

Syllabus

This is all very tentative. I've listed many more topics than there are weeks in the semester. I've rated each topic as follows:

- A: we'll definitely spend a session on this
- B: while we don't *need* to spend a session on this, it's something I'm especially interested in and would like to cover if possible
- C: most of these topics will not be covered: which ones we do cover will depend on peoples' interests and their desires to give presentations.

The order is also pretty flexible. The 'A'-rated topics would probably be best to do in the stated order; the rest can be slotted in *anywhere* after their position in this list relative to the A-topics.

Further readings, and further classification of the relative importance of readings, will be supplied later in the semester.

A. Introduction

- Anjelika Kratzer, 'What "Must" and "Can" Must and Can Mean'
- Saul Kripke, 'Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic'
- Saul Kripke, *Naming and Necessity*
- Ted Sider, 'Reductive Theories of Modality', sections 1-3

A. Modal realism and counterpart theory

- David Lewis, *On the Plurality of Worlds*, 1.1-1.2; 1.5-1.9; 2.8, 3.1, 3.3; 4.1-4.5
- David Lewis, 'Counterpart theory and Quantified Modal Logic'

A. Objections to modal realism and counterpart theory

- David Lewis, *On the Plurality of Worlds*, chapter 2
- Optional: Timothy Williamson and Michael Fara, 'Counterparts and Actuality'

B. Reducing possibilist discourse to ordinary modal discourse

- David Lewis, *On the Plurality of Worlds*, chapter 3
- Alvin Plantinga, 'Actualism and Possible Worlds'
- Robert Adams, 'Thisness and Actuality'
- Kit Fine, 'The Problem of Possibilia'
- Optional: Robert Adams, 'Theories of Actuality'
- Optional: Allen Hazen, 'Expressive Completeness in Modal Language'
- Optional: Theodore Sider, 'The Ersatz Pluriverse'

B. Properties, propositions and non-existent objects

- Alvin Plantinga, 'On Existentialism'
- George Bealer, 'Universals'
- Kit Fine, 'Plantinga on the Reduction of Possibilist Discourse'
- Timothy Williamson, 'Necessary Existents'

A. Conventionalism

- A.J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic* (excerpts)
- Rudolf Carnap, 'Meaning Postulates'
- Arthur Pap, *Semantics and Necessary Truth: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy*, chapter 7.
- Casimir Lewy, *Meaning and Modality*, chapter 5
- Theodore Sider, 'Reductive Theories of Modality', section 4.1
- Alan Sidelle, *Necessity, Essence and Individuation*
- Stephen Yablo, review of Sidelle
- Optional: W.V. Quine, 'Truth by Convention'
- Optional: Paul Boghossian, 'Analyticity Reconsidered'

C. Sceptical views about de re modality

- W.V. Quine, 'The Problem of Interpreting Modal Logic'
- W.V. Quine, 'Three Grades of Modal Involvement'
- Kit Fine, 'Quine on Quantifying In'
- Kit Fine, 'The Problem of De Re Modality'
- John Burgess, 'Quinus ab Omni Naevo Vindicatus'

C. Modal fictionalism

- Gideon Rosen, 'Modal Fictionalism'
- Gideon Rosen, 'Modal Fictionalism Fixed'
- Daniel Nolan and John [O'Leary] Hawthorne, 'Reflexive Fictionalisms'

C. The analysis of nomological necessity

- D.M. Armstrong, *What is a Law of Nature?* (excerpts)
- David Lewis, 'Humean Supervenience Debugged'
- John Hawthorne, 'Causal Structuralism'

B. Essence and modality

- Kit Fine, 'Essence and Modality'
- Kit Fine, 'Senses of Essence'
- Optional: Kit Fine, 'Ontological Dependence'

A. Reducing modal notions using set theory

Lewis, *On the Plurality of Worlds*, section 3.2
D.M. Armstrong, *A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility* (excerpts)
John Etchemendy, *The Concept of Logical Consequence* (excerpts)
Hartry Field

A. Reducing modal notions using proposition-talk

Theodore Sider, 'Reductive Theories of Modality', section 4.2
Theodore Sider, 'Reducing Modality' (MS)
Optional: Christopher Peacocke, *Being Known*, chapter 3

A. Reducing modal notions without unreduced proposition-talk

C. Non-factualism about modal discourse

Simon Blackburn, 'Morals and Modals'

C. Metaphysical necessity and the a priori

Saul Kripke, *Naming and Necessity*, lectures 1 and 3
David Chalmers, *The Conscious Mind* (excerpts)
George Bealer, 'The Philosophical Limits of Scientific Essentialism'

C. The epistemology of modality

Stephen Yablo, 'Does Conceivability imply Possibility?'
Peter van Inwagen, 'Modal Skepticism'
John [O'Leary-]Hawthorne, 'The Epistemology of Possible Worlds: A Guided Tour'