

On questions and presuppositions in typed inquisitive semantics

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Abstract

The first part of this talk lays out a compositional account of *wh*-questions in typed inquisitive semantics (Ciardelli, Roelofsen & Theiler 2017). Relevant issues include multiple *wh*-questions, the interaction between *wh*-items and disjunction, and *de dicto* readings of *which*-questions.

Motivated by the asymmetry between restrictor and nuclear scope of *which*-questions, the second part of this talk takes first steps towards modeling presuppositions of questions in inquisitive semantics.

1 Introduction

- Groenendijk & Stokhof (1984) provided a theory of questions that improved in several respects over Karttunen (1977)
- Basic inquisitive logic (Ciardelli, Groenendijk & Roelofsen 2013) in turn improved in some ways on these theories, but did not preserve all of their achievements

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Feature	K77	GS84	InqB
Compositional derivations	yes	yes	no
Interpreting short answers	no	yes	no
De dicto readings of <i>which</i> questions	no	yes	no
Ability to interpret conjoined questions	no	yes	yes
Ability to quantify into questions	no	(yes)	yes
Uniform disjunction across declaratives and interrogatives	no	no	yes
Mention-some readings	no	no	yes
Conditional questions	no	no	yes

- InqB is a first-order logic, and as such does not provide a means to compositionally assign meanings to subsentential constituents. Typed Inquisitive Semantics (Ciardelli, Roelofsen & Theiler 2017) provides the bridge between InqB and compositional semantics. We will build on it here.
- As an intermediate step in the compositional derivation, Groenendijk & Stokhof (1984, 1989) compute the *abstract* of a question—an n -place property where n is the number of *wh*-words. They use it to interpret short answers:
 - (1) a. Who walks? – John. *Abstract*: $\lambda x.x \text{ walks}$
 - b. Who loves whom? – John, Mary. *Abstract*: $\lambda y \lambda x.x \text{ loves } y$
- Typed Inquisitive Semantics gives us the means to compute the abstract of a question.
- Groenendijk & Stokhof (1984) point out that the following inference is invalid when *murderer* is taken *de dicto*:
 - (2) a. Holmes knows who is tall.
 - b. \Rightarrow Holmes knows which murderer is tall.
- Karttunen (1977) only generates the *de re* reading. The issue has not been revisited in InqB.
- Some things left for another occasion: NPI licensing in questions (Guerzoni & Sharvit, Nicolae); intervention effects (Beck, Haida, Kotek); cross-linguistic aspects (Shimoyama); superiority effects (Kotek); functional readings; sensitivity to different ways of identifying the individuals in the domain of discourse (Aloni); syntactic restrictions on mention-some readings (Fox, Xiang); pragmatics of mention-some versus mention-all (van Rooij); modals in questions (Spector).

2 Typed inquisitive semantics

- Typed inquisitive semantics is a combination of compositional semantics and basic inquisitive logic.

- Possible worlds ($w, w' \dots$) are primitives (type s). Possibilities ($p, p' \dots$) are sets of possible worlds (type $\langle s, t \rangle$). Inquisitive propositions ($P, P' \dots$) are sets of possibilities (type $\langle st, t \rangle$).
- We abbreviate $\langle e, \langle et \rangle \rangle$ as $\langle e^2, t \rangle$, and $\langle e, \langle e, \langle et \rangle \rangle \rangle$ as $\langle e^3, t \rangle$, etc. We also write $p(x^n)$ for $p(x_1)(x_2) \dots (x_n)$. Similarly, we write $\lambda x^n.b$ for $\lambda x_1 \lambda x_2 \dots \lambda x_n.b$; and similarly for quantifiers.
- We let *talks* denote the relation that holds between x and p iff p entails that x talks:

$$(3) \quad \begin{aligned} \llbracket \text{talks} \rrbracket_g &= \lambda x \lambda p \forall w. p(w) \rightarrow \text{talk}(x)(w) \\ &= \lambda x \lambda p. p \subseteq \lambda w. \text{talk}(x)(w) \end{aligned} \quad \text{type } \langle e, \langle st, t \rangle \rangle$$

- We abbreviate $\langle st, t \rangle$ as T . For p_0 a possibility (type $\langle s, t \rangle$), we write \widehat{p}_0 for the inquisitive proposition $\lambda p. p \subseteq p_0$. Similarly, for p_n of type $\langle e^n, \langle s, t \rangle \rangle$, we write \widehat{p}_n for $\lambda x_1 \dots \lambda x_n \lambda p. p \subseteq \lambda w. p_n(x_1) \dots (x_n)(w)$. For example:

$$(4) \quad \begin{aligned} \llbracket \text{talks} \rrbracket_g &= \widehat{\text{talk}} \\ &= \lambda x \lambda p. p \subseteq \lambda w. \text{talk}(x)(w) \end{aligned} \quad \text{type } \langle e, T \rangle$$

- We represent proper names as constants and use function application to combine meanings:

$$(5) \quad \llbracket \text{John talks} \rrbracket_g = \widehat{\text{talk}}(j) = \lambda p. p \in \widehat{\text{talk}}(j) = \lambda p. p \subseteq \lambda w. \text{talk}(j)(w) \quad \text{type } T$$

3 Propositional connectives

- We assume a type-polymorphic theory of coordination (e.g. Partee & Rooth 1983). Simplifying slightly, define an inquirable type as either the type T or a type $\langle \alpha, \beta \rangle$ where α is any type and β is an inquirable type.
- We define inquisitive negation, \neg , as in basic inquisitive semantics, and generalize it to higher types:

$$(6) \quad \begin{aligned} \text{a. } \neg_{\langle T, T \rangle} &= \lambda P \lambda p. \forall q. P(q) \rightarrow p \cap q = \emptyset && \text{type } \langle T, T \rangle \\ \text{b. } \neg_{\langle \alpha T, \alpha T \rangle} &= \lambda P_{\langle \alpha T \rangle} \lambda x_{\alpha}. \neg_{\langle T, T \rangle} P(x) && \text{type } \langle \alpha T, \alpha T \rangle \end{aligned}$$

- We represent the meaning of ordinary linguistic negation via inquisitive negation.

$$(7) \quad \llbracket \text{not} \rrbracket_g = \lambda P. \neg P \quad \text{type } \langle \alpha T, \alpha T \rangle$$

For any inquirable type τ we define:

$$(8) \quad \begin{aligned} \text{a. } \llbracket \text{and} \rrbracket_g &= \lambda P_{\tau} \lambda Q_{\tau}. P \cap Q && \text{type } \langle \tau, \tau \tau \rangle \\ \text{b. } \llbracket \text{or} \rrbracket_g &= \lambda P_{\tau} \lambda Q_{\tau}. P \cup Q && \text{type } \langle \tau, \tau \tau \rangle \end{aligned}$$

- As a special case, we will write $\&$ (inquisitive conjunction) for the case where we conjoin two terms P and P' of type T , and similarly for $\&$:

- (9) a. $\mathbb{A} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \lambda P \lambda P' \lambda p. P'(p) \wedge P(p)$
 b. $\mathbb{V} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \lambda P \lambda P' \lambda p. P'(p) \vee P(p)$

- Inquisitive conjunction and disjunction share various desirable properties with ordinary conjunction and disjunction, such as idempotence and associativity.
- We assume that proper names can be lifted to generalized quantifiers (note the type):

(10) a. $\llbracket \text{Lift(John)} \rrbracket_g = \lambda P_{\langle e, T \rangle}. P(j)$ type $\langle eT, T \rangle$

- We can now interpret *John and Mary walk* and *John or Mary walks*.

(11) a. $\llbracket \text{Lift(John) and Lift(Mary) walk} \rrbracket_g = \widehat{\text{walk}(j)} \mathbb{A} \widehat{\text{walk}(m)}$ type T
 b. $\llbracket \text{Lift(John) or Lift(Mary) walks} \rrbracket_g = \widehat{\text{walk}(j)} \mathbb{V} \widehat{\text{walk}(m)}$ type T

- *John or Mary walks* is interpreted as an inquisitive proposition with two alternatives:

(12) $\widehat{\text{walk}(j)} \mathbb{V} \widehat{\text{walk}(m)} = \lambda p. p \subseteq \lambda w. \text{walk}(j)(w) \vee p \subseteq \lambda w. \text{walk}(m)(w)$

- We can define type-shifted versions of the inquisitive operators ! (noninquisitive closure) and ? (noninformative closure):

(13) $? \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \lambda P. P \cup \neg P$ type $\langle \tau, \tau \rangle$

(14) $! \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \neg \circ \neg$ type $\langle \tau, \tau \rangle$

- We assume that any declarative sentence with falling intonation contains ! at its root.
- This has the following effect: Where $A \mathbb{V} B$ denotes the set of all possibilities that entail A or entail B, $!(A \vee B)$ denotes the set of all possibilities that entail $A \vee B$, including those that do not entail one of the disjuncts.

(15) $\llbracket ! [\text{John or Mary walk}] \rrbracket_g$
 $= !(\widehat{\text{walk}(j)} \mathbb{V} \widehat{\text{walk}(m)})$ type T
 $= \lambda p. p \subseteq \lambda w. \text{walk}(j)(w) \vee \text{walk}(m)(w)$

- Finally, we can define inquisitive quantifiers:

(16) a. $\exists x \varphi \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \lambda p \exists x \varphi(p)$
 b. $\forall x \varphi \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \lambda p \forall x \varphi(p)$

4 *Wh*-questions and the abstract

- We assume that questions, whether embedded or not, are headed by a silent *Q* morpheme (Baker 1970), which projects an *interrogative nucleus*. The complement of *Q* is the *abstract*.



- The abstract is of type $\langle e^n, T \rangle$: e.g. $\langle e, T \rangle$ for single-*wh* questions, $\langle e, eT \rangle$ for double-*wh*-questions.
- We could naively assume that *wh*-phrases like *who* are identity functions:

(18) e.g. $\llbracket \text{who} \rrbracket_g$ in subject position = $\lambda P_{et} \lambda x_e . P(x)$

- This differs from the treatment in Theiler (2014), where *wh*-phrases are treated as inquisitive existentials.
- But this will not work when we need to pass the abstract across sentence boundaries:

(19) Whom do you want Mary to invite?

- Here, *want* expects a proposition, so *whom* must leave a trace behind or be interpreted in situ at LF.
- This process can violate islands, so an in-situ based account is preferable (cf. Reinhart 1997):

- (20) a. Who thinks that who walks?
 b. Who will be offended if we invite whom?

- So we assume instead, following Baker (1970), that *who* carries an index, and that the *Q* morpheme binds such indices or triggers lambda abstraction below it:

- (21) a. Who walks? $\rightsquigarrow [Q [1 [\text{who}_1 \text{ walks}]]]$
 b. Who loves whom? $\rightsquigarrow [Q [1 [2 [\text{who}_1 \text{ loves whom}_2]]]]]$
 c. Who thinks that who walks? $\rightsquigarrow [Q [1 [2 [\text{who}_1 \text{ thinks [that who}_2 \text{ walks}]]]]]]]$

- Sometimes the abstract will be noninquisitive:

- (22) a. $\llbracket [1 [\text{who}_1 \text{ walks}]] \rrbracket = \lambda x_1 . \widehat{\text{walk}}(x_1)$
 b. $\llbracket [1 [2 [\text{who}_1 \text{ loves whom}_2]] \rrbracket = \lambda x_1 \lambda x_2 . \widehat{\text{love}}(x_2)(x_1)$

- Sometimes it will be inquisitive:

(23) Who walks or talks?

a. $[\text{Q} [1 [\text{who}_1 [\text{walks or talks}]]]]$

b. $[[[1 [\text{who}_1 [\text{walks or talks}]]]]] = \lambda x_1. \widehat{\text{walk}}(x_1) \vee \widehat{\text{talk}}(x_1)$

- The basic meaning InqB assigns to (21a) and (21b) captures their mention-some reading:

(24) a. $?\exists x. \widehat{\text{walk}}(x)$

b. $?\exists x \exists y. \widehat{\text{love}}(y)(x)$

- For example, (24a) has the following alternatives:
that John walks, that Mary walks, ..., that nobody walks

- It would be a mistake to treat inquisitive abstracts in the same way, however:

(25) $?\exists x. \widehat{\text{walk}}(x) \vee \widehat{\text{talk}}(x)$

- This has the following alternatives: *that John walks, that John talks, that Mary walks, that Mary talks, ..., and that nobody walks or talks.*

- A better translation uses noninquisitive closure:

(26) $?\exists x. !(\widehat{\text{walk}}(x) \vee \widehat{\text{talk}}(x))$

- This has the alternatives *that John walks or talks, that Mary walks or talks, ..., that nobody walks or talks.*

- What is responsible for the introduction of noninquisitive closure?

- Compositionally, we seem to have two options: ! is introduced by *Q*, or by the *wh*-phrases.

- In non-*wh* questions, *Q* often does not seem to introduce !

(27) Would you like coffee \uparrow , or tea \downarrow ?


\neq Is it the case that you would like either coffee or tea?

- So we assume that it is the *wh*-phrases that are responsible for the introduction of !.

(28) $[\text{who}_i]_g = \lambda P_{\langle e, T \rangle} !P(g(i))$


type $\langle eT, T \rangle$

(29)



- In nonsubject position, we resolve type mismatches by type-shifting (Hendriks 1993).

(30)



5 The Q operator

- The Q operator maps abstracts to inquisitive propositions.
- As is well known, there are several relevant candidate propositions:

(31) John knows who is tall.

a. John knows of some x that x is tall.*mention-some*

- b. John knows of every tall x that x is tall. *weakly exhaustive*
c. John knows of every x whether x is tall. *strongly exhaustive*

- Groenendijk & Stokhof (1984) take (31c) as basic, which makes it hard to model (31a) and (31b) (Heim 1994, Beck & Rullmann 1999).
- Theiler (2014) takes (31a) as basic, and models (31c) through an additional exhaustification operation.
- We assume that exhaustification optionally takes place within the interrogative nucleus; the precise “flavor” of exhaustivity in embedded questions is determined by an embedding operator that does not play a role in root questions (Theiler, Roelofsen & Aloni 2016).
- We base the meaning of Q on the inquisitive existential \exists and on the operator $?$. (This is a simplification. For certain purposes involving non-*wh* questions, it would be more accurate to use $\langle ? \rangle$, which leaves inquisitive meanings alone, and applies $?$ only to noninquisitive meanings.)

$$(32) \quad \llbracket Q^n \rrbracket_g = \lambda P_{\langle e^n, T \rangle}. ? \exists x^n. P(x^n) \quad \text{type } \langle e^n T, T \rangle$$

- Some special cases:

$$(33) \quad \begin{array}{ll} \text{a. } \llbracket Q^0 \rrbracket_g \text{ (for non-} wh \text{ questions)} = \lambda P_T. ? P & \text{type } \langle T, T \rangle \\ \text{b. } \llbracket Q^1 \rrbracket_g \text{ (for single-} wh \text{ questions)} = \lambda P_{\langle e, T \rangle}. ? \exists x. P(x) & \text{type } \langle eT, T \rangle \\ \text{c. } \llbracket Q^2 \rrbracket_g \text{ (for double-} wh \text{ questions)} = \lambda R_{\langle e, eT \rangle}. ? \exists x \exists y. R(x)(y) & \text{type } \langle \langle e, eT \rangle, T \rangle \end{array}$$

- A second version of the operator has exhaustivity built in:

$$(34) \quad \llbracket Q_{+exh}^n \rrbracket_g = \lambda R_{\langle e^n, T \rangle}. \lambda p. \forall q \subseteq p. (\lambda x^n. R(x^n)(q) = \lambda x^n. R(x^n)(p)) \quad \text{type } \langle e^n T, T \rangle$$

- Some special cases:


$$(35) \quad \begin{array}{ll} \text{a. } \llbracket Q_{+exh}^0 \rrbracket_g \text{ (for non-} wh \text{ questions)} \\ = \lambda P_T. ? P = \lambda P_T. P \vee \neg P & \text{type } \langle T, T \rangle \\ \text{b. } \llbracket Q_{+exh}^1 \rrbracket_g \text{ (for single-} wh \text{ questions)} \\ = \lambda P_{\langle e, T \rangle}. \lambda p. \forall q \subseteq p. (\lambda x. P(x)(q) = \lambda x. P(x)(p)) & \text{type } \langle eT, T \rangle \\ \text{c. } \llbracket Q_{+exh}^2 \rrbracket_g \text{ (for double-} wh \text{)} \\ = \lambda R_{\langle e, eT \rangle}. \lambda p. \forall q \subseteq p. (\lambda y \lambda x. R(y)(x)(q) = \lambda y \lambda x. R(y)(x)(p)) & \text{type } \langle \langle e, eT \rangle, T \rangle \end{array}$$

6 Which-questions

- Following Groenendijk & Stokhof (1984), we assume that *which*-questions interpret their restrictor noun *in situ*.

$$(36) \quad \llbracket \text{which}_i \rrbracket_g = \lambda N_{\langle e, T \rangle} \lambda P_{\langle e, T \rangle}. ! [N(g(i)) \wedge P(g(i))] \quad \text{type } \langle eT, \langle eT, T \rangle \rangle$$

- As for *who*, in nonsubject position we resolve type mismatches by type-shifters on the verb.



- This gives us access to the kind of object we need in order to compute a *de dicto* reading.

7 The presuppositions of *wh*-questions

- Following Groenendijk & Stokhof (1984) we have given what amounts to a symmetric account. This, however, can't be the whole story:

(38) Adapted from Higginbotham (1996):

- Which man is a bachelor?
- #Which bachelor is a man?

- Rullmann & Beck (1998) capture the contrast between these questions in terms of the presuppositions of the *which*-phrase. We will implement a version of their account in a presuppositional inquisitive semantics.
- In InqB, the semantic content of a sentence is a set of possibilities. Each possibility, in turn, is a set of possible worlds.
- We can think of each possibility as representing a potential update of the common ground.

- We now propose to model possibilities as having two components, one presuppositional and one at-issue.
- The presuppositional component represents the precondition of the potential update, the at-issue component determines the effect of the update in case the precondition is met (for reasons of space and time a detailed discussion of the discourse pragmatics that we assume is suppressed here).
- For a possibility s to support *Which bachelor is a man?* there should be some individual d such that:
 - the presuppositional component of s entails that d is a bachelor, and
 - the at-issue component of s entails that d is a man.
- Given the background assumption that all bachelors are men (which can be encoded using a meaning postulate), the presuppositional support requirement guarantees that the at-issue support requirement will be satisfied. In other words, the at-issue support requirement is vacuous, in light of the presuppositional requirement. This explains, in short, why the question is odd.
- Making this more precise calls for a presuppositional extension of inquisitive semantics.

8 Presuppositional typed inquisitive semantics

8.1 Basic semantic notions

Possibilities

- A **possibility** s is pair $\langle \pi_s, \alpha_s \rangle$, where π_s and α_s are both sets of worlds, and $\pi_s \supseteq \alpha_s$.
- We call π_s the **presupposition** of s , and α_s the **at-issue information** of s .
 - If $\pi_s = W$, then the presupposition of s is trivial.
 - If $\alpha_s = \pi_s$, then the at-issue information of s is trivial.
- Given that $\alpha_s \subseteq \pi_s$, s can always be represented as a three-valued total function from worlds into $\langle 1, 0, \# \rangle$, but we focus on the pair-representation.

Ordering possibilities

- $s \sqsubseteq t$ iff $\pi_s \subseteq \pi_t$ and $\alpha_s \subseteq \alpha_t$
- The inconsistent possibility is $\langle \emptyset, \emptyset \rangle$. It is the strongest of all possibilities.
- A possibility s is at-issue inconsistent iff $\alpha_s = \emptyset$.

Abbreviations

- $s^\top = \langle \pi_s, \pi_s \rangle$ trivializes the at-issue information of s
- $s^\perp = \langle \pi_s, \emptyset \rangle$ makes the at-issue information of s inconsistent

Propositions

- An inquisitive proposition is a set of possibilities $P \in D_{\langle st, \langle st, t \rangle \rangle}$ such that:
 - P is non-empty;
 - If $s \in P$ and $t \sqsubseteq s$ then $t \in P$ as well.

8.2 Type theory

- We use relational type theory, TT_2 , which has the same basic types as TY_2 , but in addition to functional types it also has relational (cartesian product) types.
 - Basic types: e, s, t
 - Functional types: if α and β are types, then $\langle \alpha, \beta \rangle$ is as well
 - Relational types: if α and β are types, then $\alpha \times \beta$ is as well
- The type of inquisitive propositions: $T := \langle st \times st, t \rangle$
- Abbreviations in the object language:
 - $\pi_s := \pi_1(s)$
 - $\alpha_s := \pi_2(s)$
 - $s^\top = \langle \pi_s, \pi_s \rangle$
 - $s^\perp = \langle \pi_s, \emptyset \rangle$
 - $s^\alpha = \langle \alpha_s, \alpha_s \rangle$
 - $s \sqsubseteq t := \alpha_s \subseteq \alpha_t \wedge \pi_s \subseteq \pi_t$
 - $\text{true}(P, w) := P(\langle \{w\}, \{w\} \rangle)$
 - $\text{presup}(P) := \lambda s. P(s^\perp)$
 - $A(P) := \lambda s. P(s^\alpha)$
 - $|P| := \lambda w. \text{true}(P, w)$
 - $s[P] := \langle \pi_s \cap |P|, \alpha_s \cap |P| \rangle$
 - $\text{Inq}(P) := \forall s [Ps \rightarrow \alpha_s \subseteq \pi_s] \wedge \forall s \forall t [t \sqsubseteq s \wedge Ps \rightarrow Pt]$
- Inquisitive connectives and transpication in the object language:
 - $\perp := \lambda s. (\alpha_s = \emptyset)$
 - $P \wedge Q := \lambda s. P(s) \wedge Q(s[P])$
 - $P \twoheadrightarrow Q := \lambda s. (P(s^\perp) \wedge \forall t \sqsubseteq s. (P(t) \rightarrow Q(t[P])))$

- $\neg P := P \twoheadrightarrow \perp$
- $P \vee Q := \lambda s. P(s) \vee Q(s)$ [existential projection]
- $P \vee_{\text{lr}} Q := \lambda s. P(s) \vee Q(s[\neg P])$ [left to right filtering]
- $P \vee_{\text{sym}} Q := \lambda s. P(s[\neg Q]) \vee Q(s[\neg P])$ [symmetric filtering]
- $P_Q := \lambda s. P s \wedge Q(s^\top)$ [transpication]

- Projection operators:

- $?P := P \vee \neg P$
- $!P := \lambda s. \exists S. (\forall t \in S : t \models \varphi \wedge \sqcup S = s)$

where $\sqcup S = \langle \bigcup_{s \in S} s_\pi, \bigcup_{s \in S} s_\alpha \rangle$

- Conditional inquisitive projection:

- $\langle ? \rangle := \lambda P. \lambda s. P(s) \vee (P = !P \wedge \neg P(s))$

This gives:

- If P is non-inquisitive then $\langle ? \rangle P = ?P$
- If P is inquisitive then $\langle ? \rangle P = P$

- Inquisitive universal and existential quantifiers:

- $\forall x. P := \lambda s. \forall x. P(s)$
- $\exists x. P := \lambda s. \exists x. P(s)$

- Abbreviation for entailment in the object language:

- $P \models Q := \forall s. P(s) \rightarrow Q(s)$

- Exhaustivity operator, needed for *which*-questions:

- $\text{exh}(x, R_{\langle e, T \rangle}) := R(x) \wedge \lambda s. \forall y (R x \not\models R y \rightarrow \neg(R y)(s))$

9 Fragment

9.1 Predicates

- Non-presuppositional predicate:

- $\mathbf{walk}' = \lambda x \lambda s. \alpha_s \subseteq \pi_s \wedge \alpha_s \subseteq W(x)$

- For p_0 a state (type $\langle s, t \rangle$), we write \widehat{p}_0 for the inquisitive proposition:

- $\lambda s. \alpha_s \subseteq \pi_s \wedge \alpha_s \subseteq p_0$

Similarly, for p_n of type $\langle e^n, st \rangle$, we write \widehat{p}_n for:

- $\lambda \vec{x} \lambda s. \alpha_s \subseteq \pi_s \wedge \alpha_s \subseteq p_n(\vec{x})$

- So now we can write: $\mathbf{walk}' = \widehat{W}$
- Presuppositional predicate:

$$\begin{aligned}
(39) \quad \mathbf{bachelor}' &= \lambda x. \widehat{\text{unmarried}(x)}_{\widehat{\text{male}(x)}} \\
&= \lambda x. \lambda s. \widehat{\text{unmarried}(x)(s)} \wedge \widehat{\text{male}(x)}(s^\top) \\
&= \lambda x. \lambda s. \alpha_s \subseteq \pi_s \wedge \alpha_s \subseteq \text{unmarried}(x) \wedge \pi_s \subseteq \text{male}(x)
\end{aligned}$$

9.2 First steps towards presuppositional questions

- Interrogative operator:

$$(40) \quad \mathbf{Q}'_n = \lambda P_{\langle e^n, T \rangle}. (\langle ? \rangle \exists \vec{x}. P(\vec{x})) ! \langle ? \rangle \exists \vec{x}. P(\vec{x})$$

- This presupposes that at least one of the alternatives holds.
- *Who*:

$$(41) \quad \mathbf{who}'_i = \lambda P. !P(x_i)$$

- Basic entry for *which*:

$$(42) \quad \mathbf{which}'_i = \lambda N. \lambda P. !P(x_i) N(x_i)$$

Refinement to capture that the extension of N is presupposed to be fixed:

$$(43) \quad \mathbf{which}'_i = \lambda N. \lambda P. !P(x_i) N(x_i); \mathbb{W}x?N(x)$$

Refinement to capture the fact that *which*-questions only generate strongly exhaustive readings:

$$(44) \quad \mathbf{which}'_i = \lambda N. \lambda P. [\text{exh}(x_i, \lambda x. !(N(x) \wedge P(x)))] N(x_i); \mathbb{W}x?N(x)$$

With a singular noun as a complement, this amounts to:

$$\begin{aligned}
(45) \quad \mathbf{which}'_i &= \lambda N. \lambda P. [!(N(x_i) \wedge P(x_i)) \wedge \\
&\quad \lambda s. \forall y \neq x_i. (\neg!(N(y) \wedge P(y)))(s)] N(x_i); \mathbb{W}x?N(x)
\end{aligned}$$

This captures:

- Together with the Q operator, which triggers the **presupposition** that at least one of the alternatives holds, we predict a uniqueness presupposition for singular *which*-questions.

- The **resolution conditions** require a possibility s such that for some set of individuals x_i , s presupposes that x_i are N , and it asserts that x_i are the only N who are P . This improves on Rullmann & Beck (1998). There it is predicted that it is sufficient to establish of some x_i that they are N who are P (not that they are the only ones).

- Symmetry example, singular predicates:

(46) Which man is a bachelor?

(47) $[Q \ 1 \ [\text{which}_1 \ \text{man is a bachelor}]]$

(48) $\left[\exists x [\text{exh}(x, \lambda y (\widehat{\text{male}}(y) \ \& \ \widehat{\text{unmarried}}(y)))]_{\widehat{\text{male}}(x)} \right]_{! \exists x \dots}$

For a possibility (potential update) s to support the sentence:

- the presuppositional component of s entails that there is exactly one (man who is a) bachelor
- Of some specific individual d , the presuppositional component of s entails that d is a man, and
- the at-issue component of s entails that d is the unique (man who is a) bachelor.

- The other symmetry example, still singular predicates:

(49) Which bachelor is a man?

(50) $[Q \ 1 \ [\text{which}_1 \ \text{bachelor is a man}]]$

(51) $\left[\exists x [\text{exh}(x, \lambda y (\widehat{\text{unmarried}}(y)_{\widehat{\text{male}}(y)})]_{\widehat{\text{unmarried}}(x); \widehat{\text{male}}(x)} \right]_{! \exists x \dots}$

For a possibility (potential update) s to support the sentence:

- the presuppositional component of s entails that there is exactly one man who is a bachelor
- Of some specific individual d , the presuppositional component of s entails that d is a bachelor, and
- the at-issue component of s entails that d is the unique (man who is a) bachelor.

The presuppositional support requirements guarantee that the at-issue support requirement will be satisfied. In other words, the at-issue support requirement is vacuous, in light of the presuppositional requirements. Call this a **Strawson tautology**. This explains why the question is odd.

- A sentence φ is a **Strawson tautology** iff for any state s : $s \models \varphi \Leftrightarrow s^\top \models \varphi$

10 Conclusion

- Typed inquisitive semantics provides compositional derivations
- By reusing the abstract as in Groenendijk & Stokhof (1984), we can interpret short answers
- By assuming that *which*-questions interpret their noun in situ, we account for *de dicto* readings
- Presuppositional inquisitive semantics allows us to capture presuppositions of *which*-questions and restrictor-nucleus asymmetries
- To do: multiple *which*-questions and much more!

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