The Journal of Economic Theory
The Journal of Economic Theory publishes original articles in all fields of economic theory. JET is the leading journal in economic theory. JET is also one of the core journals in all of economics.
Christian Hellwig and Karl Shell are the JET editors. The JET editorial offices are located at Cornell University and the University of California, Los Angeles. JET is published by Elsevier.
Articles in Press
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Dale T. MortensenFuture fiscal and budgetary shocks
Hian Teck Hoon, Edmund S. PhelpsMultitask principal–agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation
Philip Bond, Armando GomesDebt and deficit fluctuations and the structure of bond markets
Albert Marcet, Andrew ScottStochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: The regular case
Eugen Kováč, Tymofiy MylovanovWould letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation?
Arnaud DellisEnglish auctions and the Stolper–Samuelson theorem
Juan Dubra, Federico Echenique, Alejandro M. ManelliDirected search with multiple job applications
Manolis Galenianos, Philipp KircherCorrelated Nash equilibrium
Kin Chung LoAn axiomatic theory of political representation
Christopher P. ChambersStructural holes in social networks: A remark
Nicolas HouyInterim efficient allocations under uncertainty
Atsushi Kajii, Takashi UiSolving optimal growth models with vintage capital: The dynamic programming approach
Giorgio Fabbri, Fausto GozziSupermodularity and preferences
Christopher P. Chambers, Federico EcheniqueFinite additive utility representations for preferences over menus
Igor KopylovGlobal Newton Method for stochastic games
Srihari Govindan, Robert WilsonPartisan politics and election failure with ignorant voters
Faruk Gul, Wolfgang PesendorferThe Shill Bidding Effect versus the Linkage Principle
Laurent LamyTrading with a common agent under complete information: A characterization of Nash equilibria
Gabriella Chiesa, Vincenzo DenicolòOperators for the adjudication of conflicting claims
William Thomson, Chun-Hsien YehInvestment options and the business cycle
Boyan JovanovicSubstitute goods, auctions, and equilibrium
Paul Milgrom, Bruno StruloviciIndividual risk and Lebesgue extension without aggregate uncertainty
Yeneng Sun, Yongchao ZhangIncome effects and indeterminacy in a calibrated one-sector growth model
Nir JaimovichHeterogeneous producers facing common shocks: An overlapping-generations example
Edward J. GreenImperfect competition and indeterminacy of aggregate output
Pengfei Wang, Yi WenRedistributive politics with distortionary taxation
Benoît S.Y. Crutzen, Nicolas SahuguetFolk Theorem with Communication
Ichiro ObaraAn integral equation representation for overlapping generations in continuous time
Chris EdmondGrowing through chaotic intervals
Laura Gardini, Iryna Sushko, Ahmad K. NaimzadaMoral hazard with bounded payments
Ian Jewitt, Ohad Kadan, Jeroen M. SwinkelsAlmost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects
Hervé MoulinBayesian coalitional rationalizability
Xiao Luo, Chih-Chun YangInformal insurance in social networks
Francis Bloch, Garance Genicot, Debraj RayContagion and efficiency
Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Simon WeidenholzerMechanism design with collusive supervision
Gorkem CelikDeadlines and distractions
Maria Saez-Marti, Anna SjögrenLong persuasion games
Françoise Forges, Frédéric KoesslerSequential equilibrium in monotone games: A theory-based analysis of experimental data
Syngjoo Choi, Douglas Gale, Shachar KarivOptimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
Alex Gershkov, Balázs SzentesRepeated games with one-memory
Mehmet Barlo, Guilherme Carmona, Hamid SabourianLearning in games with strategic complementarities revisited
Ulrich BergerAfriat's theorem for general budget sets
Françoise Forges, Enrico MinelliSocial orderings for the assignment of indivisible objects
François ManiquetThe possibility of judgment aggregation on agendas with subjunctive implications
Franz DietrichOptimal growth and uncertainty: Learning
Christos Koulovatianos, Leonard J. Mirman, Marc SantuginiTaxation, agency conflicts, and the choice between callable and convertible debt
Christopher A. Hennessy, Yuri Tserlukevich“Almost” subsidy-free spatial pricing in a multi-dimensional setting
Jacques Drèze, Michel Le Breton, Alexei Savvateev, Shlomo WeberTrees and extensive forms
Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Klaus RitzbergerCollateral secured loans in a monetary economy
Leo Ferraris, Makoto WatanabeInvestment dynamics with common and private values
Dan Levin, James PeckInformation aggregation in financial markets with career concerns
Amil Dasgupta, Andrea PratFull revelation of information in Sender–Receiver games of persuasion
Jérôme MathisThe value of an informed bidder in common value auctions
Jinwoo KimDynamic psychological games
Pierpaolo Battigalli, Martin DufwenbergOptimal marginal and average income taxation under maximin
Robin Boadway, Laurence JacquetA characterization of inefficiency in stochastic overlapping generations economies
Gaetano Bloise, Filippo L. CalcianoAggregation of binary evaluations
Elad Dokow, Ron HolzmanCommunication, consensus and order. Who wants to speak first?
Nicolas Houy, Lucie MénagerCoordination and bargaining power in contracting with externalities
Alberto GalassoUncertainty and the specificity of human capital
Martin Gervais, Igor Livshits, Césaire Meh
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