

Conditionals

Cian Dorr and John Hawthorne
Topics and Readings

Week 1: Introductory

Some useful general texts:

Dorothy Edgington, 'Conditionals' (entry in the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*).

Dorothy Edgington, 'On Conditionals', *Mind* 104.414 (1995), pp. 235–329.

Johnathan Bennett, *A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Week 2: Materialism (CD)

Main reading:

Frank Jackson, 'On Assertion and Indicative Conditionals', *Philosophical Review* 88 (1979).

Further readings:

H. P. Grice, 'Logic and Conversation', in *Syntax and Semantics, Volume 3: Speech Acts*, ed. Peter Cole and Jerry Morgan, New York: Academic Press, 1975, pp. 41–58, esp. lecture 1.

Dorothy Edgington, 'Do Conditionals Have Truth-Conditions?', *Crítica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía* 18 (1986), pp. 3–39, sections 1 and 2.

Weeks 3 and 4: Kratzer's account and embedding. (JH)

Main readings:

Angelika Kratzer, 'Conditionals', in *Papers from the Parasession on Pragmatics and Grammatical Theory*, ed. A. M. Farley, P. Farley and K. E. McCollough, Chicago: Chicago Linguistics Society, 1986, URL: <https://udrive.oit.umass.edu/kratzer/kratzer-conditionals.pdf>

David Lewis, 'Adverbs of Quantification', in *Formal Semantics of Natural Language*, ed. E. L. Keenen, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975, pp. 3–15.

Further readings:

Daniel Rothschild, 'A Note on Conditionals and Restrictors', MS.

Vann McGee, 'A Counterexample to Modus Ponens', *Journal of Philosophy* 82 (1985), pp. 462–71.

Niko Kolodny and John MacFarlane, 'Ifs and Oughts', *Journal of Philosophy* 107 (2010), 115–143.

Seth Yalcin, 'A Counterexample to Modus Tollens', *Journal of Philosophical Logic* (2012), pp. 1–24.

Cian Dorr and John Hawthorne, 'Embedding Epistemic Modals', MS.

Weeks 4 and 5: Counterfactuals and their logic (JH)

Main readings:

David Lewis, *Counterfactuals*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1973, esp. chapter 1.

Kit Fine, 'Counterfactuals Without Possible Worlds', Forthcoming in *Journal of Philosophy*, URL: <http://as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/1160/Counterfactuals-jp.pdf>.

Further readings:

Robert C. Stalnaker, 'A Defense of Conditional Excluded Middle', in *Ifs: Conditionals, Belief, Decision, Chance, and Time*, ed. William L. Harper, Robert Stalnaker and Glenn Pearce, Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1981, pp. 87–104.

Kai von Fintel, 'Counterfactuals in a Dynamic Context', in *Ken Hale: A Life in Language*, ed. Michael Kenstowicz, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001.

Sarah Moss, 'On the Pragmatics of Counterfactuals', *Noûs* 46 (2012), pp. 561–86.

David Lewis, 'Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow', *Noûs* 13 (1979), pp. 455–476.

John Hawthorne, 'Chance and Counterfactuals', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 70.2 (2005), pp. 396–405.

Sarah Moss, 'Subjunctive Credences and Semantic Humility', forthcoming in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, forthcoming.

Rachael Briggs, 'Interventionist Counterfactuals', *Philosophical Studies* 160.1 (2012), pp. 139–166.

Week 6: The triviality results (CD)

Main reading:

David Lewis, 'Probabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities', *Philosophical Review* 85 (1976), pp. 297–315.

Further readings:

Alan Hájek and Ned Hall, 'The Hypothesis of the Conditional Construal of Conditional Probability', in *Probability and Conditionals: Belief Revision and Rational Decision*, ed. Ellery Eels and Brian Skyrms, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Bas van Fraassen, 'Probabilities of Conditionals', in *Foundations of Probability Theory, Statistical Inference, and Statistical Theories of Science*, ed. W. Harper and C Hooker, vol. 1, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1976, pp. 261–308.

Stefan Kaufmann, 'Conditioning Against the Grain', *Journal of Philosophical Logic* 33 (2004), pp. 583–606.

Andrew Bacon, 'In Defence of a Naïve Conditional Epistemology', MS.

Week 7: Non truth-conditional accounts (CD)

Main reading:

Daniel Rothschild, 'Do Indicative Conditionals Express Propositions?', *Noûs* (2011).

Further readings:

Dorothy Edgington, 'Do Conditionals Have Truth-Conditions?', *Crítica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía* 18 (1986), pp. 3–39.

Allan Gibbard, 'Two Recent Theories of Conditionals', in *Ifs: Conditionals, Belief, Decision, Chance, and Time*, ed. William L. Harper, Robert Stalnaker and Glenn Pearce, Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1981.

Vann McGee, 'Conditional Probabilities and Compounds of Conditionals', *Philosophical Review*

98.4 (1989), pp. 485–541.

Jamie Dreier, 'Meta-ethics and the Problem of Creeping Minimalism', in *Philosophical Perspectives 18: Ethics*, ed. John Hawthorne, Oxford: Blackwell, 2004, pp. 23–44.

Anthony Gillies, 'On Truth-Conditions for *If* (but Not Quite Only *If*)', *Philosophical Review* 118 (2009), 325–349.

Sarah Moss, 'Epistemology Formalized', forthcoming in *Philosophical Review*, forthcoming.

Week 8: Vacuity and impossibility (CD)

Main reading:

Timothy Williamson, 'Indicative Versus Subjunctive Conditionals, Congruential Versus Non-hyperintensional contexts', *Philosophical Issues* 16.1 (2006), pp. 310–333.

Further readings:

Daniel Nolan, 'Impossible Worlds: A Modest Approach', *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* 38 (1997), pp. 535–572.

Moritz Schulz, 'Wondering What Might Be', *Philosophical Studies* 149 (2010), 367–386.

J. Robert G. Williams, 'Counterepistemic Indicative Conditionals and Probability', MS