**Course Description:** This course is an introduction to modern political economy. The first part of the course is an overview of theoretical and empirical studies of electoral competition, legislative politics, and interest group politics. The second part of the course discusses applications of agency models to the study of the internal organization of government as well as the incentive structure in government decision-making. Topics include political accountability, clientelism, decentralization, judicial and bureaucratic politics.

**Grading:** In addition to regular attendance and class participation, which will account for 20% of your grade, there will in class midterm which will count for 30% and a final take home exam which will determine the remaining 50% of the grade.

**General references**


**Introduction**


Grossman Gene and Elhanam Helpman. 2001. *Special Interest Politics*, Ch 1

**Part I. Electoral Competition**

**Voter Behavior**

David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey Banks, 1998, *Positive Political Theory I*, Ch. 4 Sections 1-4
Grossman and Helpman, Ch. 3.1


**Candidate Behavior**


**Extensions**


**Part II. Legislative Politics and Interest Group Politics**

**Legislative Politics**


**Interest Group Politics**


**Part III. Political Agency and Accountability**

**Political Theory**

Przeworski Adam, Susan Stokes and Bernard Manin, Part 1, Ch. 1-4.

**Economic Models**

Besley Tim. Ch 3


**Part IV. Incentives in Government Decision-Making**

**Information, Accountability and Public Goods Provision**


**Clientelism and Redistributive Politics**


**Decentralization versus Centralization**


Bardhan Pranab and Dilip Mookherjee, "Decentralizing Anti-Poverty Program Delivery in Developing Countries" forthcoming in *Journal of Public Economics*


**Judicial and Bureaucratic Politics**
