Society

Economic

Design

SED 2002

CONFERENCE ON ECONOMIC DESIGN
SOCIETY FOR ECONOMIC DESIGN

JULY 6-9, 2002
NEW YORK
PRELIMINARY PROGRAM

-pdf version-

Daily Schedule:

• All regular sessions will take place in rooms UC-52, UC-60, UC-62 and UC-63. UC rooms  (Upper Concourse – first level down below street level) are in Tisch Hall, 40 West 4^th street.
• Plenary sessions will take place at Schimmel Auditorium, also located at the Upper Concourse of Tisch Hall.
  
• Because of increased security, photo ID will be required for presentation in order to enter NYU buildings.

J U L Y   6, S a t u r d a y

• 6:00 Opening Cocktail at the NYU Torch Club (18 Waverly Place – between Green and Mercer streets)

Morning Sessions (9:00 – 11:00)

AUCTION THEORY I [UC-52, Tisch Hall]
(Chair: Giuseppe Lopomo)

• Time is money: The effect of clock speed on seller’s revenue in Dutch auctions
  Elena Katok (Penn State University) and Anthony Kwasnica (Penn State University)
• An ascending Vickrey auction for heterogenous goods
  James Schummer (Northwestern University), and Rakesh Vohra (Northwestern University), and Sven de Vries (Technische Universität München)
• Financing auction bids
  Matthew Rodhes-Kropf (Columbia University) and S. Viswanathan (Duke University)
• Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: The GeneralizedRevelation Principle, Efficiency and Full Surplus Extraction
  Claudio Mezzetti (North Carolina University-Chapel Hill)
  

POLITICAL ECONOMY I [UC-63, Tisch Hall]
(Chair: Ignacio Ortuño-Ortín)

• Funding of political parties with electoral cheques
  Anais Tarrago (University of Alicante)
• Immigration policy with foresighted voters
  Francesc Ortega (NYU)
• Why Did the Elites Extend the Suffrage? Democracy and the Scope of Government, With an Application to Britain's “Age of Reform”
  Alessandro Lizzeri (NYU) and Nicola Persico (University of Pennsylvania)
• Electoral competition with privately informed candidates
  Dan Bernhardt (University of Illinois), John Duggan (University of Rochester) and Francesco Squintani (University of Rochester)

GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM I [UC-60, Tisch Hall]
(Chair: Rajiv Vohra)

• Exact arbitrage, well-diversified portfolios and asset pricing in large markets
  Ali Khan (Johns Hopkins University) and Yeneng Sun (National University of Singapore)
• Uncertainty and risk in financial markets
  Luca Rigotti (Tilburg University) and Chris Shannon (UC Berkeley)
• Existence of competitive equilibrium under financial constraints and increasing returns
  Nur Ata (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona) and Erdem Basçi (Bilkent University)
• Proxy fights in incomplete markets: when majority voting and sidepayments are equivalent
  Hervé Cres (HEC School of Management) and Mich Tvede (University of Copenhagen)

COALITION FORMATION [UC-62, Tisch Hall]
(Chair: Debraj Ray)

• Rationalizability for social environments
  P. Jean-Jacques Herings (Universiteit Maastricht), Ana Mauleon (Universite Catholique de Lille), and Vincent Vannetelbosch (Universite Catholique de Louvain)
• Coalitional Rationality
  Atilla Ambrus (Princeton University)
• Multilateral Negotiations and Formation of Coalitions
  Armando Gomes (University of Pennsylvania)
• On the stability of cooperation structures
  Guillaume Haeringer (Warwick University)

Plenary Session (11:30 – 12:30)
Roger Guesnerie (Collège de France and École Normale Supérieure)

Positive and normative economics of the Heckscher-Ohlin effect

Early Afternoon Sessions (2:30 – 4:00)

MECHANISM DESIGN I [UC-52, Tisch Hall]
(Chair: Tomas Sjöström)

• Supra-implementation with transfers of discrete choices
  Semih Koray (Bilkent University) and Hatice Özsoy (Bilkent University)
• The relation between implementability and the core
  Eiichi Miyagawa (Columbia University)
• Informational size and incentive compatibility with aggregate uncertainty
  Richard McLean (Rutgers University) and Andrew Postlewaite (University of Pennsylvania)

ECONOMICS OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION I [UC-63, Tisch Hall]
(Chair: Esteban Klor)

• The importance of income distribution for the price of the tax avoidance service
  Tatiana Damjanovic (Stockholm School of Economics)
• Occupational choice, incentives and wealth distribution with an endogenous rate of interest
  Archishman Chakraborty (Baruch College) and Alessandro Citanna (HEC-Paris)
• Polarization
  Joan Esteban (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona) and Debraj Ray (NYU)

MATCHING THEORY I [UC-60, Tisch Hall]
(Chair: Ahmet Alkan)

• School choice: A mechanism design approach
  Atila Abdulkadiroglu (Columbia University) and Tayfun Sönmez (Koç University)
• Stability in housing allocation problems with externalities
  Gilbert Laffond (Conservatoire national de Arts et Metiers) and Jean Laine (École Nationale de la Statistique)
• In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm
  Lars Ehlers (University of Montreal)

NETWORK FORMATION [UC-62, Tisch Hall]
(Chair: Rajiv Vohra)

• Market sharing agreements and collusive networks
  Paul Belleflame (University of London) and Francis Bloch (GREQAM)
• Formation of networks: Competition and specificity
  Dmitri Kvassov (Penn State University)

Late Afternoon Sessions (4:30 – 6:30)

MECHANISM DESIGN II [UC-52, Tisch Hall]
(Chair: Colin Campbell)

• The non transferable utility bargaining model with two privately informed and patient players
  Frans Spinnewyn and Helena Kim (K.U. Leuven)
• Is Grameen lending efficient?
  Ashok Rai (Harvard University) and Tomas Sjöström (Penn State University)
• Optimal selling mechanisms with costly information acquisition
  Jacques Cremer (University of Toulouse), Yossi Spiegel (Tel Aviv University), and Charles Zhang (Northwestern University)

DECISION THEORY I [UC-63, Tisch Hall]
(Chair: Faruk Gul)

• Foundations of Bayesian theory
  Edi Karni (Johns Hopkins University)
• Anchored preference relations
  Jacob Sagi (UC–Berkeley)
• Rational choice with status-quo bias
  Efe Ok (NYU) and Yusufcan Masatlioglu (NYU)
• Can anticipatory feelings explain anomalous attitudes to information?
  Rani Spiegler (Tel Aviv University)

INFORMATION ECONOMICS [UC-60, Tisch Hall]
(Chair: Sandeep Baliga)

• Unobservable contracts as precommitments
  Levent Koçkesen (Columbia University)
• Income maintenance programs and multidimensional screening
  Joel Shapiro (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
• Verifiability, generalized information correspondences, and optimal contracts
  Francesco Squintani (University of Rochester)
• Efficient sorting in a dynamic adverse-selection model: The hot potato
  Igal Hendel (University of Wisconsin-Madison), Alessandro Lizzeri (NYU), and Marciano Siniscalchi (Princeton University)

COLLECTIVE CHOICE [UC-62, Tisch Hall]
(Chair: Sophie Bade)

• On efficiency and sustainability in a collective decision problem with heterogeneous agents
  Ori Haimanko (Ben-Gurion University), Michel Le Breton (Universite de la Mediterannee), and Shlomo Weber (Southern Methodist University)
• Collective bargaining with transaction costs
  Alp Atakan (Columbia University)
• Putting your ballot where your mouth is – An analysis of collective choice with communication
  Dino Gerardi (Yale University) and Leeat Yariv (UCLA)
• Are honest citizens to blame for corruption?
  Haldun Evrenk (Boston University)

J U L Y   8, M o n d a y

Morning Sessions (9:00 – 11:00)

AUCTION THEORY II [UC-52, Tisch Hall]
(Chair: Claudio Mezzetti)

• Optimal repeated auction with collusive bidders
  Atila Abdulkadiroglu (Columbia University) and Kim-Sau Chung (Northwestern University)
• Modifying the uniform-price auction to eliminate ‘collusive-seeming equilibria’
  David McAdams (MIT)
• An ascending price auction for producer-consumer economy
  Debasis Mishra (University of Wisconsin-Madison), Rahul Garg (IBM India Research Lab) and Dharmaraj Veeramani (University of Wisconsin-Madison)
• Simultaneous ascending bid auctions with budget constraints
  Sandro Brusco (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid) and Giuseppe Lopomo (Duke University)

POLITICAL ECONOMY II [UC-63, Tisch Hall]
(Chair: John Roemer)

• Income dynamics and democracy
  Ignacio Ortuño-Ortín (University of Alicante)
• A model of political parties
  Gilat Levy (LSE and Tel Aviv University)
• Federal progressivity and state regressivity
  Esteban Klor (NYU)
• Does democracy engender equality?
  John Roemer (Yale University)

FINANCIAL ECONOMICS [UC-60, Tisch Hall]
(Chair: Saltuk Özertürk)

• Can stock price manipulation be prevented by granting more freedom to manipulators?
  Deniz Ilalan (Bilkent University) and Semih Koray (Bilkent University)
• The value of information in portfolio investment problems
  David Croson (University of Pennsylvania) and Thomas Weber (University of Pennsylvania)
• Staged financing and endogenous lock-in
  Levent Koçkesen (Columbia University) and Saltuk Özertürk (Southern Methodist University)
• Participation externalities and asset price volatility
  Helios Herrera (NYU and ITAM)

STRATEGIC BARGAINING [UC-62, Tisch Hall]
(Chair: Debraj Ray)

• Walrasian bargaining
  Muhamet Yildiz (MIT)
• Evolutionary Stability in a reputational model of bargaining
  Dilip Abreu (Princeton University) and Rajiv Sethi (Columbia University)
• Aspirational bargaining
  Ennio Stacchetti (University of Michigan) and Lones Smith (University of Michigan)
• Nash’s smoothed demand game revisited
  Walter Trockel (Universitaet Bielefeld)

Plenary Session (11:30 – 12:30)
Eric Maskin (Institute for Advanced Study)

Auctions for Pollution Reduction

Early Afternoon Sessions (2:30 – 4:00)

MATCHING THEORY II [UC-52, Tisch Hall]
(Chair: Tayfun Sonmez)

• Stable schedule matching under revealed preference
  Ahmet Alkan (Bilkent University) and David Gale (UC-Berkeley)
• Unique cores in general matching
  Szilvia Papai (University of Notre Dame)
• House allocation with existing tenants: An equivalence
  Tayfun Sönmez (Koç University) and Utku Ünver (Koç University)

AXIOMATIC ALLOCATION THEORY I [UC-63, Tisch Hall]
(Chair: William Thomson)

• Social orderings for the assignment of indivisible objects
  François Maniquet (Institute for Advanced Study)
• Fair production and allocation of an excludable nonrival good
  François Maniquet (Institute for Advanced Study) and Yves Sprumont (University of Montreal)
• Consistency for the resolution of conflicting claims: a geometric approach
  William Thomson (University of Rochester)

VOTING AND DECISION MAKING IN COMMITTEES [UC-60, Tisch Hall]
(Chair: Ayça Kara)

• Ranking committees, words and multisets
  Murat R. Sertel (Bogaziçi University) and A. Slinko (University of Auckland)
• Comittees, careers and communication
  Uwe Dulleck (University of Vienna) and Hans Friederiszick (RACR)
• Does majoritarian approval matter in selecting a social choice rule: An exploratory panel study
  Ayça Kara (Isik University) and Murat Sertel (Bogaziçi University)

ECONOMICS OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION II [UC-62, Tisch Hall]
(Chair: Esteban Klor)

• Unequal uncertainties and uncertain inequalities: An axiomatic approach
  Thibault Gajdos (CNRS-CREST) and Eric Maurin (CREST-INSEE)
• Information, social mobility, and the demand for redistribution
  Francesco Feri (University of Venice)
• Mobility as progressivity: Ranking income processes according to equality of opportunity
  Efe Ok (NYU) and Roland Bénabou (Princeton University)

Late Afternoon Sessions (4:30 – 6:30)

MECHANISM DESIGN III [UC-52, Tisch Hall]
(Chair: Richard McLean)

• Extraction of the surplus in standard auctions
  Massimiliano Amarante (Columbia University)
• Efficient auction mechanisms with interdependent valuations and multidimensional signals
  Richard McLean (Rutgers University) and Andrew Postlewaite (University of Pennsylvania)
• Robust mechanism design
  Dirk Bergmann (Yale University) and Stephen Morris (Yale University)
• Implementation and orderings of public information
  Colin Campbell (Rutgers University)

DECISION THEORY II [UC-63, Tisch Hall]
(Chair: Efe Ok)

• Rationalizable expectations
  Elchanan Ben-Porath (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) and Aviad Heifetz (Tel-Aviv University)
• Intertemporal preference for flexibility and risky choice
  Alan Kraus (University of British Columbia) and Jacob Sagi (UC–Berkeley)
• Unforeseen contingencies
  Nabil I. Al-Najjar (Northwestern University), Luca Anderlini (Georgetown University), and Leonardo Felli (LSE)
• Random choice and random utility
  Faruk Gul (Princeton University) and Wolfgang Pesendorfer (Princeton University)

GAME THEORY I [UC-60, Tisch Hall]
(Chair: Ennio Stacchetti)

• Nash equilibrium when players account for the complexity of their forecasts
  Kfir Eliaz (NYU)
• Informal Communication
  Wojciech Olszewski (Northwestern University)
• Nash equilibrium in games with incomplete preferences
  Sophie Bade (NYU)
• Which acceptable agreements are equilibria?
  Sylvie Thoron (GREQAM)

SOCIAL CHOICE [UC-62, Tisch Hall]
(Chair: Semih Koray)

• Efficiency in the degree of compromise: A new axiom for social choice
  Ipek Özkal-Sanver (Bilgi University) and Remzi Sanver (Bilgi University)
• Social aggregators
  Kfir Eliaz (NYU)
• Minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rules
  Orhan Erdem (Bilgi University) and Remzi Sanver (Bilgi University)
• Strategy-proof risk sharing
  Biung-Ghi Ju (University of Kansas)

J U L Y   9, T u e s d a y

Morning Sessions (9:00 – 11:00)

GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM II [UC-52, Tisch Hall]
(Chair: Luca Rigotti)

• Increasing returns and competitive equilibrium
  Erdem Basçi (Bilkent University) and Ismail Saglam (Bogaziçi University)
• Optimality of strong Tiebout equilibria in a finite local public goods economy
  Matthias Dahm (University of Alicante)
• Trading equilibrium in the public good economy
  Benyamin Shitovitz (Haifa University) and Menahem Spiegel (Rutgers University)
• Implementation with unknown endowments in a two-trader pure exchange economy
  Leonid Hurwicz (University of Minnesota)

GAME THEORY II [UC-63, Tisch Hall]
(Chair: Rajiv Sethi)

• Caller number five: New timing games that morph from one form to another
  Andreas Park (Cambridge University) and Lones Smith (University of Michigan)
• Arms races and negotiations
  Sandeep Baliga (Northwestern University) and Tomas Sjöström (Penn State University)
• Credible communication in dynastic government
  Roger Lagunoff (Georgetown University)
• On games corresponding to sequencing situations with precedence relations
  Herbert Hamers (Tilburg University), Flip Klijn (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona), and Bas van Velzen (Tilburg University)

INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION [UC-60, Tisch Hall]
(Chair: Alessandro Lizzeri)

• A comparison of market structures in R&D with endogenous spillovers
  Yumiko Baba (Aoyamagakuin University)
• Foreign direct investment and exports with growing demand
  Rafael Rob (University of Pennsylvania) and Nikolaos Vettas (Duke University and University of Athens)
• Rat races and glass ceilings: Career paths in organizations
  Peter Bardsley (University of Melbourne) and Katerina Sherstyuk (University of Melbourne)
• To merge or not to merge: that is the question
  Luis C. Corchon (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid) and Ramon Fauli-Oller (University of Alicante)

Plenary Session (11:30 – 12:30)
Andrew Postlewaite (University of Pennsylvania)

Auction Mechanisms with Interdependent Values (joint with. R. McLean)

Early Afternoon Sessions (2:30 – 4:00)

AXIOMATIC ALLOCATION THEORY II [UC-52, Tisch Hall]
(Chair: Murat R. Sertel)

• The TAL-family of rules for bankruptcy problems
  Juan Moreno-Ternero (University of Alicante) and Antonio Villar (University of Alicante)
• Ordinal proportional cost sharing
  YunTong Wang (Sabanci University) and Daxin Zhu (Tianjin University)
• Nash bargaining in ordinal environments
  Özgur Kibris (Sabanci University)

AUCTION THEORY III [UC-63, Tisch Hall]
(Chair: Alessandro Lizzeri)

• The variable value-environment: Auctions and actions
  Michael Schwarz (Harvard University) and Konstantin Sonin (Harvard University)
• Sequential auctions with endogenously determined reserve prices
  Rasim Özcan (Boston College)
• The condominium problem: Auctions for substitutes
  Roberto Burguet (CSIC)

FAIR DIVISION [UC-60, Tisch Hall]
(Chair: Steve Brams)

• Room assignment-rent division: A market approach
  Atila Abdulkadiroglu (Columbia University), Tayfun Sonmez (Koç University) and Utku Unver (Koç University)
• Cake division with minimal cuts: Envy-free procedures for 3 persons, 4 persons and beyond
  Steve Brams (NYU) and J. Barbanel (Union College)
• Equitable, envy-free, and and efficient cake cutting for two people and its application to discrete goods
  Michael Jones (Montclair State University)

Late Afternoon Sessions (4:30 – 6:30)

MECHANISM DESIGN IV [UC-52, Tisch Hall]
(Chair: Kfir Eliaz)

• Efficient resource allocation on the basis of priorities
  Haluk I. Ergin (Princeton University)
• A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation
  Roberto Serrano (Brown University) and Rajiv Vohra (Brown University)
• A mechanism design for a solution to the tragedy of commons
  Naoki Yoshihara (Yale University)
• Designing rights: Invisible hand and decentralizability/implementability theorems
  Murat R. Sertel (Bogaziçi University)

GAME THEORY III [UC-63, Tisch Hall]
(Chair: Muhamet Yildiz)

• Multiplicity, instability and sunspots in games
  Julio Davila (University of Pennsylvania)
• Rich language and refinements of cheap-talk equilibria
  Wojciech Olszewski (Northwestern University)
• Fuzzy play, matching devices and coordination failures
  P. Jean-Jacques Herings (Universiteit Maastricht), Ana Mauleon (Universite Catholique de Lille), and Vincent Vannetelbosch (Universite Catholique de Louvain)

ECONOMIC DESIGN AND PUBLIC POLICY [UC-60, Tisch Hall]
(Chair: Paul Kleindorfer)

• Regulation redux
  Michael Crew (Rutgers University) and Paul Kleindorfer (University of Pennsylvania)
• Trade in trash, recycling, and strategic environmental policies
  James Cassing (University of Pittsburgh) and Thomas Kuhn (University of Technology Chemnitz)
• Market and Contract design for catastrophic losses
  Neil Doherty (University of Pennsylvania), Paul Kleindorfer (University of Pennsylvania)