Elsevier logo

The Journal of Economic Theory

The Journal of Economic Theory publishes original articles in all fields of economic theory. JET is the leading journal in economic theory. JET is also one of the core journals in all of economics.

Cornell University logo
UCLA logo

 

Christian Hellwig and Karl Shell are the JET editors. The JET editorial offices are located at Cornell University and the University of California, Los Angeles. JET is published by Elsevier.


Articles in Press

Access to these articles is explained here.
  1. Island Matching
    Dale T. Mortensen

  2. Future fiscal and budgetary shocks
    Hian Teck Hoon, Edmund S. Phelps

  3. Multitask principal–agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation
    Philip Bond, Armando Gomes

  4. Debt and deficit fluctuations and the structure of bond markets
    Albert Marcet, Andrew Scott

  5. Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: The regular case
    Eugen Kováč, Tymofiy Mylovanov

  6. Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation?
    Arnaud Dellis

  7. English auctions and the Stolper–Samuelson theorem
    Juan Dubra, Federico Echenique, Alejandro M. Manelli

  8. Directed search with multiple job applications
    Manolis Galenianos, Philipp Kircher

  9. Correlated Nash equilibrium
    Kin Chung Lo

  10. An axiomatic theory of political representation
    Christopher P. Chambers

  11. Structural holes in social networks: A remark
    Nicolas Houy

  12. Interim efficient allocations under uncertainty
    Atsushi Kajii, Takashi Ui

  13. Solving optimal growth models with vintage capital: The dynamic programming approach
    Giorgio Fabbri, Fausto Gozzi

  14. Supermodularity and preferences
    Christopher P. Chambers, Federico Echenique

  15. Finite additive utility representations for preferences over menus
    Igor Kopylov

  16. Global Newton Method for stochastic games
    Srihari Govindan, Robert Wilson

  17. Partisan politics and election failure with ignorant voters
    Faruk Gul, Wolfgang Pesendorfer

  18. The Shill Bidding Effect versus the Linkage Principle
    Laurent Lamy

  19. Trading with a common agent under complete information: A characterization of Nash equilibria
    Gabriella Chiesa, Vincenzo Denicolò

  20. Operators for the adjudication of conflicting claims
    William Thomson, Chun-Hsien Yeh

  21. Investment options and the business cycle
    Boyan Jovanovic

  22. Substitute goods, auctions, and equilibrium
    Paul Milgrom, Bruno Strulovici

  23. Individual risk and Lebesgue extension without aggregate uncertainty
    Yeneng Sun, Yongchao Zhang

  24. Income effects and indeterminacy in a calibrated one-sector growth model
    Nir Jaimovich

  25. Heterogeneous producers facing common shocks: An overlapping-generations example
    Edward J. Green

  26. Imperfect competition and indeterminacy of aggregate output
    Pengfei Wang, Yi Wen

  27. Redistributive politics with distortionary taxation
    Benoît S.Y. Crutzen, Nicolas Sahuguet

  28. Folk Theorem with Communication
    Ichiro Obara

  29. An integral equation representation for overlapping generations in continuous time
    Chris Edmond

  30. Growing through chaotic intervals
    Laura Gardini, Iryna Sushko, Ahmad K. Naimzada

  31. Moral hazard with bounded payments
    Ian Jewitt, Ohad Kadan, Jeroen M. Swinkels

  32. Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects
    Hervé Moulin

  33. Bayesian coalitional rationalizability
    Xiao Luo, Chih-Chun Yang

  34. Informal insurance in social networks
    Francis Bloch, Garance Genicot, Debraj Ray

  35. Contagion and efficiency
    Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Simon Weidenholzer

  36. Mechanism design with collusive supervision
    Gorkem Celik

  37. Deadlines and distractions
    Maria Saez-Marti, Anna Sjögren

  38. Long persuasion games
    Françoise Forges, Frédéric Koessler

  39. Sequential equilibrium in monotone games: A theory-based analysis of experimental data
    Syngjoo Choi, Douglas Gale, Shachar Kariv

  40. Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
    Alex Gershkov, Balázs Szentes

  41. Repeated games with one-memory
    Mehmet Barlo, Guilherme Carmona, Hamid Sabourian

  42. Learning in games with strategic complementarities revisited
    Ulrich Berger

  43. Afriat's theorem for general budget sets
    Françoise Forges, Enrico Minelli

  44. Social orderings for the assignment of indivisible objects
    François Maniquet

  45. The possibility of judgment aggregation on agendas with subjunctive implications
    Franz Dietrich

  46. Optimal growth and uncertainty: Learning
    Christos Koulovatianos, Leonard J. Mirman, Marc Santugini

  47. Taxation, agency conflicts, and the choice between callable and convertible debt
    Christopher A. Hennessy, Yuri Tserlukevich

  48. “Almost” subsidy-free spatial pricing in a multi-dimensional setting
    Jacques Drèze, Michel Le Breton, Alexei Savvateev, Shlomo Weber

  49. Trees and extensive forms
    Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Klaus Ritzberger

  50. Collateral secured loans in a monetary economy
    Leo Ferraris, Makoto Watanabe

  51. Investment dynamics with common and private values
    Dan Levin, James Peck

  52. Information aggregation in financial markets with career concerns
    Amil Dasgupta, Andrea Prat

  53. Full revelation of information in Sender–Receiver games of persuasion
    Jérôme Mathis

  54. The value of an informed bidder in common value auctions
    Jinwoo Kim

  55. Dynamic psychological games
    Pierpaolo Battigalli, Martin Dufwenberg

  56. Optimal marginal and average income taxation under maximin
    Robin Boadway, Laurence Jacquet

  57. A characterization of inefficiency in stochastic overlapping generations economies
    Gaetano Bloise, Filippo L. Calciano

  58. Aggregation of binary evaluations
    Elad Dokow, Ron Holzman

  59. Communication, consensus and order. Who wants to speak first?
    Nicolas Houy, Lucie Ménager

  60. Coordination and bargaining power in contracting with externalities
    Alberto Galasso

  61. Uncertainty and the specificity of human capital
    Martin Gervais, Igor Livshits, Césaire Meh


This website is best viewed using a standards-compliant internet browser. We use and recommend Mozilla Firefox as an internet browser with good standards support. In our experience this takes less than a minute to download over the typical university internet connection and is usually very simple to install.