

Topics for review
PHIL 1480 Metaphysics
Cian Dorr
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1. Philosophy of tense: definitions and concepts
 - 1.1. A-sentences versus B-sentences
 - 1.2. A-theory versus B-theory
 - 1.3. McTaggart's argument against Russell's account of change
 - 1.4. McTaggart's argument against the reality of the A-series, and the standard A-theoretic reply
 - 1.5. Spacetime diagrams
 - 1.6. Williams' conception of the world as a spacetime manifold
 - 1.7. Williams' responses to some standard objections to the B-theory
2. Temporal ontology
 - 2.1. Eternalism, presentism, growing block view
 - 2.2. Prior's way of paraphrasing sentences that seem on the surface to be about non-present events
 - 2.3. Objection to presentism based on cross-temporal relations
 - 2.4. Objection to presentism based on possibility of believing things about non-present objects
 - 2.5. Objection to presentism based on special relativity (you'll be able to avoid answering any questions about this if you want)
 - 2.6. Markosian's proposal that times are propositions
3. Fatalism and the open future
 - 3.1. The fatalist argument discussed in lecture
 - 3.2. The 'open future' way of resisting this argument
 - 3.3. Resisting the argument by claiming that there can be true future-tense claims about what people will do, even when what they do is up to them (van Inwagen's view).
4. Ship of Theseus
 - 4.1. Argument that nothing ever persists through change, and standard response to it
 - 4.2. Argument that ships can survive gradual replacement of all their parts
 - 4.3. Competing views about the possibility of intermittent existence
 - 4.4. Lowe's argument that in the case where the original parts are reassembled, the original ship is the one with the new parts
5. Temporal Parts
 - 5.1. Definition of the doctrine of temporal parts
 - 5.2. The argument from temporary intrinsics

- 5.3. Arguments for the possibility of “cohabitation”
- 5.4. Why Sider thinks these arguments count in favour of the doctrine temporal parts
- 5.5. Sider’s argument from “anthropocentrism” (no need to bother about the vagueness bit)
6. Personal identity
 - 6.1. Physical and psychological criteria (general idea: no need to remember all the clauses in Parfit’s definitions)
 - 6.2. Reductionism versus Non-Reductionism
 - 6.3. Parfit’s argument (based on the “Combined Spectrum”)that there are cases where there’s no fact of the matter about personal identity, and hence to Reductionism
 - 6.4. Parfit’s argument for Reductionism based on the possibility of divided consciousness
 - 6.5. Parfit’s argument that in fission cases the original person does not continue to exist
 - 6.6. Parfit’s argument that “identity doesn’t matter” in fission cases or in the Branch-Line case (given Reductionism)
 - 6.7. Parfit’s views about what does matter