights have historically, systemically, and invariably formed non-reciprocal and socially atomizing mechanisms. Preuβ suggests that de-nationalizing welfare rights might be a potential social solidarity enhancer.

“Cultural Protection: A Matter of Union Citizenship or Human Rights?” Malcom Ross

Ross argues that although institutional and individual frameworks for the protection of cultural rights exists both in the EC Treaty and as a product of precedents established by the EU Court of Justice, a better way to represent culture in the legal arrangement would be to relate human rights principles with citizenship duties in an effort to maintain cultural diversity. For Ross local protection and individual enforcement of human rights is that which allows for the development of citizenship duties and the fostering of identity vis-a-vis the EU.

“The Effect of Ethno-Nationalism on Citizens’ Rights in the Former Communist Countries” Stephen J. Ross

Ross distinguishes between what he likens to be the Western (territorial) and Eastern (ethnic/religious) definitions of the nation and focuses on citizens rights (the legal especially political limits customarily imposed on aliens by the state) in order to determine the legal implications of different ethno-nationalisms in post-Soviet countries. Ross, while distinguishing Eastern from Western conceptions of nationalism, also differentiates among different forms of nationalism within Eastern countries based on the degree to which such states historically were independent from the Soviet Union. The result is a typology of sorts with categories (“old States”, “restored States”, and “new States”) that are qualified by the particular histories of each country prior to uniting with and after separating from the Soviet bloc. (Czechoslovakia, for example falls under the category of an “old State” while the Czech Republic falls under a “new State”). According to Ross “old States” lack institutionalized ethno-nationalism, “restored States” show the most legally sanctioned ethnic discrimination, and “new States” seek
legitimization by defining themselves legally in terms of ethnic groups vis-a-vis the entire population. Ross then explores ethno-nationalism in terms of the legal provisions for ethnic populations living outside the borders of the nation state, where ethnic over territorial boundaries usually define the legal status of the nation state. Ross is wary of ethno-nationalism understood as ethnic exclusion for both aliens and minority groups, and offers mechanisms to counteract the legal effects of ethno-nationalism, namely: laws to protect minorities, anti-hate/violence (national, ethnic, racial, or religious) laws, and the ratification of international human rights documents.

“Socialist Welfare Schemes and Constitutional Adjudication in Hungary” **Andras Sajo**

Sajo describes how in Hungary the rule of law, understood as the decisions of the constitutional court (in particular the 1995 social welfare rulings), hamper change and transformation in a political system with poorly designed separation of powers. Sajo refers to the Western debate concerning the affordability, enforceability, and efficiency of constitutionalizing social rights, citing both the pros and cons of such constitutional promises and/or entitlements in the post-Soviet countries of Eastern Europe. While recognizing that state welfare is a major way of compensating for lived injustices, Sajo concedes that constitutional courts are not intended to legislate towards and endorse particular socio-economic rights/policies. Sajo goes on to describe the situation in Hungary where the welfare system inherited from communist times was sustained; largely as a result of Catholicism and national solidarity, and despite the increasing costs of that system. State welfare spending practices continued until Hungary became bankrupt in 1995. An austerity package which included reduced welfare spending was passed and shortly afterwards the constitutional court decided to review the law in response to the overwhelming public disapproval. Sajo describes how by striking down the law, the members of the constitutional court legally sanctioned a material connection between the state and social rights, whereby the courts inevitably would control legislation. Sajo argues that such judicial activism is potential destabilizing for transition countries.

“From Rights to Myths” **Grazyna Skapska**

Skapska discusses the sociological effects of transformation on both a micro and macro (individual and environment change, respectively) level in an attempt to underscore the significance of rights as both legitimating transformation and enabling the resulting systemic and personal changes. Skapska suggests that the transformation process itself is shaped by the contradictions between universal versus group notions of rights on the one hand, and between classical liberal (individual) and republican (collective) notions of rights on the other. Skapska indicates that given the communist past, group notions of rights are potentially anti-transformational, as in Poland where privatization was nicknamed “nomenklatura” privatization. Still, to be efficient the privatization process requires privileged rights. Skapska further notes the incompatibility of liberal and libertarian traditions with local traditions and experiences by comparing the Polish and the American rights documents, and by noting that the development of collective rights in Poland serves to muddle transformation.

“Liberalism in Central Europe after 1989” **Zdenek Suda**

Suda presents the triumph of liberalism in post-Soviet world order and locates the major prolongation of this process in nationalism, which he feels is both a historical rival
of liberalism, as well as, that which contributed to the failure of both fascism and communism as a modern way of ordering society. Suda urges that liberalism’s connection to the social contract should not be discarded by the contemporary focus on individual autonomy over the preservation of equal opportunity in society.

“Neo-Liberalism, Post-Communist Transformation, and Civil Society” Ilja Srubar

Srubar develops the notion that the projects of liberalism and Marxism both reduce the functioning of civil society to economics, the difference between the two being the belief about the ability to plan or analyze this process. Srubar notes that the paradoxical challenge for post-Soviet transition countries is to plan for a spontaneous market coordination of social processes. Citing Durkheim, Parsons, Habermas, Hayek and Weber, Srubar describes that while historically the market functioned by way of assuming material and social inequality, the legitimization of this situation was facilitated by liberalism itself which provided for the framework within which the legal equality of contractual subjects could be recognized. This is what Srubar refers to as the normative contradiction of liberal concepts. Srubar argues that the welfare state developed as a result of the autonomy of the market (supported by the liberal legal order), and that one must take this legitimizing and protecting role of the welfare state into consideration in any attempt to evaluate the efficiency of the welfare state in modern times.

“Against Positive Rights” Cass R. Sunstein

Sunstein argues that the constitutionalization of social and economic (what he calls positive) rights in Eastern Europe thwarts the establishment of both a market economy and liberal rights. Sunstein suggests that because constitutions serve as precommitment strategies, transition countries should especially avoid constitutionalizing the welfare state if the post-Soviet constitutions are to be taken seriously. Sunstein supports his thesis by indicating that post-Soviet governments should not interfere with free markets, constitutions should support the creation of a civil society, positive rights are often unenforceable in courts, and positive rights may work against larger efforts to encourage individual initiative. Sunstein recommends minimal constitutional provisions protecting positive rights, placing positive and negative rights in separate sections, developing the notion that rights calling for government interference in the free market are not enforceable in court, and the granting of extensive contractual liberty and property rights by constitutional courts in Eastern Europe.

“The Discourse of Liberalism in Post-Socialist Europe” Lubica Ucnik

Ucnik attempts to reframe the discourse of liberalism in post-Soviet Europe and the question of whether liberal democracy is possible in countries such as Slovenia by critiquing what she considers to be Zizek’s and Salecl’s respectively inadequate portrayals of nationalism as something which serves to relegate some Other (usually a minority group) to scapegoat status. Ucnik, while rejecting what she considers to be these authors limited conception of both nationalism and power, proposes a discursive understanding of liberalism and nationalism such that nationalism (and its relation to liberalism) is considered in terms of what she calls the extension of individualism, and Plamenatz’s ‘[largely European] modern vocabulary of freedom’. Thus, according to Ucnik, not only is it that liberal societies depend on their (allegedly illiberal) nationalist ‘Other’ for the realization of the identity of each society/category, but also that the terms of the (theoretical and policy) debates surrounding both liberalism and nationalism are themselves very much a part of the modern European discourse of individualism and its
focus on negative freedom. For Ucnik, then, an understanding of nationalism in post-
Soviet Europe necessitates a deconstruction of the liberal framework of negative
freedom, and an exploration of other conceptions/forms of freedom.

“Efforts Toward ‘An Ever Closer’ European Union Confront Immigration Barriers”
Giovanna I. Wolf; Global Legal Studies Journal;
(http://www.law.indiana.edu/glsj/vol4/no1/tr1pgp.html)

Wolf explores the rights of non-EU nationals in the context of the debate
concerning the EU Treaty’s guarantee of the free movement of “persons”, specifically
with respect to how member States can legitimately/legally regulate flows of non-EU
nationals. Wolf describes how, despite the intergovernmental Schengen agreement to
harmonize immigration, visa, and asylum policies by enforcing external borders and
abolishing internal ones, member States like France and Britain have resisted
Community-level arrangements that would diminish state autonomy in immigration and
asylum policy. While noting that the EU Dublin arrangement prohibiting “asylum
shopping” may violate the human rights guarentees of the Geneva Convention, 1Wolf
suggests the trend exhibited by EU member States toward restricting immigration and
asylum policy/laws may indicate States fear of losing the ability to control economic and
social affairs.