NYU Law School Study Reveals The Nature Of Adjudication In Multimember Courts

A recently published study entitled "Environment Regulation, Ideology and the D.C. Circuit" by New York University Law School Professor Richard L. Revesz revealed that a D.C. Circuit judge’s vote (not just the panel outcome) is greatly affected by the identity of the other judges on the panel; and, in fact, the party affiliation of the other judges on the panel has a greater bearing on a judge’s vote than his or her own affiliation.

"Most significantly, judges generally vote consistently with their ideological preferences only when they sit with at least one other judge of the same political party," said Professor Revesz. "Failing to control panel composition leads to substantially underestimating the frequency of ideological voting."

Professor Revesz, director of NYU Law School’s Program on Environmental Regulation, chose to focus his study on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit because it has, since the early 1970s, played a central role in the development of environmental law and has exclusive venue over challenges to a wide array of environmental regulations.

"Some have criticized the D.C. Circuit’s politicization and maintained that judges simply vote according to their policy preferences," added Professor Revesz. "In environmental cases, the allegation goes, judges appointed by Republican Presidents vote principally for laxer regulation, and judges appointed by Democratic Presidents vote for more stringent regulation. Though prominent judges on the court have disputed the importance of ideological voting, many scholars and practitioners continue to adhere to that view, generally supporting their claims by anecdotal reference to individual cases. No systematic study of this issue until now has ever been done."

The study’s three principal conclusions were that:

1. Ideology significantly influences judicial decisionmaking on the D.C. Circuit;

2. Ideological voting is more prevalent in cases, such as those raising procedural challenges, which are less likely to be reviewed by the United States Supreme Court; and

3. A judge’s vote (not just the panel outcome) is greatly affected by the identity of the other judges on the panel; in fact, the party affiliation of the other judges on the panel has a greater bearing on a judge’s vote than his or her own affiliation.

Professor Revesz said that the study, recently published in the Virginia Law Review, improves our understanding of the nature of adjudication in multimember courts.

4/1/98