On the exceptional status of reportative evidentials*

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1 Introduction

• Evidentials are functional morphemes which encode the information source associated with a given claim (or question):

(1) Tariana\footnote{Aikhenvald, 2004, pp. 2-3}

\begin{itemize}
\item Juse irida\text{-}di\text{-}manika\text{-}\{g/mah/nih/si/pida\}\text{-}ka
\item José football 3sg\text{-}play\text{-}\{vis/nonvis/infer/assum/rep\}\text{-}Rec.Past
\end{itemize}

\(p = 'José has played football'\)
\(EVID = \) Speaker saw/heard/inferred/assumed/was told that \(p\).

A bit more specifically:

(2) Baseline Conception (BC) of Evidentials:
A speaker who sincerely utters a declarative sentence with propositional content \(p\) and an evidential of type \(EVID\) typically:

\begin{itemize}
\item a. Performs an assertion with content \(p\) (or a modalized version thereof).
\item b. Conveys in some way that the speaker has \(EVID\)-type evidence that \(p\).
\end{itemize}

• While details differ, something like this characterization is found in some form in many descriptions of evidentials.

**Big question:** To what extent does the contribution of evidentials within and across languages match the BC?

**This talk:** examine an apparent systematic counterexample to the BC – the exceptional status of reportatives.

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1.1 The exception

- Part (a) of the BC leads us to expect that it should be infelicitous to deny $p$ following an evidential-marked utterance.

- As first shown by Faller (2002), this expectation is not upheld for REPORTATIVES:

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textbf{Cuzco Quechua}\textsuperscript{(Faller, 2002, p. 191)}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \texttt{Pay-kuna-\textsuperscript{S} \textsuperscript{5} \= noqa-ma-qa qu\=lqi-ta muntu-ntin-pi saqiy-wa-n}
\begin{flushright}
\texttt{(s)he-Pl-Rep I-ILLA-Top money-Acc lot-INCL-Loc leave-1O-3}
\end{flushright}
\texttt{$p$ = ‘They leave me a lot of money’}
EVID = Speaker was told that $p$
\item \texttt{mana-m\=a riki riku-sqa-yki ni un sol-ta centavo-ta-pis}
\begin{flushright}
\texttt{not-IMPR right see-PP-2 not one Sol-Acc cent-Acc-ADD}
\end{flushright}
\texttt{saqi-sha-wa-n-chu}
\begin{flushright}
\texttt{leave-PROG-1O-3-NEG}
\end{flushright}
\texttt{$q$ = ‘(but) that’s not true, as you have seen, they don’t leave me one sol, not one cent.’}
EVID\textsuperscript{1} = Speaker has direct evidence that $q$.
\end{enumerate}
\end{enumerate}

1.2 What to do about it

- Previous authors who have noted this exception have built this into the semantics of the REPORTATIVE, i.e. denied that REPORTATIVES fit the BC in (2)

  - For example, Faller (2002) claims $p$ is not asserted in (3a), but merely ‘presented’

Today:

- Show that, contrary to suggestions in prior literature, data analogous to (3) are extremely widespread.

- Argue that REPORTATIVES are not in fact exceptional in their semantics, i.e. they do fit the BC.

- Provide a pragmatic account of (3) – and similar data cross-linguistically – in terms of \textit{pragmatic perspective shift}.

  - This only arises in REPORTATIVES, since they introduce another perspectival agent, whereas other evidentials do not.

- Flesh out a particular version of the BC which allows for a uniform semantics for (illocutionary) abductive inferential, reportative, and direct evidentials.

\textsuperscript{1}Faller argues that sentences in Cuzco Quechua without an overt evidential implicate that the speaker has direct evidence. The evidence for $q$ in this example, then, has a different status than the evidence for $p$.\

2
2 Reportative evidentials

2.1 Typology of evidentials

• The most common typology of evidentials is due to Willett (1988):

(4) Willett (1988)’s typology of evidentials:

- Direct
  - Attested
    - Auditory
    - Visual
  - Folklore
  - Thirdhand
- Indirect
  - Reported
    - Secondhand
    - Reasoning
  - Inferring
    - Results

• In addition, he proposes the following hierarchy of evidential ‘strength’:

(5) Willett (1988)’s hierarchy: Attested > Reported > Inferring

• However, more recent authors (e.g. Faller (2002) §2.4) have argued that no such universal hierarchy is possible . . .

• . . .but instead that context and details of the propositional content determines which sources of evidence are ‘stronger’.

**Conclusion:** reportative exceptionality cannot simply be attributed to them being the ‘weakest’ information source.
2.2 The exceptional status of reportatives

- As noted in the introduction, the BC in (2) holds that the ‘scope proposition’, \( p \), is asserted:

- Given this, we expect that an utterance of the form \( p_{\text{EVID}} \) and \( p_{\text{EVID}} \) should never be felicitous\(^2\), just like \( p \) and \( -p \).

- Surprisingly, however, we consistently can find examples of the form \( p_{\text{REP}} \) and \( p_{\text{DIR}} \)^3:

\[
\begin{align*}
(6) \quad \text{Cheyenne} & \quad (\text{Murray, 2010, p. 58}) \\
\text{É-hótáheva-séstse} & \quad \text{Floyd naa oha ó-sáa-hótáhévá-he-∅.} \\
3\text{-win-REP.3sg} & \quad \text{Floyd and CNTR 3-neg-win-MODa-DIR} \\
\text{‘Floyd won, I hear, but I’m certain he didn’t.’}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
(7) \quad \text{Chol} & \quad (\text{Vazquez Álvarez (p.c.)}) \\
\text{am-∅=bi} & \quad \text{juḫ-tyiki mach-bā ba’ aĩ-∅ tyi pul-i-∅, jiĩ-jach che’} \\
E-B3=\text{REP one-CL NEG=REL where E-B3 PRFV burn-IV-B3 PRON3=only that} \\
mach melel, tsāi-'āch lu’ pul-i-y-ob & \quad \text{true PRFV=Affr all burn-IV-EP-Pl3} \\
\text{NEG true} & \quad \text{‘It is said that there was one (person in the airplane) that didn’t burn up, but it’s} \\
\text{‘It is said that there was one (person in the airplane) that didn’t burn up, but it’s} \\
\text{not true, they all burned.’}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
(8) \quad \text{Estonian} & \quad (\text{Mark Norris (p.c.)}) \\
\text{Ta küll ole-vat aus mees, aga ta ei ole üldse aus} \\
\text{he surely be-REP honest man but he NEG be at.all honest} \\
\text{‘It’s certainly been said that he is an honest man, but he’s not honest at all.’}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
(9) \quad \text{Paraguayan Guaraní} & \quad (\text{Tonhauser, 2013, p. 1}) \\
\text{Che-rú=ndaje o-mba’apo guéteri há=katu n-ai-mo’ā-i} \\
B1SG-father=REP A3-work still and=CONTRAST NEG-A1SG-think-NEG \\
o-mba’apo-ha guéteri. & \quad \text{A3-work-NOM still} \\
\text{‘It’s said that my father is still working, but I don’t think he’s still working.’}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
(10) \quad \text{Tagalog} & \quad (\text{Schwager, 2010, p. 237}) \\
\text{Dadating daw siya sa isang oras, pero hindi talaga} \\
\text{will.come REP he in one hour but not really} \\
\text{‘He says he will come in an hour, but in fact he won’t.’}
\end{align*}
\]

\(^2\)The parentheses indicate that variability in whether or not an overt evidential is needed in the second conjunct. Related to this concern is the question of whether sentences with no overt evidential have a phonetically null DIRECT evidential, conversationally implicate a DIRECT evidential value, or none of the above. We set this aside here since they run equally afoot of the BC.

\(^3\)See Appendix for further such examples from 20 languages.
• Such examples are found across languages whose evidentials differ substantially in many ways:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reportative is part of larger evidential paradigm?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reportative is analyzed as:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Epistemic Modal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illocutionary operator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Morphosyntactically, Reportative is described as:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Verbal affix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clausal Clitic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auxiliary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Particle</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Reportative must take widest scope?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

• Only in St’át’inets, have examples of this sort have been claimed to be infelicitous, which we return to in §3.4.

• We mention it here since such data have caused previous authors to regard reportative exceptionality as a point of cross-linguistic variation in reportatives

Looking at all the data, however, we find that the exceptional status of reportatives is best thought of as at least an extremely robust cross-linguistic trend.

In contrast to reportatives, other evidentials – both direct and indirect are consistently infelicitous in these same languages.

• For direct evidentials, (11), we might think of this as being a reflex of their apparent ‘certainty’.

• For indirect evidentials such as conjecturals, (12), and abductive inferentials, (13), however, no such explanation is tenable.

– It would be just as plausible in principle for a speaker to have inferential or conjectural evidence that p, yet assert ¬p, as it would in the case of reportatives.

(11) **Cheyenne**  
(Murray, 2010, p. 54)

    #É-hótáheva- Floy nda oha  é-sáa-hótahévá-he-∅.

3-win-Dir.3sg Floyd and CNTR 3-neg-win-MODa-Dir

---

Krawczyk (2012), p. 90 provides an especially clear statement of this claim, claiming a ‘Taxonomy of Reportative Evidentiality’ whose primary division is between those languages where reportatives are ‘exceptional’ in our terms and those where they require speaker commitment. Alongside St’át’inets, Krawczyk mentions only German, despite the example in (35j) and similar examples discussed by Mortelmans (2000)
‘Floyd won, I’m sure, but I’m certain he didn’t.’

(12) **Cuzco Quechua** *(Faller, 2002, p. 163)*

\[\text{key-TOP backpack-LOC-CONJ be-PROG-3 but not-DIR there-LOC-NEG}\]

#‘The keys maybe/are possibly/probably in my backpack, but they are not there.’

(13) **Central Alaskan Yup’ik** *(Krawczyk, 2012, p. 22)*

#leave-PAST-INFER-IND.3SG ... leave-NEG-PAST-think.that-IND.1SG.o.3SG.o

#‘Evidently she left ... [but] I don’t think that she left.’

**Summary:** Cross-linguistically, an evidential-marked claim can be felicitously denied only if its evidence type is **reportative.**

### 2.3 Semantic accounts of reportative exceptionality

- While the systematicity of reportative exceptionality has gone unrecognized, there are several accounts of reportative exceptionality in particular languages.

Common to all of these accounts is that they treat reportative exceptionality as part of the *conventional* contribution of the reportative morpheme, i.e. its compositional semantics.

- The earliest such account is Faller (2002)’s account of Cuzco Quechua (CQ) -si.
- Faller (2002) claims that all evidentials in CQ modify the speech act performed by the sentence.
- For the reportative -si, Faller (2002) proposes the following function as its meaning:

(14) **Faller (2002)’s semantics for CQ -si:**

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{ASSERT}(p) & \quad \rightarrow \quad \text{PRESENT}(p) \\
\text{SINC} = \{ \text{Bel}(s, p) \} & \quad \rightarrow \quad \text{SINC} = \{ \exists s_2 [\text{ASSERT}(s_2, p) \land s_2 \notin \{ h, s \}] \}
\end{align*}
\]

- This function does two things:
  1. Replace the default sincerity condition that the speaker believes that \( p \) to one where someone else has asserted that \( p \)
  2. Replace the speech act of assertion with a new speech act Faller dubs a ‘Presentation’

- Part 1 encodes the reportative-type evidence while capturing the fact that it is separate from the main propositional content.
- Part 2 is where reportative exceptionality is captured. The speaker merely presents the assertion of another agent rather than asserting it.
Murray (2010) similarly claims that the Cheyenne reportative produces a proposal “to take note of the at-issue proposition, . . . but for the common ground to remain unchanged”

- While such approaches may be able to describe reportative exceptionality, they do not explain why only reportatives diverge from the BC in this way.
- Moreover, since examples like (6-10) are possible in languages with reportatives that differ in many other ways, many such semantic approaches would be needed.

3 A pragmatic alternative

- In this section, we develop a pragmatic account of reportative exceptionality based on the notion of perspective shift.

3.1 Pragmatic perspective shift

- Ordinarily, material in the complement of attitude verbs like English think and believe is attributed to the subject of that verb.
- For example, Mary’s being an alien in (15) is attributed to John, not the speaker.

(15) John thinks that Mary is an alien.

- Certain kinds of semantic content, however, have been claimed to be invariably attributed to the speaker, even in attitudinal complements.
- For example, Potts (2005) proposes a semantics where appositive relative clauses and expressive epithets are uniformly speaker-oriented:

(16) a. I disagree with the expert who advised the Carnegie family that the father, **who is not the breadwinner**, does not need life insurance  COCA, Davies (2008-)

b. The complaint says that **the idiot** filled in a box labeled “default CPC bid” but left blank the box labeled “content CPC bid (optional)”.  Harris & Potts (2009)

- While such speaker-orientation is typical of appositives and expressives, subsequent authors have claimed that cases of non-speaker-orientation are in fact possible.
- Consider, for example, the following examples from Amaral et al. (2007):

(17) a. Joan is crazy. She’s hallucinating that some geniuses in Silicon Valley have invented a new brain chip that’s been installed in her left temporal lobe and permits her to speak any of a number of languages she’s never studied. She believes that, thoughtfully, they installed a USB port behind her left ear, so the chip can be updated as new languages are available. Joan believes that her chip, **which she had installed last month**, has a twelve year guarantee.
b. **Scenario:** We know that Bob loves to do yard work and is very proud of his lawn, but also that he has a son Monty who hates to do yard chores. So Bob could say (perhaps in response to his partner’s suggestion that Monty be asked to mow the lawn while he is away on business):

Bob: Well, in fact Monty said to me this very morning that he hates to mow the *friggin’* lawn.

- Rather than arguing against a speaker-oriented semantics, Harris & Potts (2009) argue that these examples are due to pragmatically-driven *perspective shift*.
- Clearest support for this claim: non-speaker-orientation is possible even in *unembedded* cases, provided that the environment is ‘perspectivally-rich’:

(18) I was struck by the willingness of almost everybody in the room – the senators as eagerly as the witnesses – to exchange their civil liberties for an illusory state of perfect security. They seemed to think that democracy was just a fancy word for corporate capitalism, and that the society would be a lot better off if it stopped its futile and unremunerative dithering about constitutional rights. Why humor people, especially poor people, by listening to their *idiotic* theories of social justice? [Lewis Lapham, Harper’s Magazine, July 1995]

(19) I found out recently that my co-worker is a white supremacist. He had never brought it up at work, but after a couple beer at a happy hour, he asked me if I’d be interested in coming to one of his meetings. This was after 15 minutes about how all of the minorities and women in our firm get promotions and raises without deserving them. This guy doesn’t know that I’m Jewish, another group he’s directed his hate toward (they pull all of the levers in Washington and are keeping white Christians from getting ahead). Is this something I can bring to the attention of my boss? [Dear Prudence, Slate, 11/19/2013]

- They show through experimental and corpus work that salience of another perspectival agent in the context is the key factor allowing for non-speaker-orientation of appositives and expressives⁵.

| Summary: | Otherwise speaker-oriented content can be attributed to other perspectival agents in ‘perspectivally-rich’ contexts. |

⁵Though they do find that embedding in an attitude verb helps promote non-speaker-orientation as well, since it brings to salience the attitudinal subject’s perspective.
3.2 Reportative exceptionality as perspective shift

Reportative denials like (20), we claim, involve perspective shift of the same sort.

(20) **Cuzco Quechua** *(Faller, 2002, p. 191)*

a. Pay-kun-(\[S\]) ſuqa-ma-qa qulqi-ta muntu-ntin-pi saqiy-wa-n
   (s)he-PL-REP I-ILLA-TOP money-ACC lot-INCL-LOC leave-1O-3
   \( p = \) ‘They leave me a lot of money’
   EVID = Speaker was told that \( p \)

b. mana-má riki riku-sqa-yki ni un sol-ta centavo-ta-pis
   not-IMPR right see-PP-2 not one Sol-ACC cent-ACC-ADD
   saqi-sha-wa-n-chu
   leave-PROG-1O-3-NEG
   \( q = \) ‘(but) that’s not true, as you have seen, they don’t leave me one sol, not
   one cent.’
   EVID = Speaker has direct evidence that \( q \).

- In line with the BC, the conventional discourse effect of (20a) is as follows\(^6\):
  1. Speaker asserts (in some sense) that \( p \)
  2. Speaker conveys that their evidence for \( p \) is what someone else has told them

- The reportative meaning in 2 makes salient the reporter’s perspective, . . .

- . . .which allows for 1 to be interpreted from the perspective of the reporter given a
sufficiently rich context.

“Context” here includes aspects of the sentence itself which make clear the speaker’s differing
perspective regarding \( p \).

- Specifically, denials frequently make use of words like *really* or *true*, first person atti-
tude reports, NPIs, and other kinds of evaluative language.

- Rather than bare denials, we typically find *emphatic* denials where the gap between
the speaker’s view and the reporter’s is independently clear.

- Consider, for example, the following contrast from Koring (2013) for Dutch *schijnen*
(similar contrasts exist for Chol =*bi* as well):

(21) a. **Dutch** *(Koring, 2013, p. 50)*

\[
\begin{align*}
\#\text{Anneloes} \underline{\text{schijnt}}\ &\text{thuis te zijn, maar dat is niet zo} \\
\text{Anneloes seems home to be but that is not so} \\
\text{‘Anneloes is said to be at home, but she’s not.’}
\end{align*}
\]

\(^6\)We will refine this characterization somewhat in §4, in particular about the question of what we mean
by “assert in some sense” here.
b. **Dutch** *(Koring, 2013, p. 49)*

> Anneloes schijnt thuis te zijn, maar ik *geloof* er niets van.  
> ‘I’ve heard that Anneloes is at home, but I don’t believe it.’

- One further such aspect of felicitous denials in at least some cases is prosody (Schwager (2010) for Tagalog *daw*, Valenzuela (2003) for Shipibo-Konibo -ronki)

In the absence of such a context, however, the reportative is typically used in apparently veridical ways (see Faller (2007)):

(22) **Cuzco Quechua** *(Faller, 2007, p. 6)*

a. Qusqu-pi hospital-pi ka-sha-n ...  
> Cuzco-LOC hospital-LOC be-PROG-3  
> ‘She is in Cuzco in [the] hospital.’

b. Lima-man-raq[sí] yawar-ni-n-pis ri-n  
> Lima-ILLA-CONT-REP blood-EUPH-3-ADD go-3  
> ‘Her blood even went to Lima.’

- Mortelmans (2000)’s claims for German *sollen* that speaker skepticism must be overtly marked, but that “this possibility is in practice not very frequently made use of”.

### 3.3 Evidence from Bulgarian and Turkish

- Parallel to the denials above, the Bulgarian and Turkish perfects of evidentiality allow for denials of the reportative’s scope:

(23) **Bulgarian** *(Smirnova, 2013, p. 34)*

*Reportative context:* Your best friend, Ivan, has to work hard to support his family. His wealthy uncle died but did not leave him any money. When you speak on the phone with your former classmate, she tells you that Ivan had inherited millions from his uncle. You know that this is not true:

> Ostavil mu milioni! Ta toj puknata stotinka ne mu leave.IMPERF.PRES.PLE him millions EMPH he crunched cent NOT him  
> be.3sg.PRES leave.PERF.PLE  
> ‘He left him millions, [I hear]! He didn’t leave him a red cent.’

(24) **Turkish** *(Şener, 2011, p. 98)*

*Reportative context:* Seda tells Ayşe (the speaker) that Sinan fell off the bike:

> Sinan bisiklet-ten düş[müş] ama gerçekten öyle birşey yok  
> Sinan bike-ABL fall-REP but actually like nothing exists  
> ‘It is reported to the speaker that Sinan fell off the bike, but in fact nothing like that happened.’
• These same forms, however, can also be used in cases of abductive inferential evidence, in which case denials are infelicitous:

(25) **Bulgarian**  
*Abductive inferential context*: When you discovered a chapter of an unauthored manuscript in Maria’s study, you inferred that Maria is writing a book. Later you learned that it is Maria’s sister who is writing the book. When one of your friends asks you what Maria does, you say:

Maria *pišela* kniga. Vsäštnost, tova ne e taka.  
#Maria write.IMPERF-PRES,PLE book in.fact it NOT be.3sg.PRES so

‘#Maria is writing a book, [I inferred]. In fact, it is not true.’

(26) **Turkish**  
*Abductive inferential context*: Seda sees Sinan getting up from the ground with his bike and his backpack spread around. Although Seda hasn’t see Sinan fall, she infers that he has fallen off the bike:

Sinan *bisiklet-ten düş-müš* ama gerçekte öyle birşey yok  
#Sinan bike-ABL fall-REP but actually like nothing exists

‘#Speaker infers that Sinan fell off the bike, but in fact nothing like that happened.’

• Such data are expected under our pragmatic account – denials are felicitous only when the context makes salient another perspective, that of the reporter.

• To account for this variability semantically, however, Smirnova (2013) (Bulgarian) and Şener (2011) (Turkish) instead must a covert lexical ambiguity.

### 3.4 Are there really any counterexamples?

• As noted in §3.2, previous literature has regarded reportative exceptionality as a parameter of cross-linguistic variation rather than a consistent pattern.

• The main reason for this are claims that have been made for three languages of the Pacific Northwest:

  – St’át’îmcets (Matthewson et al. (2007))
  – Gitksan (Peterson (2010))
  – Nuu-chah-nulth (Waldie et al. (2009))

• On close inspection, however, these authors are actually testing a subtly different claim — that it is infelicitous for a speaker to assert $p_{Rep}$ if s/he knows $p$ is false — and have regarded denials like (3) as particular instances of this.

• For example, Peterson (2010) cites the following as evidence for this claim in Gitksan:
(27) **Gitksan** *(Peterson, 2010, p. 127)*

**Context:** You know John was at work yesterday [It is apparently known that John cans fish for fun when not at work rather than that he works in a fish cannery].

```
#si-hon=\[gat\]=it  John k’yoots
CAUS-fish=REP=PND  John yesterday
```

‘[I heard] John canned fish yesterday.’

- Such data, however, is in fact expected under our pragmatic account:
  - No perspectivality-rich environment is established in the context and nothing in the utterance serves to differentiate the speaker’s perspective from the reporter’s.
  - In particular, the speaker’s private belief regarding \( p \) ought to play no role unless there is reason to believe that this knowledge is somehow publicly available.

Only in St’át’ímcets do we actually find a claim that utterances of the form ‘\( p_{REP} \), but \( \neg p \)’ are infelicitous:

(28) **St’át’ímcets** *(Matthewson et al., 2007, p. 22)*

**Context:** You had done some work for a company and they said they put your pay, \$200, in your bank account, but actually, they didn’t pay you at all.

```
#Um’-en-tsal-itás  \[ku7\]  i  án’was-a  xetspqiqen’kst táola,  t’u7
give-DIR-1SG.OBJ-3PL.ERG  REP  DET.PL  two.EXIS  hundred  dollar  but
aoz  kw  s-7um’-en-tsal-itas  ku  stam’
NEG  DET  NOM-give-DIR-1SG.OBJ-3PL.ERG  DET  what
```

‘# [reportedly] They gave me \$200, but they didn’t give me anything.’

There are at least two responses to this data point:

1. This example may not have enough evaluative language to convey the disconnect between the speaker and reporter’s perspectives (cf. Chol and Dutch above).

2. St’át’ímcets has been claimed by Lyon (2009) to lack perspective shift in a different case: verbal irony.

- Beyond noting the apparent absence of verbal irony in texts, Lyon constructs scenarios like (29), arguing that speakers consistently propose more literal alternatives, e.g. ‘Here is your thing which may or may not actually be a cup’:

(29) **Context:** Participant A is visiting at his friend B’s house to have coffee. B only has one cup and one bowl. B hands A a bowl of coffee and says:

---

\(^7\)Peterson (2010) purports to provide such an example for Gitksan (his example 3.63), but the example in fact involves a lexical verb glossed as ‘hear’ without the reportative =\( kat \) appearing at all. The infelicity of such an example is itself quite unexpected since ‘hear’ is presumably non-factive, but in any case the example therefore does not bear on the present issue.
It is plausible, then, that more general linguistic or cultural aspects of perspective shift might explain the judgment in (28) under the present account.8

4 Illocutionary evidentials contribute asymmetric assertions

- In the previous section, we argued for a pragmatic account of reportative exceptionality based on the notion of perspective shift.
- We are now in position to propose a uniform semantics for reportative, abductive inferential, and direct evidentials.
- We focus here on illocutionary evidentials (see Matthewson et al. (2007) for an epistemic semantics which does not incorporate reportative exceptionality)
- Stalnaker (1978): Common Ground (CG) is the set of propositions which “the speaker is disposed to act as if he assumes or believes that the proposition is true, and as if he assumes or believes that his audience assumes or believes that it is true as well”
- While the CG is a basis for joint action in the conversation, it may diverge from speaker beliefs (a point discussed far more explicitly in Stalnaker (2002)).
- At the same time, we clearly nonetheless keep track of what other speakers believe, or at least what they are publicly committed to believing.
  - Gunlogson (2001): the analysis of rising declaratives like ‘It’s raining?’ requires reference to the Discourse Commitments of each participant, DCx
- So, we assume discourse contexts determine an ordered triple:

(30) Discourse components: \( \langle X, \text{CG}_X, \{\text{DC}_x \mid x \in X\} \rangle \)

- While this basic setup is similar to Gunlogson (2001), Davis (2009), Farkas & Bruce (2010), we differ in that we take both \( \text{CG}_X \) and \( \text{DC}_x \) to be primitives.
  - i.e. discourse participants may agree to act as though \( p \) is true, even if neither is committed to this being so, publicly or privately.
- An ordinary assertion (i.e. one with no evidentials), then, has two components:

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8This is especially so since Matthewson et al. (2007) report that – unprompted – speakers were explicitly comparing the utterance in question to a parallel, more literal example with a lexical verb glossed as ‘say’.
An ordinary assertion by discourse participant $A$ with propositional content $p$:

a. Adds $p$ to $DC_A$.

b. Proposes to add $p$ to $CG_{\{A,B\}}$ on the basis of (31a), subject to acceptance or denial by $B$.

- We can call such assertions symmetric since the propositions being added in (31a) and (31b) are the same.

Claim: An assertion with an (illocutionary) evidential makes an asymmetric assertion:

An evidential assertion by discourse participant $A$ with propositional content $p$ and evidential requirement $Evid$:

a. Adds $Evid(p)$ to $DC_A$.

b. Proposes to add $p$ to $CG_{\{A,B\}}$ on the basis of (31a), subject to acceptance or denial by $B$.

- The speaker publicly commits herself to having a certain type of evidence for $p$, but avoids having to make any commitment to $p$ itself.

- In contrast, the conventional effect of the evidential assertion is to propose that we should continue our conversation acting as though $p$ were true$^9$.

- For the reportative, then, the existence of reportative evidence that $p$ is added to $DC_A$ and the speaker proposes to add $p$ to the CG:

We return now to cases of reportative exceptionality like (33):

(33) Cuzco Quechua (Faller, 2002, p. 191)

a. Pay-kuna-s ūoqa-ma-qqa qulqi-ta muntu-ntin-pi saqiy-wa-n (s)he-PL-REP I-ILLA-TOP money-Acc lot-INCL-LOC leave-1O-3 $p$ = ‘They leave me a lot of money’

$Evid = $ Speaker was told that $p$

b. mana-má riki riku-sqa-yki ni un sol-ta centavo-ta-pis not-IMPR right see-PP-2 not one Sol-Acc cent-Acc-Add saqi-sha-wa-n-chu leave-PROG-1O-3-NEG $q$ = ‘(but) that’s not true, as you have seen, they don’t leave me one sol, not one cent.’

$Evid = $ Speaker has direct evidence that $q$.

- Here, the same conventional contribution is present, differing only in that the proposal is attributed to the reporter, not the speaker:

$^9$See Farkas & Bruce (2010) for detailed discussion of the proposal-like nature of assertions, and Murray (2010) for discussion of this idea as it applies to evidentials.
(34)  a. Adds Evid(p) to DC_A.
    b. The speaker points out that the reporter would Propose to add p to CG_{A,B} on
       the basis of (31a), subject to acceptance or denial by B.

- As with appositives and epithets, (34b) is content which, semantically, would be
  attributed to the speaker, but need not be given the perspectivally-rich environment.

Beyond accounting for reportative data (including subsequent denials), this semantics extends readily to other kinds of evidentials, both direct and indirect.

- The only difference in the semantics is that the evidential basis in (31a) will differ in
  the value of Evid.

5 Conclusion

- **Main empirical claim:** cross-linguistically, declaratives with reportative evidentials
  are unique among evidentials in that their scope can be felicitously denied.

- Whereas previous authors have proposed primarily semantic accounts for such facts,
  we have proposed an account based on pragmatic perspective shift

- While time precludes a more detailed comparison, this approach has a number of
  empirical and theoretical advantages over semantic alternatives:

**Empirical**

- Better predictions about the kinds of contexts where reportatives can be used and the
  role of evaluative language in establishing this context.

- Predicts the complex behavior of ‘indirect’ evidentials (e.g. Bulgarian, Turkish) without
  appeal to covert ambiguity.

- Captures the fact that reportatives are typically used in veridical (e.g. as discussed
  by Faller (2007))

**Theoretical**

- *Explains* why reportatives allow for denials while other ‘weak’ evidentials do not.

- Avoids the need for positing novel speech acts/illlocutionary moods, relying instead
  on tools already needed for assertions cross-linguistically.

- Allows for a minimal semantics where (illlocutionary) direct, reportative, and abductive
  inferential evidentials differ only in evidence type.

The semantics of reportatives of course differ across languages in various dimensions which
we have not accounted for here (e.g. the table in §3.2).

- Reportative exceptionality, however, is not one of these, and being due to pragmatic
  perspective shift, is not part of the data these analyses must account for.
References


Lyon, John (2009) Grammatical restrictions on ironic interpretations in St’át’imcets, ms. UBC.


Walddie, Ryan, Tyler Peterson, Hotze Rullmann, & Scott Mackie (2009) Evidentials as epistemic modals or speech act operators: testing the test, handout from WSCLA.


Appendix: Reportative denials across languages

(35) a. **Amdo Tibetan**

Krawczyk (2009), cited in (Krawczyk, 2012, p. 88)

Lhamo wa-(song) gzig ɤm̥ onkyang khomo ma-song (tʰa)
Lhame leave-PAST IND REP but NEG leave-PAST.3s (DIR)

‘It is said that Lhamo left, but she didn’t leave.’

b. **Basque**

Zubeldia (2012)

Euri-a ar ȯomen d-u, baina ez
rain-DET.SG.ABS PROG REP 3SG.ABS.PRS-have but no
d-u-t uste euri-rik ar ȯ
3SG.ABS.PRS-have-1SG.ERG think rain-PRTV PROG

d-u-en-ik
3SG.ABS.PRS-have-COMP-PRTV

‘It is said that it is raining, but I do not believe that it is raining.’

c. **Bulgarian**

(Smirnova, 2013, p. 34)

Ostavil mu milioni! Ta toj puknata stotinka ne mu
leave.IMP.REF.PRES.PLE him millions EMPH he churned cent NOT him
e ostavil be.3sg.PRES leave.PERF.PLE

‘He left him millions, [I hear]! He didn’t leave him a red cent.’

d. **Central Alaskan Yup’ik**

(Krawczyk, 2012, p. 34)

Aya-llru-uq gguq ... Aya-ksaite-llru-yuk-aa
leave-PAST-3s-REP ... leave-NEG-PAST-think.that-IND1s,3s

‘It is said that she left ... I don’t think that she left.’

e. **Cheyenne**

(Murray, 2010, p. 58)

É-hótáheva sëstsc Floyd naa cha é-sáa-hótábévé-he-غو.
3-win-REP.3sg Floyd and CNTR 3-neg-win-MODa-DIR

‘Floyd won, I hear, but I’m certain he didn’t.’

f. **Chol**

(Vazquez Álvarez (p.c.))

am-غو [bi] juñ-tyiki mach-bá ba’ aín-غو tyi pul-i-غو, jiñ-jach
E-B3=REP one-CL NEG=REL where E-B3 PRFV burn-IV-B3 PRON3=only
che’ mach melel, tsä’-äch lu’ pul-i-y-ob
that NEG true PRFV=AFFR all burn-IV-Ep-PL3

‘It is said that there was one (person in the airplane) that didn’t burn up, but
it’s not true, they all burned.’

g. **Cuzco Quechua**

(Faller, 2002, p. 191)

i. Pay-kuna-ș ŋoqa-ma-qa quiqi-ta muntu-ntin-pi saqiya-wa-n
(s)he-PL-REP I-ILLA-TOP money-ACC lot-INCL-LOC leave-1O-3

p = ‘They leave me a lot of money’

10The Bulgarian and Turkish data are a bit more complicated in ways to be discussed in §3.3.
Evid = Speaker was told that p

ii. mana-má riki riku-sqa-yki ni un sol-ta centavo-ta-pis
    not-IMPR right see-PP-2 not one Sol-Acc cent-Acc-Add
    saqi-sha-wa-n-chu
    leave-PROG-1O-3-NEG
    q = ‘(but) that’s not true, as you have seen, they don’t leave me one sol,
    not one cent.’
    Evid = Speaker has direct evidence that q.

h. **Dutch**  (Koring, 2013, p. 49)
   **Context:** The speaker’s credit card details have been stolen, leading to money
   being lost from her bank account, and she has contacted the bank to settle this,
   the speaker might say afterwards:
   Het geld *schijnt* al overgemaakt te zijn, maar ik heb nog niets op
   the money *REP* already transferred to be but I have still nothing on
   mijn bankrekening gezien
   my bank.account seen
   ‘They told me that they transferred the money, but I haven’t seen it yet in my
   account.’

i. **Estonian**  (Mark Norris (p.c.))
   Ta küll ole-vat aus mees, aga ta ei ole üldse aus
   he surely be-REP honest man but he NEG be at.all honest
   ‘It’s certainly been said that he is an honest man, but he’s not honest at all.’

j. **German**  (Schenner, 2010, p. 211)
   Er *soll* was aber nicht stimmt, in Harvard studiert haben
   He REP which but not true in Harvard studied has
   ‘It is said that he studied in Harvard, but this is not true.’

k. **Japanese**  (McCready & Ogata, 2007, p. 162)
   Jon-ga kuru *soo-da* kedo, hontoo-ni kuru-no ka totemo shinjirarenai
   John-NOM come REP but really-DAT come-NOM Q really can’t believe
   ‘(They said) John would come, but I really don’t think he will.’

l. **Jarawara**  (Dixon, 2003, p. 180)
   Makari-[mone] o-na haa, rona-ni-ke
   clothes(f)-REPf 1SGA-AUX DEP canvas(f)-1PNF-DECLF
   ‘I thought it was clothing, but it is canvas (lit. It was said to be clothing, . . . )’

m. **Korean**  (Kim, 2012, p. 142)
   Taewoo-NOM cigarette-Acc quit-Ant-REP That-TOP fact-NOM NEG-DCL
   ‘(It is said) Taewoo quit smoking. That is not true.’

n. **Paraguayan Guaraní**  (Tonhauser, 2013, p. 1)
It’s said that my father is still working, but I don’t think he’s still working.’

‘Reportedly, Santa Claus left the presents, but I know that he doesn’t exist.’

‘(It is said that) this month the president will raise your salary. Go see it! (I am sure this is not true.)’

‘He says he will come in an hour, but in fact he won’t.’

‘The old man Lungkarda was supposedly crouching down reckoning he was blind. But he was just crouching down pretending.’