Syllabus

This course explores the interplay of law and politics in international relations. Too often the role of international law in the relations of nations is neglected, under-appreciated, or even vilified. If discussed at all, international law is often treated as a static set of “rules” governing (or being broken by) states in the course of their mutual relations. Our approach, following the tradition of Myres McDougal (of the “New Haven School”), postulates that international law is a decision-making process characterized by “functional duality” and “competing claims and mutual tolerances.” As such, it is both an input in foreign-policy making and, in turn, influenced and [re]shaped by state practice (i.e., foreign-policy behavior).

Like its realist precursor, neorealism—which still dominates the contemporary international-politics literature—considers self-help an iron law of survival for states in an anarchic system (i.e., a world without an overarching authority over and above sovereign states). It dichotomizes national interest and international law, considering the two incompatible and even antithetical. Furthermore, neorealist stalwarts such as Kenneth Waltz assert that out of the survival instinct under conditions of anarchy, no state will voluntarily accept constraint on its sovereignty. An ultimate purpose of this course is to assess the validity of this realist dichotomy, by examining (1) whether states may find upholding international law to be, however paradoxically, in their national interest, precisely because of systemic anarchy; (2) how nation states do in fact voluntarily accept curbs on their sovereignty, such as in the outlawry of the use of force (self-help) except in self-defense, and in regard to certain obligations —arising from treaties they freely contracted— as in the areas of environmental control, trade, and arms control; and (2) how nations, even powerful ones (like the U.S.), may find their foreign-policy decisions circumscribed by the restrictions of international law. For this part of the course, a familiarity with the neorealist theory of international politics will be a plus (although we will, where appropriate, discuss it in class).

Our study focuses on: (a) international law as a code of conduct; (b) the law’s mitigating effects on state behavior, e.g., on the “security dilemma” and the “relative gains” fixation; and (c) the cumulative effects of state interactions (practice) on the
law’s progressive development.

We will be concerned not merely with what international law prescribes, but equally with how nations behave within the parameters set by it, and, *a fortiori*, how state practice, when repeated over time, gives meaning to specific norms of the law. Because of the time constraint, this course does not purport to be an across-the-board study of all aspects of international law (such coverage properly belongs to a good undergraduate course, but cannot be duplicated here). Only a selected number of topics of international law will receive scrutiny —chosen both because of their intrinsic significance and, more especially, because they illustrate (i) the political foundations of international law, (ii) the legal dimensions of international political, economic, and security relations, and (iii) how international law constrains state behavior, often mitigating the self-help effects of systemic anarchy. Nevertheless, within the chosen topics, empirical cases will be examined, to demonstrate how international law is “found” and applied and, ultimately, whether international law makes a difference in the conduct of relations between and among international actors (both states and non-state actors).

The evolution of international law within the parameters of our changing Westphalian system over time will be examined. Questions such as the challenge that power politics poses to international law, and conversely the pull (or constraining effects) of international law on power politics, will be explored.

In the context of the international law-politics interplay, we shall also examine how doctrines such as self-determination and economic sovereignty, which may have arisen initially from domestic political debates but have found their way into modern international law, have helped transform the power configuration of our Westphalian system. For instance, over 80 former colonies and dependencies have gained statehood in exercise of their right of self-determination after World War II. The resultant post-1960 decolonization process has unalterably reshaped the world’s power structure beyond recognition, neorealist demurer (or oblivion) notwithstanding.

**TEXTS FOR PURCHASE**

^William Slomanson, *Fundamental Perspectives of International Law*, 5th ed. (Thompson/West, 2007);

^Charlotte Ku and David Diehl, eds., *International Law: Classic & Contemporary Readings*, 2d ed. (Lynne Rienner, 2003); paperback;

^David Bederman, *International Law Frameworks* (Foundation Press, 2001); pb;

ON RESERVE

*James C. Hsiung, *Anarchy & Order: The Interplay of Politics & Law in International Relations* (Lynne Rienner, 1997)


*Morton Kaplan and Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, *The Political Foundations of International Law* (John Wiley, 1961);

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CLASS CALENDAR & READINGS

(N.B.: Readings below provide varying degrees of depth, to suit student backgrounds at varying stages of intellectual development.)

1. International Law, Politics, and Political Science

   *Hsiung, 3-19
   ^Slomanson, 1-29; 54-57
   ^Bederman, 1-11
   ^Ku & Diehl, 1-22
   ^Barker (2000), 1-36
   +Coplin (for full citations, see References below)
   +Reisman (2001: in defense of world public order against terrorism)
   +Deutsch & Hoffmann

2. IL & the Changing Systemic Parameters: Universality of International Law (?); IR Theories & IL

   *Hsiung, 19-27
   *Kaplan and Katzenbach, chs. 2-3
   ^Barker, 70-96 (IR theories & IL)
   *Damrosch, et al., xxvii-xxxvi
   +Reisman (1990a)
   +Vogts (2001: on "hegemonic international law")
   +Reisman (1990a)

3. The International “Legislative Process”: Sources & Evidence of IL; Domestic Law & IL; Role of I0s

   ^Slomanson, 11-33; 38-41
   ^Bederman, 12-47; 158-169
4. Systemic Change; Self-Determination; Economic Sovereignty’
   and Non-State Actors
   *Hsiung, 129-151
   ^Slomanson, 117-180 (IOs); 191-227 (individuals and corps.)
   ^Ku & Diehl, 155-180
   *Damrosch, et al., 790-798 (Texaco Overseas Petroleum v. Libya)
   +Halperin

5. Foreign Policy & IL: Diplomacy; Responsibility of States
   ^Slomanson, 65-105; 323-350
   *Hsiung, 103-106
   ^Bederman, 80-92; 49-79
   +Moynihan
   +Perkins, chs. 2-3

6. Jurisdictional Conflict & Jurisdictional Immunities; and
   Protection of National & International Interests
   ^Bederman, 170-204
   ^Slomanson, 233-261
   *Hsiung, 87-103
   ^Barker, 137-175
   *Damrosch, et al., ch. 13

7. Conflict Resolution: Peaceful Settlement of Disputes
   ^Slomanson, 389-437
   *Hsiung, chs. 3-4
   *Damrosch, et al., ch. 11
   +Rosenne

8. Legal and Illegal Uses of Force: Self-Defense, Intervention,
   Collective Security, U.N. Peace-keeping
   ^Slomanson, 445-520
   ^Bederman, 205-232
   ^Ku & Diehl, 285-332
9. Regulation of Armaments: Arms Control, Nuclear Weapons and IL
   *Hsiung, ch. 2
   *Damrosch, et al., 1056-1059; 1077-1087
   +Jensen
   +Klausen
   +Falk (1997)

10. Regulation of International Economic Relations:
    Monetary & Trade Regimes
    ^Slomanson, 621-662
    ^Ku & Diehl, 231-254
    *Damrosch, et al., ch. 20
    +Jackson
    +Lowenfeld

11. Challenge to State Sovereignty: Human Rights and IL
    ^Slomanson, 529-579
    *Hsiung, ch. 6
    ^Bederman, 93-109
    ^Ku & Diehl, 333-384
    *Damrosch, et al., ch. 8
    +Forsythe (2000)
    +Reisman (1990b)

12. Community Interests over State Interests: Control Over
    the Environment and the Global Commons
    *Hsiung, ch. 8
    ^Ku & Diehl, 385-504
    ^Slomanson, 591-614
For all its importance, the topic of diplomatic and consular privileges and immunities receives only scanty attention here. Interested parties, especially current and prospective “practitioners” (foreign service personnel and IO officials), are urged to consult *Damrosch, et al., ch. 14; McClanahan; Bland; Wood & Serres, Sen; and Wilson.

OTHER REQUIREMENTS OF THE COURSE

Class attendance is absolutely essential, as we attempt to weave diverse strands from the readings and classroom lectures into a whole fabric. In addition to a final exam, a term paper is required, due at the time of the final. The topic of the paper should be chosen in consultation with me no later than the third week of class. A one-page précis on research design, the major hypothesis, a brief bibliographic note (please consult the References below first), and your expected findings, is due during the fifth week. My office hours are Mondays, 3:30-5:30 p.m.; and other times by appointment. My office is located at 726 Broadway (Rm. 717). My direct line is: (212) 998-8523; and e-mail address: <ich2@nyu.edu>.
REFERENCES


Panama. Boston: South End Press.


