Democratization and Linguistic Complexity
The Effect of Franchise Extension on Parliamentary Discourse, 1832–1915

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Short title: “Democratization and Linguistic Complexity”

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Abstract

We consider the impact of the Second Reform Act, and the doubling of the electorate it delivered, on the linguistic complexity of speeches made by members of parliament in Britain. Noting that the new voters were generally poorer and less educated than those who already enjoyed the suffrage, we hypothesize that cabinet ministers had strong incentives—relative to other members—to appeal to these new electors with simpler statements during parliamentary debates. We assess this claim with a data set of over half a million speeches for the period between the Great Reform Act and Great War, along with methods for measuring the comprehensibility of texts—which we validate in some detail. The theorized relationship holds: ministers become statistically significantly easier to understand (on average) relative to backbenchers, and this effect occurs almost immediately after the 1868 election. We show that this result is not an artifact of new personnel in the House of Commons.

keywords: parliament, Westminster, British Political Development, text-as-data, methodology

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Replication information for all figures and tables in the published paper are available in the JOP Data Archive on Dataverse http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/jop. Supplementary materials are available in an online appendix. Contact the author for replication information pertaining to the online appendices.
1 Introduction

Few topics have featured as prominently in applied political science research as the causes and consequences of democratization (e.g. Lipset, 1959; Huntington, 1968; Przeworski et al., 2000; Boix and Stokes, 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005). Of particular interest is the (optimistic) notion that with franchise extension and competition comes increasing political responsiveness and accountability for citizens (e.g. Bartolini, 2000; Przeworski, 2009). And within this large literature the changes to Britain in the middle of the nineteenth century have captured a great deal of scholarly attention (e.g. Bagehot, 1873/2011; Seymour, 1915; Trevelyan, 1922; Gash, 1952; Woodward, 1962), with primary focus on the passing of the relevant legislation in 1867 (e.g. Himmelfarb, 1966; Smith, 1967; Walton, 1996; Moser and Reeves, 2014) and its effects on politicians and voters (e.g. Cox, 1987; McLean, 2001; Berlin and Dewan, 2011; Camp, Dixit and Stokes, 2014). In part, this is because the ‘Westminster system’ that resulted has been widely emulated for its stability and decisiveness (e.g. Lijphart, 1999; Rhodes and Weller, 2005), and there is thus a natural interest in uncovering its development and possibly charting its future course. This is especially true of its characteristic institutions of ministerial responsibility and fierce frontbench competition in parliament and in the electorate.

In keeping with this interest, in the current paper we seek to understand how suffrage extension affected the behavior of backbench members of parliament (MPs) relative to ministers during the Victorian period. Our central idea is that members of the governing executive—the cabinet—had new incentives after the expansion of the electorate: they were required, as leaders of their parties, to appeal to a poorer, less educated median voter. We contend that they did so, in part, via simpler linguistic expressions in their parliamentary speeches. Meanwhile, because backbenchers increasingly understood that citizens were “voting for the
party, rather than for the man” (Cox, 1987, 136), we argue that these MPs were under considerably less pressure to adjust their speaking style.

We are hardly the first to investigate the new incentives for legislators and their principals introduced by voting reform. In the long term, the eventual rise of the parliamentary Labour party as an electoral force representative of working-class interests (see, e.g., Thompson, 1963; Cox, 1997), along with the commensurate decline of the Liberals (Searle, 2001), is probably the best known consequence of a larger franchise (when considered alongside other reforms such as the introduction of the secret ballot). By contrast, and with some exceptions (see, e.g., Hurst, 1965, on the effects of the secret ballot in Ireland) analysts find relatively little evidence of immediate change to other markers related to MP activity: these include roll call cohesion (Eggers and Spirling, 2014c), Liberal vote share (Berlinski and Dewan, 2011), the socioeconomic backgrounds of cabinet personnel (Berlinski, Dewan and Van Coppenolle, 2014) and party orientation in the electorate (Cox, 1987). On the one hand, these null findings are surprising: the almost doubling of the electorate via the Second Reform Act to include poorer, less educated voters was certainly predicted (or feared) by contemporaneous actors to have consequences for the nature of both substantive and descriptive representation (see, e.g., McLean, 2001, for a discussion of the ‘Adullamites’). On the other hand, scholars of the period do not typically have access to the kinds of fine-grained data that makes investigating possibly subtle shifts in behavior straightforward. Compare this situation, for example, with the study of American politics—in particular regarding the ‘Homestyle’ of Members of Congress, where researchers can either follow contemporary members and record their interactions (e.g. Fenno, 1978), experiment on them (see Grose, 2014, for an overview) and their constituents (e.g. Larson, 1990), or work with the large amounts of text produced by such elected officials in communication with their constituents and others (e.g. Grimmer, 2013). Similarly, researchers interested in Comparative politics
for the contemporary period can utilize manifestos (e.g. Budge et al., 2001; Benoit, Laver and Mikhaylov, 2009), parliamentary speeches (e.g. Slapin and Proksch, 2008), and detailed election studies with roughly similar questions across nations to estimate the degree to which different systems and different times respond to voter needs (e.g. Powell, 2000). Thus, while we have very strong priors for this vital period in the Westminster system’s history, testing our hypotheses is prohibitively difficult, and our empirical findings look ambiguous at best—and confusing at worst.

Diagnosing the problems with extant studies of the effects of democratization is not difficult; solving these maladies is far from trivial. Put crudely, scholars are typically restricted by limited data on elite—i.e. MP—responses to suffrage expansion: studies are either intensive with coverage of short time periods (e.g. Schonhardt-Bailey, 2008; Berlinski and Dewan, 2011), or more extensive in terms of numbers of observations but necessarily less fine-grained in terms of both the information and inferences that are possible (e.g. Cox, 1987). In the former case, researchers face the obvious difficulty that suffrage expansion may not have immediate consequences for politician behavior—perhaps because some degree of ‘learning’ must take place. In the case of the broad studies, though impressive in scope they are likely to miss subtle, small changes to the way that individual agents perceive the situations they face and adjust their actions accordingly. In both cases then, there is a danger that effects that do exist are ‘missed’. Putting aside these specific issues of study scope, it is far from obvious where we should look for evidence of new incentives and behaviors: ideally, we would have a large number of observations from which we can plausibly measure ‘responsiveness’ directly and in a way that allows us to compare both across individuals and across time.

In this paper, we make progress where other attempts have faltered and show evidence consistent with our contention of a differential behavioral affect on ministers versus back-
benchers. We do this in a way made possible with an analysis of a data set of hundreds of thousands of speeches—along with MP covariates—from the House of Commons between 1832 and 1915 (see Eggers and Spirling, 2014b). We focus on speeches as outputs precisely because they allow politicians to respond instantly to changing circumstances, without the various implementation lags one must allow when studying policy or party-system shifts. Further, in contrast to the 24-hour news cycle politics of the present day, parliamentary speeches (and reports on them) were the primary way that voters of the time monitored the actions of their representatives. Speeches have another advantage: they are an equitable resource insofar as, subject to recognition rules in the Commons, anyone can (and did) undertake them, allowing us observations for essentially the entire population of MPs. In summary then, speeches are very much a key place, if not the only place, where we might see democratization having an immediate and noticeable effect.

Our innovation methodologically is to measure the ‘comprehensibility’ (or complexity) of the utterances using well known metrics from education research, that take into account the number of syllables relative to the number of words found in documents (see Flesch, 1948). These are straightforward to calculate, and have been used elsewhere in the study of speech (e.g. Lim, 2008), albeit not on so many texts. These scores are combined with techniques that allow multiple individuals, making multiple speeches, to be compared over time as their roles in the chamber change. In particular, we show that almost immediately after the Second Reform Act, cabinet ministers altered their speech in a way that made those speeches simpler to understand for the median member of the electorate—that is, someone poorer and less educated than had previously voted. This finding provides crucial support for earlier hypotheses regarding the leadership role that cabinet members increasingly played (relative to backbenchers) in appealing directly to popular opinion, such that their parties could win national elections (Cox, 1987; Jenkins, 1996; Rush, 2001). In terms of point predictions,
our estimates imply that, controlling for length of speech and other member-level variables, being a minister after 1868 was equivalent to moving from around the 48th to the 60th percentile of comprehensibility in the chamber as a whole: with predicted values approximately ten percent larger than backbenchers. This finding is robust to the usual standard error corrections, and to alternate specifications and measurement strategies. Importantly, we are able to rule out the possibility that the change in language is due to new personnel arriving in the House over time: rather, it is the result of new incentives for those already there.

Although the techniques we use here are not new, we are applying them to a large data set and in an innovative way. With that in mind, we spend some time below exploring their details and validating their use, before moving to our results and conclusion. Prior to that, however, we set the substantive scene for our study: the advent of the Second Reform Act in 1867.

2 Appealing to the Newly Enfranchised

The *Representation of the People Act* of 1867—colloquially known as the Second Reform Act—has attracted much scholarly attention on its origins and passing (e.g. Himmelfarb, 1966; Smith, 1966; Cowling, 1967; McLean, 2001; Moser and Reeves, 2014), its details and its effects (e.g. Laski, 1928; Smith, 1967; Canandine, 1999; Aidt, Daunton and Dutta, 2010; Berlinski and Dewan, 2011). The features of interest for our purposes are two-fold: first, the massive expansion of the franchise from around one to two million men. Second, the reduction in the property requirement needed for voting (see, e.g. Walton, 1996, for details of the change). In practice, and importantly for our work here, the Act “brought substantial

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The Act itself dealt with English and Welsh matters; Scotland and Ireland saw reforms via the Representation of the People (Scotland) Act and Representation of the People (Ireland) Act, both of 1868.

For reference, the 1871 census recorded a total population of around 26 million for England, Scotland and Wales combined. Around 12.6 million were males (of any age).
working-class majorities to the electoral registers of almost all the boroughs" (Walton, 1996, 35), and in this way suffrage expansion was disproportionately greater in urban areas than elsewhere. Indeed, using figures from Bowley (1937) and Mackenzie (1921), Berlinski and Dewan (2011, 7) note that “it is clear that the extension of the franchise gave the vote to urban unskilled workers.”

A salient feature of these new voters was that they were, on average, less educated (and less literate) than pre-existing holders of the suffrage. To see this, consider calculations from Mitch (1992), who obtains a large sample of marriage certificates for the period 1869–1873, and measures male literacy from the ability of grooms to sign their own names. The class status of the men is inferred from their father’s occupation, listed on the same certificate. In the Mitch (1992, 24–25) approach, there is a hierarchy of five socioeconomic classes, the latter three of which are characterized as “petty shopkeepers, skilled manual trades, mining, most transport occupations”, “semi-skilled manual labor”, and “unskilled labor” respectively. In Table 1 we provide figures for all five of these groups, in terms of the number of individuals recorded as literate and illiterate in each. As can be seen from the table, the top occupation class (I and II) have very few individuals (around 1%) who lack literacy skills. By contrast, grouping the lower three classes together, we see illiteracy rates at around 20%. These proportions are statistically significantly different ($p < 0.01$).

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For completeness, class (I) are those occupations types which are “titled, high public office, military officers”, class (II) are “professions, commerce, clerical, farmers”.

Calculated from Table 2.3 in Mitch (1992).

This result is robust to including class (III) as one of the ‘prior voter’ groups; separately, it is robust to dropping class (V) from the analysis altogether.
Table 1: Number of literate and illiterate men in Mitch (1992) sample, by occupational class. The ‘prior voters’ are those classes likely already enfranchised prior to the Second Reform Act; the ‘new voters’ are those classes more likely to be part of the newly extended franchise.

If we interpret the lower labor classes as being comprised of those joining the suffrage as a result of the Second Reform Act (which accords roughly with the distinctions made by Berlinski and Dewan (2011)), we have clear evidence that these ‘new voters’ were less educated and less literate than those already part of the franchise. Although we cannot observe this directly, it seems safe to further assume that those that were literate in classes of low overall literacy had lesser proficiency in reading and writing that the literate in classes of widespread literacy. That is, we suppose that the binary indicator of literacy hides continuous variation whereby literate voters prior to 1868 were on average better able to read than the literate who joined the franchise after the Second Reform Act. This matters for our causal story below, in which speeches are reported to electors mostly in written (i.e. newspaper report) form: thus we require that the literate among the new voters struggle with complex linguistic expressions more than the literate who were already voting.

2.1 Ministers as the Focus of Electoral Competition

A related consequence of the franchise expansion was the development of new political behavior by electors; in particular, “voting for the party, rather than for the man” at the ballot box,
with citizens increasingly “using their votes to determine what did matter: party control of
the executive” (Cox, 1987, 136). Whether or not the rise of the ‘party orientated electorate’
was caused simply by the expanded suffrage per se is debatable (see Cox, 1987, 94–95), but
there is little doubt that it focussed attention on the cabinet and its members as the key
actors in politics, and the ones responsible for winning (or losing) elections. Commensurate
with this new role as the locus of voter choice was an ongoing increase in partisan cohesion
(beginning in the 1850s) in roll call voting, with leaders in the House of Commons able
to discipline their troops at levels approximately equal to those in modern British politics
(see Eggers and Spirling, 2014c). Crucially for our account, backbenchers had much weaker
incentives than ministers to adjust their language. This is because, at a time when national
party appeals began to matter more than local connections or family name, those without
cabinet rank were no longer as important as they previously had been for winning their own
seats: it was their leaders on the frontbenches who would be the deciders of election success
or failure for everyone in their party. Of course, this does not mean that backbenchers did
not make any attempts to curry favor with their local electors; rather, our position is that as
the franchise expanded, such individual MP efforts were (a) less effective than they once had
been as voters increasingly responded to leaders at Westminster and their ‘brands’ (b) much
more costly—perhaps prohibitively so in some seats—than previously. To clarify further,
the claim here is not that backbenchers were utterly unaffected linguistically by the Reform
Act; instead, our theory predicts that their rate and total magnitude of change would be
less than their leaders.

Our central idea is that these forces—new, less educated voters, and the “triumph of par-
tisan politics” (Jenkins, 1996, ch 6) in the electorate and in parliament—meant that the

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See Camp, Dixit and Stokes (2014) for discussion of the US and UK in comparative perspective on this
point.
Westminster executive was faced with fresh challenges and opportunities. In particular, the cabinet was required to adopt strategies such that it could appeal to electors and compete successfully for power at the ballot box. While others have investigated these strategies as they pertained to election spending (e.g. Hanham, 1978; Camp, Dixit and Stokes, 2014), and some have specifically investigated the emergence of early manifesto-style addresses such as in the Midlothian Campaign (see Kelley, 1960; Matthew, 1997), we turn our attention to the changing nature of speeches in the House of Commons itself.

2.2 Observational Implications

Our hypothesis is two fold: first, that cabinet members reduced the linguistic complexity of their speeches after the Second Reform Act; second, that the average change in complexity for ministers was larger than the average change for those not serving in the cabinet. Ministers altered their speech to ensure that the newly increased electorate—with its lower average educational level—could understand and be convinced by executive speeches. Put more crudely, democratization resulted in the ‘dumbing down’ of rhetoric and argument by ministers in a way designed to win votes at the ballot box. Whether this proposed mechanism is convincing depends on the plausibility of several links in the causal chain. First, readers may question the extent to which parliamentary speeches were in fact disseminated to the public at large. For the period under study, this is not a concern: indeed, Victorian Britain was notable for “universal press coverage” of Commons activity and “the explosive expansion of the press in the middle of the century” (Cox, 1987, 54–55). This press penetration extended to poorer voters, especially after the repeal of taxes that had kept prices artificially high until the middle of the century. Thus, by 1861 the cheapest of the weekly sheets, including those aimed specifically at working-class voters such as Lloyd’s Newspaper and Reynold’s News had circulations of 412,000 and 150,000 respectively (Hewitt, 2013, 105). Further-

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We give an explicit ‘difference in differences’ formulation of the problem below.
more, there is little doubt that parliamentary speeches did indeed make the news. To get a sense of political reporting, we inspected archived copies of *The Penny Illustrated Paper*, an inexpensive pictorial publication produced from 1861 to 1913. We looked specifically at the first sixth months of 1886, a period in which Prime Minister Gladstone attempted to pass the first Irish Home Rule Bill before resigning when he failed to do so. Searching the records for ‘Gladstone’ as a keyword returns results (see Online Appendix A for more details) in which the Prime Minister’s speeches from the dispatch box are quoted verbatim (January 30, April 17, April 24) along with utterances from Irish Nationalist Parnell (April 17) and Liberal Unionist Joseph Chamberlain (June 19). Separately, the paper carried information regarding the composition of Gladstone’s cabinet (February 6), MP John Bright’s views on the bill (March 27), and Gladstone’s subsequent ‘manifesto’ on the proposed fate of Ireland (June 19). The fact that newspapers relayed political debate was not lost on politicians of the day: for example, commenting on the implications of a discussion regarding women’s suffrage in 1873, radical MP John Bright opined from the backbenches that “The substance of this debate will be carefully reported in the newspapers, the report will go to every town and village in the United Kingdom, and to every English-speaking country under British rule...” (cited in Jenkins, 1996, 18).

Second, it is clear that members themselves were acutely aware that the expansion of the suffrage would bring less educated (if not necessarily illiterate) voters into the electorate: Robert Lowe, leader of the ‘Adullamite’ Liberal MPs skeptical of the Second Reform Act noted that those who would be newly enfranchised exhibited “venality...ignorance...drunkeness” and were in general “impulsive, unreflecting and violent people” (cited in Saunders, 2011, 206). Among more sympathetic MPs, the debate was not over whether the pool of voters to

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Available via library subscription to the *Gale Digital Collection*. Neuberg (1977, 224) notes that it had a circulation of around 200,000 by 1885, while Martin (2006, 23) points out that it “targeted the working classes and tended to cover the kind of information that interested them”.

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whom politicians must appeal would change, but rather the extent of those changes (see e.g. McLean, 2001, 66–67 on the ‘rating’ required for enfranchisement). Third, there is evidence that party leaders were aware of the need to appeal to these new voters, albeit in somewhat limited ways that did not alienate other members of the electorate. Thus Disraeli—or at least his Home Secretary Richard Cross—embarked on a series of union and labor reforms in the 1870s (St John, 2010, 151–153) while Salisbury actively pursued the ‘respectable’ suburban but working class “villa vote” (see Shannon, 1996). On the Liberal side, the party made early, if perhaps ineffectual, attempts in some cities to “recruit candidates with working-class appeal” prior to the 1868 election (Moore, 2006, 25) and the rise of “New Liberalism” thereafter is a specific example of an ideology that sought to embrace new voters and their concerns (Sykes, 1997).

All told then, senior politicians on the government side of the House of Commons had strong reasons to adapt their policies and language in the aftermath of the Second Reform Act in a way that was less true of their backbench colleagues in their own party and among the opposition. We should thus expect that any change towards simpler speech was larger in magnitude for ministers than it was for others. Assessing this claims requires that we investigate their speeches over time. It is to our data on this that we turn before explicating our measurement strategy.

3 Data

Our data consists of speeches made in the House of Commons between 1832 and 1915. Thus, the Second Reform Act of 1868 occurs approximately half way into our time series, allowing a large window before and after in which to assess any effects on speech style. The speech data

See also Jennings (426 1962) on Chamberlain’s ‘Radical Program’ for the 1885 General Election.
is matched to individual MPs, which is then matched to various covariates including party of
election, cabinet status, and competitiveness of constituency elections. These measures and
the data are described by Eggers and Spirling (2014a) (which draws on Craig (1989, 1974);
Cook and Keith (1975); Butler and Butler (1994)). For the data set in its original form,
there are 860,192 speeches for 4233 MPs, with an average of 203 speeches per member. For
our analysis below, we restrict ourselves to members running for either the Conservative or
Liberal party in elections, excluding various idiosyncratic versions of those labels, along with
nationalist parties and the (early) Labour party. What remains are 675,997 speeches, from
3613 members, for an average of 187 speeches per MP. We are confident that restricting our
data is appropriate for at least two reasons: first, because only the Liberals or Conservatives
could plausibly form the cabinet during the period under study and thus these parties con-
stitute the key actors for our work; second, our findings below are robust to including those
other parties as part of the opposition. We make very few further ‘adjustments’ to our data
set. In particular, we impose no minimum length on speeches (empirically, the minimum
number of words is 1, the maximum is 11,000, with a mean around 248) and remove only one
session from our analysis: the very short (just 129 speeches) first session after the indecisive
1892 general election, at which time Salisbury awaited a no confidence vote before resigning
as Prime Minister. In some cases, we have covariate cases missing for (multiple observations
on) MPs, and we drop those cases from our regressions, giving \( N = 670091 \).

In time-series terms, our data is divided into parliamentary ‘sessions’ each of which last
approximately one year and which collectively comprise ‘parliaments’ (which begin after
general elections). In the period under study, different sessions within the same parliament
have different parties in cabinet because Victorian politicians did not always go to the coun-
try for a new popular mandate after their Prime Minister resigned or lost the confidence
of the House. An example of this would be the ascension of Disraeli (who followed Lord
Derby to the premiership) after Lord Russell’s Liberal government fell in 1866—without any intervening election. Because ministers (then as now) could leave office at any time with no more general consequence for the session itself, our measurement of who is a minister in any given session is relatively inclusive. That is, the metric includes anyone who served at least one day in the cabinet during that session.

Having described our data, our next task is to provide a metric for measuring, and comparing, the comprehensibility of speeches made in the House of Commons.

### 4 Methods and Measurement

Starting at least with Sherman’s (1893) “Objective Study of English Prose and Poetry”, scholars of literature and education have been interested in the notion that texts could be statistically analyzed and their “readability” measured. Although this key quantity of interest has been variously defined—depending in part on the relevant researcher’s motivation (e.g. Dale and Chall, 1949)—at its core, readability refers to the comprehensibility of a text; literally, the ease with which it may be understood by a reader with varying levels of education. A number of metrics have been proposed for assessing comprehensibility (e.g. Lively and Pressey, 1923; Dale and Chall, 1949; Gunning, 1952; McLaughlin, 1969) with that of Flesch (1948) being the most famous and widely used (Klare, 1963). Flesch’s (1948) formula, given in Equation (1) yields a score for any given body of text that is known as the Flesch Reading Ease (FRE) statistic. In the original application from which it was derived, the value of the statistic was found to have lower bound of 0, and an upper bound of 100, though this need not be the case in other data sets. Though we will use the score directly

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FRE = 205.9 / \left( \frac{1}{	ext{average word length}} + \frac{1}{	ext{average sentence length}} \right) - 1
\]

The formula results from a study undertaken by Flesch in which he regressed the average grade level of school children who could answer at least 75% of multiple choice questions regarding comprehension of texts they read on a constant and the two bracketed variables in the equation. In that context, a score of 100 means that the document could be understood by a student with a fourth grade education and thus could
in what follows, we note that educational researchers typically convert this output to a (minimum) number of years of US schooling—known as a Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level—that a student would require to find a given document comprehensible (see Kincaid et al., 1975).

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206.835 - 1.015 \left( \frac{\text{total number of words}}{\text{total number of sentences}} \right) - 84.6 \left( \frac{\text{total number of syllables}}{\text{total number of words}} \right)
\] (1)

Inspection of Equation (1) suggests that the Flesch score is not difficult to calculate using modern processing programs, assuming some machine-readable version of the text exists. As can readily be seen, for a fixed number of words in a document, increasing the number of syllables of those words, and grouping the words into fewer sentences both increase the complexity of the text in question.

Guidelines for interpreting the statistic may be found in several sources (including Flesch, 1949, 149–150); Cann, Goelzhauser and Johnson (2014, 663) give the following: “Texts with FRE scores ranging from 0 to 30 are considered very difficult to read, 31 to 50 are difficult, 51 to 60 are fairly difficult, 61 to 70 are standard, 71 to 80 are fairly easy, 81 to 90 are easy, and 91 to 100 are very easy.” To anchor these categories conceptually, note that Cann, Goelzhauser and Johnson (2014) place the average academic political science article at around 33, on a par with judicial opinions, while the *New York Times* has a mean FRE of about 48 and childrens’ books such as *Peter Pan* and *The Wind in the Willows* have FRE scores approaching 80. Giving context for these scores outside of the school setting, Dalecki, Lasorsa and Lewis (2009, 6) calculate that “85 percent of Americans today can read at the 50–60 reading ease level, 72 percent at the 30–50 level, and 28 percent at the lowest (0–30) level”.

Indeed there are several online calculators for this task, and it is included as standard in some word processing software. Here we use the implementation given by Rinker (2013) for the R statistical environment.
As suggested by the citations above, this paper joins a literature in social science that makes use of Flesch scores. It is also not the first piece to make the assumption that tools designed originally for measuring ease of reading can be meaningfully applied to texts that were spoken. For example, Jansen (2011) considers the clarity of central bankers answers to questions at legislative hearings. Closer to the subject matter of the current paper, Lim (2008) considers the evolution of rhetoric in Presidential speech-making since the founding of the republic. As a practical matter of course, the most common method by which parliamentary speeches would come to the attention of voters at the time would be via written reports in newspapers.

4.1 FRE Scores for Parliamentary Speeches

Applying the formula implied by Equation (1) to the parliamentary speeches for our study requires some preliminary preprocessing decisions on how to deal with the texts. While we do not stem the documents, or remove stop words, we do convert some parliamentary terms of art that contain period punctuation: thus, ‘Hon.’ becomes ‘Honorable’, ‘Rt.’ becomes ‘Right’, ‘Mr.’ becomes ‘Mister’ and so on. This allows more accurate calculation of the number of sentences in a speech, since it avoids miscounting periods. We then split each speech into sentences using the usual punctuation marks plus semi-colons and vertical bars, which are used in the early periods of our data to break up long utterances. Finally, we strip whitespace (other than single spaces), and drop speeches that contain no alphabetic characters (these typically arise when members give answers as numbers).

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We also drop some terms with periods, like ‘St.’

Subsequent inspection suggests this decision makes no difference to the relative distribution of speech scores, outside of some outliers for non-cabinet members. And, in any case, our main results are robust to the removal of outlier speeches.
Table 2: Summary of FRE statistics for speeches in our data.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>minimum</th>
<th>first quartile</th>
<th>median</th>
<th>mean</th>
<th>third quartile</th>
<th>maximum</th>
<th>std dev</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-301.80</td>
<td>42.59</td>
<td>52.25</td>
<td>52.63</td>
<td>62.14</td>
<td>205.80</td>
<td>19.94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: Distribution of FRE statistics for parliamentary data: boxplot and histogram. The x-axis for the later is the FRE statistic of the speech. Note that the bulk of the FRE statistics are between 0 and 100.

Looking over the entire period, the distribution of FRE statistics for our speeches is given in Table 2. We note that mean and median are both around 52, with a standard deviation around 20. We note that the minimum (-301.80) and maximum (205.80) imply a range larger than in the original Flesch (1948) study, although the boxplot (left) and histogram (right) in Figure 1 suggest that such values are outliers: note that the bulk of the distribution is between 0 and 100.

In Figure 2 we report the (by session) mean speech comprehensibility for cabinet (square points) and non-cabinet (circular points) MPs over the period under study. We also include smoothed loess lines to capture general trends. The main observation is that, somewhere around the 1860s, the average cabinet speech becomes more comprehensible than the average non-cabinet one, whereas prior to that time the means had been very similar. Immediately then, we have some (albeit) crude evidence in favor of our hypothesis above.
The source of these patterns is naturally of interest. We know from Equation (1) that the FRE score for a given speech is increasing in two (non-constant) components: one pertaining to the average sentence length and one pertaining to the average number of syllables per word. For our preliminary finding above—that cabinet speeches became relatively (and absolutely) less complex after the Second Reform Act—we considered only the aggregate (i.e. combined) effect of changes to these quantities. To get a sense of what drives the underlying patterns, consider Figure 3 where, for our historical period, we plot the (mean) average number of sentences for cabinet and non-cabinet speeches and the (mean) average number of syllables per word for the same.

An immediate observation from the figure is that, somewhere around 1868, the mean sentence length for ministers fell from around 27 words to around 21 words by the mid-1880s. While there was also a decline for backbenchers, it was not nearly so precipitous. The mini-
terial decrease does not appear to only be a function of sentence length, however. Studying the right panel, we see a decline in average syllables per cabinet word too. This recovers somewhat by the turn of the century, while the trend for the backbenchers is generally upwards. All in all, the patterns here suggest that ministerial speech got simpler because cabinet sentences got shorter, while backbencher words (almost simultaneously) had more syllables. This latter fact adds some credibility to our underlying claim that non-cabinet MPs became harder to understand in a relative sense, although we will return to the notion of possible ‘new roles’ for parliamentarians after our more formal results section.

Given the length of the period under study, it would be surprising if speeches had not changed in ways other than their comprehensibility and composition. In fact, they became on average shorter: cabinet and non-cabinet speeches had a mean length of around 500 words in the immediate aftermath of the First Reform Act, and were reduced in length in a fairly smooth and consistent fashion over time. By the turn of the 20th century, both cabinet and non-cabinet speeches reach a low of around 150 words (on average). Figure 4 displays these trends clearly. A natural concern might be that any changes to comprehensibility of speeches (measured by the FRE statistic) are an artifact of this shortening. On inspection, we doubt this is the case: the correlation between speech length and reading ease is very weak, at around 0.04. This is true regardless of whether we include ‘outliers’ (as identified
in the boxplot of Figure 1) in the calculation. In any case though, we include speech length as a variable in some of our regressions below.

![Diagram](image)

Figure 4: Average length of speeches for cabinet and non-cabinet MPs over time. The $y$-axis is the (mean) number of words per speech.

### 4.2 Validation

An obvious concern about the use of Flesch scores is that though they are well validated outside of this application, they do not measure linguistic complexity for our period. In Table 3 we a range of scores for speeches occurring in the first session of 1885. While the first three speeches are made by non-cabinet members, the last two are utterances from ministers. Though this is in no way a test of our general propositions above, we see that the ministers here—who are responding to queries raised by others—tend to be ‘punchier’ and more pithy in their speech. Furthermore, one can well imagine that working class voters would find it easier to follow the simpler speeches than the longer ones.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>word count</th>
<th>sentence count</th>
<th>syllables</th>
<th>score</th>
<th>role</th>
<th>speech</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>-3.18</td>
<td>non-cabinet</td>
<td>asked the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, Whether Her Majesty's Government have arrived at any practical decision with regard to the establishment of emigration bureaux for the purpose of promoting, as promised early in the Session, a systematic system of State-directed emigration?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45.45</td>
<td>non-cabinet</td>
<td>Can the right hon. Gentleman give the House any information as to when the Royal Commission on the Depression of Trade is likely to report on this subject?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>66.41</td>
<td>non-cabinet</td>
<td>said, he wished to know how many years ago these bayonets were made, and whether the name of the firm and the date of their manufacture were stamped upon them?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>85.89</td>
<td>cabinet</td>
<td>I will consider that. I think there will be no objection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>103.70</td>
<td>cabinet</td>
<td>That I cannot say till I have seen it.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Samples of speeches, from the first session of 1885, with a variety of comprehensibility scores: from the least to the most easy to understand.

Another way to assess the validity of our approach is to consider the scores given to contemporaneous texts that are specifically not parliamentary speeches (and thus not in our data) but are aimed at voters in general. To the extent that the relative scores given to those documents are in line with our priors regarding their intended audiences, we have evidence that the metric is a reasonable one. Here, we look at two members serving over approximately the same period: Keir Hardie, a Labour MP (with intermittent service between 1892 and 1915) and Arthur Balfour, a Conservative member (between 1874 and 1922). For Hardie, we use the text of eight books that he wrote between 1905 and 1911 published primarily by the (then) Independent Labour party, and presumably aimed at working class voters. For Balfour, we use (seven) essays for mid-brow magazines and lectures given to various

---

The focus of our analysis below are Liberal and Conservative members and, consequently, Hardie is not in the parliamentary speech data. We make use of him here precisely because we know that as a Labour member he wrote for an (almost) exclusively working class audience during this period, whereas a Liberal member might well have been appealing more broadly in class terms, in keeping with that party’s supposed electoral appeal at this time. Thus Hardie provides a purer validation test here.

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university audiences between 1882 and 1891, presumably aimed at a more middle class audience. For each of the works, we calculate the Flesch scores and report their distributions in Figure 5. As can readily be seen, Balfour’s writings with a median score of around 46 are considerably more complex than Hardie’s with a median of approximately 61. Parametric and non-parametric tests of means ($p < 0.01$) confirm this observed difference.

![Figure 5: Boxplot showing difference between complexity of works by Keir Hardie (Labour party) and Arthur Balfour (Conservative party).](image)

Bibliographical details of the texts can be found in Online Appendix B.

In passing, we note that Charles Dickens’ fiction of this period has a mean score of around 77, suggesting that the politicians in question were writing and speaking in a considerably more complex way.

For each given session, we are estimating a regression of the form

$$\text{FRE}_i = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{cabinet}_i + \gamma \mathbf{Z} + \epsilon_i$$

where $\text{FRE}_i$ is the FRE score of the $i$th speech, $\text{cabinet}_i$ is the cabinet membership status of the MP making the $i$th speech; $\mathbf{Z}$ refers to a set of control variables—party, competitiveness of seat and word count—for
cabinet are displayed (with 95% confidence intervals) in Figure 6. The solid horizontal line marks zero. Our first observation from the figure is that the point estimates begin below zero, and around the 1860s rise into positive territory and stay there for the remaining time periods in the data. In words, being a cabinet minister is initially associated with making speeches that are (on average) more difficult to comprehend than those of other members; subsequently, cabinet speeches are easier to understand. Obviously, in many cases, the confidence intervals cross the zero line, but a general pattern is apparent.

Figure 6: Estimated $\hat{\beta}$ on cabinet status in session-by-session linear regressions [with 95% confidence intervals]. Solid horizontal line marks zero. Note the general rise in coefficients from below, to above zero, around 1868.

To clarify the timing of the change, we use the session-by-session coefficients on cabinet status and regress these on their session numbers (with the first session of our data being session ‘1’, the second being session ‘2’ and so on) while simultaneously estimating the breakpoints in this relationship in the sense of Bai and Perron (2003) (as implemented by Zeileis et al. 2002). Using standard defaults, we obtain one breakpoint as the optimally fitting model with that break dated at the first session of 1868—in line with our theory. We consider which $\gamma$ is the set of coefficients and $\epsilon_i$ is an error term. Because members make multiple speeches per session, we cluster the standard errors at the MP level.

See Online Appendix C for the full model comparison table.
the robustness of change point in more detail after introducing our ‘main’ regression results below.

This *prima facie* evidence is helpful, and is in line with our main hypothesis. Nonetheless readers may reasonably object that it is inefficient and possibly misleading to break up the data on a session-by-session basis, especially if subsequent structural break tests ignore the estimation uncertainty in the coefficients—as they do here. A more philosophically appropriate test then is to combine all the sessions and assess the possibility of time-specific effects directly. With that in mind, we now re-estimate the regression with the inclusion of an interaction term involving the product of a member’s cabinet status and a dummy that takes the value ‘1’ for any session after the 1868 election—the point at which we hypothesize the change occurred. We do this with and without the controls. The results of those regressions, with standard errors again clustered by MP, are presented in Table 4.

To clarify, the regression being estimated has as its dependent variable the FRE score of the $i$th speech and may be written as:

$$\text{FRE}_i = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{cabinet}_i + \beta_2 \text{reform}_i + \beta_3 (\text{cabinet}_i \times \text{reform}_i) + \gamma \mathbf{Z} + \epsilon_i$$

where $\text{cabinet}_i$ is the cabinet membership status of the MP in the $i$th observation, $\text{reform}_i$ is a dummy pertaining to whether the MP is speaking before or after the 1868 election, and $(\text{cabinet}_i \times \text{reform}_i)$ is simply the interaction of the two; $\mathbf{Z}$ refers to a possible set of control variables for which $\gamma$ is the coefficient and $\epsilon_i$ is an error term. Written this way, the regression may be interpreted as a ‘difference in differences’, in the sense that attention focusses on comparing the magnitude of change in cabinet behavior before and after the reform with the (presumably smaller) change in non-cabinet behavior over the same period.

Note that we do not use MP-level fixed effects due to the fact that only 3% of our MPs ever change roles: that is, the cabinet variable takes one value for almost all MPs at all times meaning that fitting fixed effects would generally not allow one to estimate the effects of cabinet vs non-cabinet status.
Table 4: Table of estimates for regression of comprehensibility of speech on cabinet status and
time dummy (for Second Reform Act) and interaction between the two—with and without
controls.

For completeness, we begin with the version with the controls (second column). Note
first that there is no statistical significance attached to the ‘Liberal MP’ variable: that is,
the party identification of the member does not seem to be systematically associated with
complexity. The same goes for ‘competitiveness’ of constituency, which is a measure of the
average number of candidates running in a seat at the general election (and has a mean
of around 1.5 for our period). We observe that the coefficient on ‘word count’ (literally,
the number of words in the speech) is statistically significant, but negative: that is, longer
speeches are (on average) easier to comprehend than shorter ones. Before getting to the
main variables of interest, we note that the two models have essentially identical fit statistics: the adjusted-$R^2$ of the restricted model is 0.0084 while adding the extra variables on the
right hand side pushes this only to 0.0103. We thus focus on the simpler version—without
controls—for interpretation purposes since those extra variables add little to the analysis (implying that our main finding below is reasonably robust).

Putting aside the uncertainty estimates for the moment, we see that the point predictions are as we would expect given our hypothesis. A minister prior to the Second Reform Act has a lower average comprehensibility ($\hat{y} = 50.6$) than one serving after that date ($\hat{y} = 56.6$), and the difference is around six points on the FRE scale. By contrast, the difference for a backbencher between serving before ($\hat{y} = 51.4$) and after ($\hat{y} = 52.1$) is around 0.7 of a point on the scale. Clearly, in both absolute and relative terms, cabinet members went through a larger positive shift in their linguistic behavior than their non-cabinet colleagues and the implied difference in differences is around five points. To get a sense of the substantive effect of the reform, consider a hypothetical backbencher promoted to the cabinet in the first session of 1868. The coefficients imply that he would make his average speech \textit{ceteris paribus} around eight percent easier to understand (on the FRE scale) relative to his colleagues still on the backbenches. This is non-trivial, corresponding with a change from around the 48th to the 60th percentile in the score distribution (for speeches made after the 1868 election).

Returning to uncertainty estimates, in Figure 7 we provide an estimated marginal effect plot (taking into account the standard error clustering) and we see that our priors find support: while ministers—if anything—are slightly less comprehensible relative to backbenchers prior to reform, they are clearly more understandable after.
Figure 7: Estimated marginal effect of cabinet membership on speech comprehensibility, before and after the Second Reform Act.

5.1 Robustness: Timing and Data Quality

Above we showed that when looking session-by-session, the immediate period after the 1868 general election was a break point (indeed, the only break point) in the time series. We conducted several further tests on our data—described in some detail in Online Appendix C—to corroborate this claim and to rule out possible ‘pre-trends’ in the time series. First we re-estimated our ‘main’ regression model based on data ‘local’ to the hypothesized change point initially using five sessions before and after the first session of 1868, and then ten sessions before and after. The central findings on the difference in the differences between cabinet and non-cabinet MPs remains intact. Second, we estimated a simple regression of FRE on cabinet status for all data prior to the first session of 1868: the results implied that, if anything, cabinet speeches tended to be less comprehensible than non-cabinet speeches prior to the Second Reform Act. Finally, we perform an explicit ‘placebo’ test by treating the last session of the 1865 parliament (i.e. prior to the electoral reform) as a proposed change date. The regression that resulted had a similar but lower adjusted-$R^2$ than the original model, thus leading us to conclude that it does not offer a more plausible period for any break in the data generating process that occurred.
A separate issue for our analysis is the fact that FRE scores are, in general, much more variable for short speeches than long speeches. This is unfortunate from a statistical perspective because it is presumably the shorter speeches that contribute most to key differences we observe between ministers and non-cabinet members, while simultaneously these are the observations about which we are least certain in a sampling sense. With this in mind, we conduct four further versions of our ‘main’ regression to verify that our conclusions regarding the impact of the Second Reform Act are robust. In the first two, we limit ourselves to short speeches (fewer than one hundred words) and then long speeches (more than one hundred words). In the third specification, we use only speeches that are not outliers. Finally, we estimated a weighted regression where the weights are simply the length of the speeches. In Online Appendix D, we report the results of these enquiries in more detail: it suffices here to note that the implied difference in differences between ministers and non-ministers is robust in terms of the hypothesized direction.

5.2 Ruling out ‘new types’

Thus far, an implicit assumption for our work has been that the change to cabinet ministers’ utterances was (primarily) a product of individuals responding to new incentives in the electorate. An alternative hypothesis is that, in fact, the Second Reform Act introduced new ‘types’ of individuals to the House of Commons with different latent features and that it the changing make-up of the chamber that yields the results we saw above. There are at least two ways to investigate this possibility, to which we now turn.

First, we consider all individuals who served in a cabinet position at least once after the

A speech’s length is an outlier if it is greater than the upper quartile multiplied by 1.5 times the interquartile range, or less than the lower quartile multiplied by 1.5 times the interquartile range.
1868 election: i.e. after the Second Reform Act took effect. Using a paired $t$-test with ministerial office as the treatment, we compare their mean speech comprehensibility when in the cabinet with their average when serving as a backbencher. The mean difference uncovered is (an increase of) 2.58 on average, which is statistically significant ($p < 0.01$). Since this test keeps the individuals themselves constant, and combined with the fact that cabinet ministers serving in this period are not disproportionately more likely to have been elected to parliament after 1868 relative to backbenchers they serve alongside, it provides strong circumstantial evidence that cabinet office (after 1868) had some effect regardless of the fixed characteristics of the MPs involved.

To put this finding on even surer footing, we now turn to a more systematic study of fixed effects. In particular, restricting the data to cabinet members, we regress the session mean comprehensibility score on a session dummy, and then on a session dummy plus fixed effects for the MPs. The idea here is that if the regression with the MP fixed effects has different coefficients for the time dummies, we may conclude that the latent features of individual cabinet members are important for explaining the data we saw. In Figure 8 we present a plot of the coefficient on the session dummies for both regressions, with their 95% confidence intervals. The broken lines represent the intervals for the fixed effects case, and the solid lines are those without member effects. In every case, these intervals overlap: that is, we have no evidence that adding member fixed effects matters relative to the more general time dynamic portrayed above.

To clarify, we potentially have confounding here if ministers in the post-1868 period are more likely than contemporaneous backbenchers to have been elected in or after the 1868 election. This is not the case: if anything, the reverse is true—67% of the cabinet ministers had their first session in parliament after the 1868 election, compared with 93% of those not serving in the cabinet.

To verify that, in fact, joining and leaving the cabinet had the expected effect on a given (well known) individual, we investigated the case of William Gladstone—who spent six decades in the House of Commons. Our findings for Gladstone are generally in line with our theory, especially after the Second Reform Act. See Online Appendix F for more details.
Figure 8: Comparing model with and without member fixed effects; $y$-axis is $\hat{\beta}$ on the relevant session dummy; $x$-axis denotes session. Vertical lines denote 95% confidence intervals.

5.3 Ruling out ‘new roles’

Another plausible mechanism for the decreasing relative complexity of cabinet speeches—separate to any pressure from voters—is that ministers began to operate in a new legislative environment incidental to the Second Reform Act, and that changes to the nature of ministerial speech are an artifact of these fresh organizational imperatives. It is certainly true that the historical literature has discussed the nineteenth century as a period in which the Commons’ agenda altered. On the other hand, those events do not line up with 1868 as a change point: indeed, it the 1880s onwards that are typically emphasized. For example, until the 1880s, questions to ministers came before all other business, but from 1881 questions to the Prime Minister came at the end of the day (Jones, 1973). Furthermore, 1882 saw the advent of a new Speaker power to ‘close’ debate in response to Irish obstructionism at that
Figure 9: Proportion of all speeches in House of Commons made by cabinet and non-cabinet members over time.

time (Dion, 1997, e.g.). By the turn of the century, government dominance of the agenda was essentially in its modern form as a result of Balfour’s ‘railway timetable’ reforms (see discussion in Chester and Bowring, 1962).

One way to assess possible changing roles for the cabinet—including more agenda control—is to analyze their relative share of speeches in the House of Commons over time. In Figure 9 we do just that. There the thick solid line is the proportion of speeches made by the cabinet; the broken line corresponds to those made by backbenchers. We would be concerned if, around 1868, there was a sudden and permanent increase or decrease in these relative quantities. This is not the case. Indeed, examining the time series for change points (in the sense of Bai and Perron, 2003) reveals that if there is a break in the data generating process, it occurred at the first session of 1885. Visual inspection of the figure suggests the same finding: one can readily see that the cabinet enjoys more ‘air time’ after that session.

While this is heartening news for the originally proposed causal mechanism and its origins in the Second Reform Act, it may nonetheless be the case that this late century uptick is driving the main post-reform act result from our regressions. To check this, we exclude all data from the first session of 1885 onwards and rerun our analysis for the shorter period. Comfortingly, the results are essentially identical to those from our ‘main model’ above, and are displayed (with clustered standard errors) in Online Appendix E.
A second way to assess a possibly ‘new’ role for ministers immediately after 1868 is to consider the order of speeches, in terms of the types of members making them, around the time in question (see Eggers and Spirling, 2014a, for a similar approach). We estimate a series of logistic regressions with each speaker’s (binary) cabinet role predicted by the previous speaker’s role. We then calculate the predicted probability that a minister speaks after a non-minister for each session. If this probability changes in a ‘once-and-for-all’ way after the Second Reform Act, this implies that ministers are fulfilling a different role: either engaging somewhat more or somewhat less in floor debate than previously. Fortunately, this is not what we find: in Figure 10 we report the predicted probabilities and their confidence intervals for the period between the 1852 and 1880 general elections. Crucially, the sessions before and after the 1868 election have very similar point estimates, with confidence intervals that often overlap.

Figure 10: Probability that a minister speaks immediately after a non-minister for the period between the 1852 and 1880 general elections.
All told then, we find little evidence—historical or empirical—of contemporaneous changes to ministerial roles that render as spurious our ‘main’ results above.

6 Discussion

Observers of modern democracies speak anxiously of the ‘dumbing down’ of political discourse (Lim, 2008). They fear that important yet subtle debates and distinctions are increasingly lost and that elected officials no longer lead opinion in a thoughtful way. A more optimistic take on recent trends is to regard the simplification of political language as helpful (or perhaps vital) for the engagement of citizens with increasingly constrained time budgets and interests outside of governance (e.g. Temple, 2006). Whatever the truth, as political scientists we have strong reasons to hope and to believe that politicians respond to voters as much as voters respond to their representatives. This is true in both theory (e.g. Meltzer and Richard, 1981) and in empirical work (e.g. Canes-Wrone, Brady and Cogan, 2002) that stresses the importance of congruence between the preference held by constituents and the actions taken by politicians. A natural consequence of this logic is that when new types of citizens join the electorate—in the modern period, typically via immigration (e.g. Tam Cho, 1999)—officeholders will compete for their support and alter their platforms in a way that reflects this underlying change.

Here we studied this very broad phenomenon for an historically important period: the Victorian age of democratization in Britain. Unlike other studies that relied on shorter periods or coarser data at higher levels of aggregation, our findings were unambiguous: cabinet members, after a doubling of the electoral roll in 1867, began to make parliamentary speeches with different properties than before. In particular, entirely in fitting with predictions from the literature, their utterances became easier for the median member of the electorate to
understand. This median voter was a man of the working class, with less access to education (and literacy) than had previously been the case in the electorate. As far as we know, our paper is the first to provide systematic evidence of a ‘reform effect’ on the language used in parliament. Crucially, we noted that this change was not due to new types of MPs—with different priorities or experiences—entering the Commons after electoral reform. Indeed, our auxiliary analysis suggested that it is the same members acting in new ways upon finding their way to the frontbench that is responsible for the decrease in complexity in speeches.

As is inevitable with observational data, it is no easy task to be confident about the causal process that undergirds an empirical pattern. Certainly, our findings are not artifacts of superficial changes to speech records: for example, it is not simply that ministers make shorter speeches over time which is then picked up (artificially) in our complexity metric. Furthermore, we have reason to believe that incentives to simplify presentation are strongest for cabinet members: in Westminster systems they are held accountable for government policy, and their performance—especially on the economy—is the best predictor of future general election success. Unsurprisingly then, it is ministers who most sought to appeal to voters. On the other hand, showing evidence consistent with a theory is not the same as showing that the theory is correct. In particular, we do not know whether ministers consciously altered their linguistic style and what, precisely, the impetus for this was: perhaps Prime Ministers such as Disraeli and Gladstone, who seemed acutely aware of the new electoral calculus (see, e.g., McLean, 2001, on Disraeli’s introduction of a new dimension to British politics), took the lead and advised their colleagues to speak more simply (or promoted those from the backbenches that could). No doubt there was a period of ministerial ‘learning’ as the effects of the Reform Act in the constituencies became clearer over time. Alternatively, the stimulus may be been less direct—perhaps a result of civil service professionalisation and the increasing role of the bureaucracy in serving and advising ministers in terms of their
relationship with the House. Finally, it is possible that the relative decline in ministerial complexity is a consequence of a more direct and aggressive ministerial questioning dynamic as the opposition frontbenches employ interrogatives which are inevitably longer than the ‘punchy’ answers they receive. Understanding the precise mechanism requires more fine-grained data than we have here, though studying modern speech-writing and speech-giving by politicians may help us understand how they think about the audience to which they must appeal.

Moving beyond the United Kingdom, similar methods might useful for studying, say, the development of the ‘Second Party System’ (see, e.g., Jenkins and Stewart, 2012) and ‘Jacksonian Democracy’ in the United States with its new emphasis on voters over political elites. In particular, researchers might explore whether the latter increasingly spoke in ways comprehensible to the median elector at this time. Of course, the tone or complexity of speeches is only one part of what it means for parliamentarians to be ‘responsive’ to voters. More important for material welfare is policy. Here, the extent of linguistic complexity is likely less helpful than a study of both topics of debate (as in Quinn et al., 2010), and of bills that became acts (relative to those that didn’t). Again, textual methods can be helpful, and the speeches and related data we have used provide the beginnings of a resource to get at such quantities of interest. We leave such efforts for future work.

Richard Crossman, for example, argues that ministers dealing with their civil servants find themselves constrained in terms of the plausible policy choices they may chose (and presumably then present to the electorate) (see Crossman, 1975).

We do not mean that the simplification of language by cabinet members is a mere ‘artifact’ of the rising importance of questions-and-answers: rather, the intended inference is that this new speech dynamic allowed central actors to appeal to the new electorate and in so doing rewarded shortened, simplified, robust partisan points over more long-winded, philosophical inquiries.

Including membership information for the Shadow Cabinet, which was not recorded during the Victorian period.
Acknowledgements

Thanks to Laura Bronner, John Marshall and Raphael Heuwieser for comments on an earlier draft. Audiences at the Harvard Political Economy Workshop and Toulouse Institute for Advanced Study provided helpful suggestions. Three referees and the Editor provided extremely valuable feedback on both content and style.
References


**URL:** [http://github.com/trinker/qdap](http://github.com/trinker/qdap)


**Biographical Statement**

Arthur Spirling is an Associate Professor at New York University, New York, NY 10012.
Online Appendix A  Examples of Political Reporting from *The Penny Illustrated Paper* (1886)

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<tr>
<th>Article Title/Headline</th>
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<th>Notes</th>
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<td>MR. GLADSTONE’S DICTUM ON IRELAND</td>
<td>Jan 30</td>
<td>quotes Gladstone in Commons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR. GLADSTONE’S SPEECH.</td>
<td>Jan 30</td>
<td>quotes Parnell in Commons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News in a Nutshell</td>
<td>Feb 6</td>
<td>reports (new) Gladstone Cabinet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR. BRIGHT AND MR. GLADSTONE’S PLAN.</td>
<td>March 27</td>
<td>reports John Bright’s views of Gladstone’s Ireland Bill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR. GLADSTONE’S PLEA FOR IRELAND.</td>
<td>April 17</td>
<td>quotes Gladstone in Commons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR. PARNELL ON MR. GLADSTONE’S MEASURE.</td>
<td>April 17</td>
<td>quotes Parnell in Commons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our Illustrations.</td>
<td>April 17</td>
<td>quotes Gladstone in Commons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR. GLADSTONE’S NOBLE EFFORT TO ARREST HEARTLESS EVICTION IN IRELAND.</td>
<td>April 24</td>
<td>quotes Gladstone in Commons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR. CHAMBERLAIN’S RIGID STAND AGAINST THE GLADSTONE POLICY OF RECONCILIATION WITH IRELAND.</td>
<td>June 19</td>
<td>quotes Chamberlain in Commons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR. GLADSTONE’S NEW MANIFESTO IN FAVOUR OF A REAL UNION BETWEEN BRITAIN AND IRELAND.</td>
<td>June 19</td>
<td>quotes Gladstone ‘manifesto’</td>
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Online Appendix B  Validation: Texts from Hardie and Balfour

The Balfour texts are from Balfour (1893) and are as described in Table 5. The Hardie texts are as described in Table 6.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>1883</td>
<td>Berkeley’s Life and Letters</td>
<td>National Review</td>
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<td>1887</td>
<td>Handel</td>
<td>Edinburgh Review</td>
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<td>1882</td>
<td>Cobden and the Manchester School</td>
<td>Nineteenth Century</td>
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<td>1885</td>
<td>Politics and Political Economy</td>
<td>National Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>A Fragment on Progress</td>
<td>Address at Glasgow University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1888</td>
<td>The Religion of Humanity</td>
<td>Address at Church Congress, Manchester</td>
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Table 5: Texts by Arthur Balfour, used for validation of FRE statistics.

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<td>Published by ILP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>Can a Man be a Christian on a Pound a week</td>
<td>Published by ILP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>Common Good</td>
<td>Published by National Labour Press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>ILP and All About It</td>
<td>Published by ILP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>India: Impressions and Suggestions</td>
<td>Published by Home Rule for India League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>John Bull and His Unemployed</td>
<td>Published by ILP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>Killing No Murder</td>
<td>Published by ILP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>Karl Marx: the man and his message</td>
<td>Published by ILP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Texts by Keir Hardie, used for validation of FRE statistics. “ILP” refers to the Independent Labour Party.
Online Appendix C  Robustness of 1868 as a Structural Break

To begin, in Table 7 we report the results of the Bai and Perron (2003) test for structural breaks in terms of the relative model fit (residual sum of squares and BIC) for different numbers of breaks as performed on the session-by-session regression coefficients. Clearly, one break is optimal. The optimal timing of that break is the first session of 1868.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>number of breaks</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RSS</td>
<td>181.15</td>
<td>144.35</td>
<td>128.89</td>
<td>115.96</td>
<td>107.56</td>
<td>107.36</td>
<td>111.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>321.49</td>
<td>315.32</td>
<td>318.94</td>
<td>323.21</td>
<td>330.11</td>
<td>343.31</td>
<td>359.83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: Optimal number of breaks: residual sum of squares and BIC suggest 1 break.

We checked the robustness of the first session of 1868 as a break point in several ways. First, we re-estimated our ‘main’ regression model based on data ‘local’ to the hypothesized change point. In particular, we re-run our regression using data only from the five sessions before and after the first session of 1868, and then using data only from the 10 sessions before and after the first session of 1868. The idea here is that our central findings should be robust when we look only at the immediate vicinity of the Reform Act: if not, it suggests that there are ‘pre-trends’ occurring (well) prior to 1868 that dictate the relative difference between cabinet and backbenchers; alternatively, non-robust results might suggest that it is changes (well) after the franchise extension that are driving the findings.

The good news, from the perspective of the original findings, is that the central findings on the difference in the differences between cabinet and non-cabinet remains intact. We give the coefficients and clustered standard errors in Table 8. Notice that the first column—dealing with the five sessions before and after the reform—implies a change to the predicted
outcome for cabinet ministers of $-0.35$, while for other members it is $-1.73$. Although these differences are not in the hypothesized direction in absolute terms (i.e. our aggregate findings above suggest complexity actually decreased over time), the relative differences are as expected. Looking at the second column, which deals with the ten sessions pre and post reform, we once again see the expected results: the implied change for the average cabinet member is $0.57$ points on the FRE scale, but for a backbencher it is $-1.89$ points.

We do further checks on our proposed change point. First, we estimate a simple regression of FRE on cabinet status for all data prior to the first session of 1868. The coefficient on ministerial status is negative ($-0.82$) with a clustered standard error ($0.417$) implying that, if a speech score difference exists between those in the cabinet and those outside, it is negative prior to the hypothesized break. This is again suggestive evidence that pre-trends are not of fundamental concern. Finally, we perform an explicit ‘placebo’ test by treating the last session of the 1865 parliament (i.e. prior to the electoral reform) as a proposed change date. The regression that results has a similar but lower adjusted-$R^2$ ($0.0083$) than the original model ($0.0084$), thus leading us to conclude that it does not offer a more plausible period.

Table 8: ‘Main’ regression of FRE on variables, restricting data to five and ten sessions around the first session of 1868.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Five Sessions</th>
<th>Ten Sessions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>51.17*</td>
<td>51.60*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet member</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.50)</td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform Act dummy</td>
<td>$-1.73^*$</td>
<td>$-1.89^*$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet $\times$ Reform Act</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>2.46*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.96)</td>
<td>(0.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$N$</td>
<td>76736</td>
<td>149666</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

MP clustered standard errors in parentheses
for any break in the data generating process that occurred.

Online Appendix D  Flesch Reading Ease scores as a function of speech length: heteroscedasticity

To get a sense of the variability of the FRE as a function of speech length, consider Figure 11. There, for the entire corpus, we plot the lengths of the speeches (x-axis) and their calculated FRE score (y-axis). Of note is the obviously larger variance of scores when speeches are short (especially at less than 100 words or so), and the relatively consistent range of scores as speeches get longer (in passing, note that the median speech in the corpus is around 69 words long, while the mean is around 248 words).

This heteroscedasticity implies that it is short speeches that provide much of the variance in the data. From a sampling perspective unfortunately, these are precisely the speeches about which we are least certain—in terms of their FRE scores. With this in mind, we conduct four further regressions to verify that our conclusions regarding the impact of the Second Reform Act are robust. In the first two, we limit ourselves to short speeches (fewer than
Table 9: Robustness of FRE results as a function of document length

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>&lt; 100</th>
<th>&gt; 100</th>
<th>No outliers</th>
<th>Weighted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>53.53*</td>
<td>49.16*</td>
<td>51.73*</td>
<td>50.10*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet Member</td>
<td>1.47*</td>
<td>−2.74*</td>
<td>−1.25*</td>
<td>−2.41*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.39)</td>
<td>(0.53)</td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
<td>(0.59)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform Act</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>−0.55</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.37)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet × Reform Act</td>
<td>4.10*</td>
<td>3.11*</td>
<td>3.35*</td>
<td>2.55*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.73)</td>
<td>(0.69)</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
<td>(0.84)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N   | 409662 | 258696 | 630946 | 670216

Clustered standard errors in parentheses
* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

Table 10: Implied difference in differences from regressions in Table 9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Cabinet before</th>
<th>Cabinet after</th>
<th>Others before</th>
<th>Others after</th>
<th>diff-in-diff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 100</td>
<td>54.994</td>
<td>59.732</td>
<td>53.528</td>
<td>54.166</td>
<td>4.100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 100</td>
<td>46.415</td>
<td>48.976</td>
<td>49.158</td>
<td>48.612</td>
<td>3.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No outliers</td>
<td>50.481</td>
<td>54.196</td>
<td>51.730</td>
<td>52.096</td>
<td>3.350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weighted</td>
<td>47.687</td>
<td>50.457</td>
<td>50.102</td>
<td>50.321</td>
<td>2.551</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A speech’s length is an outlier if it is greater than the upper quartile multiplied by 1.5 times the interquartile range, or less than the lower quartile multiplied by 1.5 times the interquartile range.

one hundred words) and then long speeches (more than one hundred words). In the third specification, we use only speeches that are not outliers. Finally, we estimated a weighted regression where the weights are simply the length of the speeches. In each case, we use (MP) clustered standard errors. The results are reported in Table 9. In Table 10 we report the implied difference in differences (via the $\hat{\gamma}$s from the regressions) for cabinet members relative to non-cabinet MPs for the various models. Importantly, the predictions are similar to our ‘main’ regression above (where the implied difference in differences was around 5 points): in particular, the Second Reform Act led to an increase in FRE scores for ministers above and beyond any increase for backbenchers.
Online Appendix E  Second Reform Act and changes to Cabinet Speech Roles

Table Online Appendix E is our ‘main’ regression run only on the data prior to the first session of 1885. Note that this version of the findings predicts speeches by the cabinet increase on the FRE scale by around 3.45 points (on average), while speeches from other members *decrease* on the scale by around 0.09 points.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre-1885 data, only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>51.40*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet Member</td>
<td>-0.82*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform Act Dummy</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet x Reform Act</td>
<td>3.54*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>334631</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses
* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

Table 11: Regression of FRE reading ease on cabinet status, reform dummy and interaction for data prior to the first session of 1885.

Online Appendix F  Gladstone’s Career in and out of Cabinet

In Figure 12 we report William Gladstone’s median FRE for every session he served during his six decade career in the House of Commons. The solid lines and points denote periods in the cabinet; the open points and broken lines denote his service outside the cabinet. Notice that in line with our ‘main’ regression above, prior to the Second Reform Act (prior to the vertical line), Gladstone in cabinet is not obviously higher scoring on the FRE scale than Gladstone outside of ministerial office. Note however, that after the 1868 election the find-
ing we assert above generally holds for this MP. In particular, consider his move from Prime Minister in the final session of the 1868 parliament to losing that office at the 1874 election: clearly, his median FRE score moves downwards, before recovering somewhat. Coming back to power in 1880 as Prime Minister, his median FRE score shifts upwards (as predicted) before dropping sharply when he resigns and the Liberal government collapses in the summer of 1886.

Figure 12: William Gladstone’s (median) FRE for speeches made as backbencher and cabinet minister. Solid vertical line denotes session immediately after the 1868 General Election.

A second implication of our theory is that opposition leaders—such as Gladstone in the 1870s and late 1880s—ought to seek to speak in simpler ways than their backbenchers after the Second Reform Act. With this in mind, Figure 13 plot Gladstone’s FRE scores over time again with the solid line demarcating his cabinet service and the broken line representing his non-cabinet periods. This time, a gray line has been added to demarcate the median FRE of Liberal backbenchers serving at the same time. Note here the sample differs to that used for the plot above insofar here we restrict speeches to 200 words or fewer here simply to ensure Gladstone and his colleagues are directly comparable: he tended to make unusually long speeches. The main point is that, when Gladstone is the leader of the opposition after he loses the 1874 election to Disraeli, it can be readily seen that his median FRE score (for this
sample) soars above and beyond the median Liberal. And, indeed, this pattern continues for some time afterwards. This is exactly in keeping with our expectations about the opposition frontbench.

![Figure 13: Gladstone’s median FRE score in cabinet (unbroken black line) and out (broken line), relative to his median backbencher (unbroken gray line). Data restricted to speeches of 200 words or less.](image)

Figure 13: Gladstone’s median FRE score in cabinet (unbroken black line) and out (broken line), relative to his median backbencher (unbroken gray line). Data restricted to speeches of 200 words or less.