The effect of leadership change on military disputes

Military disputes have always brought painful consequences including tangible and intangible losses. Two world wars remind us of the horrific penalties that war imposes on mankind. Knowing these negative repercussions, why do nations fight wars? James D. Fearon argues that there always exist ex ante bargaining (negotiation) opportunities. However, nations gamble in war, according to Fearon’s rational explanation for war, due to incomplete information—disagreement about relative power, miscalculation of an opponent’s willingness to fight—and commitment problem. Fearon’s rationalist explanation of war can also be interpreted by taking the role of national leaders into account as they have direct roles in making strategic calculations and commitment before, during and after a war.

If national leaders have a noticeable impact especially in formulating war policies, then we can expect variations in policies from one leader to another. One way to observe this variation is through national leadership change during a dispute. In democracies, leadership change is frequent through elections. In non-democracies, leaders tend to have long tenure but leadership change (through coups or other means) is not uncommon. Does regime type explain the policies adopted by new leaders? According to the theoretical approach I am taking in this paper, the answer is yes and I will discuss this later in detail. The question that I intend to
explore here is **how leadership change affects military conflicts.** I think this is an important question for an understanding of the extent to which leaders are able to exert influence in policy decisions in the context of military dispute. There is a common perception that leadership change often brings new policies, new goals for the nation. In November 2003, following mass demonstrations over ballot rigging in parliamentary elections, the Georgian government had to step down and a new democratic leader came into power. How much change can a new leader bring in Georgia’s rebel province Abkhazia and how will the new leader deal with the Russian government, which supports rebels’ aspirations of secession from Georgia.

Other questions related to leadership change are: can institutional differences between democracies and non-democracies explain leaders’ policy preferences? Do new leaders follow their predecessor’s policies or make new policies according to their personal or party beliefs and ideologies in dealing with an ongoing conflict? If leaders make new policies and strategies to execute such policies, how much do they consider the opinion of domestic constituencies, their political survival and the resolution of the conflict? These are intriguing questions.

I will layout the theoretical foundation for my hypotheses and other literatures related to my question in detail in the next section. The literature review section will also clarify some of the arguments that are crucial for the proposed hypotheses. In the subsequent sections I will present hypotheses, data, research design, regression results, and interpretation. In the last section I will conclude by a brief evaluation and implications for future research.

**I. Literature Review & Building blocks of the Theory**

**Leaders’ Survival: a Selctorate Theory explanation**
Bueno de Mesquita et al (2003) (hereafter BdM2S2) classify domestic political institutions according to the number of people whose support a leader needs in order to stay in power—the winning coalition (W)—and the number of people from whom this winning coalition is drawn—the selectorate (S). Modern liberal democracies typically have large selectorate (usually all adult citizens) and the winning coalition is also large, sometimes as much as about half of the selectorate. Large coalition regimes are referred, in loose terms, to democracies. The ratio of selectorate and winning coalition vary in non-democracies. Monarchies and military juntas are regimes that have both small winning coalition and small selectorate. In autocracies, winning coalitions are small though they have large selectorates. Small coalition systems are used to mean, in loose terms, non-democratic regimes. According to BdM2S2, “the types of policies and survival of leaders are influenced by these institutional variables.”

Domestic political institutions shape the incentives and therefore the policy choices of political leaders. Why do leaders choose particular policies? BdM2S2 assume that leaders, regardless of institutional differences, want to pick policies that help them survive in office. Leaders typically produce two types of goods from available resources: Public goods (such as education, health care, national security, etc.) that benefit all members of society and private goods (e.g. providing business contracts, especial financial and other benefits to cronies) that benefit only those in the incumbent’s winning coalition.

BdM2S2 claim that “the size of the winning coalition determines the type of policies leaders produce and type of goods leaders allocate in order to stay in office.” The large a leader’s winning coalition, the greater his focus on public rather than private goods. Leaders in small coalition systems are able to stay in office longer than their counterpart in large coalition regimes. In small coalition systems (autocracies) leaders emphasize private goods in order to
keep the members of their winning coalition loyal. As long as an autocratic leader keeps his key supporters happy with private goods, his political career is safe. In contrast, leaders in democracies have to maintain a large winning coalition and they rely heavily on public goods because providing private goods to a large W will be very costly. Thus, providing good public policies is important for democratic leaders’ survival. However, for non-democratic leaders this is not the case.

Political selection institutions, as argued by BdM2S2, determine which outcomes permit a leader to keep his job and which do not. The authors maintain that these institutional differences profoundly influence a leader’s choices during his country’s involvement in international conflicts. According to the Selectorate model, large winning coalition leaders make a larger effort to succeed in disputes than small coalition leaders in order to reduce the risk of policy failure and subsequent deposition from office. In contrast, small coalition leaders provide substantial private goods to their supporters and reduce the risk of deposition regardless of foreign policy outcomes. However, small coalition leaders tend to try hard and put great effort to win if they face a threat of deposition by external opponents after defeat. In other words, “small coalition leaders try hard in wars of survival.”

One of the significant fields of research on institutional arrangements and international relations is “Democratic Peace” theory, which suggests that democracies do not fight each other (Maoz and Abdolali 1989; Bremer 1992; Oneal and Russet 1997). BdM2S2 provide an alternative explanation in supporting Democratic Peace propositions. BdM2S2 argue that democratic leaders are more likely to try hard to win wars than autocrats. They pick and choose their fights more carefully. Fearing policy failure, democracies avoid contests they do not think they can win. This explains why democracies won a disproportionate percentage of wars in
which they participated. Since both leaders of large coalition systems in a dispute try hard to win war, neither has a disproportionate advantage over the other and fighting such wars will be very risky. Thus, democratic leaders try to avoid war with each other.

Political survival of leaders in small W systems depends on satisfying a few key supporters through the distribution of private goods. Autocratic leaders do not need foreign policy success for their survival in office. They try less hard than democrats in wars because defeats do not greatly affect leaders’ survival in office. As a result, autocratic leaders can afford to be less selective in wars; they even fight wars where their ex ante probability of winning is poor (BdM2S2, 2003).

In another article Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, and Woller (1992) argue that there is a close connection between war and the fate of the regime. This relationship depends on regimes accountability to the citizens they serve. A failed policy in the domain of international war will make a regime vulnerable to removal from office. Defeats in war are considered policy failures. Thus, defeats heighten the likelihood of domestic punishment. The authors contend that leaders’ behavior in a dispute is strongly influenced by expectations about the consequences of actions because regimes will be punished for failed foreign policy. The article investigates how international wars have domestically provoked consequences for violent regime change in the political systems of the participants.

The likelihood that defeats in international conflicts (can be considered foreign policy failure and threat to national security) will provoke domestic punishment for leaders (deposition from power) depends on the kind of institutional settings leaders face. Bueno de Mesquita et al (2003) found an important empirical relationship between dispute outcomes and the fate of leaders. The authors argue that the members of the winning coalition and selectorate care about
how their state fares in international politics both for material and policy concerns. Thus, the outcomes of international disputes should have a large impact on the ability of leaders to hold office. As BdM2S2 argue, “the number of leadership removals during or after wars by internal force is much higher than by external force.” A leader’s failure in a dispute may lead his winning coalition to abandon him in favor of a new leader. According to BdM2S2, leaders see international politics through a lens of domestic politics. Leaders perceive success through the eyes of his winning coalition. The authors’ empirical findings suggest that the outcome of crises has substantial effect on the risk of removal. Leaders with large winning coalition systems are always at greater risk of removal if they are defeated in disputes than small coalition leaders.

**Decision-making: Institutional difference**

I do not intend to illustrate the complicated domestic political process of decision-making. I want to distinguish the institutional difference between democracies and non-democracies in terms of leaders’ leverage in exerting their preferred policies.

A small coalition leader’s decision to fight a war is often influenced by the leader’s discretionary policies or personal ambitions. He can exert his will more easily than a democratic leader. Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (1995) assume single-peaked preferences and unidimensional issues related to the threats of warfare, and applied Black’s Median Voter theorem (1958) to illustrate the influence of median voters (interested party or coalition controlling a majority of political influence within a nation). Using the Median Voter Theorem, we can see that the policy objective of the interested party located at the median of the distribution of power on the policy in question is expected to prevail internally. This is especially true in democratic institutions, in which leadership change is frequent through elections. In such
institutions it is hard for an incumbent to impose his explicit will against median voter’s position because of the fear of electoral defeat, impeachment or deposition by confidence voting process (used in parliamentary democracies).

Let \( V = \) the median voter

\( I = \) the incumbent leader.

\( C = \) challenger who wish to gain control over the government’s foreign policy.

\( R = \) policy space

\([*]=\) The ideal point where the utility is maximum for each player.

\[ X^*_C \quad X_C \quad X^*_V \quad X_I \quad X^*_I \]

\( R \)

Though both the incumbent and the challenger have their own preferred or ideal point, they want to be close to the ideal point of median voter (\( X^*_V \)) proposing \( X_C \) and \( X_I \). If the incumbent implements his ideal point (\( X^*_I \)), he will lose the median voters support to the challenger (provided issues are unidimensional, single picked, all vote and majority rules). The threat of losing support of the median voter and consequently the fear of losing the election constrains \( I \) not to wander too far from \( X^*V \). This is also true for the challenger who wants to replace the incumbent leader. As a result, incumbent and challenger both converge to the median voters’ ideal point and do not go far from the median voters’ preferred policy. It is relatively hard for a democratic leader to exert his ideal policy against the median voter’s policy. Using this
logic I argue that existing policy in a dispute that has been supported by the median voters is unlikely to be altered drastically by a new leader in large coalition systems.

In small coalition systems, such as in autocracies, however, the situation is different. According to BdM2S2, after a transition period, new leader’s affinity with the winning coalition is revealed. In other words, after leadership change, selectors, who wish to get into the leaders winning coalition, pass through a transition period. A member of the seletorate knows whether she is included in the leader’s winning coalition and if she is included, then she can guarantee the flow of private goods. After the transition period, a new autocratic leader can afford to drift away from policies preferred by \( V \) and can implement policy which is close to his ideal policy \( (X^*I) \). Incumbent can afford to drift away from the median voters’ ideal point without fear of losing power because he can keep his key supporters happy with private goods. The basis for this argument is that the loyalty norm is stronger in small coalition systems than in large coalition systems. In autocracies, the coalition members are less likely to abandon the incumbent leader because defection is both risky and costly-- losing the access to private goods. This loyalty norm ensures the incumbent’s holds on power in small coalition systems. Thus, it is relatively easy for an authoritarian leader to implement his ideal policy.
The Median Voters theory illustrates that democratic leaders are more constrained than autocratic leaders in implementing their ideal policy. A new leader in democracy, which has been engaged in an interstate military conflict, can not drastically alter existing dispute policies with ease even if doing so is his preferred policy. However, a drastic measure, such as backing down in a war is relatively less problematic for an autocratic leader as long as his coalition members are satisfied.

**Interaction of Polities:**

Interactions between different polities based on the Selectorate theory arguments and potential consequences of leadership change are briefly presented below:

**Homogeneous Dyads:** It is generally accepted in the literature that democracies do not fight each other and this is so because both try hard and put great effort to win and neither has disproportionate advantage over the other. One democracy will attack another only if it is sure about victory and in such case negotiation is very likely. Leadership change in democratic dyad is less likely to escalate the dispute. When both are non-democracies, winning war is less critical for a small coalition leader’s survival as discussed above. As a result, the decision to fight is easily influenced by factors such as leaders’ idiosyncratic desires. For example, Egyptian president Jamal Nasser’s (a small coalition leader) desire to be the dominant Pan Arab leader led Egypt to get involved in regional conflicts (like Civil War in Yemen) during the 1950s and 1960s. Thus, dispute between two autocracies may or may not escalate after leadership change.
because the new leader may not share his predecessor’s strategies, beliefs and ideologies.

**Heterogeneous Dyads:** Heterogeneous (such as autocracies vs. democracies or vice versa) dyads are interesting cases. When there is lower ex ante probability of winning, democracies are less likely to get involved in such wars given that they are highly selective. In this case, the question of leadership change during disputes and its effect is not relevant because it is already expected that democracies will not fight. However, when there is a higher ex ante probability of winning, democracies do fight in such wars and leadership change in the midst of war is less likely to change war policies and continuation is expected. Autocracies, on the other hand, may become involved in wars even if their ex-ante probability of success is poor. Leadership change during the dispute may cause a sudden change of existing policies.

Bueno de Mesquita and others, especially BdM2S2 have done substantial research on institutional arrangements of different polities, their engagement in military disputes, leaders’ tenure in office, the effect of dispute outcomes on regimes and leaders, and so on. However, BdM2S2 do not specifically address how leadership change in the midst of a dispute affects a country’s existing war policies. Their analysis and empirical findings serve as a theoretical foundation for my hypotheses that are based on BdM2S2’s “Selectorate Model.”

Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith examine how leadership change affects trading relations between nations. Consistent with their hypotheses, the authors found that large winning coalition systems are relatively less affected by leadership turnover. In such systems, trade remains constant regardless of leadership change. The effect of leadership change in democracies is much less profound. On the other hand, when the winning coalition is small, leadership change greatly affects trading relations, causing a decline in trade. Here I give a brief summery of their
empirical findings:

Regime type and cooperation: Trade and cooperation are at higher levels among nations with large winning coalitions than in other systems. All else equal, large coalition systems trade more than small coalition regimes. Higher levels of trust and cooperation can be maintained between the large coalition systems.

Dynamic patterns of trade and leader turnover: After leadership turnover, a new leader might change the policy of his predecessors. But the policy choices of leaders in large coalition systems remain relatively unchanged. In contrast, there is a greater volatility in the policy choices of small coalition leaders. It is less likely that democratic leaders will cheat on trade agreement if they want to survive in office. The turnover of leaders in democracies leaves relations between states relatively unchanged and the flow of trade remains relatively constant.

In contrast, in small W systems policy change is unpredictable after leadership turnover. Since change in trade policy is greatly unpredictable in small W systems, leadership change has a greater impact on trade in autocratic systems. Leadership turnover in small coalition systems harms trade relations because it may cause a shift in protectionist policies and since autocrats can act with relative impunity, leaders in a trade relation with an autocrat fear being exploited. Thus, when autocrats come into office, trade declines. However, over time trade is reestablished as trust grows between the autocrat and other trade partners.

The arguments and analysis presented in this article are germane for the research question of this paper. Based on the Selectorate theory Smith and McGillivray found that leadership change does not have major effects on trade relations in democracies. On the other hand,
leadership change in non-democracies has a major impact on trade relations. The aim of this paper is to find out if the same is true in military disputes.

James D. Fearon emphasizes the effect of audience costs on the outcomes of international disputes. Fearon argues that the state less able to generate audience costs (arise from the actions of the domestic constituencies) is always more likely to back down in disputes that become public contests. On the other hand, the state which is able to generate greater audience costs is less likely to back down after escalation. Thus, if actions, such as mobilization of troops generate greater audience costs for democratic than for non-democratic leaders, then democracies back down significantly less often in crises.

Fearon’s argument that democracies are less likely to back down after escalation in a crisis than non-democracies is related to the current investigation. I argue that leadership change in democracies during crises should not alter Fearon’s claim—not backing down—because new leaders will probably face the same constraints, such as audience costs. New leaders in autocracies may back down in a crisis, as they do not face strong audience costs.

Benjamin F. Jones and Benjamin A. Olken examined the effect of leadership change (as a result of the previous leaders’ death) on economic growth. They found robust evidence that leaders matter, especially in autocratic settings, but not in democracies. According to the authors’ empirical findings, the deaths of autocrats (and the accession of new leaders) lead towards improvement in growth through new leaders’ direct influence in fiscal and monetary policies. They also found that the deaths of autocrats, unlike democrats, lead to unusual changes in political regimes. These findings are important and related to the question I am investigating in this paper. They support the argument that a new leader in small coalition systems is able to assert his ideal policies and drastic policy change is possible. The same is less true for a new
leader in large coalition systems.

**II. Hypotheses:**

Involvement in military disputes is endogenous to my research project. Thus, the question I intend to answer is the following: once a nation is in a military dispute, how does leadership change affects the dispute? The focus of this project is to investigate whether leadership change affects a state’s decision to continue the war it has been involved. Except in wars of survival, I claim that after leadership change a leader’s decision to continue to follow the pre-existing policies without drastic changes concerning the dispute is affected by the kind of institutional setting he faces, particularly domestic institutions for leader removal and selection. I propose two hypotheses:

1) Because a large coalition leader is constrained by the institutional setting, a drastic change in war-related policies is unlikely in large coalition systems (democracies) after leadership change. A new leader’s policies are consistent with the pre-existing policies concerning the dispute.

A useful observation for the above hypothesis is American involvement in the Iraq War and 2004 Presidential election in the US. We can ask a counterfactual question: had challenger John Kerry been elected, how likely is it that he would pursue a drastic policy change in dealing with Iraq? Kerry’s campaign and proposed policy on Iraq issue suggest that major change was unlikely. Kerry’s proposed policies did not indicate a drastic change but promised to fight a “more effective war.”² Staying on the course was clear in Kerry’s proposed policy as he said, “we may have differences about how we went into Iraq but we do not have the choice just to
pick up and leave.”

2) In small W systems, a new leader can make policies without fearing removal from office and faces no or very few (often co-opted) institutional constraints. Thus, drastic change is possible after leadership change in small W systems (autocracies). Consistency with the pre-existing policies is less likely.

The literature review presented above supports my hypotheses. The building blocks of my hypotheses are BdM2S2’s “Selectorate Theory”; Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith’s significant findings of the relationship between leadership change and interstate trade relations are important sources of inspiration. Fearon’s audience costs model and Johns & Olken’s findings of unusual changes in non-democracies, not in democracies, after leadership changes also support the hypotheses. The hypotheses are based on BdM2S2’s argument on leader’s political survival and crisis involvement. The events that proceed after leadership change in any polity is the leader’s revelation of affinity with the selectors, who know during the transition period whether they are included in the leader’s winning coalition. As the membership to the leader’s winning coalition is known, the members of the winning coalition guarantee their flow of private goods as well as public goods. Democratic and non-democratic institutions differ significantly in terms of the frequency of leadership change as well as the allocation of resources for private and public goods. Consistency in leaders’ policies in large coalition systems and lack of it in small coalition systems stems largely from the institutional constraints leaders face. In democracies, in which the loyalty norm of the winning coalition is weaker than in autocracies and a leader’s prime focus is the supply of public goods rather than private goods to coalition
members, leadership change is frequent. A new leader in democracies most likely faces the same constraints as the previous leader and runs the risk of losing office if he fails to provide good public policy (public good), such as foreign policy success. On the other hand, for an autocratic leader the supply of private goods is more important than public goods and the leader can stay in power as long as he keeps his key supporters and cronies (coalition members) happy with private goods.

One issue needs to be clear about democratic consistency, proposed in the first hypothesis. It is not uncommon to see that during national election (in large coalition system) in the midst of a military dispute the challenger, in the event of a growing support for ending the dispute, may promise to terminate the dispute if he gets into the Office. Thus one might question the plausibility of the first hypothesis if such a challenger defeats the incumbent since he might try to carry out the promise. However, the important question here is can a new leader suddenly end a military conflict that his country has been fighting for a long without considering international prestige and credibility of his nation’s foreign policies? I argue that while a challenger may promise to end the dispute during election campaign, it often turns out to be a hard thing to do to implement such policy because, as I discussed previously, successful foreign policies and upholding its credibility are very important for a large coalition leader. Thus, considering foreign policy consequences of sudden backing down, a new leader will likely to pursue a policy (in the presence of a growing public pressure), which Henry Kissinger, former U.S. National Security Adviser and Secretary of State, called “honorable extrication.” This policy was adopted by U.S. President Richard M. Nixon regarding the Vietnam War “without jeopardizing American credibility and prestige abroad”. This theme will come up again in the Greco-Turkish War later in this paper.
A very brief examination of Richard Nixon’s policy on the Vietnam War as a challenger and as president will clear the discussion. Presidential campaign of 1968, when the United State was in the middle of a war in Vietnam, one of the burning issues was American policy on the war. Facing with the growing protests against the war, Nixon declared that he had a “secret plan” to end the war in Vietnam. However, in turned out that his secret plan was to continue the war until he could cut an honorable negotiated deal. In the first term of his presidency he continued the war and it is argued that he “widening down” the war beyond Vietnam and spread the conflict into Laos and Cambodia. He could not implement his “secret plan” in the first term. Instead he explained his policies during 1972 presidential campaign and derided Democratic challenger George McGovern’s call for immediate withdrawal from Vietnam as “cut-and-run” strategy that “would undermine U.S. prestige abroad . . .”\(^5\)

The claim that leadership change during a war is less likely to change the war policy of a democratic nation needs further clarification. Leadership change can be exogenous. In democracies such exogenous element can be constitutionally binding term limits after which a new leader comes in office through elections, vote of confidence by which parliament members (with a majority support) can remove a leader and impeachment with the same function as vote of confidence process. For example, Neville Chamberlain, the Prime Minister of Britain, was removed from office by members of the House of Commons because Chamberlain policy of appeasing Adolf Hitler of Germany was regarded as humiliating and disliked by the members of the House of Commons\(^6\). Other factors or events can also cause leadership change, such as death of a leader brings a new leader into office. My claim is feasible in the cases of leadership changes as a result of previous leader’s death and change through election after the completion
of previous leader’s term limit. In both cases, a new leader will face the same institutional constraints and is likely to follow the policy (regarding war) that has been supported by the median voters without significant alteration. Most American presidents during the cold war era followed almost the same policy of containment to prevent the spread of communism. American involvement in any international conflicts during this period was mostly stemmed from containment policy and supporting anti-communist groups.

However, one can argue that leadership change through vote of confidence process in parliamentary democracies should alter deposed leader’s policy because a leader will be removed whenever parliament members seriously dislike his policy. I would like to argue that a leader’s ex ante calculation of adopting a policy in such a polity (parliamentary democracy) takes the possibility of removal in case the parliament members vehemently oppose the policy into account given that every leader wants to stay in power. Ariel Sharon, the Prime Minister of Israel, is a good example of political maneuvering to save his government from removal by members of the Knesset over the issue of Gaza pullout. It is reasonable to argue that Sharon’s ex ante calculation included the possibility of opposition of his policy and also ensuring enough support to save his government. In fact, Sharon did manage to save his government7.

III. Data

In order to test my hypotheses, I will use data from the following sources: 1) The Militarized Interstate Dispute Data, 1816-2001 from Correlates of War (COW) projects (Version 3.0). 2) Leadership data from BdM2S2’s “Leader_ data.” 3) The winning coalition data (W)
from “BdM2S2_nation_year_data.” 4) COW National Capabilities dataset.

The Militarized interstate disputes (hereafter MIDs) data contain essential attributes to each militarized interstate dispute from 1/1/1816 through 12/31/2001. The MIDs data restricts “interstate” dispute to interactions among diplomatically recognized member states of the global system and excludes interactions involving non-recognized states or non-state actions. The term “Militarized interstate dispute” is defined as cases in which the threats, display or use of military force short of war by one state is explicitly directed towards the government, official forces, property or territory of another state. War is defined by using more specific criteria. War refers to those militarized interstate disputes, which escalate to the point where military combat is sufficiently sustained that it will result in a minimum of 1000 total battle deaths (Bremer, Stuart et al).

Since involvement in a military dispute is endogenous to my hypotheses, it is important to identify the level at which a state is involve in a conflict. Hostility level is classified into different categories and each of them is coded with an ordinal number: no militarized actions (1), threat to use force (2), display of force (3), use of force (4), war (5). Among these categories, use of force and war are relevant for testing my hypotheses. The actions that are considered as uses of force are blocked, occupation of territory, seizure, clash, raid, use of biological, chemical or nuclear weapons that results in less than 1000 total death. The definition of war is given above. I will not use threats to use force, and display of force data. The COW project refers threats as verbal indications of hostile intent, which is often expressed in the form of ultimatums. Displays of force involve military demonstrations but no combat interaction. Since threats to use force and displays of force do not involve any combat interactions between initiators and targets, these data are not relevant for my project. After excluding the first three categories of hostility level—no
military actions, threats to use force, and display of force—there are 1652 observations of interstate war and use of force by initiators or targets.

The start date of a dispute is identified by the initiation of the first militarized incident. The end date of a sub-war militarized dispute (seizure, blocked, occupation, etc,) in the absence of a formal resolution, cease-fire or mutual troops withdrawal is when there are no codable incidents for at least six months. The end date for a state’s involvement in an interstate war is coded as the last day of the war itself, unless it drops out prior to termination of the war (Bremer et al).

The leadership data contain information about leadership tenure--from starting day/month/year in office to out day/month/year from office across countries. The W data measure a country’s internal institutional arrangements-- the size of the winning coalition. BdM2S2 (2003) provide the information and procedure by which the winning coalition size is derived. Here I give a brief description of the procedure. The winning coalition size is calculated as a composite index based on the variables REGTYPE (taken from Arthur Bank’s data), and XRCOMP, XROPEN, and PARCOMP from the POLITY IV data. For a polity when REGTYPE (regime type) was not a military or military/civilian regime, one point is given to the W index. When XRCOMP (the competitiveness of executive requirement) corresponds to greater degrees of responsiveness to supporters that is, the chief executive was not selected by heredity or in rigged, unopposed elections, another point is assigned to the W index. XROPEN (the openness of executive recruitment) contributes an additional point to the index if the executive is selected in a more open setting. Lastly, one more point is given to the index if PARCOMP (competitiveness of participation) in a polity corresponds to stable, enduring organized political groups that regularly compete in national politics. Then the score generated by the above
procedure is divided by the maximum value of the index, which is 4. The minimum W value is 0 and maximum is 1 (Bueno de Mesquita et al).

The COW national capabilities data set provides information on each country's material capabilities from 1816 to 2001. The sources of material capabilities include iron and steel production, military expenditures, military personnel (in thousands), energy consumption (thousands of coal- ton), total population and urban population (population greater than 100,000 living in cities). A composite index of national capability score is then derived from above mentioned indicators.

IV. Research design:

Dependent variable:

The dependent variable is log of war duration after leadership change \[\log (\text{duration after leadership change}) = \log \text{durafter} \]. Initially the duration is measured in days that is, how many days a dispute lasted after leadership change. I will construct this data in the following ways: first I will sort out those entries of militarized disputes (force was used) and interstate wars in which leadership changed during the disputes. Then I will calculate the duration of a conflict from the day a new leader came in power to the end of the dispute. In order to do this, I will use the MIDs data, which has the start and end date of all disputes, and BdM2S2’s leadership data, which record the date each leader entered and left office. However, duration measured in days does not give the propensity of longevity. For example, duration of 45 days and 52 days do not provide a meaningful difference. To alleviate this problem I will use log of duration after leader change.
Duration of war after leadership change is a feasible way to investigate a new leader’s policy regarding war—continue to fight or stop fighting. Dispute duration after leadership changes can be a reasonable reflection of new leader’s policy in dealing with the dispute. If a dispute ended 30 days after leadership change, it is reasonable to think that some maneuvering had taken place between the belligerents and the new leader proposed or agreed to that maneuver, which had a considerable impact on the termination of the dispute. However, a dispute may end because the belligerents exhausted their resources and thus were unable to continue the dispute independent of the new leaders’ policy. To take this matter into account, I control for national capability (NCap) and capability ratio of a participant (or a coalition) compare to its opponent(s).

**Independent variable:**

The independent variable is the value of W that measures a country’s institutional arrangements-- regime characteristics. For the convenience of analyzing regression results, I create a dummy variable named $Smalllargew$. If a polity is a democracy (large coalition) – W score is 1 or .75—the variable is coded 1. When the polity is a non-democracy (small coalition)—W score is 0, .25, or .5—the variable is coded 0. Distribution of $Smalllargew$ is the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Smalllargew</th>
<th>Freq.</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small W</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large W</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Control and other Independent variables:

I) *Ncap* (National capability): This variable is intend to capture a nation’s power (in absolute terms) reflected by material capabilities. A country’s national capability may be an important factor for it to continue the ongoing military dispute. A country poorly endowed with material resources may force to stop fighting, which incurs heavy costs on its existing low level of resources. A reverse condition is true for a country with high level of material resources. This data is drawn from COW national capability data set.

II) *Cap Ratio*: A country or a coalition’s power (capability) relative to its opponent may affect the duration of conflict. I will assess the power of the state in question relative to its opponent by calculating the proportion the state in question possesses: \( \frac{\text{CAP}_A}{\text{CAP}_A + \text{CAP}_B} \). The higher this proportion, the stronger the state is relative to its opponent.

III) *Logdurbefore*: This variable is the log of dispute duration before leadership change: \( \log (\text{duration before leadership change}) = \logdurbefore \). I will measure the duration from the starting day of a dispute to the day a new leader comes in office. The reason behind using log already mentioned above. Long-lasting war may affect war duration. A prolonged dispute increases the prospect of rivalry termination (Cioff-Revilla, 1998). Beside longevity effect, this variable is very important for testing the hypotheses. It will serve as an indicator of consistency. By looking at the relations between \( \logdurafter \) and \( \logdurbefore \) in the regression result, it is possible to say whether the continuation of a dispute before leadership changes (duration before leadership change) also exists after leadership change.

IV) *MultiLchange*: This is a dummy variable. If a dispute involved more than one leadership change, I coded this variable 1, otherwise 0. This is also an important variable for
testing consistency. It will indicate how the multiple leadership changes affect the dispute continuity.

V) **Fatality**: I use this variable to capture how costly a dispute in terms of human losses. Increasing fatality may affect dispute duration. If fatality level is very high, leaders may be forced by public pressure to shortened the dispute. The data has a range of 0 to 6; 0 being no fatality and 6 being high level of fatality, more than 1000. The data is available in the COW MIDs dataset.

VI) **Multilateral**: A leader’s discretion in making war policies may not be the same between bilateral and multilateral disputes. Multilateral dispute may have different implication for a leader and there are many factors that simultaneously affect the war. Two world wars are good examples in this case. This is a dummy variable. If a dispute had more than two participants—an initiator and a target, I coded 1 otherwise 0. COW MID data set has the information about the number of participants in each dispute.

VII) **HostilityL**: Hostility level is included to see if the intensity of war has any affect on the continuation of disputes. Hostility level is obtained from MID dataset. Highly intense disputes are coded 5 and relatively low level of intensity disputes are coded 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hostility Level</th>
<th>Freq.</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hostility Level 5</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>27.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostility Level 4</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>72.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
VIII) _Ptrans_: I include this variable to control the effect of polity transition. The data is taken from Polity IV data set. The conditions that I include as causes of polity transition are: a polity’s transition from non-democracy to democracy, democracy to non-democracy, state failure, interruption, authority collapse, and interregnum periods etc. I consider that the existence of any of these factors may affect a leader’s ability to formulate policies. _Ptrans_ is a dummy variable. If any of the conditions mentioned above exists, I coded the variable 1 otherwise 0.

I will run two tests on my hypotheses. From the test I intend to explain how leadership change during militarized disputes, depending on the winning coalition size, affects the policy (duration of the disputes in my model) of participating nations. Two regression equations are following:

**Hypothesis 1**

\[
\text{Logdurafter} = A + B_1 \text{Logdurbefore} + B_2 \text{Multi-L-change} + B_3 \text{Multilateral} + B_4 \\
\text{Fatality} + B_5 \text{Ncap} + B_6 \text{Cap Ratio} + B_7 \text{HostilityL} + B_8 \text{Ptrans if Smalllargew ==1}
\]

I expect _logdurbefore_ and _multilateral_ are positively related to _logdurafter_. I also predict to find no relation between _multi-L-change_ and duration after leadership change (logdurafter).

**Hypothesis 2**

\[
\text{Logdurafter} = A + B_1 \text{Logdurbefore} + B_2 \text{Multi-L-change} + B_3 \text{Multilateral} + B_4 \\
\text{Fatality} + B_5 \text{Ncap} + B_6 \text{Cap Ratio} + B_7 \text{HostilityL} + B_8 \text{Ptrans if Smalllargew ==0}
\]
My predictions for hypothesis 2 are following: \( \text{logdurbefore} \) and \( \text{multilateral} \) are unrelated to \( \text{logdurafter} \); there should be a relationship between \( \text{multi-L-change} \) and the dependent variable but the relation can be positive or negative. My prediction is summarized in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Logdurafter</th>
<th>Large Coalition</th>
<th>Small Coalition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Logdurbefore</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-L-change</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatality</td>
<td>No Prediction</td>
<td>No Prediction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HostilityL</td>
<td>No Prediction</td>
<td>No Prediction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**V. Results**

The results I obtain from regressions support my hypotheses and expectations regarding consistency of large coalition leaders in formulating dispute policies. In this section I will present the results and explain what these results imply in the next section. Though less significant in implication, below I present simple summary statistics of duration after leadership change.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small W</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>491.61</td>
<td>804.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large W</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>495.40</td>
<td>580.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The regression results of the hypotheses are given below respectively.

**Table: 2.1**

The effect of leadership change on military disputes in large coalition system: (Hypothesis 1 test)

| Variable        | Coef. (Std. Err.) | P >| t| |
|-----------------|-------------------|-----|---|
| Logdurafter     |                   |     |   |
| Logdurbefore    | .152 (.074)       | 0.04* |   |
| Multi-L-change  | .298 (.264)       | 0.26  |   |
| Multilateral    | .548 (.242)       | 0.02* |   |
| Fatality        | .178 (.080)       | 0.02* |   |
| Ncap            | -1.39 (2.04)      | 0.49  |   |
| Cap Ratio       | -.265 (.402)      | 0.51  |   |
| HostilityL      | -1.04 (.422)      | 0.01**|   |
| _Cons           | 8.41 (1.68)       | 0.00  |   |

N = 138
R-square = .227

* Significant at P ≤ 0.05
** Significant at P ≤ 0.01
Table: 2.2

The effect of leadership change on military dispute in small coalition system:
(Hypothesis 2 test)

| Variable          | Coef. (Std. Err.) | P >| t| |
|-------------------|-------------------|-----------------|
| Logdurafter       | -.025 (.116)      | 0.83            |
| Logdurbefore      |                   |                 |
| Multi-L-change    | 1.01 (.387)       | 0.01**          |
| Multilateral      | .376 (.389)       | 0.33            |
| Fatality          | .474 (.152)       | 0.00**          |
| Ncap              | -3.70 (3.46)      | 0.28            |
| Cap Ratio         | .510 (.581)       | 0.38            |
| HostilityL        | -1.92 (.701)      | 0.00**          |
| _Cons             | 11.47 (2.749)     | 0.00            |

N = 112
R-square = .201

* Significant at P ≤ 0.05
** Significant at P ≤ 0.01
Below I reproduce the prediction table and compare with the results.

### Table: 2.3
Predictions & Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Logdurafter</th>
<th>Large Coalition</th>
<th>Small Coalition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prediction</td>
<td>Result</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logdurbefore</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-L-change</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatality</td>
<td>No Prediction</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HostilityL</td>
<td>No Prediction</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

√ = prediction is consistent with the result.

**IV. Interpreting the Results:**

**Duration before and after leadership change: a measure of consistency**

Summary statistics provided in table: 1.4 reveals interesting differences between large and small coalition system in duration of disputes after leadership change. The standard deviation figures can be read this way: in small coalition system deviation from mean duration of disputes after leadership change is much higher than that of large coalition system. This
difference also means differences in policies of small coalition leaders without consistency and thus large deviation from the mean.

An important question for the hypotheses or my claim of consistency in large coalition system and lack of it in small coalition system concerning dispute policies is this: how long a nation will continue an ongoing dispute after its leadership change? The answer of this question can be found by looking at the relationship between logdurbefore and logdurafter.

The results are consistent with my hypotheses. Table 2.1 shows that logdurbefore is positively related to logdurafter in large coalition system and the result is significant (at P ≤ 0.05 level). This positive relation means that the long a dispute been going on before leadership change, it is likely to continue after leadership change in large coalition system. It also implies that leadership change during military dispute in democratic polities does not cause drastic policy change and a new leader tends to stay on course of the pre-existing dispute policies. Thus, as predicted in hypothesis 1, there exists a consistency with regards to dispute policies in large coalition system after leadership change. However, this is not the case in small coalition system. Table 2.2 shows that logdurbefore is unrelated to logdurafter. This implies that there are no relationship between how long a dispute been going on before and how long it will likely to go
on after leadership change in small coalition system. As predicted in hypothesis 2, the results confirm that there is no consistency among leader’s policies regarding the course of disputes.

A new leader’s decision to continue an ongoing conflict depends on the importance he attaches to prevailing in the dispute. Though all leaders want to win a fight, the importance of winning varies and this importance depends on the institutional arrangements particularly leadership removal and selection institutions. According to the Selectorate model, democracies are very selective about choosing a fight. However, if they choose a fight, it is important for a democratic leader to win that fight because winning a war implies successful foreign policy and ensuring national security—both are important public policy. Because large coalition leaders depend on providing good public policies to retain coalition’s support, they put extra effort to prevail in a dispute when previous expectation is not met, even if that means staying on course of the dispute for long. The same logic also applies for a new leader who came to the office in the midst of a dispute. For a small coalition leader, ensuring resource flow to provide private goods to a small number of coalition members is very important to stay in power than spending resources on war effort. The condition of Mexican military before and during Mexican-American war can nicely illustrate this point. Mexican military lacked uniforms, weapons, ammunition and often without salary. However, most of the top generals, despite low official salaries and little or no inherited wealth, acquired substantial rural holdings. This was because no Mexican leaders were able to retain power without the support of the army. Even though Mexican military expenditures were often more than one-half the national budget, the poor condition of the army was caused by the fact that most of the allocated money went to the purse of top military leaders, who were the important winning coalition members for the leaders to stay in power. This poor condition of military was emphatically expressed when US General
entered the Covent of Santa Maria Churubusco, his Mexican counterpart said, “If we had ammunition, you wouldn’t be here.”

Thus, a small coalition leader put less effort to win a conflict. Unlike democratic leaders, autocrats can survive defeat in war by accommodating the policy demands of a victor (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2004).

Two doctrines for waging war can bring more insight to this discussion. Sun Tzu, a general in the service of King Ho Lu of Wu, wrote on war strategy long ago:

“The skillful general does not raise a second levy; neither is his supply wagons loaded more than twice. Once war is declared he will not waste precious time in waiting for reinforcements, nor will he turn his army back for fresh supplies, but crosses for enemy’s frontier without delay... If equally matched we can offer battle; if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy; if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him (the enemy).”

Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Defense of US President Ronald Regan, and Colin Powell, who commanded the US forces in 1991 Gulf war and served as the Secretary of State under President George Bush, articulated their doctrines on using arm forces. In a speech on November 28, 1984, Weinberger said:

“. . . If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning. If we are unwilling to commit the forces or resources necessary to achieve our objective, we should not commit them at all . . .”

Colin Powell’s doctrine articulates the same idea about using combat forces:

“When we do use it, we should not be equivocal: we should win and win decisively.”

Looking at Sun Tzu’s doctrine, intended to use for a small coalition leader, and Weinberger and Powel’s Doctrine, which are intended for large coalition leaders, important differences in strategies are apparent. Rapid victory is needed, reinforcement is foolish, and...
continue to engage in a fight depending on enemy’s capability are Tzu’s advice for a leader. These imply that consistency and staying on course and trying hard to win the war is less important. On the other hand, Weinberger and Powell’s strategies and advises are different. They argues for high ex ante selectivity when choosing a fight but at the same time they also emphasize the importance of achieving objectives (victory) once committed, which requires regular reassessment of objectives in emerging situations. Thus, the emphasis on staying on course of a dispute if armed force is committed is apparent in their doctrines.

**Multiple and Single leadership change:**

Table 2.1 shows that in large coalition system, multiple leadership change has less affect and the result is not significant. Though the coefficient is positive, the result implies that there is less connection of multiple leadership change to duration. To see how single leadership turnover affect the dependent variable—logdurafter, I run the test using a new independent variable “Single-L-change”. The result is not significant (not shown in the result section). The result is consistent with my prediction. As I explained above that in democracies there is consistency among leaders in making and following dispute policies and there should not be a drastic change after leadership change, the results in multiple-L-change and Single-L-change confirm the consistency explanation.

On the other hand, table 2.2 shows that in small coalition system, multiple leadership change has large impact (Coef. Is 1.01) on the duration of dispute and the result is significant (at P ≤ 0.01 level). That is in small coalition system, multiple leadership change greatly increase the dispute duration. However, in the cases of single leadership change, dispute duration decrease
drastically and the result is significant (at \( P \leq 0.01 \) level).

The finding that dispute duration decrease after single leadership turnover is not surprising since for a small coalition leader saving resource instead of spending it on war efforts is more important so that he can provide enough private goods to his coalition members and stay in power. “Kim Jong Il, an autocrat of North Korea is kept in power by a small number of winning coalition – key military leaders, close, royal relatives, and essential bureaucrats numbering between 250 and 2500 out of 20 million citizens, or no more than about one ten-thousandth of the population. It is estimated that Kim Jong Il needs $1.2 billion to sustain himself in office out of the approximately $12 billion that makes up his nation’s GDP. It is estimated that the average member of his winning coalition receives about $500,000 where per capita income in North Korea is around $600.”15 Now suppose a hypothetical situation in which North Korea engaged in a military dispute with another nation and Kim Jong Il was deposed and replaced by another autocratic leader. The new leader will be constrained by poor resources, as GDP figure suggests, and need to decide how much he will spend on winning coalition and how much on war efforts. It is reasonable to expect that the new leader will allocate less resource on war efforts so that he has enough to provide private goods to his cronies. In this scenario, we can expect that he will cut short the dispute by negotiating, capitulating or other means.

The second findings that multiple leadership changes in small coalition systems significantly increase dispute duration is interesting. Multiple leadership changes during disputes in small coalition systems often occur in domestic turmoil within a short period of time. Coups, violent revolutions, assassinations of leaders often caused such leadership turnover. Before coming to power, every leader and his coalition members have some complains that they promise to fix. But once they get in power, their calculation of how much they can spend on war
efforts and how much they must spend on private goods is likely to change. It is especially the case when there are less transparency and accountability of small coalition governments about the economic conditions of their country. For example, it is alleged that Stalin’s government and Chinese governments up until its economic boost often lied about their economic growth. As a result of this lack of transparency about the economic conditions, a new leader might be unable to deliver the promised private goods to the coalition members. This inability of a leader may lead his coalition members to defect, which causes multiple leadership changes. Thus, before the end of the transition period and a new leader can start implementing his new policies, leadership change happens again. In such a situation while the political office of the country is unstable by multiple leadership changes, the ongoing fight is likely to continue by military officials without any policy decisions from above. As this process continues, the ongoing dispute also continues.

**Multilateral disputes**

Table 2.1 shows that after leadership change democracies continue the dispute course and the result is significant (at P ≤ 0.05 level). This result is consistent with democratic consistency explanation that leadership change during military disputes does not drastically change the dispute policies. This also implies that democracies are more trust worthy partner in a multilateral dispute. Alastair Smith and Fiona McGilligray argue that democracies are trustworthy partner in trade relations; my findings show that democracies are also more reliable for making a military alliance. Breaking commitment may cause a bad reputation for a democracy in international relations and it might become a foreign policy issue that the challenger can exploit against the leader in the next election.
However, the result in table 2.2 shows that in small coalition system, the variable ‘multilateral’ is not significant. This makes sense because leadership change can cause drastic policy change in non-democracies since foreign policy success and standing in international relations is less important for a leader in such system to stay in power. I briefly discuss the Russian revolution and subsequent leadership change during World War I and Russia’s withdrawal from the war later in this paper.

**Costly and intense disputes**

Though not directly related to the hypotheses, HostilityL (a measure of intensity) and Fatality (costliness in terms of human lives) have some interesting results. Table 2.1 and 2.2 show that both in large and small coalition system more intense war end quickly and the result is significant. The relation between fatality and duration after leadership change is positive and the result is significant. However, there is a difference between the two systems. The results show that in democracies, increasing casualties has relatively more (adverse) effect on dispute duration than in non-democracies (the Coef is .17 in large coalition and .47 in small coalition). This means that democracies are more responsive to public pressure as a result of increasing combat casualties than non-democracies.
Domestic turmoil in Tsarist Russia and subsequent leadership change during World War I was a worrisome event for the Allies. The riots culminated on March 8 and the government led by Golitsin was forced to resign. Price Lvov replaced him but for a very short period of time. Alexander Kerensky, who served as Minister of war in Lvov’s government, took the power. Kerensky was in favor of continuing the war against Germany and drive the enemy out of Russian territory. Though he had the support within his party (The Revolutionary Socialist Party), he faced fierce opposition from other element of the party and its allies, who wanted Russia to quit the war at any price.

Meanwhile, Marxist revolutionary Vladimir Ulyanov (Lenin) and his colleagues arrived in Petrograd and issued his stirring Slogan, “Bread, Land, Peace.” Soon Lenin joined the “Councils” or “Soviets”, composed of workers, soldiers and revolutionaries, and the Councils ran most big cities. Lenin’s followers (known as Bolsheviks) constituted a minority portion of the Councils. However, he pursued double strategies: make the Soviets the only effective governing power and make the Bolsheviks the dominant power in the Soviets. The failure of Social Democratic party to integrate support behind Kerensky’s policies and other subsequent events led Lenin to realize his goals. Kerensky’s short lived provisional government lost power
as he failed to obtain a majority support of his winning coalition. Kerensky fled and Lenin got in power. Among many goals, one that he vehemently pursued was an immediate end to the war with Germany. He immediately took Russia out of the war and accepted a punitive peace treaty from Germany at Brest-Litovsk in March 1918. As a result of the treaty, Germany seized a large area of Russia and redeployed nearly a million troops to the western front. Thanks to US involvement in the war in April 1917 that reinforced the Allies’ war efforts.

What is important to notice in this example is that small coalition leaders are able to pursue and assert policies of their discretion without fear of deposition as long as they had coalition member’s support. Lenin terminated Russian part in the war by co-opting with Germany without consideration of Russia’s commitment to the Allies and Russia’s territorial intactness. It would have been a hard thing to do had Lenin faced a democratic institutions and electoral punishment for capitulating to Germany.

**Greco-Turkish War**¹⁷

1919 – 1922

The Greco-Turkish War, also called the war in the Asia Minor and (in Turkey) a part of the Turkish war of independence, was fought between Turkey and Greece in the awake of the World War I.

The root of this conflict is linked to the secret agreements on sharing of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the World War I. The Western Allies (particularly British Prime Minister David Lloyd George) had promised Greece territorial gains at the expense of the Ottoman if
Greece entered the war on the Allied side. The territorial gains included eastern Thrace, the Islands of Imbros and Tenedos, and parts of western Anatolia around the city of Izmir.

Eleftherios Venizelos was the Prime Minister of Greece and his Liberal Party had the majority in the Parliament at that time. Venizelos formed “Komma Fileleftheron” (Liberal Party) in 1910 and formed the government in the same year. Though at the beginning years of the War (WWI) Greece remain neutral, Venizelos supported the formation of an Alliance with the Entente. But the King Constantine wanted to remain neutral. In a series of debates with the King, Venizelos resigned in 1915. However, his party again won election and he became Prime Minister again. Greece entered the World War with Bulgaria’s attack on Serbia, with which Greece had an alliance treaty.

Soon after the armistice (Armistice of Mudros) at the end of the War (WWI) Greek troops occupied Izmir and the surroundings (that were promised as Greece’s territorial gains) in May 1919. Meanwhile, Mustafa Kemal, the leader of Turkish revolutionaries, formed a Turkish national movement at Anatolia, which rejected the Treaty of Sevres (that ended World War I with the Ottoman) and prepared to defend against any aggression of what they believed was their national land. In the summer of 1920, the Greek Army launched attacks and extended their zone of occupation over all Western and North Western Asia Minor.

In October 1920 the Greek army advanced into Anatolia with the intention of defeating Kemalist forces before they were ready to attack the Greek perimeter at Izmir. This pre-emptive attack was started under the liberal government of Venizelos. However, Venizelos’ party lost the November 1920 elections. After Venizelos’ defeat, Dimitrios Gounaris, contested the elections as the de facto leader of the “United Opposition” and with a platform of ending the war,
controlled most deputies in the parliament and became the Prime Minister.

Greek faced their first battle defeat (First Battle of Inonu) by the Kemalist forces in January 1921. Though Gounaris wanted to withdraw from Asia Minor, he was unable to find an honorable extrication without making it a foreign policy disaster. Thus, he reinforced the war efforts and continued the war against Turkey. In 1921 after Greek’s first defeat, the Allied initiated London Conferences to modify the Treaty of Sevres and make a compromise between the belligerents and some agreements were reportedly reached during the Conference. However, Greece defied the agreements and launched another attack in March 1921 (Battle of Inonu II). After the successful Greek advance towards Eskisehir and Afyon, Gounaris urged the continuation of the advance towards Ankara. In June 1921 the strengthened Greek army marched to the River of Sakarya, less than 62 miles west of Ankara. However, this advance was stopped by the Turkish counter attacks at the battle of Sakarya. Greek army defeated again in August 1921. In August 1922 Greek army suffered their final defeat at the battle near Afyon. The armistice was reached in October 1922. Turkey captured Izmir and Greece evacuated the occupied areas. After the disaster of August campaign, Gounaris was ousted from power.

Some interesting points I want to make here. How much an effect did leadership change in Greece, a large coalition polity, have on its war efforts? The brief analysis I presented above shows that leadership change during the war had little effect. The pre-emptive attacks started under Venizelos’ government continued after Gounaris came in power. These continuations of war efforts support my findings that leadership change in large coalition system has little effect on its dispute policy. The new leader Gounaris’ calculation of continuing the war is also important here. He wanted to withdraw from Asia Minor but with an honorable way so that Greeks foreign policies would not seem a failure. Since foreign policy success is important for a
large coalition leader, his calculations make sense. Unable to find an honorable way to extricate from the war, Gounaries reinforced war efforts and continued the war.

V. An Evaluation and Conclusion

The results, as I explained above support the hypotheses and my predictions. However, the research in this paper did not cover or explained well some factors that may be related to the question of leadership change and its effect on military disputes. One such factor that was not explained well is multilateral disputes. I use multilateral disputes as a control. In such disputes, multiple factors may influence a country’s policy decision and many factors may work simultaneously. For example, leadership change in a partner country and if the country is a powerful one within the coalition, then this change may affect not only that country’s war policies but also the ability of the coalition to continue the war. Other kinds of shocks may also affect the war efforts. Though I found an interesting and plausible result for multilateral disputes, without taking into account other related factors, the finding may not be adequate for interpreting multilateral disputes. Other factor I did not include in my research is whether a country in my dataset was simultaneously involved in other disputes. This factor may have an effect on the duration of a particular dispute that I analyzed in the dataset.

I have worked on this project and finished it within a limited time frame. So if I had more time, I would have included factors related to multilateral disputes and a country’s involvement in other disputes into the data set. Though I provided two case examples of leadership change and its effect on the disputes separately, I would have done more in depth analysis of case
Without these few setbacks, the empirical findings in this project are promising. The question I have analyzed here has not been addressed adequately in the literature. I think my findings will contribute to the existing literature of internal institutional settings, leadership and international disputes. Consistency hypotheses in this paper and its empirical support suggests that although democracies are very selective about involvement in military disputes, if they involve in one, they tend to continue their effort to reach a favorable solution, which is a foreign policy success and important for a democratic leader. However, in non-democracies such consistency is less likely. It is important to note that this paper does not predict anything about dispute outcome.

The question of leadership change and its effect on ongoing dispute can be extended to those disputes that have been alive for decades. These long lasting disputes have interstate characteristics, such as Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Kashmir conflict between Pakistan and India as well as intrastate characteristics such as Russian disputes with Chechnya. Because these conflicts are long living, leadership change occurred several times in respective belligerent countries. An interesting future research link is to observe how leadership changes affect strategies and policies of the participating countries dealing with the dispute and also analyze how domestic political institutions affect leader’s policies. An interesting case may be Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Recently there has been leadership shack up in this conflict. After the death of Yasir Arafat Mahmoud Abbas became the president of the Palestinian Authority and more recently Hamas won majority in the parliament defeating governing Fatah. On the other side, Ariel Sharon will likely to be out of scene because of health reason; national election is forthcoming in Israel and it will be interesting to see new leader’s policies regarding Palestinian
issue.

Note:


7) The assessment on Gaza withdrawal and Sharon government’s survival is based on regular news article from *The New York Times* and other news media. Since there are number of articles, I do not give specific article name here.

8) COW measured dispute duration based on how many days the belligerents were on the battlefield or exchanged fires. For example, if a dispute started in 1940 and ended in 1945, the actual duration recorded in data set does not reflect five years. I disagree
with this method. When two countries are in a war or light military skirmish, there are adverse effects on almost every aspect of these two country’s inter-state relations. There are lots of examples to support this. Israeli-Arab wars are perhaps good examples to show how war negatively affects interstate relations. Enmity and cold relations not only existed during but also beyond the war duration that most Muslim Countries do not have formal relations with Israel. Thus, considering this, I calculate war duration from the starting day to the end day of war.

9) For a detail analysis of why large coalition leaders put more efforts during war than small coalition leaders, see Bueno de Mesquita et al “Testing Novel Implications from the Selectorate Theory of War” World Politics (April 2004). Also, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, et al. The Logic of Political Survival Ch. 6


11) See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mexican-American_war


15) The information is taken from Bueno de Mesquita et al “Testing Novel Implications
from the Selectorate Theory of War.” The estimation for the North Korean Winning coalition and Kim Jong Il’s requirements to maintain the loyalty of his coalition is based on the authors’ personal conversations with North Korean specialists.


17) See [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greco-Turkish_War_%281919-1922%29](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greco-Turkish_War_%281919-1922%29) for Greco-Turkish War and also for Eleftherios Venizelos and Dimitrios Gounaris.

**Bibliography:**


