Tentative syllabus

Week 1: The paradoxes of coincidence

Sider: section 5.1
van Inwagen: chapter 13, pp. 124–131

Week 2: Sortal-relative and temporally relative identity

George Myro, ‘Identity and Time’
Harry Deutsch, ‘Relative Identity’, entry in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*
John Hawthorne, ‘Identity’
Optional: Sider section 5.5, which presupposes Sider chapter 2.

Week 3: Wiggins on coincidence and sortals

David Wiggins, *Sameness and Substance Renewed*, chapters 2 and 3
Kit Fine, ‘A Counterexample to Locke’s Thesis’
Sider: section 5.3

Week 4: Temporal Parts: stating the view; the problem of temporary intrinsics

Sider: chapters 1 and 3; section 4.6
David Lewis, *On the Plurality of Worlds*, short excerpt

Week 5: More arguments for and against temporal parts

Sider: sections 4.1 – 4.5, 4.7, 4.8, and chapter 6.

Week 6: Modal plenitudinism

Stephen Yablo, ‘Identity, Essence and Indiscernability’
Kit Fine, ‘Things and their Parts’

Week 7: Context-sensitivity and the paradoxes

David Lewis, *On the Plurality of Worlds*, sections 4.1 and 4.5
Sider: section 5.8
Kit Fine, ‘The Non-identity of a Thing and its Matter’

Week 8: The special composition question

First short papers due this week, for those who are taking the short paper option

van Inwagen: chapters 1 – 12
Cian Dorr and Gideon Rosen, ‘Composition as a Fiction’
Week 9: Causal arguments against composites


Week 10: The problem of the many

Peter Unger, ‘The Problem of the Many’
David Lewis, ‘Many, But Almost One’
Vann McGee and Brian McLaughlin, ‘Lessons of the Many’
van Inwagen, chapter 17

Week 11: Vague identity and vague existence

Gareth Evans, ‘Can there be vague objects’
David Lewis, ‘Vague Identity: Evans Misunderstood’
Sider: section 4.9
van Inwagen: chapters 18–19

Week 12: Metaontology 1

Sider: Introduction.
Eli Hirsch, ‘Quantifier-Variance and Realism’

Week 13: Metaontology 2

Dorr, ‘What We Disagree About When We Disagree About Ontology’