

Time and Modality syllabus

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Primary readings:

1. my manuscript *Counterparts*, portions of which will be distributed over the course of the semester.
2. David Lewis (1986). *On the Plurality of Worlds*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Week 1: Introduction

- *Counterparts*, section 1.1.

Week 2: Propositional eternalism and necessitism

- *Counterparts*, sections 1.2 and first half of 2.4.
- Theodore Sider (2002). *Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, section 2.1.
- David Lewis (1979). 'Attitudes *De Dicto* and *De Se*'. *Philosophical Review* 88, pp. 513–43. (Background on the idea of *de se* belief.)
- Ofra Magidor (forthcoming). 'The Myth of the *De Se*'. Forthcoming in *Philosophical Perspectives*. (Rebuttal of Lewis's paper.)

Week 3: Utterance truth, ignorance, and anaphora

- *Counterparts*, sections 2.2 and 2.3.
- Mark Richard (1981). 'Temporalism and Eternalism'. *Philosophical Studies* 39, pp. 1–13.
- Berit Brogaard (2012). *Transient Truths*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, excerpts TBD.
- David Braddon-Mitchell (2004). 'How Do We Know It Is Now Now?' *Analysis* 64, pp. 199–203.
- Daniel Deasy (forthcoming). 'The Moving Spotlight Theory'. Forthcoming in *Philosophical Studies*. (A very helpful defence, also relevant to several subsequent sections.)

Week 4: Semantics: time and world variables and the semantics of attitude verbs

- *Counterparts*, sections 2.1 and 2.4.
- Jonathan Schaffer (2012). 'Necessitarian Propositions'. *Synthese* 189, pp. 119–162.
- Barbara Hall Partee (1973). 'Some Structural Analogies between Tenses and Pronouns in English'. *Journal of Philosophy* 70. (A seminal paper. The main take-aways are summarised by Schaffer.)
- Kiyomi Kusumoto (1999). 'Tense in Embedded Contexts'. PhD thesis. University of Massachusetts, Amherst, chapter 1. (A helpful review of some of the central issues in the semantics literature on tense. I wish philosophers would do this sort of literature review in their doctoral theses!)

Week 5: Elitism versus egalitarianism

- *Counterparts*, sections 1.3–1.5 and 2.5.
- David Lewis (1983). 'New Work for a Theory of Universals'. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 61, pp. 343–77. (Introduces the idea of naturalness.)

- Cian Dorr and John Hawthorne (2013). 'Naturalness'. In *Oxford Studies in Metaphysics*, vol. 8, ed. Karen Bennett and Dean Zimmerman. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 3–77. (More background.)
- Dean W. Zimmerman (2005). 'The A-theory of Time, the B-theory of Time, and Taking Tense Seriously'. *Dialectica* 59, pp. 401–57. URL: <http://philpapers.org/rec/ZIMTA0>. (Argues that it is hard to make sense of the elitist claim in such a way that it does not follow from eternalism and propositional temporalism.)

Week 6: Physics: spacetime

- *Counterparts*, section 2.6.
- Theodore Sider (2002). *Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, section 2.4. (Succinctly gets the central problem onto the table.)
- Hilary Putnam (1967). 'Time and Physical Geometry'. *Journal of Philosophy* 64, pp. 240–47. (The classic paper on this issue.)
- Dean W. Zimmerman (2011). 'Presentism and the Space-Time Manifold'. In *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time*, ed. Craig Callender. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 163–246. (A thoughtful treatment.)

Week 7: Counterpart theory: introduction

- *Counterparts*, sections 2.7 and 3.1.
- David Lewis (1968). 'Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic'. *Journal of Philosophy* 65, pp. 113–26. (The original paper; worth careful study. Look at the reprinted version in *Philosophical Papers, vol. 1* which has important postscripts.)
- Theodore Sider (1996). 'All the World's a Stage'. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 74, pp. 433–53. (Introduced the idea of temporal counterpart theory.)
- Theodore Sider (2000). 'The Stage View and Temporary Intrinsic'. *Analysis* 60, pp. 84–88. (Relates temporal counterpart theory to Lewis's 'Problem of Temporary Intrinsic')

Week 8: Counterpart theory, unrestricted quantification, and propositions

- *Counterparts*, sections 3.2–3.5.
- *Plurality*, sections 1.1, 2.8, and 4.1.
- Delia Graff Fara (2009). 'Dear Haecceitism'. *Erkenntnis* 70, pp. 285–97.

Week 9: Necessary and eternal being

- *Counterparts*, section 3.6.
- Timothy Williamson (2013). *Modal Logic as Metaphysics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, excerpts TBD.
- Meghan Sullivan (2012). 'The Minimal A-theory'. *Philosophical Studies* 158, pp. 149–74. (Defends a view of time closely modeled on Williamson's view of modality.)

Week 10: Multiply *de re* propositions, actuality, times, and worlds

- *Counterparts*, chapter 4.
- *Plurality*, section 4.4.
- Michael Fara and Timothy Williamson (2005). 'Counterparts and Actuality'. *Mind* 114, pp. 1–30.
- Jeff Sanford Russell (2013). 'Actuality for Counterpart Theorists'. *Mind* 122, pp. 85–134.

Week 11: Context-sensitivity, counting, and the necessity of identity

- *Counterparts*, section 4.4.
- David Lewis (1971). 'Counterparts of Persons and their Bodies'. *Journal of Philosophy* 68, pp. 203–11. (Introduces the idea of 'sortal-relative' counterpart relations.)
- *Plurality*, section 4.5.
- Sarah Moss (2012). 'Four-Dimensionalist Theories of Persistence'. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 90, pp. 671–86. (Addresses counting-related issues for Sider's view.)

Week 12: Issues for modal counterpart theorists

- *Counterparts*, chapter 5.
- *On the Plurality of Worlds*, sections 1.6, 1.8, 2.4, 2.6.
- Phillip Bricker (2001). 'Island Universes and the Analysis of Modality'. In *Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis*, ed. Gerhard Preyer and Frank Siebelt. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 27–56.

Week 13: Issues for temporal counterpart theorists

- *Counterparts*, chapter 6.
- Theodore Sider (1996). 'All the World's a Stage'. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 74, pp. 433–53. (Sider's "stage" view is only one of several temporal-counterpart-theory friendly accounts of the nature of ordinary objects which we will be considering.)
- David Lewis (1976). 'The Paradoxes of Time Travel'. *American Philosophical Quarterly* 13, pp. 145–52. (We'll be talking about time travel, which will be bewildering if you have never read this paper.)