Primary readings:

1. my manuscript *Counterparts*, portions of which will be distributed over the course of the semester.

Week 1: Introduction

- *Counterparts*, section 1.1.

Week 2: Propositional eternalism and necessitism

- *Counterparts*, sections 1.2 and first half of 2.4.
- David Lewis (1979). ‘Attitudes *De Dicto* and *De Se*’. *Philosophical Review* 88, pp. 513–43. (Background on the idea of *de se* belief.)
- Ofra Magidor (forthcoming). ‘The Myth of the *De Se*’. Forthcoming in *Philosophical Perspectives*. (Rebuttal of Lewis’s paper.)

Week 3: Utterance truth, ignorance, and anaphora

- *Counterparts*, sections 2.2 and 2.3.
- Daniel Deasy (forthcoming). ‘The Moving Spotlight Theory’. Forthcoming in *Philosophical Studies*. (A very helpful defence, also relevant to several subsequent sections.)

Week 4: Semantics: time and world variables and the semantics of attitude verbs

- *Counterparts*, sections 2.1 and 2.4.
- Kiyomi Kusumoto (1999). ‘Tense in Embedded Contexts’. PhD thesis. University of Massachusetts, Amherst, chapter 1. (A helpful review of some of the central issues in the semantics literature on tense. I wish philosophers would do this sort of literature review in their doctoral theses!)

Week 5: Elitism versus egalitarianism

- *Counterparts*, sections 1.3–1.5 and 2.5.
• Dean W. Zimmerman (2005). ‘The A-theory of Time, the B-theory of Time, and Taking Tense Seriously’. Dialectica 59, pp. 401–57. url: http://philpapers.org/rec/ZIMTA0. (Argues that it is hard to make sense of the elitist claim in such a way that it does not follow from eternalism and propositional temporalism.)

Week 6: Physics: spacetime
• Counterparts, section 2.6.

Week 7: Counterpart theory: introduction
• Counterparts, sections 2.7 and 3.1.

Week 8: Counterpart theory, unrestricted quantification, and propositions
• Counterparts, sections 3.2–3.5.
• Plurality, sections 1.1, 2.8, and 4.1.

Week 9: Necessary and eternal being
• Counterparts, section 3.6.

Week 10: Multiply de re propositions, actuality, times, and worlds
• Counterparts, chapter 4.
• Plurality, section 4.4.
Week 11:  Context-sensitivity, counting, and the necessity of identity

- *Counterparts*, section 4.4.
- *Plurality*, section 4.5.

Week 12:  Issues for modal counterpart theorists

- *Counterparts*, chapter 5.
- *On the Plurality of Worlds*, sections 1.6, 1.8, 2.4, 2.6.

Week 13:  Issues for temporal counterpart theorists

- Theodore Sider (1996). ‘All the World’s a Stage’. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 74, pp. 433–53. (Sider’s “stage” view is only one of several temporal-counterpart-theory friendly accounts of the nature of ordinary objects which we will be considering.)
- David Lewis (1976). ‘The Paradoxes of Time Travel’. *American Philosophical Quarterly* 13, pp. 145–52. (We’ll be talking about time travel, which will be bewildering if you have never read this paper.)