GAMES, STRATEGY, AND POLITICS
Politics V53.0844 S. J. Brams
New York University 726 Broadway, Rm. 754
Fall 2003 (212) 998-8510; steven.brams@nyu.edu
Class: Mon. & Wed., 2:00 - 3:15 PM Office Hrs.: Mon., 3:30 - 6 PM
Applications of game theory—and an alternative strategic theory called “theory of moves”—as well as social-choice theory to a wide variety of strategic situations, principally but not exclusively in politics, will be examined. Uses of strategy in voting in committees and elections, in political campaigns, in the defense and deterrence policies of nations, and in bargaining and coalition-building situations will be among the topics discussed. Secrecy and deception as political strategies will also be analyzed.
Although the applications of strategic thinking will be mainly to American and international politics, strategy in everything from the Bible to sports and business today will be studied, too. Social-choice topics that will be analyzed include the manipulability of different voting systems, problems of achieving proportional representation in parliamentary democracies, and conflicts among different apportionment methods. Fair-division procedures for resolving disputes will also be analyzed.
In addition to the required readings, further readings will be recommended throughout the course for those interested in pursuing particular topics in greater depth. No mathematical training beyond high school mathematics is assumed in the course. The written requirements of the course include a midterm and a final examination plus a short paper on a topic that is chosen in consultation with the instructor. Each of the three written requirements will count approximately 1/3 towards your final grade.
Required Books
Brams, Steven J. RATIONAL POLITICS: DECISIONS, GAMES, AND STRATEGY.
Washington, DC/Boston: CQ Press/Academic Press, 1985/1989 (out of print; used
copies and bound reproductions in bookstore). RP
Brams, Steven J. THEORY OF MOVES. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
1994. TOM
Brams, Steven J., and Alan D. Taylor. THE WIN-WIN SOLUTION: GUARANTEEING FAIR SHARES TO EVERYBODY. New York: W.W. Norton, 1999. W-W
Dixit, Avinash, and Barry Nalebuff. THINKING STRATEGICALLY: THE
COMPETITIVE EDGE IN BUSINESS, POLITICS, AND EVERYDAY LIFE.
New York: W.W. Norton, 1991. TS
Sept. 3: RP, chs. l-2; TOM, Introduction; TS, Introduction
Sept. 8: TOM, ch. 1; TS, ch. 1-2
Sept. 15: TOM, ch. 2; TS, ch. 3-4
Sept. 22: TOM, ch. 3; TS, ch. 5-6
Sept. 29: TOM, ch. 4; TS, ch. 7
Oct. 6: TOM, chs. 5-6
Oct. 13: TOM, chs. 7-8
Oct. 20: Midterm Examination
Oct. 27: RP, ch. 3; TS, ch. 8-9
Nov. 3: RP, ch. 4; TS, chs. 10-11
Nov. 10: RP, chs. 5 & 7 (skip ch. 6)
Nov. 17: 6-8 page paper due; oral reports
Nov. 24: RP, chs. 8-9; TS, chs. 12-13
Dec. 1: W-W, entire book
Dec. 8: Review
Dec. 15(?): Final Examination
Game Theory Texts
Aliprantis, Charalambus D., and Subir K. Chakrabarti. GAMES AND DECISION
MAKING. Oxford University Press, 2000.
Bierman, H. Scott, and Luis Fernandez. GAME THEORY WITH ECONOMIC
APPLICATIONS. Addison-Wesley, 1993.
Binmore, Ken. FUN AND GAMES: A TEXT ON GAME THEORY. D. C. Heath, 1992.
Camerer, Colin F. BEHAVIORAL GAME THEORY: EXPERIMENTS IN
STRATEGIC INTERACTION. Princeton University Press, 2003.
Davis, Morton D. GAME THEORY: A NONTECHNICAL INTRODUCTION, 2d ed.
Basic, 1983.
Dixit, Avinash, and Susan Skeath. GAMES OF STRATEGY. W.W. Norton, 1999.
Dutta, Prajit K. STRATEGIES AND GAMES: THEORY AND PRACTICE. MIT
Press, 1999.
Eichberger, Jürgen. GAME THEORY FOR ECONOMISTS. Academic, 1993.
Friedman, James W. GAME THEORY WITH APPLICATIONS TO ECONOMICS, 2d.
ed. Oxford University Press, 1990.
Fudenberg, Drew, and Jean Tirole. GAME THEORY. MIT Press, 1991.
Gardner, Roy. GAMES FOR BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS. Wiley, 1995.
Gibbons, Robert. GAME THEORY FOR APPLIED ECONOMISTS. Princeton
University Press, 1993.
Gintis, Herbert. GAME THEORY EVOLVING: A PROBLEM-CENTERED
INTRODUCTION TO STRATEGIC MODELING IINTERACTION. Princeton University Press, 2000.
Hargreaves Heap, Shaun P., and Yanis Varoufakis. GAME THEORY: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION. Routledge, 1995.
Luce, R. Duncan, and Howard Raiffa. GAMES AND DECISIONS: A CRITICAL
SURVEY. Wiley, 1957.
McMillan, John. GAMES, STRATEGIES, AND MANAGERS: HOW MANAGERS
CAN USE GAME THEORY TO MAKE BETTER BUSINESS DECISIONS.
Oxford University Press, 1992.
Miller, James D. GAME THEORY AT WORK: HOW TO USE GAME THEORY TO
OUTTHINK AND OUTMANEURER YOUR COMPETITION. MCGraw-Hill,
2003.
Morris, P. INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY. Springer-Verlag, 1994.
Morrow, James D. GAME THEORY FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISTS. Princeton
University Press, 1994.
Myerson, Roger B. GAME THEORY: ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT. Harvard
University Press, 199l.
Rasmusen, Eric. GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME
THEORY, 2d ed. Basil Blackwell, 1994.
Ritzberger, Klaus. FOUNDATIONS OF NON-COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY.
Oxford University Press, 2002.
Romp, Graham. GAME THEORY: INTRODUCTION AND APPLICATION. Oxford University Press, 1997.
Rubinstein, Ariel, and Martin J. Osborne. A COURSE IN GAME THEORY. MIT Press, 1994.
Samuelson, Larry. EVOLUTIONARY GAMES AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION.
MIT Press, 1997.
Stahl, Saul. A GENTLE INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY. American
Mathematical Society, 1999.
Straffin, Philip D. GAME THEORY AND STRATEGY. Mathematical Associaiton of
America, 1993.
Vega-Redondo, Fernando. EVOLUTION, GAMES, AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR. Oxford University Press, 1996.
Watson, Joel. STRATEGY: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY. Norton,
2002.
Weibull, Jörgen. EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY. MIT Press, 1995.
Zagare, Frank C. GAME THEORY: CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS. Sage, 1984.
Applications and History of Game Theory and Social-Choice Theory
Ankeny, Nesmith C. POKER STRATEGY: WINNING WITH GAME THEORY.
Basic, 1981.
Arrow, Kenneth J., Amartya K. Sen, and Kotaro Suzumura (eds.). HANDBOOK OF
SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, vol. 1. North Holland, 2002
Aumann, Robert J., and Michael B. Maschler. REPEATED GAMES WITH
INCOMPLETE INFORMATION. MIT Press, 1995.
Aumann, Robert J., and Sergiu Hart (eds.). HANDBOOK OF GAME THEORY WITH
ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS, vols. 1/2/3. North Holland, 1992/1994/2002.
Austen-Smith, David, and Jeffrey S. Banks. POSITIVE POLITICAL THEORY I:
COLLECTIVE PREFERENCE. University of Michigan Press, 2000.
Axelrod, Robert. THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION. Basic, 1984.
Axelrod, Robert. THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION: AGENT-BASED
MODELS OF COMPETITION AND COOPERATION. Princeton University Press, 1997.
Baird, Douglas G., Robert H. Gertner, and Randal C. Picker. GAME THEORY AND
THE LAW. Harvard University Press, 1994.
Bates, Robert H., et al. ANALYTIC NARRATIVES. Princeton University Press, 1998.
Bicchieri, Cristina, Richard Jeffrey, and Brian Skyrms (eds.). THE DYNAMICS OF
NORMS. Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Bicchieri, Cristina, Richard Jeffrey, and Brian Skyrms (eds.). THE LOGIC OF
STRATEGY. Oxford University Press, 1999.
Bilbao, Jesús Mario. COOPERATIVE GAMES ON COMBINATORIAL
STRUCTURES. Kluwer Academic, 2000.
Binmore, K. G. GAME THEORY AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT. Vols 1/2:
PLAYING FAIR/JUST PLAYING. MIT Press, 1994/1998.
Binmore, Ken, Alan Kirman, and Piero Tani (eds.). FRONTIERS OF GAME THEORY.
MIT Press, 1993.
Boorman, Scott A. THE PROTRACTED GAME: A WEI-CH’I INTREPRETATION
OF MAOIST REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY. Oxford University Press, 1969.
Brams, Steven J. BIBLICAL GAMES: GAME THEORY AND THE HEBREW
BIBLE. MIT Press, 1980/2003.
Brams, Steven J. GAME THEORY AND POLITICS. Free Press, 1975.
Brams, Steven J. NEGOTIATION GAMES: APPLYING GAME THEORY TO
BARGAINING AND ARBITRATION. Routledge, 1990.
Brams, Steven J. PARADOXES IN POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
NONOBVIOUS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE. Free Press, 1976.
Brams, Steven J. THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION GAME. Yale University Press,
1978.
Brams, Steven J. SUPERIOR BEINGS: IF THEY EXIST, HOW WOULD WE KNOW?
GAME-THEORETIC IMPLICATIONS OF OMNISCIENCE, OMNIPOTENCE,
IMMORTALITY, AND INCOMPREHENSIBILITY. Springer-Verlag, 1983.
Brams, Steven J. SUPERPOWER GAMES: APPLYING GAME THEORY TO
SUPERPOWER CONFLICT. Yale University Press, 1985.
Brams, Steven J., and Peter C. Fishburn. APPROVAL VOTING. Birkhäuser Boston,
1983.
Brams, Steven J., and D. Marc Kilgour. GAME THEORY AND NATIONAL
SECURITY. Basil Blackwell, 1988.
Brams, Steven J., and Alan D. Taylor. FAIR DIVISION: FROM CAKE-CUTTING TO
DISPUTE RESOLUTION. Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Brandenburger, Adam, and Barry J. Nalebuff. CO-OPETITION. New York:
Doubleday, 1996.
Chwe, Michael Suk-Young. RATIONAL RITUAL: CULTURE, COORDINATION,
AND COMMON KNOWLEDGE. Princeton University Press, 2001.
Colman, Andrew. GAME THEORY AND ITS APPLICATIONS IN THE SOCIAL AND BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES, 2d ed. Butterworth, Heinemann, 1995.
Colomer, Josep M. STRATEGIC TRANSITIONS: GAME THEORY AND
DEMOCRATIZATION. Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000.
Coughlin, Peter. PROBABILISTIC VOTING THEORY. Cambridge University Press, 1992.
Cox, Gary W. MAKING VOTES COUNT: STRATEGIC COORDINATION IN THE
WORLD’S ELECTORAL SYSTEMS. Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Curiel, Imma. COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY AND APPLICATIONS: COOPERATIVE GAMES ARISING FROM COMBINATORIAL OPTIMIZATION PROBLEMS. Kluwer Academic, 1997.
Downs, Anthony. AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY. New York: Harper,
1957.
Symposium: Economics of Voting. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 9, no. 1 (Winter 1995): 3-98.
Enelow, James M., and Melvin J. Hinich (eds.). ADVANCES IN THE SPATIAL
THEORY OF VOTING. Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Farquharson, Robin. THEORY OF VOTING. Yale University Press, l969.
Felsenthal, Dan S., and Moshé Machover. THE MEASUREMENT OF VOTING POWER: THEORY AND PRACTICE, PROBLEMS AND PARADOXES. Edward Elgar, 1998.
Fudenberg, Drew, and David K. Levine. THE THEORY OF LEARNING IN GAMES. MIT Press, 1998.
Garfinkel, Michelle R., and Setergios Skaperdas (eds.). THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CONFLICT AND APPROPRIATION. Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Gates, Scott, and Brian D. Humes. GAMES, INFORMATION, AND POLITICS:
APPLYING GAME THEORETIC MODELS TO POLITICAL SCIENCE. University of Michigan Press, 1997.
Ghemawat, Pankaj. GAMES BUSINESSES PLAY: CASES AND MODELS. MIT Press, 1997.
Gilboa, Itzhak, and David Schmeidler. A THEORY OF CASE-BASED DECISIONS.
Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Green, Donald P., and Ian Shapiro. PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE. Yale University Press, 1994.
Grofman, Bernard (ed.). INFORMATION, PARTICIPATION, AND CHOICE: AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY IN PERSPECTIVE. University of Michigan Press, 1993.
Grillidi Cortona, Pietro. EVALUATION AND OPTIMIZATION OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS. SIAM, 1999.
Hanley, Nick, and Henk Folmer (eds.). GAME THEORY AND THE ENVIRONMENT.
Edward Elgar, 1998.
Haufbauer, Josef, and Karl Sigmund. EVOLUTIONARY GAMES AND POPULATION DYNAMICS. Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Hinich, Melvin J., and Michael C. Munger. ANALYTICAL POLITICS. Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Hovi, Jon. GAMES, THREATS AND TREATIES: UNDERSTANDING COMMITMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. Pinter, 1998.
Howard, Nigel. PARADOXES OF RATIONALITY: THEORY OF METAGAMES
AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR. MIT Press, 197l.
Kelly, Jerry S. SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY. Springer-Verlag, 1988.
Kolm, Serge-Christophe. MODERN THEORIES OF JUSTICE. MIT Press, 1996.
Kreps, David M. GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC MODELLING. Oxford
University Press, 1990.
Kuhn, Harold W. (ed.). CLASSICS IN GAME THEORY. Princeton University Press,
1997.
Landany, Shaul P., and Robert E. Machol (eds.). OPTIMAL STRATEGIES IN
SPORTS. North Holland, 1970.
Laver, Michael. PRIVATE DESIRES, POLITICAL ACTION: AN INVITATION TO
THE POLITICS OF RATIONAL CHOICE. Sage, 1997.
Livingston, Paiseley. LITERATURE AND RATIONALITY: IDEAS OF AGENCY IN
THEORY AND FICTION. Cambridge University Press, 1991.
McDonald, John. THE GAME OF BUSINESS. Doubleday, 1975.
McLean, Iain, and Arnold B. Urken (eds.). CLASSICS OF SOCIAL CHOICE. University of Michigan Press, 1995.
Macrae, Norman. JOHN VON NEUMANN. Pantheon, 1992.
Méro, László. MORAL CALCULATIONS: GAME THEORY, LOGIC, AND HUMAN FRAILTY. Copernicus/Springer-Verlag, 1998.
Merrill, Samuel, III. MAKING MULTICANDIDATE ELECTIONS MORE
DEMOCRATIC. Princeton University Press, 1988.
Merrill, Samuel III, and Bernard Grofman. A UNIFIED THEORY OF VOTING: DIRECTIONAL AND PROXIMITY SPATIAL MODELS. Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Miller, Nicholas R. COMMITTEES, AGENDAS, AND VOTING. Harwood Academic, 1995.
Mor, Ben D. DECISION AND INTERACTION IN CRISIS: A MODEL OF
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS BEHAVIOR. Praeger, 1993.
Moulin, Hervé. COOPERATIVE MICROECONOMICS: A GAME-THEORETIC INTRODUCTION. Princeton University Press, 1995.
Moulin, Hervé J. FAIR DIVISION AND COLLECTIVE WELFARE. MIT Press, 2003
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