Monday – Wednesday 12:30-1:45 PM
Waverly Room 431
Revised (Monday, April 03, 2000)
William Roberts Clark
715 Broadway, Room 414
212.998.8525
william.clark@nyu.edu
Office Hours:
Mondays 2-4PM
This class will examine the interaction between politics and macroeconomics in the United States and other industrial democracies.The Class will begin with an examination of evidence for the two main arguments concerning the interaction between politics and macroeconomics (the partisan model and the electoral model) found in the U.S. case.We will then examine whether the connection between politics and macroeconomics differs when polities employ other types of political institutions.To do so, we will need to become acquainted with other forms of political organization.Consequently, we will spend the middle portion of the class becoming acquainted with the political institutions of Western Europe.Finally, we will examine the interaction between politics and the macroeconomy in a comparative perspective that includes both the U.S. and other industrial democracies.
Since the class will deal extensively with the politics of macroeconomic policy, students will need to learn some fundamentals about macroeconomics.This, however, is not a course in macroeconomics, nor will it be assumed that students have had preparation in macroeconomics.
Students will be required to write three short take-home exams.In addition, they will be expected to complete assigned readings before class and participate in class discussions.Each exam will be worth 25% of their final grade.As will their class participation.
Texts
required for Purchase:
Keech, William R. Economic Politics: The Costs of Democracy. (New York: Cambridge University Press).
Gallagher, Michael, Michael Laver, and Peter Mair. 1995. Representative Government in Modern Europe. (McGraw-Hill, Inc.).
Garrett, Geoffrey. 1998. Partisan Government in the Global Economy. (New York: Cambridge University Press).
The American Case
Wed. Jan.19Introduction.
Mon. Jan. 24, Keech, Chapters 1 and 2.
Wed. Jan. 26Keech, Chapter 4.Elections and the Macroeconomy
Mon. Jan. 31Keech, Chapter 4Parties and the Macroeconomy
Wed. Feb. 2Keech Chapter 5Macroeconomic Goals
Mon. Feb.7Keech Chapter 6Voters, Elections, Accountability, and Choice
Wed. Feb.9Keech, Chapter 7Discretion and Accountability in the Fiscal Policy Process
Mon. Feb.14Keech Chapter 8Discretion and Accountability in the Monetary Policy Process.
Wed. Feb.16 Keech Chapter 16 Conclusion
Comparative Institutions
Mon. Feb.21Class Cancelled - President's day
Wed. Feb.23.Ch. 1 and 2 - GLM - The Executive
Mon. Feb.28 GLM Chapter 3, Parliaments
Wed. March 1GLM Chapter 7 Patterns in Party Politics
Mon. March 6 GLMChapter 8Party Families
Wed. March 8 GLM Chapter 9 Voting Patterns and Social Cleavages
Mon. March 13 -15 No Class -- Spring Break
Wed. March 20 GLM Chapter 11 Elections and Electoral Systems
Mon. March 22GLM Chapter 12
Wed. March 27 GLM Chapter 13 Policy
Mon. March 29 GLM Chapter 14Interest Articulation
Mon. April, 3 GLM Review
Wed April 5GLM Review
Mon. April 10 Garrett, Partisan Politics in the Global Economy Chapter 1 and 2
2nd take home exam due.
Wed. April 12 Garrett, Chapter 3 and 4
Mon. April17NO CLASS
Wed. April 24 Clark, William Roberts and Mark Hallerberg, Forthcoming, "Mobile Capital, Domestic Institutions, and Electorally-induced monetary and fiscal policy". American Political Science Review. 94,2.(in the mean time, you may get it at :
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~corsetti/euro/Euroit.htm#s-agenda)
Mon. Monday April 26 .Garrett. Chapter 5
Wed.May 1 Chapter 7. Clark, William Roberts and Usha Nair Reichert, with Sandra Lynn Lomas and Kevin L. Parker. 1998, "International and Domestic Constraint on Political Business Cycles." International Organization (Winter) 51,1: 87-120.