Disjunctivism about perceptual appearances, as I conceive of it, is a theory which seeks to preserve a naïve realist conception of veridical perception in the light of the challenge from the argument from hallucination. The naïve realist claims that some sensory experiences are relations to mind-independent objects, that is to say if we conceive of this mental phenomena as episodes or events, they take among their constituents mind-independent objects. According to the disjunctivist, in a case of veridical perception this very kind of experience that you now have is of a kind which could not be occurring were one having an hallucination. We can accept the conclusion that hallucinations must either have mind-dependent constituents or none at all. Nothing will follow from this alone to show that experiences had when perceiving can have no mind-independent objects.

More specifically, I assume that the disjunctivist advocates naïve realism because they think that this position best articulates how sensory experience seems to us to be when simply we reflect on its character before engaging in further philosophical theorising. If the disjunctivist is correct in this contention, then accepting the argument from hallucination one must also accept that the nature of sensory experience is other than it seems to us to be. One may complain at this stage that if experience is other than it seems to be, a common understanding that we have of how we are in a position to know things about the world around us and to be able to think about the objects available to us is undermined. This would be to put us in the kind of position that Hume exploits for his scepticism with regard to the senses: we seem to be cut off from the world through lacking the kind of contact with it that we supposed ourselves to have.

This sceptical problem is not the same as the more familiar scepticism with regard to the external world associated with the Meditations. The Cartesian problem can be formulated simply by assuming that we can conceive the situation in which as far as one can tell just by reflection on one’s circumstances cannot be told from how things currently are, but in which one is deprived of conditions for perceiving and knowing through perception how things are. The challenge then made is for one to demonstrate to the challenger’s or one’s own satisfaction that one does not occupy this situation. The initial hypothesis does not require that one make any assumption about the nature of perceptual experiences, and in particular does not require that one assume that the very same experiential episodes could occur in hallucination as in perception. It would be a mistake, therefore, to suppose that advocating disjunctivism might address directly this kind of problem.

Now one might doubt that either the initial concern of the disjunctivist is well-motivated. For example, one might suppose that some form of intentional theory of perception is as well placed to articulate our commonsense conception of perceiving as naïve realism. Or, one might question whether the kind of consequence that rejecting such a commonsense conception of experience would have for our understanding of our knowledge of and reference to the things around us in the environment: so an error theory of perception is quite acceptable. But for the sake of this paper, I would like the reader to assume that these assumptions are to be taken seriously. For I suspect that there are many philosophers who are inclined to think that even if the disjunctivist could establish these concerns as a serious motivation for the doctrine, still the theory itself would be unacceptable because of the consequences the theory has elsewhere in our conception of the mind; namely in relation to the character of sensory experience and our awareness of that character.

What I want to do here is to try and articulate somewhat more the kind of gut resistance to disjunctivism that many feel (of course I may rather be too sympathetic to the project to succeed in doing this). Indeed the aim here is to try and locate as best I can what should be the most fundamental point of disagreement between a disjunctivist position and any of the alternatives. From a disjunctivist perspective, resistance to the account will be based on a false picture, either of sensory experience, or of the kind of knowledge we have of it. If we can locate
the place of must fundamental disagreement, the disjunctivist will then be placed to try and offer an explanation of why it should seem so counter-intuitive even if true.

In the bulk of the paper I will be taken up with identifying and elaborating the fundamental disagreements here. They will turn on the possibility according to the disjunctivist that someone should be a certain way experientially simply in virtue of their situation being indiscriminable through reflection from veridical perception. This seems to describe a situation, according to the opposing intuition in which phenomenal consciousness itself has been left out of the picture. In the first part of the paper I sketch in some more detail what I take to be the fundamental three commitments of disjunctivism. I then turn to the formulation of this worry about the seeming absence of phenomenal consciousness and its relation to older concerns about absent qualia. In turn this raises questions about the role of higher-order perspectives in characterising disjunctivism. I aim to sketch opposing models of how phenomenal consciousness and self-awareness fit together. In the brief, final section I connect these different models to different reactions to external world scepticism.

1. We can see the distinctive content of disjunctivism about the theory of perception as comprising three basic commitments. As I will argue, the commitment which seems most clearly counter-intuitive is the third of these, and our discussion for much of the rest of this paper will focus on what is and is not involved in this final commitment.

The first commitment reflects the antecedent acceptance of Naïve Realism. Taking as our starting point one of entirely veridical perception of, say a white picket fence as the thing it is, the disjunctivist’s first claim is:

(I) No instance of the specific kind of experience I have now, when seeing the white picket fence for what it is, could occur were one not to be perceiving such a mind-independent object as this.

We should understand this claim as the rejection of what McDowell calls, ‘the highest common factor’ view of sense experience. A naïve realist view of (entirely veridical) perceptual experience is as that of a relation between the perceiver and objects of perception. Taking sensory experiences to be events, these objects of perception are to be understood as constituents of the event in question. The naïve realist supposes it is an aspect of the essence of such experiential episodes that they have such experience-independent constituents. But there could be no such episodes given two further assumptions: what we might call Experiential Naturalism, that our sense experiences are themselves part of the natural causal order, subject to broadly physical and psychological causes; the second, Common Kind Assumption, that whatever kind of mental or more narrowly experiential event occurs when one perceives the very same kind of event could occur were one hallucinating.

With Experiential Naturalism we simply have the common observation that it is possible to bring about an hallucinatory experience through suitable manipulation of brain and mind. We do not need to engage in inducing appropriate correlation between subject and other entities. So if it is a necessary condition of the occurrence of such an experience that other entities exist and be suitably related to the experience, then the causes of experience must be sufficient to guarantee these conditions obtaining. From this we can derive the disjunction that either hallucinatory experiences lack any constituent elements, and hence impose no such necessary conditions on their occurrence, or the constituent elements they have are themselves constitutively dependent on the occurrence of that kind of experience. In such a situation, the causal conditions for experience will be sufficient for it to occur, since bringing about such an experience will thereby guarantee the obtaining of what are necessary conditions for it.

Now, suppose for the moment that hallucinatory experiences do meet the second of these models: they possess constituent elements which are experience-dependent. Then, by the Common Kind Assumption, whatever kind of experience does occur when one is perceiving, that
kind of experience can be present when one is hallucinating. So if an hallucinatory experience must be of a kind which constitutes the existence of its objects, then since the very same kind of experience is also present when perceiving, that too will constitute the existence of its objects. Mind-independent entities cannot then be constituents of the experience, contra the naïve realist. This gives the naïve realist reason to reject this conception of hallucination, a conception familiar from sense-datum accounts, and hence one which generally people might construe as implausible anyway. The alternative, to deny that the hallucination has any constituent elements, is, in effect, to embrace a representationalist or intentionalist construal of hallucination. For, of course, the denial that it has any constituent elements must be consistent with the evident fact that, from the subject’s perspective, it is as if there are various objects of awareness presented as being some way or other. So a description of what we might call the subject matter of the experience, what is ostensibly presented to the subject, seems to commit us to the existence of what the naïve realist thinks of as the constituents of experience in the case of veridical perception. Since we deny that there are any such constituents of the experience in the hallucinatory case, our talk here must be lacking in ontological import. We are treating the hallucinatory experience as if it is the presentation of objects when in fact it is not.

Again, by the Common Kind Assumption, whatever kind of experience occurs when perceiving that same kind of event is present when one hallucinates. So if the hallucinatory experience lacks any constituents, then the perceptual experience, being of the same kind, does not really have any constituents either. Although there may be objects which do act as appropriate values for our quantifiers or referents for our terms when describing how things are presented as being to the subject of the perceptual state, none of these should be taken actually to be aspects of the experiential state itself, since such a kind of experience can occur when the subject is not perceiving. Given the naïve realist’s commitment to thinking of perceptual experience as genuinely relational between the subject and a mind-independent world, this representationalist construal of hallucination is no more amenable than the sense-datum conception.

If we do not want to abandon Experiential Naturalism and deny that experience is part of the natural order, rather than some external condition on it, naïve realism is preserved only at the expense of denying the Common Kind Assumption. And that is what (I) does. Now of course, there clearly are construals of that assumption on which it is trivially false. For if we relax our conception of a kind of event sufficiently that any description of an event mirrors a kind, it is easy to find kinds which some individual events fall under and otherwise matching individuals fail to. You paint your picket fence white on Tuesday and I do so on Wednesday: mine is a Wednesday painting, yours a Tuesday one. Nothing has been said to show that this doesn’t make for different kinds of event. In parallel, all parties to the debate about perception and sensory appearance agree that there are descriptions true of your experience when perceiving – namely that it is an experience which on this occasion constitutes the perception of some object – which will not hold of the corresponding hallucination.

For the Common Kind Assumption to be a non-trivial falsehood, therefore, we need some conception of the privileged descriptions of experiences. For it to be a substantive matter that perceptions fail to be the same kind of mental episode as illusions or hallucinations, we need some characterisations of events which reflect their nature or what is fundamentally true of them. Given this it is easy to see how one might just think the debate not worth pursuing: one might think that there just are no interesting kinds for events to discriminate among the descriptions true of both perception and matching hallucination and those descriptions true of only one. I won’t address such pessimism about the state of debate directly here. Rather I will just assume for the sake of this discussion that we can make sense of the idea that there are some privileged classifications of individuals, both concrete objects and events, and that are talk of what is essential to a given individual tracks our understanding of the kinds of thing it is. We accept that entities can be classified by species and genus. But there is a most specific answer to the question, ‘What is it?’ That is, I will assume that for all such mental episodes or states there is a unique
answer to this question which gives its most specific, or fundamental, kind. In being a member of this kind, it will thereby be a member of other, more generic kinds as well. It is not to be assumed that for any description true of a mental event, there is a corresponding kind under which the event falls.

In rejecting the Common Kind Assumption, the disjunctivist might be seeking to deny that there is anything really in common with respect to being an experience or being a mental state which perceptions, illusions and hallucinations need have in common. This would be to deny even that the idea of a perceptual experience defines a proper mental kind, since all parties to the debate agree that this is a notion we can apply equally to veridical perceptions, illusions and hallucinations. Yet given that disjunctivism seeks to defend naïve realism, the rejection of the Common Kind Assumption only requires that one claim that the most specific kind of experience one enjoys when perceiving not occur when having an illusion or hallucination. Given this, the fact that the experience enjoyed when hallucinating could not have mind-independent objects as constituents would not entail that the same would have to be so of veridical perception experience. So the disjunctivist preserves naïve realism through affirming (I) and thereby denying the Common Kind Assumption.

The commitment to naïve realism is probably not shared by most readers, but this is not to say that the idea that some sense experiences should be relations to objects in the world around us is a bizarre or counter-intuitive suggestion. What is puzzling, rather, is what the disjunctivist is thereby forced to say about other cases of sense experience, illusion and hallucination. Now it may appear that all that the disjunctivist has to say is something entirely negative: that these are not cases of having the specific kind of experience one has when veridically perceiving. But in fact there is something more to say here which derives from what ought to be common ground to all parties to the debate.

Suppose one starts out only with the notion of veridical perception, what could introduce one to the idea of sensory experience more generally, to include illusion and hallucination? One route is through the kind of thought experiments that Descartes uses at the beginning of the Meditations. Consider your current perception of the environment around you. Perhaps you are staring out at a late spring evening; or lying in summer grass; or sitting in a dusky office reading a philosophy paper. It is quite conceivable for you that there should be a situation in which you could not tell that things were not as they are now: so it might seem to you as if you were then staring at a white picket fence, or taking in the smell of new mown grass, even though you unknown to you in that situation you were not doing so. Your perspective on the situation would not, in that situation, distinguish how things were from how they are now. Now we might say that how you are in that situation is a matter of having a sense experience which is not a case of perception – it is at least cases like this which we mean to include in the extension of the notion of sense experience. Now the disjunctivist can exploit this conception of experience in order to explicate his or her preferred notion of sense experience in general, i.e. that which generalises across veridical perception, illusion and hallucination. This gives us the second commitment of disjunctivism:

(II) The notion of perceptual experience in general is that of being indiscriminable through reflection from veridical perception

We should immediately note three points about (II). First, the relevant conception of what it is for one thing to be indiscriminable from another is that of not possibly knowing it to be distinct

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1 We have a broader conception of sense experience than this, of course. For we allow that we can have illusions and hallucinations which are not veridical perceptions but which are not indiscriminable from perceptions; their character may vary wildly from what the corresponding perception would be like. For the sake of this paper, I want to work with the simplifying assumption that throughout we are to deal with what we might call perfect hallucinations. For some discussion of how we can generalize away from this case see ‘LOSA’.
from the other. It is not part of the starting point here that these avowedly modal notions of impossibility and knowledge should be reducible to, for example, facts about the functional organisation or sorting behaviour of a subject. More exactly, since here we are concerned with knowing of individual experiences whether they are among the veridical perceptions or not, we can gloss it as:

$$\neg \Diamond K_{\text{through reflection}} \rightarrow x \text{ is one of the } V_s$$

(Not possible to know through reflection that it is not one of the veridical perceptions.) This condition is met whenever $x$ is one of the $V_s$, but if there are truths which are unknowable through reflection, then the condition can be met in other ways. Second, the restriction ‘through reflection’ is an important and central addition here. When we describe the original Cartesian thought experiment, we are considering a case in which we unknowingly find ourselves in a situation which we can’t know is not one of staring at a white picket fence. But we equally have a conception of sense experiences occurring where one has been tipped off about their non-perceptual status. If I take you into the bowels of William James Hall and subject you to an expensive visual-cortical stimulator so as to induce in you the hallucination of an orange, it seems quite conceivable that I should put you in a situation which in a certain respect is just like seeing an orange. In one important respect it is not: I have told you the experiment you will be subject to. So you do have information which rules this situation out from being one in which you are perceiving the orange. Talk of ‘through reflection’ is intended to capture this possibility. The situation in which you are knowingly having a hallucination of an orange is like a Cartesian situation in which you don’t know of the hallucination, arguably because if we bracket that information then what is available to you otherwise in the circumstance of hallucination does not discriminate between the two situations. As we will see further below, the inclusion of this restriction and the notion of introspectively grounded knowledge of experience which it exploits is central both to developing a coherent account of disjunctivism and to a resistance to its picture of what sense experience could be.

Third, we should note that condition (II) just taken by itself ought to be interpretable as at least extensionally adequate on all theories of perceptual experience. Of course, the disjunctivist’s opponent will not think that this properly gives an account of the nature of sense experience, and nor, for the matter, may it really articulate the concept or conception that we all have of what sense experience is. Nonetheless, the condition cannot fail to count as a sense experience anything which genuinely is one. For according to someone who accepts CKA, the relevant condition for being an experience, being a $P$-event, say, will be exemplified by both perceptions and perfect hallucinations. In both cases then the $x$ in question will be one of the $V_s$, namely a $P$-event, and so it will not be possible for one to know that it is not one. The only way in which the extensions of our concept of sense experience and what is defined by (II) may fail to coincide is if (II) really is too liberal: that is if it will include as instances of experience episodes which fail to be $P$-events. Now, as we will see below, the full import of this possibility is a delicate matter. But at first sight, this is not a possibility that a theorist will wish to countenance. For after all, if in meeting (II) we describe a situation which from the subject’s own perspective is just as if one is seeing the white picket fence (as the Cartesian thought experiment suggests), then how could it fail to count as a visual experience of a white picket fence? Someone who wishes to rule out such a case because it is not a $P$-event, whatever the particular account of experience is, seems to be offering us too restrictive an account of sense experience, interpreting what should at best be a sufficient condition for having a sense experience with a necessary condition. This suggests that a defender of CKA will also hold that one cannot be in a situation indiscernible through reflection from having a sense experience without thereby having a sense experience. As a result this imposes certain constraints on any account of the nature of sense experience; namely that these should be states which we can through introspection detect the absence of as well as their presence.
So the disjunctivist’s opponent need not reject (II) itself, or think of it as obviously implausible. They may agree that our initial understanding of what sense experience is, is as (II) dictates, but then offer a more substantive account of what it takes for something to be an experience and so meet the condition in (II). On the other hand, even if they think that the condition laid down in (II) itself is too thin or modest as an account of our understanding of sense experience, still for the reasons we have rehearsed above, they are unlikely to complain that (II) gets the extension of our concept of sense experience wrong. So (II) itself is unlikely to lead to any counter-intuitive consequences and on its own can hardly be considered controversial. In contrast, one might suggest that the combination of (I) and (II) does together induce a surprising further claim about perceptual experience. (I) commits us to thinking that there are some sense experiences which have a distinctive nature lacked by others, while (II) insists that all of these can nonetheless be indiscriminable from each other introspectively. Together this suggests that the phenomenal characters of two experiences can be different even while one of them is indiscriminable from the other. Many have supposed that what we mean by the phenomenal character of an experience is just that aspect of it which is introspectible, and hence that any two experiences which are introspectively indiscriminable must share their phenomenal characters, even if they differ in other ways.\(^2\)

Now while some such complaint may have widespread support in discussions of phenomenal consciousness, it is not clear whether it should be taken as a primitive claim which is somehow obvious, and the rejection of which is incredible. After all, we can make at least some sense of the idea that distinct individuals, distinct events, distinct scenes can all be perceptually presented to us and yet be perceptually indiscriminable from each other. It is not obvious that we should deny that of the individual experiences of the various individuals, events and scenes have as part of their phenomenal natures the presentation of those very objects. If so, distinct experiences will be different in ways which is not necessarily detectible through introspective reflection. Even if it is right, in the end, to rule out any such conception of experience, the view is not so patently ridiculous as to show that the principle of phenomenal indiscriminability guarantees sameness of phenomenal character is an evident truth. If we think this principle correct, and hence think that (I) and (II) could not be true together, then there will be something more basic or primitive that commits us to this principle.

This principle requires that any two experiences that are introspectively indiscriminable must have all aspects of phenomenal character the same. A weaker claim would just be that any two such experiences must have a phenomenal character in common. On one way of interpreting the conjunction of (I) and (II), one could take the disjunctivist to be offering an account consistent with this weaker principle. For the disjunctivist could then be taken as supposing that matching with (II) will be the generic notion of phenomenal character, what all sense experiences of the relevant kind have in common. The account of veridical perception which motivates (I) could then be taken as offering a specification of just one of the determinate kinds of phenomenal character one could have. Hence the relevant instance of (II) indicates the full extent of situations in which one can have the determinable kind of mental event, visual experience of a white picket fence, say. And then different instances of this kind of experience may be brought about in different ways: perhaps in some instances one is aware of a sense-datum array; in other cases one entertains an appropriate sensory representation; according to the naïve realist in veridical perception one is presented with the white picket fence itself as part of the experiential situation. If we interpreted the claims in this way, then we could hold on to something as correct in the initial complaint. (II) would be indicating for us the range of cases in which episodes share a

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\(^2\) In effect, this is to press what I called principle (IND) in ‘The Reality of Appearances’: ‘If two experiences are indistinguishable for the subject of them then the two experiences are of the same conscious character’ (p.81).
phenomenal character, now thought of as a determinable, even if they then have other differences which may also be significant differences even in phenomenal terms.

For all we have so far said, this is a possible way of interpreting disjunctivism. Yet, I think it is a conception of what sense experience is which the disjunctivist wants to rule out. The disjunctivist will deny that there is any super-ordinate conception of sense experience which we can understand independent of the special case of veridical perception. Veridical perceptions do not stand to sense experience in general simply as determinates to determinables. And the sharpest way to see the extra condition here is to turn to what I take the third commitment of the disjunctivist to be. This commitment is not one which disjunctivists will necessarily avow as part of their starting point, and indeed McDowell would deny the need for it. One formulation of the argument from hallucination focuses on questions about the causal conditions for bringing about hallucinations, and in particular works with the thought that it is possible that a hallucination can be brought about through the same proximate causal conditions as a veridical perception – what I shall call a causally matching hallucination. While I would argue that the standard form of this argument does not succeed in showing that the Common Kind Assumption must be endorsed, a reverse form of the argument does suggest that in cases of causally matching hallucination, whatever kind of experience is produced in that case of hallucinating, that same kind of experience also occurs in the corresponding perceptual case. Since there is now a common kind of experience to such hallucinations with perceptions, as well one which is peculiar just to the case of veridical perception, there is pressure on the disjunctivist to say what kind of experience this could be which does not make redundant the naïve realism the disjunctivist seeks to defend. The answer is

(III) For certain experiences, at least, namely causally matching hallucinations, there is no more to the phenomenal character of such experiences than that of being indiscriminable from corresponding veridical perceptions.

For, of course, a given visual perception of a white picket fence is indiscriminable from such a perception of a white picket fence and hence falls under this kind in just the way that a perfect hallucination would. What is true of the veridical perception, though, is that there is more to be said of what it is like. For the causally matching hallucination, though, the disjunctivist must say that there is no more to its experiential character than possessing the negative epistemological condition of not possibly being known through introspective reflection of not being such a perception of a white picket fence.

Given the commitment to (III) it is clear that the disjunctivist cannot think that there is a broad determinable condition, being a sense experience, of which being a veridical perception is just a determination, since there can be no case of actually instantiating a determinable without thereby instantiating a determination. Moreover it brings out the radical suggestion that the disjunctivist wishes to make, that our understanding of what hallucinatory experience is like is entirely derivative of our grasp of the nature of veridical perception.

But this concluding point also, I think, brings out quite what is so incredible about the disjunctivist’s position. For having now described the causally matching hallucination in this way, the disjunctivist seems to be saying that while proper phenomenal consciousness is absent in the case of the causally matching hallucination, since there is nothing positive to say about what it is like, the subject is not in a position to know this, since it is ex hypothesi indiscriminable from veridical perception. And it is hardly surprising to resist the suggestion that hallucination could be this way.

Of course so described the position suggests nothing other than the worry about absent qualia. It has long been common to complain against functionalist theories of mind that it is quite conceivable that an entity may fulfil all of the functional conditions for possessing a mind and yet lack any qualitative consciousness. Such a creature would be a philosophical zombie. In our current case, however, the concern seems to be with a restricted or minimal absence: a subject
who lacks genuine phenomenal consciousness in the case of causally matching hallucination but yet is not in a position to know this about his or her experience.

The worry here is not, I take it, that this is a genuine possibility. The concern is rather the reverse. The objection is that surely it is incredible that anyone could think that being phenomenally conscious like this, indicating the way one is now (indifferently between perception and hallucination) could just be a matter of the obtaining of a certain epistemological condition, and secondly to suppose that someone could seemingly be in the position of failing to discern the absence of phenomenal features and so fulfilling the condition of their situation being indiscriminable from visual perception while lacking any further sensory character. The worry here combines both a conviction of what it must take for there to be phenomenal consciousness and how we are in a position to know about it.

2. In the context of debate about functionalism or more recently the physical grounding of consciousness, it is unclear whether either side must think it a genuine possibility that the functional or physical conditions should be present yet phenomenal consciousness absent. For example, functionalists inclined towards treating sensory consciousness in terms of dispositions to believe will deny that fixing the same functional conditions just would not be sufficient for a subject to have sensory consciousness. So the typical argumentative strategy when pressing the conceivability of absent qualia is normally to claim that it is at least conceivable that the relevant conditions should be present and yet phenomenal consciousness be absent. Such criticisms are external to the theoretical position criticised.

Yet that does not seem to be the situation in debate with the disjunctivist. For the disjunctivist typically will not accept, for example, a belief-dispositional analysis of veridical perception. Rather, the disjunctivist seems to be committed for the case of genuine veridical perception to a rather rich account of phenomenal consciousness in terms of relations to mind-independent objects. So by the disjunctivist’s own lights there is more to phenomenal consciousness in many cases than is present in the case of the subject when having a causally matching hallucination. So it seems the disjunctivist him or herself ought to be committed to the description of this case in terms of the absence of phenomenal consciousness without the subject’s awareness of this fact.

Now I think the disjunctivist ought to resist this description of their view about hallucinatory experience. For the disjunctivist need not adopt a view on which they have to deny the intuition that there is equally something it is like for a subject who has a perfect hallucination as for someone who is veridically perceiving. But it is a nice question exactly the proper way to respond. Returning to our discussion of (II) one might think a swift reply is to hand. Surely, one may insist, if the situation of the hallucinator is really indiscriminable through reflection from the perceiver, then there could be nothing missing phenomenally for the subject. What more could there be which the subject is lacking?

In the context of this challenge, the response is too quick. For, of course, the opponent may well agree that it could not really be possible to have the seeming presence of phenomenal consciousness in its actual absence. For such an opponent it could not be the case that it seemed to a subject as if phenomenal consciousness were present and yet the necessary conditions for such consciousness be absent. The complaint, though, is that the disjunctivist him or herself seems to be committed to that possibility given that the disjunctivist does note the contrast between the presence of genuine presence to the subject of the mind-independent world and the mere negative epistemological condition of not possibly telling one’s current situation from veridical perception. Rather than simply insisting on the necessary conjunction of phenomenal consciousness with its seeming presence to a subject, the disjunctivist needs to explain why we should grant that the satisfaction of the negative epistemological condition is sufficient in itself to meet the condition.
That is to say, to reject the objection the disjunctivist must insist that the obtaining of the negative epistemological condition in itself guarantees the presence of subjectivity – that the individual in question thereby has a point of view on the world and that there is something that it is like for one to be as that individual is. We do not need to appeal over and above this to any positive phenomenal characteristics the lack of which entails the absence of genuine consciousness.

One way of putting the disagreement here, then, is to think of it in terms of contrasting conceptions of phenomenal consciousness, and how such consciousness relates to self-awareness and self-conscious knowledge of experience. Underlying the objection, we might suggest, is a picture of phenomenal consciousness as a condition which obtains independently of one’s being in a position to know that one is so, such that one’s recognition that one is having experience, and experiencing things to be one way or another. It is the presence of this independent condition which the disjunctivist seems to be denying is present in a case of causally matching hallucination and thereby seems to be denying the presence of genuine consciousness in that case.

But in its place, the disjunctivist may insist that we cannot conceive of phenomenal consciousness independently of the higher order perspective that can be taken on it. And hence to conceive of someone’s position as being indiscriminable for them from veridical perception is thereby to imagine them as properly having a point of view and hence subjectivity. It is for this reason that there need be nothing more to them being conscious in this way.

Yet to insist on this as the way out of our initial puzzle about absent qualia and philosophical zombies is to invite yet a further concern. For surely we want to allow that there are sentient beings which possess phenomenal consciousness but which are not capable of making self-conscious judgements about their own psychological states. To appeal to a higher-order perspective on conscious states in the case of causally matching hallucinations is to appeal to something which would be lacking in the case of such creatures. Yet if we are capable of having phenomenal consciousness when hallucinating, surely such creatures are equally capable. So doesn’t this show that the issues raised about phenomenal consciousness here are just independent of the questions about any higher-order perspective on conscious experience, and hence that the response is inadequate? To answer this properly we need to address this problem directly.

3. Suppose that dogs are sentient but lack any interesting theory of mind. In particular let us suppose that they lack the cognitive sophistication to entertain thoughts about their own experiences and the similarities and differences among them. Note that this is not to deny them thoughts about the objects of perception and the similarities and differences among them. The disjunctive theory can make sense of the thought that a dog’s visual perception of a bunch of carrots is different in character from the dog’s olfactory apprehension of a bowl of meaty chunks. The first experience, after all, may have among its constituents visually manifest objects and qualities such as carrots, the orange of their flesh and the green of the leaves; while the latter experience involves the smelly presence of jelly and wet cooked meat. So far this fits with our intuitions that the world can be a relatively varied place for the dog, even if it lacks the sophistication to think about the world in as many rich ways as we can.

But if we move from the case of perception to ask how in general the disjunctivist is to think of dog sensory experience, then the answer is presumably to be supplied by (II), that the dog’s experiences should be the same or different to the extent that they are discriminable or indiscriminable through reflection. Yet if we are asking of the dog’s own knowledge of the sameness or difference of his or her experiences, then we already have the answer that the dog does not know of the distinctness of any of their experiences, for the dog lacks all knowledge that any given experience is of this or that kind. From this it seems to follow that by (II) each experience the dog has is of the same kind as any other experience that the dog has. Thought of
one way, one might then suppose that the dog simply has the one experience. But given that we can make sense by the disjunctivist’s lights of the various perceptions that the dog has, it is probably better to embrace the absurdity of supposing that each experience would have to exemplify every possible kind of experience that the dog could enjoy. Each experience would exemplify all, and indeed contradictory, phenomenal characteristics at once.

How can the disjunctivist avoid this unfortunate conclusion? The first response is to consider a slightly less aggravated version of the problem. For (II) read in one way will generate problems for us even if we stick to self-aware human beings. Imagine the case of John who has normal sensory sensitivity but is very much in his own world and inattentive to things he sees or tastes. Let’s suppose that John doesn’t do well at telling scarlet apart from vermilion. Just as he is bad at telling apart samples of these shades of red, so we may suppose him inattentive at telling apart the visual experiences of these samples. In such cases it seems perfectly appropriate to say not only that John doesn’t discriminate the samples or experiences, but also that he can’t. But this seems to commit us to saying that the experience of scarlet and the experience of vermilion are indiscriminable for John, and hence by (II) that the experiences should be the same. Yet it was no part of our initial commitment that the experiences should have to be the same: we were making an observation about John’s inclination to attend and the judgements he is liable to make; nothing need be included in this about how he will or will not experience the world to be.

Now in the case of John, we can note that there are different ways we can be talking about someone’s inability or incapacity to do something. Often when we note not only that someone has not done something but that they could not have done it, that they lack the ability or the capacity, then we indicate that there is some particular ground present which is operative in their failure. When Nancy stumbles on the dance floor, one might say not only that she is failing to dance the tango but that she simply can’t dance it. In saying on this occasion that she can’t dance it, one might not mean that there are no circumstances in which she succeeds in dancing the tango, or even that normally she is able to. Perhaps Nancy is a dance instructor, and the tango is her speciality; however, this evening given how much she has had to drink, there is just no way that her limbs can coordinate successfully to produce a tango.

When we talk about particular individuals’ incapacities or inabilities, therefore, we often have in mind some particular condition obtaining in them in virtue of which we have the failure. That one person could not on a particular occasion do something, does not mean that they couldn’t on some other occasion, or that others cannot, or that a different range of people could not do that thing. However, sometimes we have ways of talking which aspire, as one might say, to greater objectivity or impartiality. For example, if you take a suit to the tailor’s for invisible mending, the tailor will not have lived up to his or her advertisements if they mend the clothes with thick, bright red thread but then pluck your eyes out. If clothes genuinely have had invisible mending, then the mend should not be visible to anyone – and not just not visible to the average English person who has learnt not to pay too close attention to others’ attire, but not visible to Italians or Americans more used to admiring the fine textiles with which the human form can be clothed. Here we seem to have an appeal to an impersonal talk of inability or incapacity: we are talking about an aspect of the object in question, rather than some way a given individual or group of individuals is such that they can’t succeed in a particular task.

Now, I suggest, when the disjunctivist is talking about the case of John, the relevant claim of indiscriminability to fix the kinds of experience which John is having are the impersonal or objective such claims: that is we are interested in the claim that John is in a situation for which it is impossible simpliciter and not just impossible for John to tell apart through introspective reflection from a veridical perception of a patch of scarlet. In this case, the experience of a swatch of vermilion will not count as indiscriminable from this perception because although John himself might fail to notice the difference, there is a difference between the two situations which one could through reflection come to attend to and notice. And, the disjunctivist wishes to claim, it is
our understanding of this fact which grounds our recognition that John’s experiences can differ from each other. Although attention typically does lead to differences in sense experience – and according to some empirical hypotheses makes for all the difference between presence of phenomenal consciousness and its absence – we do have the conception that it is possible for experience to be a certain way whether focally attended to or not. And in this particular instance, we find quite conceivable that there was a way things were for John had he but directed his attention. In appealing to the impersonal sense of indiscriminability the disjunctivist can make sense of this conception.

So far we can make sense of there being facts about the discrimination of John’s experiences even if he fails to discriminate them and even if there is a ground in virtue of which he could not but fail to note the difference. Yet John at least has the capacity to make judgements about his own experiences and is self-aware of them even if inattentive to them. How could this help with the case of the dog? For the dog itself is not in a position to know either way about its experiences, given the hypothesis that it does lack self-awareness and does not have the cognitive capacities to know that its experiences are one way rather than another.

Certainly when we reflect on experience ‘from the inside’, with a concern for the question what it is like to experience in this way rather than that, we cannot but engage in this in a self-aware and self-conscious way. For so to imagine experience is precisely to adopt the higher-order perspective on such experience and think about what it is like to be that way. That a higher-order perspective is involved in so imagining does not necessarily mean that the higher-order perspective is thereby part of the imagined situation. Here we have a familiar parallel with Berkeley’s tree in the quad. In visualising the tree, one has a psychological state with the tree as object which one takes to be inessential to the existence of the tree. Moreover, one may even agree to the more controversial claim that in visualising what one imagines is imagining seeing, and so in one way the content of imagination is of the object together with a psychological state. Nonetheless the aim of so imagining may well be to imagine the object as it would be with no perceiver present; the elements of the act of imagining which go beyond this task, one’s act of imagining itself, and the imagined psychological state through which one imagines the tree, are all discounted. So too, one might suppose with imagining experience. Although one cannot but imagine it from a self-aware perspective and thereby imagine self-aware experience in another creature, when one so imagines, one may take as one’s task to imagine experience which is not self-aware.

Now I suggest that to the extent that we do have an understanding of the varieties of experience of dogs, we exploit such an imaginative project in ascribing determinate kinds of experience to the dog. And hence we adopt such a higher-order perspective on an experiential situation in imagining things to be a given way for the dog. So we are in a position to know experiences as the same or different through reflection, and it with that knowledge in play that we ascribe experiences of one kind rather than another to the dog. There is after all a higher-order perspective in play in the ascription of experience, and any understanding we have of that ascription, even if the higher-order perspective is not that of the actual subject to whom the experience is ascribed.

4. Given that we are exploiting an impersonal conception of indiscriminability, and in doing so exploiting a self-conscious perspective that the subject of experience need not him, her, itself share, it is clear that the disjunctivist’s claim should not be taken as directly telling us about the relevant non-modal facts which ground the truths the disjunctivist claims make it the case that the subject is having one experience rather than another. We are not to suppose that its being impossible to know through reflection that $x$ is not one of the $F$s is true in relation to John’s experience, or the dog’s experience, because of certain further psychological facts about either: it is not constituted simply by their dispositions to sort entities be they the external objects of perception, or the internal psychological states which correspond to these.
Of course it is tempting to suppose that these claims must be grounded in further facts about the situation, if not psychological facts relating to the subject’s judgements about or behaviour towards the relevant realm, then in facts about the realm itself. That is, one might say, if the claims of indiscriminability are not to be grounded simply in how John or the dog can or cannot judge themselves, aren’t they simply grounded in our knowledge of the identity of the kinds of experience the subject enjoys?

Moreover, one might think that this further temptation really is something forced on us, once we recognise the way in which the corresponding notions of indiscriminable through sight, or smell, or taste actually work. For suppose someone presents you with a cunningly crafted bar of soap which looks just like an Amalfi lemon. Sometimes people craft soap to look lemon like in a way which makes them both recognisably lemon-shaped bars of soap but clearly different all the same from any genuine lemon. But we can imagine a master craftsman of soap sculpture making a soap lemon so perfectly that there is no way just with the naked eye to tell the bar of soap from a genuine lemon. In this case the bar of soap and the lemon it was based on may well be visually indiscriminable. And in saying this, I don’t mean merely to be saying that I, with little interest in the particular ways in which the surface of lemons are textured when waxed and when not, cannot tell them apart, but rather than one just couldn’t tell them apart.

This additional condition brings with it a certain objectivity with the impersonality, and so the possibility of someone being mistaken about this matter. For example, we might imagine an over-confident television chef convinced that they can spot the real lemon from the bar of soap. Moreover we may suppose that purely by chance they pick the real lemon as the lemon when presented with the two. And in explaining their success the chef may claim that there was just a way that the lemon looked which the soap lacked. And now we can see that such a claim could just be wrong – the proper explanation of the choice was something incidental, not to do with how either object looked. What the chef is mistaken about is not only his own grounds for the judgement (or lack of them) but also something about the objects in question: in being visually indiscriminable they share something, the same appearance or look.

What is true of looks and lemons is true too of smells and tastes. If two wines just could not be told apart by use of the palate, then the two wines do share a taste. There will be a smell in common among the various objects which no dog could tell apart. We have focused on the idea of introspective reflection and on the possibility of cases of distinct experiences which cannot be told apart in this way. Moreover, we have focused on an impersonal or objective sense of being indiscriminable through such reflection, one which as we have stressed is not grounded in the particular varieties of acuity that any given individual might have. So is this not to say that the indiscriminability in question must be grounded in some common objective features which the situations share? Doesn’t this lead us after all to say that if two experiences cannot be told apart through introspective reflection then that must be because the two share something which introspection here tracks: namely a phenomenal character.

If the worry sticks then it looks as if the moves we have made to preserve the disjunctivist from the problematic example of the dog, undermine the position by showing the inevitable need for a notion of phenomenal character which will common to all of the indiscriminable situations, veridical perceptions and hallucinations. But, I suggest, the concern here in the end does not spell out a problem for the disjunctivist, but rather indicates something special about the case of introspective reflection which marks the fundamental difference between the disjunctivist and his or her opponents: we have returned to the point of disagreement about the status of hallucination as genuinely phenomenally conscious or not. But to see this we need first to ask more about the intuition that the lemon and the bar of soap must have something in common and how that analogy can or cannot carry over to the case of introspective reflection.
5. Sticking with the assumption that claims of indiscriminability are ways of talking about the impossibility of knowing through a given means, we might start out noting that there is no simple entailment from the impossibility of knowing by sight that the bar of soap is not a lemon, that it must thereby have something in common with a lemon which one picks on by sight. Unless we assume some form of verificationism, we cannot rule out the possibility of some truths, here the negative fact that the bar of soap is not a lemon is just not available for knowledge through use of one’s eyes.

Yet perhaps within a very limited purview a kind of verificationism is appropriate. For, we might note, in the case of visually observable phenomena, our use of sight in good viewing conditions is an appropriate way to come to know of the presence, or absence, of such phenomena. Vision, at least in ideal circumstances, is a way of coming to know things about one’s environment, which things being the kinds of things that vision can tell one about. When one fails to tell apart the lemon and the soap, the failure is not a matter of the breakdown of the visual system or the conditions for viewing these objects. So if vision is normally a way of telling whether things are thus and so within the visible world, then the fact that vision cannot tell our two objects apart suggests that with respect to the visible world there is something that it does detect in common between them. And that fact, that there is something to be picked up on here, we mark with talk of the look, the visual appearance or just the appearance which the two things share.

So, I suggest, we are inclined for the objects of sense to suppose that there must be something in common among things not discriminated by the senses, precisely because the senses provide us with ways of determining how things are in the world independently of their operation. If this is right, then we will be impelled to accept the parallel move concerning introspective reflection to the extent that we think of it as offering us similarly an aspect on the inner realm of experience to be detected as the same or different.

This raises a familiar question: to what extent can there be any fruitful analogy between introspective reflection and perception or observation? It is common now to argue that on the whole no good analogy can be drawn, that we need a non-observational conception of self-awareness. Various different strategies of argument have been offered as grounds for the disanalogy, but what I want to highlight here is a line of thought which connects with the starting point of our discussion of disjunctivism, and the conception it employs of sense experience in general.

In relation to the operation of the senses, we both have the conception of appropriately favourable circumstances in which use of the senses can deliver knowledge of some subject matter, and the possibility of less favourable circumstances in which one makes a judgement associated with the same modality but it fails to be fully warranted. When viewing an ordinary street scene in good light, I am in a position to tell whether any of the medium sized objects in view are red or not. If anything is red, then I am in a position to gain visual knowledge that it is so; and if nothing is red, then I am in a position on the basis of visual information to conclude that there is nothing red there. As the focus on cases of illusion and hallucination underline, there are situations in which I make visual judgements which are not candidates for knowledge: the lighting may not be good, I may be unwell or you may have induced an hallucination in me. Mistakes in judgement I make in such situations need not be due to any failure on my part; rather the judgement I make may well coincide with how things seem to me to be. It is just that my judgements will be knowledge in coinciding with perceptual seemings only where perceptual judgement is made in favourable circumstances.

Suppose that one conceived of introspective reflection as a determinate modality of knowledge, akin to the employment of one’s eyes in vision or ears in audition. Then we might hypothesise that there are cases in which, when favourably employed, one’s introspective judgements will be knowledge. In contrast, there should be cases in which one is not ideally placed to determine things through introspective means, and, if this is to parallel the case of sense
perception, how things then seem to one will not coincide with how they really are. Although one’s introspective judgements coincide with how things seem to one introspectively, they will fail to be knowledge because they do not coincide with how one’s conscious mind really is.

Now how we first introduced the idea of a perfect hallucination does not leave room for this model. All that that required was that there should be a situation in which from the subject’s perspective the situation should be indiscriminable from one of veridical perception. While we can fix such situations without reference to the actual use of any sense modality, for all that is needed is that from the subject’s perspective it is not knowable that the sense modality is not in play, nothing requires that the restriction ‘through reflection’ actually indicate a given mechanism being employed. Hence a situation in which one failed to employ properly an introspective mechanism but which from the subject’s perspective seemed to be a case of employing such a mechanism would count as a situation in which it seemed to the subject as if things were a certain way (e.g. not knowably distinct from one of seeing a white picket fence). In such a situation, then, how the subject’s phenomenal consciousness seemed would be how it was, and a subject’s judgements which coincided with this would thereby be knowledge.

The import of this for our current discussion is that it undermines the rationale for supposing that there must be a common appearance across indiscriminable situations not only for the senses but also for introspection. In the case of the senses, we can note that across the presentations of objects which are indiscriminable there are identical seemings occurring in circumstances favourable to knowledge. That this is not a failing of the relevant sense modality, that it is not a case in which circumstances are not ideal, is reflected in our preparedness to grant that there is after all something to be known across the two, a shared appearance. When we turn to introspection, though, there is no independent state of affairs to which the seemings common to perception and hallucination need be responding – or there need not be given that we accept (II). For in the hallucinatory case what makes for this being one of its seeming as if there is a white picket fence is just that that is how things seem – i.e. that from the subject’s point of view it is not knowably distinct from seeing a white picket fence. So there is no further feature which the subject’s introspective reflection could be picking up on independent of this fact.

Once we reject the observational model of introspection, for reasons familiar beyond the claims of disjunctivism, there is no independent handle on the idea that the perspective of introspective reflection on one’s circumstances must always be tracking facts about phenomenal consciousness constituted independently of that perspective. The disjunctivist is committed to denying that that perspective does track independent phenomenal facts in the case of causally matching hallucination. For in that case, the fact that it is indistinguishable from veridical perception constitutes how things are from the subject’s perspective.

6. As I have told the story here, the disjunctivist should resist the characterisation of his or her position in which the subject who has a causally matching hallucination suffers from local loss of phenomenal consciousness. All parties will agree that the subject of hallucination lacks some of the conditions of veridical perception. For those who accept the Common Kind Assumption these conditions are external to the characterisation of the kind of sensory experience one has when perceiving. Not so for the naïve realist: the best characterisation of what one’s veridical sense experience is like must in part be in terms of those elements of the environment manifestly perceived. So those positive elements of the sensory circumstance must be lacking when it comes to the case of the causally matching hallucination.

The deep point of disagreement arises here. Given the introspective support for naïve realism, the disjunctivist will insist that it is not that anything more is evident about the circumstance that one is in when having a causally matching hallucination apart from the seeming presence of features which are in fact absent and are only present when veridically perceiving. But this fact alone is sufficient to constitute the existence of a putative point of view on the world.
What pushes the initial worry we started out with, I suggest, is the conviction that there
must be more than this even to the causally matching hallucination. In reading this, you are not
currently hallucinating. The disjunctivist agrees that there is more to your experience than just the
negative epistemological property of being indiscriminable from this veridical perception, there is
the positive character of the veridical perception itself. But now, one wants to say, just as I can
tell that there is more in this case, so too I would be equally placed in the case of causally
matching hallucination, so there must be something I am picking up on, the phenomenal character
which has been left out by the disjunctivist. To adopt this position, I’ve suggested, is to suppose
that we can fix the facts of phenomenal consciousness independently of the higher-order
perspective on it, in as much as we think of the latter as correctly reporting or reflecting these
additional facts.

And once we acknowledge this, then we must think of the phenomenal facts that we pick
up on in this way as being independent of the experience being a veridical perception, for the
properties in question will have to be common to the causally matching hallucination and the
veridical perception it is indiscriminable from. So it could not be that one’s experience being this
way in itself (as opposed to being this way in certain circumstances) constituted the kind of
contact with one’s environment which would explain one’s ability to think about things around
one and come to know how they are. Moreover, if the naïve realist is right that we do conceive of
our sensory experience in cases of perception as providing such a contact with the world, and we
are inclined to understand our ability to think about and know of these things in terms of such
experience, then recognising our experience as only a common element to perception and
hallucination comes at the cost of losing that understanding.

At best, if the disjunctivist has established that naïve realism best characterises how our
sensory experience seems to initial reflective intuition, the position we end up in here is one of
clashing intuitions. For on the one hand there is the thought that experience’s being so, as it is
now when I am veridically perceiving is a matter of my standing in an appropriate relation to the
world around me. On the other hand, there is the intuition that in this circumstance I am able
reflectively to pick up on how my experience is and the subject of a causally matching
hallucination would equally be so placed – so the phenomenal character of both experiences must
be shared, and hence cannot be relational in this way.

I say that this second claim is something we find intuitive, and apart from indicating that
we find this plausible, I think it adds two further elements. The first is that, even if there is
something more for us to say as to the truth of the relevant condition, we do not immediately
appeal to those further considerations in order to support the claim. The appeal of the thought is
more fundamental than that – one can’t really conceive either of what experience, or more exactly
the kind of perspective we have on experience could be, if it is not a matter of responding to what
is there. The second is this. If this is the right place to identify the basic disagreement with
disjunctivism, one which does not turn on either slips of formulation in disjunctivism, or
misconception of its consequences, then in as much as the objection just seems intuitive, the
appropriate strategy for the disjunctivist at this stage is not so much to offer any particular
argument against it (for after all it is a claim which we accept independently of the further
elaborations we try to give of why we are so committed) as to explain why the principle seems so
attractive to us, given that it is false. At this point what the disjunctivist needs to do is to engage
in philosophical pathology.

In the closing section, I want to begin the sketch of how that might go. For, I want to
suggest, one way forward is to see a connection here between the intuitions here and external
world scepticism, although not quite of the form that people commonly indicate in these debates.
Towards the end of the first chapter of *The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism*, Barry Stroud reflects on the situation one finds oneself in when taking seriously the sceptical challenge to be found in Descartes’s First Meditation:

Looking at what we can know in such a predicament? We can perhaps know what sensory experiences we are having, or how things seem to us to be…We are in a sense imprisoned within those representations, at least with respect to our knowledge…

This can seem to leave us in the position of finding a barrier between ourselves and the world around us. There would then be a veil of sensory experiences or sensory objects which we could not penetrate but which would be no reliable guide to the world beyond the veil. (B. Stroud, *The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 32-3.)

Stroud here seems to suggest that when in the grip of the sceptical challenge and think clearly about our situation, we will see our experience as a barrier between us and the world which we want to know of. In talking this way, Stroud echoes Bennett’s earlier talk of a veil of perception which likewise was to designate acceptance of the conceivability that our sense experiences as a whole might mislead us about the world.

That scepticism should lead to the idea of our sense experience being a veil or a barrier between us and the world should be a surprising thought. For, consider the following analogy. Suppose you have recently moved into an old Boston house and in the attic discovered seemingly a journal from the wars of independence. This is an intimate record, and from its close and somewhat obsessive detail, it now seems to you that you know things about the day to day life in late eighteenth century Massachusetts that you could not otherwise have happened on: the journal seems to give you a contact with that world. But now add that a malicious neighbour falsely, but seemingly authoritatively, informs you that the previous owner of your apartment was a fantasist and forger, given to constructing such fancies as the journal. The document you possess is not, he claims, a record of that past turbulent time, but is rather a cunning and recent fiction imagining how things must have been.

Under the sway of his disturbing story, you may now feel cut off from the contact you seemingly had with the eighteenth century. It need not be that you are convinced by his story: you have some sense that he likes to deflate people in their pleasures. But with the doubt about the provenance of the journal having been put forward so forcefully, it seems as if you need some further evidence to indicate that this is not after all a matter simply of fiction. And in that situation you cannot enjoy the journal as once you did. Even if the journal is genuine, you are no longer in a position without further evidence to exploit the privilege it affords you of looking back into the past. You have lost the contact with that time that you found so pleasurable. So far, the parallel with Stroud’s concern with external world scepticism seems close enough, albeit on a smaller terrain. Where one might balk, I suggest, is in the idea that one should now see the journal as somehow a veil or barrier between one and those past events whose record one once enjoyed. For it seems, given that the journal is genuine, this indeed does provide a route back to the past, but just one which one isn’t now in a position to exploit. Just because one’s neighbour sows the seed of doubt about the veracity of the journal, there is no reason to think that the journal thereby becomes misleading or fabrication in itself. So likewise, we might ask of Stroud’s discussion, why should the fact that in taking seriously the sceptical doubts mean that my senses now must act as a barrier between me and the world which otherwise they give me contact with, rather than simply being the facilitators of that contact, but in a way which I could not now exploit?

And indeed, one might hypothesise that Stroud here has moved too fast and conflated two forms of scepticism about the world which Hume was proud to hold up as distinct. The kind of global scepticism about our sense-based knowledge of the world that Descartes presses on us does not require one to take any particular view of the nature of sense experience. In itself it does not require us to suppose that our senses are any kind of veil or barrier between us and the world. In contrast, the sceptical challenge that Hume is proud to press in sec XII of the *First Enquiry*
starts out with the assumption that we naively suppose our sense experience to be one way, while philosophical reflection shows that it is clearly other than this. On the basis of demonstrating this alleged mistake, Hume then goes on to press a general scepticism about our knowledge of the world.

In the context of Hume’s challenge, we can make sense of the idea of our sense perception being a veil or barrier between us and the world. For at the outset of Hume’s challenge, we supposedly have a certain conception of what sense experience provides us with. But this conception is supposedly shown to be mistaken. That may be understood as sense experience failing to present to us a mind-independent world as it seemingly purports to do. Once one recognises that experience fails in this task, then one might consider oneself cut off from the world in contrast to how one earlier conceived of one’s position. In contrast to Stroud’s story, one now supposedly has positive information about the non-factive status of the source in question.

Now Hume’s scepticism with regard to the senses is a motivating concern for disjunctivist’s about the theory of perception, as we noted above. For the disjunctivist seeks to preserve a naïve realism about experience, a view of experience they claim best articulates how sense experience seems to us to be. The significance of preserving such an account is partly that it accords with the understanding we have of what we know and how we can think about things. With such a view falsified, it is much less clear we can hold on to the ordinary beliefs about our environment in the way we used to do, and so we have a sceptical challenge of the sort that Hume was concerned with.

Perhaps, however, there is a closer connection here between the Humean sceptical challenge and the Cartesian one, and so there is something right about Stroud’s position. Or so, I suggest, the disjunctivist may argue. For the disjunctivist may suggest that the conviction we have that introspective reflection must give us substantive knowledge of the phenomenal character of experience in the case of perfect hallucination no less than veridical perception arises from supposing that we remain in the same epistemic position with respect to our experience when addressing the sceptical challenge, and so suspending acceptance of any proposition knowledge of which is inconsistent with the sceptical scenario. To do this consistently is to retreat in relation to our sense experience merely to the negative knowledge that it is not knowably not a veridical perception, rather than the positive knowledge that one would have if the sceptical challenge had been answered satisfactorily and one was in the position not only of gaining knowledge through sense perception, but knowing how sense perception provides for that. Yet if we remain in the same epistemic position in the context of the sceptical challenge, and we do have substantive knowledge of experience in the case of veridical perception, then we must continue to have substantive knowledge when retreating in the face of the sceptical challenge.

As we saw above, the assumption that introspective reflection must give one substantive knowledge of the phenomenal character of experience independently of whether one is perceiving or hallucinating requires that that phenomenal character be common to perception and hallucination. And conceiving the phenomenal character to be such a way is inconsistent with naïve realism. Experience which met this condition, therefore, would have to be other than how (granting the disjunctivist his or her initial claims) it seems to us through initial reflection on it. That would be to land oneself, then, in the problematic position of Humean scepticism after all.

So, the disjunctivist will press, interpreting our introspective reflection as providing us with sceptic-proof knowledge of our experience is self-defeating. We could only have such knowledge if our experience is other than it seems to us to be. At the same time, we can see why we would be pressed so to conceive of our experience. For the kind of knowledge we have of our experience when not engaged in answering the sceptical challenge would give a simple and direct answer to the sceptical puzzle. After all, if how things are with me is that I am seeing a white picket fence, and this is something I know just through reflection on my experience, then I have an immediate rebuttal of the challenge. The problem is that the sceptical challenge deprives me of the possibility of exploiting this knowledge to disprove the sceptical hypothesis. But that I am so
deprived does not affect the way in which I can reflect on my experience. So it will continue to seem to me that there is something I can know, and which knowledge I should be able to exploit even in the context of this challenge.

At this point we may conclude that it will seem intuitive that there is more that I must be able to know about my sense experience, whether I am perceiving or hallucinating, than the disjunctivist will allow as long we do not have a direct and satisfying answer to the sceptical challenge.