The Journal of Economic Theory

Future Fiscal and Budgetary Shocks
Hian Teck Hoon, Edmund S. Phelps

Multitask principal-agent problems: optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation
Philip Bond, Armando Gomes

Debt and Deficit Fluctuations and the Structure of Bond Markets
Albert Marcet, Andrew Scott

Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: The regular case
Eugen Kováč, Tymofiy Mylovanov

Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation?
Arnaud Dellis

English auctions and the Stolper–Samuelson theorem
Juan Dubra, Federico Echenique, Alejandro M. Manelli

Directed search with multiple job applications
Manolis Galenianos, Philipp Kircher

Correlated Nash equilibrium
Kin Chung Lo

An axiomatic theory of political representation
Christopher P. Chambers

Structural holes in social networks: A remark
Nicolas Houy

Interim efficient allocations under uncertainty
Atsushi Kajii, Takashi Ui

Solving optimal growth models with vintage capital: The dynamic programming approach
Giorgio Fabbri, Fausto Gozzi

Supermodularity and preferences
Christopher P. Chambers, Federico Echenique

Finite additive utility representations for preferences over menus
Igor Kopylov

Global Newton Method for stochastic games
Srihari Govindan, Robert Wilson

Partisan politics and election failure with ignorant voters
Faruk Gul, Wolfgang Pesendorfer

The Shill Bidding Effect versus the Linkage Principle
Laurent Lamy

Trading with a common agent under complete information: A characterization of Nash equilibria
Gabriella Chiesa, Vincenzo Denicolò

Operators for the adjudication of conflicting claims
William Thomson, Chun-Hsien Yeh

Investment options and the business cycle
Boyan Jovanovic

Substitute goods, auctions, and equilibrium
Paul Milgrom, Bruno Strulovici

Individual Risk and Lebesgue Extension without Aggregate Uncertainty
Yeneng Sun, Yongchao Zhang

Income Effects and Indeterminacy in a Calibrated One-Sector Growth Model
Nir Jaimovich

Heterogeneous producers facing common shocks: An overlapping-generations example
Edward J. Green

Imperfect competition and indeterminacy of aggregate output
Pengfei Wang, Yi Wen

Redistributive politics with distortionary taxation
Benoît S.Y. Crutzen, Nicolas Sahuguet

Folk Theorem with Communication
Ichiro Obara

An integral equation representation for overlapping generations in continuous time
Chris Edmond

Growing through chaotic intervals
Laura Gardini, Iryna Sushko, Ahmad K. Naimzada

Moral hazard with bounded payments
Ian Jewitt, Ohad Kadan, Jeroen M. Swinkels

Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects
Hervé Moulin

Bayesian coalitional rationalizability
Xiao Luo, Chih-Chun Yang

Informal insurance in social networks
Francis Bloch, Garance Genicot, Debraj Ray

Contagion and efficiency
Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Simon Weidenholzer

Mechanism design with collusive supervision
Gorkem Celik

Deadlines and distractions
Maria Saez-Marti, Anna Sjögren

Long persuasion games
Françoise Forges, Frédéric Koessler

Sequential equilibrium in monotone games: A theory-based analysis of experimental data
Syngjoo Choi, Douglas Gale, Shachar Kariv

Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
Alex Gershkov, Balázs Szentes

Repeated games with one-memory
Mehmet Barlo, Guilherme Carmona, Hamid Sabourian

Learning in games with strategic complementarities revisited
Ulrich Berger

Social orderings for the assignment of indivisible objects
François Maniquet

Afriat's Theorem for General Budget Sets
Françoise Forges, Enrico Minelli

Optimal growth and uncertainty: Learning
Christos Koulovatianos, Leonard J. Mirman, Marc Santugini

The possibility of judgment aggregation on agendas with subjunctive implications
Franz Dietrich

Taxation, agency conflicts, and the choice between callable and convertible debt
Christopher A. Hennessy, Yuri Tserlukevich

“Almost” subsidy-free spatial pricing in a multi-dimensional setting
Jacques Drèze, Michel Le Breton, Alexei Savvateev, Shlomo Weber

Trees and extensive forms
Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Klaus Ritzberger

Collateral secured loans in a monetary economy
Leo Ferraris, Makoto Watanabe

Investment dynamics with common and private values
Dan Levin, James Peck

Information aggregation in financial markets with career concerns
Amil Dasgupta, Andrea Prat

Full revelation of information in Sender–Receiver games of persuasion
Jérôme Mathis

The value of an informed bidder in common value auctions
Jinwoo Kim

Dynamic psychological games
Pierpaolo Battigalli, Martin Dufwenberg

Optimal marginal and average income taxation under maximin
Robin Boadway, Laurence Jacquet

A characterization of inefficiency in stochastic overlapping generations economies
Gaetano Bloise, Filippo L. Calciano

Aggregation of binary evaluations
Elad Dokow, Ron Holzman

Communication, consensus and order. Who wants to speak first?
Nicolas Houy, Lucie Ménager

Coordination and bargaining power in contracting with externalities
Alberto Galasso

Uncertainty and the specificity of human capital
Martin Gervais, Igor Livshits, Césaire Meh