This class focuses on recurrent problems and concepts that are encountered within the scientific study of international politics. The problem of deterrence, for instance, is one of these problems. The threat to carry out an action, if credible, can deter the other side from taking an action. Unfortunately, from the analyst’s point of view, this means that things we don’t see very often create the actions we observe. In game theoretic terms, it is off the equilibrium path behavior that shapes the observed equilibrium path behavior. What are the consequences of deterrence and how can we study them? This class seeks to address these kinds of problems.

The class examines both conflict studies and international political economy. Although the topics are all substantively based, a significant proportion of class time is dedicated to research design and theory development.

I emphasize student participation. I believe that to really understand something you must be able to explain it to someone else. For this reason, each student will be assigned a different reading that they will be responsible to present. Obviously, I do not expect that every one will be able to present the technical details of all the models, but I expect students to grasp the central themes and research design. You should aim to discuss your presentation with me prior to class.

In addition to presenting an occasional model, all participants are expect to have thoroughly read each of the paper and come prepared to discuss the models. In particular, students should think about the following: How does the reading answer the substantive question? What are the limits to the research design used? How could the work be extended, or used to address other questions? If the paper is theoretical, what empirically falsifiable predictions does it generate? What other approaches could be used to address the substantive questions?

Grades are determined by participation and a research paper. This paper can take several forms. You might want to extend the scope of one of the readings, or perhaps devise an empirical test for one of the theoretical pieces. Alternatively, you might research a topic of interest to you. The main requirement is that the paper involve some form of original research and scholarship. I am not interested in literature reviews. Students present their research design towards the end of the semester. These presentations are designed to enable constructive criticism and enhance quality of final papers.

You should purchase the following books. Most of the articles are available online through JSTOR. I have prepared a reading package for those not available electronically.

Books:

Syllabus

September 10th Deterrence and its Consequences

September 17th Bargaining and War
Powell Ch. 2, 3

September 24th Dynamic Theories of War
Robert Powell, Chapter 4.

October 1st Democratic Peace
**October 8th** The Domestic Consequences of War
Hein E. Goemans "Fighting for Survival: The Fate of Leaders and the Duration of War,: Journal of Conflict Resolution (October 2000).
Bueno de Mesquita, et. al. 2002 Logic of Political Survival Chap. 6 ,7 & 8.
Recommended: Goemans, Hein. War and Punishment: The causes of War Termination and the first world war.2000 Princeton University Press.

**October 15th** Who Wins Wars
Recommended:

**October 22nd** Audience Costs

Recommended.

**October 29th Cooperation Theory**


**November 5th Cooperation in Practice**


**November 12th International Institutions**


**November 19**

**Alliances**

Powell Chapter 5.


**November 26**

**Student presentations**

**December 3**

**Sanctions/ Terrorism**


**December 10**

**Student presentations**

**December 20**: Papers due at noon.