1. Philosophy of tense: definitions and concepts
   1.1. A-sentences versus B-sentences
   1.2. A-theory versus B-theory
   1.3. McTaggart’s argument against Russell’s account of change
   1.4. McTaggart’s argument against the reality of the A-series, and the standard A-theoretic reply
   1.5. Spacetime diagrams
   1.6. Williams’ conception of the world as a spacetime manifold
   1.7. Williams’ responses to some standard objections to the B-theory
2. Temporal ontology
   2.1. Eternalism, presentism, growing block view
   2.2. Prior’s way of paraphrasing sentences that seem on the surface to be about non-present events
   2.3. Objection to presentism based on cross-temporal relations
   2.4. Objection to presentism based on possibility of believing things about non-present objects
   2.5. Objection to presentism based on special relativity (you’ll be able to avoid answering any questions about this if you want)
   2.6. Markosian’s proposal that times are propositions
3. Fatalism and the open future
   3.1. The fatalist argument discussed in lecture
   3.2. The ‘open future’ way of resisting this argument
   3.3. Resisting the argument by claiming that there can be true future-tense claims about what people will do, even when what they do is up to them (van Inwagen’s view).
4. Ship of Theseus
   4.1. Argument that nothing ever persists through change, and standard response to it
   4.2. Argument that ships can survive gradual replacement of all their parts
   4.3. Competing views about the possibility of intermittent existence
   4.4. Lowe’s argument that in the case where the original parts are reassembled, the original ship is the one with the new parts
5. Temporal Parts
   5.1. Definition of the doctrine of temporal parts
   5.2. The argument from temporary intrinsics
5.3. Arguments for the possibility of “cohabitation”
5.4. Why Sider thinks these arguments count in favour of the doctrine temporal parts
5.5. Sider’s argument from “anthropocentrism” (no need to bother about the vagueness bit)

6. Personal identity
6.1. Physical and psychological criteria (general idea: no need to remember all the clauses in Parfit’s definitions)
6.2. Reductionism versus Non-Reductionism
6.3. Parfit’s argument (based on the “Combined Spectrum”) that there are cases where there’s no fact of the matter about personal identity, and hence to Reductionism
6.4. Parfit’s argument for Reductionism based on the possibility of divided consciousness
6.5. Parfit’s argument that in fission cases the original person does not continue to exist
6.6. Parfit’s argument that “identity doesn’t matter” in fission cases or in the Branch-Line case (given Reductionism)
6.7. Parfit’s views about what does matter