

Intergroup Violence and Political Attitudes: Evidence from a Dividing Sudan

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How do episodes of intergroup violence affect political opinions toward outgroup members? Recent studies offer divergent answers. Some suggest violence deepens antagonism and reduces support for compromise, while others contend it encourages moderation and concessions to prevent further conflict. We argue that violence can fuel both hostility toward the outgroup and acceptance of outgroup objectives and provide evidence from a unique survey of 1,380 respondents implemented by the authors in greater Khartoum in Sudan in 2010 and 2011. We find that Northerners who experienced rioting by Southerners in Khartoum in 2005 were more likely to support Southern independence but less likely to support citizenship for Southerners remaining in the North. In combination, these results suggest that political violence hardens negative intergroup attitudes and makes individuals willing to concede separation to avoid living alongside outgroup members.

How do experiences of intergroup violence shape opinions on policies that affect outgroup members?¹ Politically motivated, episodic violence (including riots, violent protests, and terrorist attacks) is common in developing countries, but its effects on public opinion are understudied. The existing literature suggests two divergent effects that such violent events can have. On the one hand, intergroup violence may deepen existing divisions and harden individuals' resolve to retaliate and reject outgroup demands (Canetti-Nisim et al. 2009; de Waal 2005; Hayes and McAllister 2001). On the other hand, exposure to violence may make individuals more willing to support concessions to the outgroup in order to forestall future violent events (Gould and Klor 2010; Hazlett 2013; Lyall 2009).

In this article, we draw on both of these strands in the literature as we link individuals' experiences of violence and their political opinions in the context of a dividing Sudan. In January 2011, some four million South Sudanese voted in a referendum to determine

whether their region should remain part of a unified Sudan or become an independent state. The referendum formed a core part of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) in 2005 to end more than two decades of brutal civil war. As polls predicted, Southerners voted overwhelmingly in favor of secession, and South Sudan gained independence in July 2011. Northern attitudes toward partition and the status of Southerners have been far more divided. This article explores this variation in attitudes about the future of Africa's largest country using a survey of 1,380 randomly sampled residents of greater Khartoum, the sprawling city of eight million that is home to the vast majority of Southerners living in the North. This unique survey was implemented by the authors in 2010, with a follow-up in 2011.

We argue that Northerners' exposure to violence rooted in the conflict with the South shaped their attitudes toward partition. To test our argument, we

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explore the effects of variation in exposure to violence during a spontaneous riot in Khartoum in 2005, triggered by an unforeseen event—the sudden death of the SPLM’s leader John Garang in a helicopter crash. In the immediate aftermath of Garang’s death, thousands of Southerners in Khartoum took to the streets, many believing Garang had been assassinated. During the riots, large numbers of civilians were caught unexpectedly in areas heavily affected by violence, without deliberately selecting into the conflict. By chance, some Northerners were harmed during the riots, while other similar Northerners were not, which we argue below affords us a clean way to estimate the effect of violence on political opinion.

Our analysis shows that exposure to the 2005 riots significantly increased support for separation but at the same time decreased support for Southerners’ rights to retain their citizenship in the North. This suggests that the literature’s seemingly divergent claims can be complementary, in particular in the context of a secessionist struggle. Individuals exposed to riot violence are more likely to support conceding Southern independence, not because they have become more moderate, but because they are no longer willing to live in close proximity to Southerners.

We show that our main result is robust to alternative measures of violence exposure, confining the data to various relevant subsamples and a variety of potential confounding factors. We also address the concern that residential patterns may confound the relationship between riot exposure and political opinions, in the sense that those close to Southerners could be more likely to support separation but also more likely to have been affected by the riot. We establish that our core finding is not due to variation in Northern-Southern colocation. We also show that riot exposure is reported in geographic clusters, consistent with indiscriminate collective violence as opposed to selective attacks against Northerners with certain political views.

The next section provides intuition for our main hypotheses linking violence exposure and political opinions. We then discuss the 2005 Khartoum riots, describe the survey and sampling design, and present the results of our statistical analysis.

Political Violence and Its Effects on Ethnic Divisions

The idea that episodes of intergroup violence exacerbate existing divisions and erode a sense of common fate

across groups within diverse societies has a long history in the literature on ethnic conflict (Kaufmann 1996; Posen 1993), but few studies systematically document these effects at the level of the individual.² Violence, the argument goes, charges public discourse with antagonistic content, produces more rigid boundaries between ethnic groups (de Waal 2005), and can lead even moderate individuals to support exclusionary policies (Canetti-Nisim et al. 2009) and fear the physical proximity of members of the other group (Fearon and Laitin 2000).³ In their most extreme version, the arguments in this literature suggest that interethnic violence may harden ethnic boundaries almost irreversibly, making future cooperation between groups difficult, if not impossible.⁴

Little individual-level research has linked political violence to deteriorating intergroup attitudes and behaviors, and existing studies have focused largely on terrorist threats in developed countries such as the United States and Israel. Perceptions of terrorist threat have been associated with Jewish Israeli opposition to civil and political rights for Palestinians (Canetti-Nisim, Ariely, and Halperin, 2008), risk-minimizing behaviors in post-9/11 New York (Huddy et al. 2002), as well as negative stereotyping and support for harsh immigration and security policies directed at Arabs in a national sample of Americans (Huddy et al. 2005).⁵ Security threats appear to fuel intolerance (Wang and Chang 2006) and a willingness to curtail civil liberties (Davis and Silver 2004).

At least three mechanisms underpinning these findings have been articulated in the literature. First, security threats may elicit an affective response of fear and enmity toward the outgroup, which translates into heightened support for exclusionary policies (Canetti-Nisim, Ariely, and Halperin 2008;

²Exceptions include Shayo and Zussman (2011), Hayes and McAllister (2001), Balcells (2012), and Bauer et al. (2011).

³Two commonly cited examples of this process are the ossification of the Hutu-Tutsi divide due to cycles of ethnic violence and genocide in Rwanda and Burundi (Prunier, 1995) and the hardening of the previously amorphous division between “Arabs” and “Africans” in Darfur as a result of ethnic violence in the 1980s and the genocide in 2003 (de Waal, 2005).

⁴This argument features prominently in academic and policy debates about the relative merits of power-sharing and partition as solutions for ethnic conflict (e.g., Kaufmann 1998; Kumar 1997). See Sambanis (2000) and Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2009) for a critical empirical assessment of the argument for partition.

⁵For a classic work on the relationship between threat perception and increased intolerance, xenophobia, and ethnocentrism, see LeVine and Campbell (1972).

Jarymowicz and Bar-Tal 2006; Marcus 2000). Second, threats can incentivize individuals to support policies that appear to mitigate risk, including policies that impinge on the rights of minorities (Huddy et al., 2005, 2002). Third, exposure to threat may motivate anxious individuals to reduce uncertainty by supporting simple political solutions, which tend to target minorities and avoid more complex and nuanced strategies of accommodation (Bonanno and Jost, 2006).

These existing studies argue that concerns about being the target of outgroup violence can prompt individuals to support harsh policies toward outgroup members. We build on and move beyond this literature in three ways. First, we focus on the effects of riot violence, not terrorist threats. Riots are a more common source of insecurity than terrorist attacks, at least in Africa, but their effects on political opinion are virtually unstudied. From 1990 to 2011, African countries with a population greater than one million experienced a total of 2,115 riot events killing at least 34,500 people, compared to 803 terrorist events killing at least 12,500 people, according to data collected by Salehyan et al. (2012).⁶ Second, we study the effects of violence in a developing country, where physical security is a central subject of political debate.⁷ Third, we study the effects of past exposure to actual episodes of intergroup violence as opposed to threats of potential future attacks.

Others have begun to investigate the effects of prior violence on political opinions, and several have produced results consistent with the literature on security threats discussed above (Bonanno and Jost 2006; Hayes and McAllister 2001). However, an alternative finding that links exposure to political violence to moderation and a willingness to make concessions to the outgroup has also emerged.⁸ For example, Gould and Klor (2010) show that Israelis

living in close proximity to terror attacks are more willing to grant territorial concessions to Palestinians and support a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Lyall (2009) finds that Chechen villages shelled by Russian forces were less likely to man insurgent attacks, and Hazlett (2013) argues that exposure to violence has led to war weariness and a desire for peace among surveyed Darfurian refugees.⁹

The existing literature thus suggests two quite different types of individual-level consequences of violence exposure. On the one hand, violence can deepen intergroup divisions and prompt individuals to support retaliatory and uncompromising policies directed at the outgroup. On the other hand, violence can motivate individuals to support policies that may prevent further conflict through moderation and concessions. This article investigates which effect dominates in the case of exposure to episodic riot violence. To our knowledge, no existing work has addressed this question, although some of the literature has suggested that the effects of different types of violence exposure are in fact similar (Bateson, 2012).

In analyzing the relationship between violence exposure and political opinions, we focus on a spontaneous riot that struck Khartoum in 2005. Brought about by an unforeseen event, indiscriminate rioting exposed some Northerners to attack but left otherwise similar Northerners unaffected, which helps us disentangle violence as a cause (rather than as a result) of intergroup antipathy. Our empirical strategy rests on two important features of the riots. First, Northerners exposed to rioting were predominantly victims rather than perpetrators during this episode of violence. Second, given their location and other observable characteristics, they became riot victims by chance. We consider that Northerners' riot exposure may be a function of their location and socioeconomic characteristics, and we carefully probe this possibility in the empirical section below as well as the online appendix.

We hypothesize that individuals exposed to the riot will be apprehensive of members of the outgroup and support policies that they believe will best protect them personally from renewed violence. Such policies include partition as a means to spur the relocation, whether voluntary or forcible, of outgroup members. In fact, we propose that exposure to violence generates support for partition even among individuals who are pessimistic about the macropolitical implications of

⁶We count an event as terrorist if terrorism is identified as a potential event issue. Riot events are all events that are either typed as or escalated into an organized or a spontaneous riot. The total number of all (nonriot) anti- and extragovernment violent events is 2,098 resulting in at least 51,500 fatalities. The Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD) Version 3.0 is available at <https://www.strausscenter.org/scad.html>.

⁷Campbell (2003) notes that comparatively little research on attitudes toward outgroup members has been conducted in developing countries.

⁸A more voluminous recent literature has examined the effects of wartime victimization on ingroup trust, political participation, and capacity for collective action (Bellows and Miguel 2009; Blattman 2009; Gilligan, Pasquale, and Samii 2013; Jha and Wilkinson 2012; Voors et al. 2012). We follow this literature in our use of micro level data but expand on it by focusing on the effects of low-level violence on attitudes *across* groups.

⁹In a similar vein, Huddy et al. (2005) find that post-9/11 anxiety correlates with isolationism and diminished support for aggressive military action.

separation. We argue that individuals maximize their perceived personal safety and will trade off what they would consider large-scale economic and national security setbacks for an opportunity to remove local outgroup members. (We show statistical evidence about the relationship between riot exposure and national security concerns below, but we discuss economic concerns in the online appendix.)

Our core hypothesis is that exposure to violence has a positive effect on support for separation. We highlight and probe the robustness of this finding because, at first glance, it could suggest that violence exposure leads to moderation or recognition of the grievances, capabilities, and resolve of hostile outgroup members, in line with the moderating effect proposed in some of the literature discussed above. However, we argue to the contrary that support for separation does not indicate moderation but rather pessimism about the prospect of coexistence with members of the outgroup and a desire to permanently end personal contact with them.¹⁰ To evaluate this claim, we test the complementary hypothesis that those exposed to violence will be more likely to favor denying basic political rights to members of the outgroup. In particular, we hypothesize that riot-exposed Northerners will be more supportive of withdrawing citizenship from Southerners who remain in the North. We find that the tendency in the literature to associate an individual's willingness to make concessions with moderation is off the mark, at least in the case of exposure to riot violence and perhaps more broadly. Violence exposure can fuel *both* sharp hostility and support for key outgroup objectives in the same individual. Riot-exposed Northerners in Khartoum are eager to eliminate a perceived Southern threat from their daily lives, and partition becomes a means to accomplish precisely that.

This study also speaks to the literature on secession, which typically does not discuss public attitudes toward partition in the "rump state" and focuses on elite preferences or the demands of the seceding region. We argue here that public opinion in the nonsecessionist core is worth a careful look, even if it is a less central driver of conflict than attitudes in the secessionist region. In the Sudanese case, Northern attitudes toward secession matter for two main reasons. First, a sizable subpopulation of the

Northern respondents we focus on in this study are precisely those individuals about whom the government in Khartoum cares most: Riverine Arabs living in Khartoum. This group forms a core part of President Omar al-Bashir's winning coalition, and Bashir depends upon their support if he is to continue to maintain his hold on power. As such, Bashir's regime has remained attuned to the sentiments of their Islamist and Arab base as they have made decisions about compliance with the terms of the CPA since 2005.

Second, prior exposure to violence works to make the process of partition itself more costly. The same underlying fear and mistrust that make ordinary people prefer partition can also make partition more violent and tragic. Consider the precarious position of Southerners living in the North today. Southerners were stripped of their citizenship rights in early 2012, and they face intimidation and violence in their daily lives. Much of this violence has been perpetrated at the grassroots level, underpinned by the hostile opinions of North Sudanese toward Southerners in the aftermath of Sudan's partition.

Those who do address the question of popular support for partition in the core state emphasize the importance of potential economic costs, either in the form of lost income from secessionist regions (Bartkus, 1999; Collier and Hoeffler 2006) or rising costs of public-goods provision within a now smaller rump state (Buchanan and Faith 1987). Given accumulating evidence that regions with access to natural resources or other sources of wealth are more likely to make secessionist demands (Collier and Hoeffler 2006; Morelli and Rohner 2010; Ross 2004; Sambanis and Milanovic 2011), one should expect the economic consequences of partition to weigh heavily on individuals considering the costs and benefits of territorial division.

A second explanation for resistance to secessionist claims suggests that the material value of a break-away region is less important than concerns about future secessionist conflicts elsewhere within an existing state (Walter, 2006).¹¹ According to this argument, governments who anticipate future challenges, such as governments in states with multiple territorially concentrated ethnic groups, will attempt to build a reputation as unyielding to sovereignty demands. Ordinary individuals, too, could fear that the loss of one region increases the chance that other regions will secede, leading to the further disintegration of their state.

¹⁰See also Sambanis and Shayo (2013) for a model that formalizes the logic of reinforcing patterns of violence and self-identification. They show that under certain conditions peaceful interethnic relations can persist as the circumstances that enabled such relations change.

¹¹See also Tir (2005), who finds that rump states are more likely to experience post-partition conflict than secessionist states.

Both arguments suggest reasons for Sudan (a multi-ethnic country with a history of peripheral rebellions) to oppose the secession of South Sudan (a region holding 75% of the country's oil fields and production). But while such considerations matter to ordinary citizens, we argue that public attitudes are also shaped by episodes of violent confrontations with members of the seceding population. We contend that individuals in the rump state will be more likely to support separation, in spite of its potentially negative economic or broader national security consequences, if they perceive partition will enhance their personal physical security. Northerners exposed to rioting Southerners will favor policies that will remove Southerners from their daily lives and therefore will be more likely to support separation, no matter the potential national-level consequences.

Black Monday and Northern Attitudes toward Partition

Northern Sudanese generally refer to the riots that shook Khartoum in the aftermath of John Garang's death as "Black Monday," although the violence continued for some 48 hours into early Wednesday. John Garang, the leader of the SPLM and Sudan's first Vice President at the time of his death on July 30, 2005, was en route from Uganda to Southern Sudan when his helicopter crashed in an apparent accident. While many Southerners remain suspicious of the circumstances surrounding the crash, available evidence does not suggest that Garang was assassinated. At the time of the crash, the helicopter was passing through a violent storm on the Ugandan side of the border (Africa Confidential 2005, 2), and neither the SPLM leadership nor Sudanese elites have agitated for the view that foul play was involved.

Garang's sudden and unexpected death shocked many Sudanese, not simply those from South Sudan. Only three weeks before the helicopter crash, Garang had received a hero's welcome in Khartoum when he returned to the capital for the first time since the second civil war began in 1983. Garang's death also seems to have caught the government in Khartoum off-guard. The government initially stalled and claimed that Garang was alive, but it revised this report after 24 hours, which increased uncertainty surrounding the circumstances of his death (International Crisis Group 2005, 2). The news was devastating for many Southerners. Rumors immediately began to spread that the Northern government was responsible for

Garang's death, and Southerners across Khartoum began to riot.


The violence began in the central market in downtown Khartoum and quickly spread to the outer neighborhoods of the capital (Medani 2005). While security forces quickly restored order in the heart of the capital, the riots intensified in the outer neighborhoods. Hardest-hit areas included the primarily working-class neighborhoods of Al Kalakla in Khartoum, El Fitehab in Omdurman, and Haj Yousif in Bahri (International Crisis Group 2005; Medani 2005). Figure 1 shows the location of these areas (marked with a hatch pattern) relative to the administrative units included in our survey sample. After an initial wave of violence by Southerners and some ethnic Nuba (non-Arab Northerners from the peripheral Nuba Mountains region, some of whom fought with Southern forces during the war), a small number of Northerners also took to the streets to retaliate.¹² The relatively small number of Northern participants in the rioting is consistent with the idea that those Northerners exposed to the riot violence were overwhelmingly victims rather than perpetrators during this event. In total, roughly 130 people were killed, more than 1,000 were injured, and thousands of private properties were destroyed (International Crisis Group, 2005; Medani, 2005).

Without question, the Khartoum riots were limited in scope compared to the decades of brutal violence carried out during Sudan's post-colonial civil wars. In spite of this fact, the survey evidence we present suggests that these riots had significant and lasting effects for many Khartoum residents. The riots represented the first time since the second civil war began in 1983 that the violence that ravaged the South (and peripheral parts of North Sudan) came directly to Khartoum. In-depth interviews suggest Black Monday, an unexpected and emotionally charged event, became a "flashbulb memory" (Brown and Kulik 1977) for many in Khartoum who remember vividly where they were and what happened to them as the riots unfolded.¹³

¹²For an in-depth look at the origins of Nuba resistance to Northern governance, their historical alliance with the SPLM, and the current conflict in the Nuba Mountains, see International Crisis Group (2013).

¹³However, the Khartoum riots did not cause the referendum process that eventually led to Southern independence. The CPA, which provided for the referendum, was signed in January 2005, more than six months before Garang's death. The online appendix includes additional information and interview quotes related to the Black Monday riots.

FIGURE 1 Riot Distribution Khartoum



Note: Most severely riot-affected administrative units (hatched areas, based on literature), randomly sampled administrative units (black boundaries), and heat map of riot exposure (gray scale overlay).

In the words of a Northern respondent named Mohammed:

“I remember the day of the riots like it was yesterday. The fighting started in the morning, after I dropped my kids at school in Omdurman and drove across the White Nile Bridge into central Khartoum. As the violence spread throughout the day, I became very worried about my kids. I rushed back to the school to pick them up and take them home. On the way home from the school, in the back-streets of Omdurman, we came across a group of angry rioters from South Sudan who were blocking the road. I quickly turned our car around and chose a different route.”¹⁴

When public debate in Khartoum over Southern separation reached its height in late 2010, Mohammed firmly supported partition: “We may lose the South’s oil wealth but at least we won’t have to waste resources on fighting against the South anymore, and without

the instability Southerners are causing, we can live in peace.”

We are not the first to suggest that the Khartoum riots had a profound impact on North-South relations. According to Young (2005), the riots “had the effect of driving the wedge further into the divide between Northerners and Southerners, between Arabs and Africans. Thus moderate Northerners sometimes concluded that it was neither possible nor desirable to have Southerners and Northerners under one roof, while others from the North expressed the view that the *abed* (slaves, a pejorative term applied to Southerners) should either behave themselves or return to the South” (2005, 538).¹⁵

¹⁴Interview, Khartoum, July, 2010.

¹⁵The Arabic “abd” is commonly used to express servitude to Allah (as in Abdullah, servant of God), but the term and its plural “abeed” are also used to derogatorily refer to “black” South Sudanese (Deng 1995, 5).

Survey and sampling design

The data for this article comes from a survey of a representative sample of 1,380 individuals from five administrative units (AUs) in greater Khartoum. Greater Khartoum consists of the 23 out of 36 AUs in Khartoum State that contain any urban residential population according to Sudan's 2008 census, and it encompasses the three historic cities of Bahri, Omdurman, and Khartoum at the confluence of the Nile. We conducted an initial round of interviews in November and December 2010, prior to the South Sudanese referendum on independence, and a follow-up in the fall of 2011, after Southern independence had been realized. Our analysis below uses the data from 2010, except when we make explicit use of additional information collected in 2011 to test the robustness of our results.

Khartoum is popularly described as a microcosm of Sudan, and it is an attractive survey site in that we are likely to sample respondents from a broad cross-section of Sudanese society as a whole.¹⁶ Residents of Khartoum also constitute the segment of Sudan's population on whose support the authoritarian Sudanese government around President Bashir relies most heavily, so the popular sentiments that our survey identifies are more likely to have a visible impact on government policy than similar sentiments in other cities.¹⁷

Respondents were selected using a multistage stratified cluster-sampling procedure.¹⁸ We randomly sampled 62 popular administrative units (PAUs) within five randomly chosen administrative units and selected households within PAUs by drawing target coordinates that were located by GPS-equipped enumerators in the field. Enumerators then asked the head of each sampled household to construct a roster of adult household members, and individual respondents were sampled from this roster.¹⁹ Enumerators stressed

the project's lack of any political affiliation and the random selection of respondents and provided details about measures taken to protect respondents from any kind of retaliation. Most respondents (87%) agreed to participate. About 84% of those who agreed to participate in the survey also agreed to be contacted for interviews in the future and shared a range of contact information (local address, GPS coordinates, information on ancestral home, contact details for several nonhousehold relations).

Enumerators frequently reported that respondents were initially apprehensive. Surveys by most international organizations, such as recent intention-to-migrate surveys by the UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), require supervision by Sudan's Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC), which generally takes the form of minders who accompany enumerators. This was an important reason why we completed all survey work in-house, with our own staff, who obtained necessary permissions from local, non-HAC authorities.²⁰

We took a series of additional measures to protect respondents (and enumerators), who could be at risk of being suspected that they participated in violent action in the past or who could hold political opinions that could make them a target of violent groups or Sudanese state authorities, and enumerators were instructed to provide a detailed description of these measures to respondents.²¹ These measures aim to make it impossible for anyone in Sudan, including enumerators and investigators, to link particular sets of responses to specific individuals, generic respondent profiles, or even other sets of responses from the same subject.

Three steps are particularly important. First, our staff was not allowed to observe a respondent's answers to potentially sensitive questions while administering the survey, but the relevant response sheet was completed by the subject him- or herself. While an enumerator read each question and the available response options (because many subjects do not know how to read), the subject marked the appropriate box in

¹⁶See, for example, Gwen Thompkins, "Khartoum, Sudan's Cosmopolitan Epicenter" (<http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=92621314>).

¹⁷A complementary representative sample of residents of Kosti in the border state of White Nile was lost when state security failed to accept permits issued by the governor and other local authorities on the first scheduled day of survey administration.


¹⁸Refer to this article's online appendix for details.

¹⁹All interview materials were available in Sudanese Arabic and English, Sudan's two official languages. Most interviews were conducted in Arabic. Our team included enumerators from all of Sudan's principal regions of origin, who spoke a variety of additional languages, including various dialects of the Fur, Dinka, and Nuba, and who assisted respondents with limited or no knowledge of the official languages.

²⁰Our staff obtained permits from PAU, AU, and locality authorities. Localities are groupings of AUs within states.

²¹Instructions and a range of other survey-related materials are available at <http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/24112>. We obtained IRB approval or an institutional equivalent from New York University, the University of Oxford, and the University of Khartoum. The University of Khartoum provided guidance under the aegis of the relevant dean and an Advisory Committee of faculty members established for this project.

FIGURE 2 Descriptive Statistics: Attitudes toward Partition and Citizenship for Southerners



private. Upon completion, the respondent placed the response sheet in an envelope among other (possibly decoy) response sheets. Second, any potentially sensitive responses and contact information were physically separated from each other and from a respondent's other answers. Response sets can be linked by matching separate identifiers generated for each respondent, but the required key makes it impossible for someone who obtains survey sheets to link sensitive information to specific individuals or broad participant profiles. Third, we restricted circulation of the document containing potentially sensitive questions. Even if someone was able to obtain survey responses to sensitive questions, these responses would consist of checked boxes and would be meaningless without the relevant survey instrument. By controlling the distribution of question sheets, we minimize the possibility of unauthorized access to sensitive information.

Results

We are interested in Northern respondents' attitudes toward partition and their views on the status that ought to be conferred on Southerners who choose to remain in the North. Figure 2 presents variation in two key outcome variables for three categories of respondents: Northerners, which our analysis focuses on; Nuba, a non-Arab ethnic group from the North's southern periphery, many of whom supported the SPLA during the war but were sidelined during the negotiations that led to the CPA; and Southerners, who we exclude from later analysis but shown here

for the sake of comparison.²² We show results for Nuba respondents separately to highlight the high degree of similarity between them and those for Northern respondents more generally, despite the group's historical ties to the South.

The first panel shows responses to the question whether the respondent supports unity of North and South Sudan or separation for the South.²³ Among Northerners, 12% support secession of the South. We see comparable support among Nuba, which could be a backward-looking reaction to a peace agreement that generated few benefits for the Nuba or a forward-looking realization that they are set to lose a key partner in extracting concessions from Khartoum for the periphery. Even among Southerners, a plurality (47%) voices support for unity. We suspect that many Southerners who answered "don't know" or refused to provide an answer are in fact supporters of separation, but we find our results otherwise broadly consistent with referendum returns, which showed that 42% of votes cast in the North were in favor of unity.²⁴

²²A table with sample and estimated population proportions of these subgroups is available in the online appendix.

²³All survey items discussed in this article are introduced using essentially the same wording as was used in interviews with subjects. The exact wording of all questions and response options can be found in the online appendix.

²⁴Josh Kron and Jeffrey Gettleman, "South Sudanese Vote Overwhelmingly for Secession," *The New York Times* (January 21, 2011). We would expect greater support for unity in a random sample of Southerners in Khartoum than a sample of voters, due to depressed turnout of those favoring unity in a referendum that was anticipated to yield separation.

TABLE 1 Effect of Riot Exposure on Support for Separation

| Probit Model | | | | | | |
|--|------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Dependent Variable: Support Separation | | | | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Fighting in neighborhood | .369 (.180)** | .547 (.185)*** | .470 (.182)** | .530 (.195)*** | .564 (.181)*** | .806 (.203)*** |
| Gender | | -.792 (.267)*** | -.543 (.242)** | -.560 (.243)** | -.926 (.280)*** | -.384 (.259) |
| Age | | .002 (.006) | .006 (.006) | -.001 (.008) | -.0003 (.008) | .005 (.006) |
| Working | | -.620 (.358)* | | | -.689 (.347)* | |
| Self-employed | | .172 (.352) | | | .254 (.308) | |
| Asset index | | | -.187 (.119) | | -.281 (.107) | |
| Relative wealth | | | -.025 (.111) | | .028 (.116) | |
| Education (log) | | | | -.124 (.122) | -.093 (.130) | |
| Father's educ. (log) | | | | -.051 (.110) | .005 (.122) | |
| Paved roads | | | | | | -.056 (.216) |
| Electricity | | | | | | .602 (.365) |
| Piped water | | | | | | -.421 (.406) |
| Cell service | | | | | | 1.079 (.333)*** |
| Observations | 940 | 870 | 848 | 838 | 729 | 815 |

Note: All models include AU and region of origin indicators. * $p \leq .10$, ** $p \leq .05$, *** $p \leq .01$.

The second panel of Figure 2 shows respondents' views on whether Southerners living in the North should be allowed to retain their Sudanese nationality after separation. Northerners are roughly divided on this question. More startling is the fact that this is also true for respondents from the Nuba Mountains and even the South, who may want to ensure that Southerners collectively return and contribute to a newly formed South Sudan.

Riot Exposure and Support for Separation

We now ask how rioting by Southerners in Khartoum in 2005 affected non-Southerners' attitudes toward separation. We code respondents as having been affected by the riots if they answered "yes" to a question that asked whether there was any fighting in their neighborhood

during the August 2005 riots in Khartoum.²⁵ This form of riot exposure was widespread, with an estimated 45% of non-Southerners reporting this to be the case.

The first column of Table 1 shows results from a basic probit model of a respondent's support for separation, which includes only location and group indicators in addition to our independent variable of interest. We find a strong and significant effect of riot exposure: support for separation (which takes the value of 1 if the respondent favors separation and 0 otherwise) is positively related to whether respondents reported having been affected by the 2005 Khartoum riots. Even more than five years after the Khartoum riots, the extent to which respondents were exposed to the unrest reverberates in their

²⁵We discuss and use additional measures of riot exposure later in the article.

responses to questions about the country's status.²⁶ Not only is this a testament to the magnitude of Black Monday in the eyes of many Northerners,²⁷ but it also reflects the fact that the referendum, conducted just after we completed the survey, is linked to the CPA, which was signed and heavily debated in Khartoum in the months leading up to John Garang's fateful helicopter trip and subsequent violence.

In the remaining columns of Table 1, we show that the estimate persists and in fact increases when we include a variety of potentially confounding factors in addition to the location and group indicators already included in the first specification.²⁸ This is consistent with reports that Southerners directed their anger at the relatively privileged riverine elite, whose baseline support for separation is low compared to other Northerners: the kind of limited targeting that

²⁶It is conceivable that respondents with negative attitudes toward Southerners are more likely to recall or falsely claim that they were victimized by Southerners during the 2005 riot. This kind of measurement bias is a challenge in any survey research. While we cannot rule out the possibility, we believe this is not a major problem in our case, for three reasons. First, we spaced survey questions so that respondents were asked about the riot about three dozen questions after they were asked their views on separation, citizenship, and the prospects for peace, in order to minimize the chance that respondents' expressed political views would prime them to (perhaps falsely) report riot exposure. We sequenced questions in this way in order to ensure that measured differences in political opinion could be attributed to riot exposure itself as opposed to being reminded about one's riot exposure by a preceding survey question. Second, political attitudes were recorded by subjects themselves, so that they would have no incentive to justify anti-Southern views to enumerators by claiming that Southerners harmed them during the riot. Third, respondents were not asked to self-identify as victims or targets of the riot, but they were asked factual questions (whether there was fighting in their neighborhood, they were physically injured, lost a job, etc.) in order to gauge their riot exposure, which should reduce differential recall or false victimization claims.

²⁷In the lead-up to the referendum, the events of "Black Monday" became a rallying cry for some Northern hard-liners, especially Al-Tayeb Mustafa, the uncle of Sudan's President Bashir and owner of one of the most widely read newspapers in Khartoum, Al-Intibaha. Mustafa regularly invoked the riots as evidence that Northerners and Southerners could not live together. However, we do not find evidence in our empirical analysis that the effect of riot exposure on support for partition is conditional on getting news from Al-Intibaha, nor is reading Al-Intibaha a significant correlate of support for separation.

²⁸The work indicator is ternary, with values for full-time, part-time, and no employment. Self-employment is a self-reported binary variable. The asset index is the first factor from a factor analysis of 13 wealth indicators (refrigerator, radio, television, mobile phone, non-mobile phone, computer, Internet access, satellite dish, mattress, bicycle, motorcycle or scooter, and car or truck). The relative wealth measure captures how respondents compared their household's wealth to others in their neighborhood, on a 4-point scale. Education is measured in log-years. The presence of any paved roads, an electricity grid, a piped water system, and cell-phone service in a respondent's PAU was recorded by an enumerator.

observers noted amid the chaos of the riots biases our estimation against the positive effect of riot exposure on support for partition that we find, and our estimates in fact become larger as we adjust for socioeconomic covariates. The substantive effect of riot exposure on support for separation is large and ranges from 7 to 13 percentage points across these specifications.²⁹

Table 2 shows results from three different kinds of robustness checks, each shown in a separate panel. The models in panel A show that the effect holds across relevant subsamples: First, we exclude Nuba, since many Nuba aligned themselves with the Southern Sudanese SPLA during the Second Civil War. Second, we limit the sample to respondents who trace their origin to the North-Central region and exclude not only respondents from the Nuba Mountains, but also those from Darfur, Kordofan, the East, and elsewhere. Third, we further limit the sample to members of the three main riverine Arab tribes, the Danagla, the Jaliyyin, and the Shaygiyya, which have dominated the central government since independence (El-Tom, 2002) and are especially likely to be associated with Sudan's political elite.³⁰

The second set of robustness checks shown in panel B indicates that our results are not driven by particular modeling decisions. In column (4), we show that our results do not depend on efficiency gains associated with our stratified sampling design. Column (5) addresses the concern that we have ignored those who "don't know" about their support for unity or separation by coding such responses as an intermediate value and estimating an ordered probit model. Again, the result persists. Finally, column (6) responds to the worry that the listwise deletion of observations for which any data is missing could introduce bias in our estimates. We multiply impute missing values on any of the control variables, perform estimation on a now larger set of observations, and obtain an estimate of essentially the same size and with about the same standard error.

²⁹A basic comparison of weighted proportions yields a similar estimate: 17% of those who report riot exposure support separation, compared to 10% of those who do not.

³⁰The results also holds if we exclude anyone who has not been in their current neighborhood since before the riot. This is not surprising given that displacement due to Black Monday was minimal and reported by only two of our non-Southern survey respondents. We do not observe any spike in relocation after the riot: 18% of respondents report having moved into their neighborhood between 2005 and 2010 (6% in the riot year 2005 and post-riot 2006), compared to 15% in the previous six years (and 5% in pre-riot 2003 and 2004). We also find that the share of individuals who have moved into Al Boogha since 2005 is lower than it is for Abuanja, even though the former saw significantly less violence on Black Monday.

TABLE 2 Robustness of the Effect of Riot Exposure on Support for Separation

| Probit Model, unless Specified Otherwise | | | |
|--|---|---|--|
| Dependent Variable: Support Separation | | | |
| Panel A: Robustness to Different Subsamples | | | |
| Sample | (1) Excl. Nuba | (2) North-Central only | (3) Riverine Arabs only |
| Fighting in neighborhood | .725 (.196)*** | .540 (.225)** | .615 (.276)** |
| Observations | 566 | 326 | 166 |
| Panel B: Robustness to Different Modeling Approaches | | | |
| Model | (4) Ignore survey design | (5) Ordered probit | (6) Multiple imputation |
| Fighting in neighborhood | .384 (.132)*** | .409 (.178)** | .518 (.168)*** |
| Observations | 729 | 768 | 929 |
| Panel C: Robustness to Effects of Residential Patterns | | | |
| Robustness check | (7) Incl. respondent estimate of Southern neighborhood share | (8) Incl. respondent estimate, code “don’t know” as zero | (9) Excl. if respondent estimate is 10% or higher |
| Fighting in neighborhood | .553 (.234)** | .639 (.195)*** | .695 (.288)** |
| Observations | 553 | 675 | 309 |
| Robustness check | (10) Incl. PAU-level average respondent estimate | (11) Incl. PAU-level average, code “don’t know” as zero | (12) Incl. Southern share of PAU-level sample |
| Fighting in neighborhood | .535 (.160)*** | .519 (.158)*** | .562 (.178)*** |
| Observations | 729 | 729 | 729 |

Note: Models include gender, age, employment and self-employment indicators, asset index, relative wealth, logged years of education, logged years of father’s education, and AU and region of origin indicators. Due to sample limitations, model (3) does not include AU indicators. ** $p \leq .05$, *** $p \leq .01$.

Residential Patterns and the Effect of Riot Exposure

While we have accounted for basic location effects by including administrative-unit fixed effects throughout the analysis, one could still be concerned that residential patterns are confounding the relationship between riot exposure and support for separation. Perhaps those who live close to Southerners are more likely to have been affected by the riot, but they are also either more likely to be sympathetic to Southerners’ demand for partition because they have interacted with them regularly or are particularly keen on removing Southerners from

their area of residence and support partition for this reason. Panel C in Table 2 shows that our results are robust to variation in respondents’ proximity to Southerners. In columns (7) and (8), we include respondents’ assessment of the share of Southerners in their neighborhood as a control variable (in one column excluding responses of “don’t know” and in the other coding them as zero). In column (9), we exclude any respondent who says that Southerners account for a double-digit percentage share of the neighborhood. Columns (10) and (11) take the same respondent assessments but average them within each PAU and include the average as a control variable. Finally, column (12) includes the

TABLE 3 Alternative Measures of Violence Exposure

| Probit Model | | | |
|---|---------------------------|--|---|
| Dependent Variable: Support Separation | | | |
| Panel A: Effect of Wartime Exposure to Violence | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Sample | All Northerners | North-Central only | North-Central only, excl. soldiers |
| Affected by war in South | .117 (.243) | .628 (.243)** | .647 (.257)** |
| Observations | 761 | 343 | 327 |
| | (4) | (5) | |
| Sample | North-Central only | All Northerners, excl. those affected by war with South | |
| Affected by war in Darfur | .255 (.236) | | |
| Fighting in neighborhood | | .662 (.308)** | |
| Observations | 341 | 277 | |
| Panel B: Effect of Direct and Indirect Riot Exposure | | | |
| | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| Sample | All Northerners | All Northerners | Excl. those who were indirectly but not directly exposed |
| Riot exposure, direct only | .307 (.254) | | .558 (.276)** |
| Riot exposure, direct and indirect | | .573 (.256)** | |
| Observations | 589 | 497 | 369 |

Note: Models (1)-(5) include gender, age, employment and self-employment indicators, asset index, relative wealth, logged years of education, logged years of father's education, and AU and region of origin indicators. Models (6)-(8) use the sample from the follow-up round and include gender, age, pre-riot employment and self-employment indicators, asset index, relative wealth, logged years of education, logged years of father's education, and AU and region of origin indicators. ** $p \leq .05$.

PAU-level share of Southerners that we actually observe in our sample as a proxy for the prevalence of Southerners in any respondent's neighborhood. Across all of these specifications, the effect of riot exposure varies only minimally and retains statistical and substantive significance.³¹

Alternative Measures of Violence Exposure

One question that remains is how sensitive our results are to how we measure exposure to violence in general

³¹We can also show that the effect of riot exposure on support for separation is robust even if we assume that we have omitted an unobservable variable that is correlated with both the outcome and the independent variable of interest. Results from an appropriate sensitivity analysis are included in the online appendix.

and riot exposure in particular. The consequences of a riot surely differ from those of a prolonged civil war, although Panel A of Table 3 suggests that riot exposure and exposure to the war with the SPLA may be similar in their effects on support for separation, at least for a plausible subsample of respondents: column (1) indicates no effect of war exposure across all Northerners, but column (2) shows an effect for individuals of North-Central origin, the core constituency of the SPLA's primary war opponent, the government in Khartoum.³² We exclude those who fought in the war in column (3), since exposure

³²A respondent is coded as having been affected by the war with the South if he or she was physically injured or displaced, lost a job, business, or property, was separated from family members or friends, or had a family member or friend who was physically injured or killed.

to violence could affect perpetrators and victims differently, without any change in the result.

At the same time, it is not the case that exposure to any type of violence correlates with increased support for partition, but only violence that actually originates with the relevant actors, here Southerners: column (4) shows that respondents affected by the war in Darfur are not more likely to support granting independence to the South.³³ We also show, in column (5), that this does not imply that riot exposure simply rekindles memories of the war, with the positive effect of riot exposure on support for separation a spurious corollary. In fact, riot exposure is positively correlated with support for partition even if we exclude any respondents affected by the war with the South. These results hint at similarities in the effects of wartime and riot violence, which we hope future research will continue to explore.

We have so far measured riot exposure in terms of whether a respondent reported fighting in his or her neighborhood during the Black Monday unrest, which is the riot-related item we were able to ask during the initial round of data collection in 2010. This raises the question to what extent the estimated effect on support for partition captures the effect of being personally attacked and to what extent it captures the effect of people in the respondent's neighborhood being attacked more generally. We now show that exposure of others in one's neighborhood is sufficient to produce the estimated change in separation-related attitudes, using additional data from a second round of interviews conducted in late 2011. During these interviews, we collected a detailed record of respondents' direct exposure to the violence of Black Monday, albeit for a smaller sample. We then construct two measures shown in panel B of Table 3: First, we code each respondent as having been directly affected if he or she was physically injured or displaced, lost a job, had property damaged, was separated from family members or friends, or had a family member or friend who was physically injured or killed in the course of the riots. Second, we create a measure of indirect exposure, which is the spatially predicted level of riot exposure for a respondent given the extent to which others in the area were affected. We essentially construct a heat map as in Figure 1 of direct riot exposure and then assign to each individual a predicted exposure level, which is a distance-weighted function of the exposure of all non-

Southern respondents around him or her.³⁴ Figure 1 displays the geographical distribution of direct riot exposure, where the share of respondents that report riot exposure is lowest in light gray areas and reaches its highest levels in dark gray areas. The heat map shows distinct riot clusters in Abuanja, Haj Yousif, and Al Shajara, consistent with relatively indiscriminate, collectively targeted violence as opposed to violence directed at specific individuals (which mitigates the concern that rioters might have selectively targeted Northerners supportive of partition, such as their employers).

We also used the second round of interviews to ask respondents to provide information about their circumstances at the time of the signing of the CPA in January 2005, roughly six months prior to the riot. We obtained this pre-riot information for all of the control variables that we have used, and panel B of Table 3 now includes only pre-riot covariates. While this helps address concerns about the post-riot measurement of control variables that could be affected by riot exposure, note that respondents' recollection of contextual information from 2005 could itself be a function of riot exposure.

Column (6) of Table 3 shows that direct riot exposure is positively but insignificantly correlated with support for separation, but we recover an effect once we account for the fact, as we do in column (7), that respondents could be affected indirectly: we now change riot exposure to a person's indirect exposure level for anyone who was not directly affected. That is, we are able to validate the article's main result with data that was collected after our initial analysis and that records specific kinds of riot exposure as opposed to a subjective overall assessment of exposure, provided we aggregate data to a level that roughly corresponds to the neighborhood, the same level at which subjects provided their initial exposure assessments.

We contend that direct riot exposure returns a statistically insignificant result because indirect exposure is sufficient to fuel anti-Southern (and pro-partition) sentiments: There are too many respondents included in column (6) who were not directly affected but are surrounded by those who were and hence are also more likely to support separation. Column (8) provides evidence that this is indeed the case: individuals who were directly affected by the riots are significantly

³³We show the estimate for North-Central respondents to facilitate the comparison of columns (2) and (4), but the same result obtains for all Northerners.

³⁴More precisely, we compute predicted values for all respondent locations from an ordinary kriging estimation, provided there are at least three data points within a radius of 500 meters. We model spatial correlation with a spherical model with nugget .2 and range 12 kilometers, which plausibly fits the empirical variogram. For more information, see Pebesma (2004) and Diggle and Ribeiro (2006).

TABLE 4 Effect of Riot Exposure on Support for Southerners Being Able to Retain Citizenship

| Probit Model | | | | | | |
|--|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Dependent Variable: Support Southerners Being Able to Retain Citizenship | | | | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Fighting in neighborhood | -.425 (.181)** | -.415 (.160)** | -.408 (.194)** | -.433 (.185)** | -.433 (.196)** | -.516 (.199)** |
| Gender | | -.151 (.175) | -.029 (.181) | -.142 (.165) | -.069 (.229) | -.242 (.171) |
| Age | | .002 (.006) | -.003 (.007) | -.001 (.007) | -.001 (.008) | -.001 (.006) |
| Working | | -.259 (.212) | | | -.152 (.265) | |
| Self-employed | | .367 (.249) | | | .363 (.289) | |
| Asset index | | | -.047 (.138) | | -.109 (.147) | |
| Relative wealth | | | -.225 (.125)* | | -.198 (.131) | |
| Education (log) | | | | -.134 (.121) | -.112 (.152) | |
| Father's educ. (log) | | | | -.036 (.090) | -.002 (.098) | |
| Paved roads | | | | | | .171 (.195) |
| Electricity | | | | | | -.132 (.269) |
| Piped water | | | | | | -.026 (.441) |
| Cell service | | | | | | .610 (.363) |
| Observations | 842 | 778 | 765 | 745 | 647 | 731 |

Note: All models include AU and region of origin indicators. Sample includes all Northerners. * $p \leq .10$, ** $p \leq .05$.

more likely to support separation than those who were affected neither directly nor indirectly, with an effect size comparable to the effect of fighting in the neighborhood.

Riot Exposure and Support for Citizenship Rights for Southerners

We hypothesized that those affected by Black Monday would not only support separation to a greater extent but would also advocate for tough measures against Southerners who decide to stay in the North. Their increased support for separation is not a sign of moderation or a newfound understanding of Southern aspirations and capabilities, but rather the result of a recognition that sharing one country has become an unpalatable option. Table 4 provides evidence for this claim by analyzing whether respondents thought Southerners should be permitted

to retain their nationality after partition. The effect of having been affected by the riot is now negative and significant at the 95% level across specifications. Riot exposure is among the largest statistically significant correlates of low support for Southerners' citizenship rights among all of the factors that we account for in this analysis.³⁵

The Effect of Riot Exposure on Security Concerns

Riot-exposed individuals also appear disproportionately pessimistic about the likely effect of separation on the security situation of the country as a whole, as shown in the first two columns of Table 5: they are 12 percentage

³⁵Being of Nuba origin translates into strong support for letting Southerners retain citizenship, with coefficient estimates ranging from .303 (.275) to .654 (.257) across models.

TABLE 5 Effect of Riot Exposure on Beliefs about Peace and Security

| Probit Model | | | |
|--------------------------|---|---|--|
| Dependent Variable | Believe that separation will lead to other regions calling for self-determination | Believe that separation will help maintain peace in North Sudan | Believe that separation will have positive effect on own physical security |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Sample | All Northerners | North-Central only | North-Central only |
| Fighting in neighborhood | .426 (.169)** | -.377 (.216)* | .685 (.200)*** |
| Observations | 628 | 302 | 296 |

Note: Models include gender, age, employment and self-employment indicators, asset index, relative wealth, logged years of education, logged years of father's education, and AU and region of origin indicators. * $p \leq .10$, ** $p \leq .05$, *** $p \leq .01$.

points more likely to think other regions will call for self-determination if the South separates, and, among respondents of North-Central origin, they are 9 points less likely to say that separation will help maintain peace in North Sudan. We find no evidence that riot-affected individuals support separation because they think partition will minimize conflict in Sudan as a whole; if anything, they are more likely to think that partition will have the opposite effect. Yet riot-affected North-Central respondents also strongly believe that partition will lead to improvements in physical security for themselves, as shown in column (3).

In combination, the results in Table 5 suggest that riot-scarred Northern Sudanese are navigating a trade-off between the proximal and the peripheral consequences of Southern secession. They are disproportionately weary that simmering conflicts like the one in the Nuba Mountains can escalate if the South is let go—not just because the partition could rekindle the determination of insurgents but also because the government in Khartoum has ramped up its efforts to brutally extinguish peripheral dissent. But peripheral conflicts have plagued Sudan for decades without many disruptions to life in the capital. The more proximate effect of secession would be the de facto removal of large numbers of Southerners who did disrupt life in Khartoum in 2005 and a corresponding improvement in perceived physical security at the local level. When faced with this trade-off, riot-affected Northerners tend to favor separation.

Conclusion

This article laid out an argument for how exposure to episodic political violence can affect people's political opinions and increase support for separation, not

because they become more moderate but because they are no longer willing to live with outgroup members in a multiethnic setting. We suggested that the unplanned riot that shook Khartoum in 2005 exposed Northerners to violence in a way that allows us to make inferences about its effects. The article then introduced an original survey dataset collected by the authors with a team of research assistants in Khartoum around the time when voters cast their ballots in favor of an independent South Sudan. This survey provides, to our knowledge, the only independently collected public political opinion data for greater Khartoum at this critical moment in Sudanese history. Finally, we presented the empirical argument that riot exposure correlates with heightened support for partition. We also presented evidence to suggest that riot-affected Northerners who support Southern independence do so not out of an improved appreciation of Southern goals or a belief that partition will bring peace to Sudan, but because they hope to displace potentially threatening Southerners that remain in Khartoum.

There is a potentially troubling implication to these findings. Would-be secessionists might see violence as an effective strategy to sway public opinion in favor of partition. However, recent research on secessions suggests that this type of violence can have negative consequences in the long run, as peaceful partitions are more likely to result in post-separation peace than their violent counterparts (Tir, 2005).

Our research suggests several avenues for future research. We have shown that violence exposure in 2005 continued to affect Northern political attitudes five years later, but it is reasonable to ask if this effect will decay over time and at what rate. More generally, we believe future research should consider partition as a dynamic process. For example, few quantitative

studies examine the impact of partition on ethnic minorities trapped on the “wrong” side of a newly created international border. How will Southerners living in Khartoum adapt to changed, and often less hospitable, political circumstances? Under what conditions do minorities decide to remain in the rump state or migrate to the newly created secessionist state? Do Southerners who stay adopt strategies to signal their loyalty to the post-partition state or to appear more “Northern” in everyday social life? What is the impact of partition on members of other non-Arab minority groups who have lost a major ally as a result of Southern independence? We will continue to explore these questions using the panel design of our survey, and we will probe the political and social consequences of separation in both rump and secessionist states as the process of partition unfolds over time.

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