Partition as a Solution to Ethnic Conflicts:
The Significance of Third-Party Guarantees

I. Introduction

It is frequently held that since the end of the Second World War, there has been a marked increase in ethnic warfare. In fact, the apparent increase is due to the steady accumulation of established conflicts. In other words, it is becoming increasingly difficult to reach a lasting resolution. In recent years, several authors have recommended that partition - the division of a larger state into smaller, more ethnically homogenous ones - be used to counter this trend. They claim that partition is the only solution that addresses the core security dilemma present in ethnic conflicts: the fear of destruction, literally or culturally, of one ethnic group by another. Critics, however, argue that partition does not solve conflicts at all, and may even serve to prolong them.

This paper will present the arguments of both positions within the context of appropriate cases. It will then go on to give an empirical analysis of cases of partition since the Second World War in order to argue that partition is indeed a viable solution, though with one important distinction from the established literature: it is the presence of credible third-party guarantees that promotes successful partitions, not the level of separation between combatant ethnic groups. The argument will then be analyzed in the context of the longstanding conflict in Cyprus. Only when third parties made credible commitments could the Greek and Turkish Cypriots could maintain the balance of peace. Finally, conclusions will be drawn and some suggestions made as to the direction of future research.
II. Proponents of the Utility of Partition

Civil conflicts - as ethnic conflicts generally are - have erupted at a steady rate of 2.31 per year since the end of the Second World War. The rate of conflict resolution, however, has lagged behind at 1.85 per year.\(^1\) The result is that, each year, new insurrections add to the body of established conflicts. There is no shortage of fuel for new conflicts. The former imperial powers have released the majority of their colonies from bondage. Large swaths of Asia and Africa that have not enjoyed self-determination for decades, if not centuries, have finally gained control of their own affairs. Similarly, the collapse of the Soviet Union and its enormous sphere of influence over Asia and Eastern Europe has granted the power of self-governance to groups that have not been formerly able to exercise that privilege.\(^2\) In the resulting power vacuum, many have looked to traditional ethnic groups in order to define political agendas. In some cases, such as in the former Yugoslavia, political elites have even purposefully set agendas along ethnic lines in order to seize a greater share of power.\(^3\) This has often resulted in an escalation of tensions between various ethnic groups within freshly independent territories. Minority groups fear exploitation and the repression of their traditional heritage. Majority groups fear that the presence of a large, vocal minority group will lessen their own prestige and destabilize the new nation. Each group is forced to calculate their relative safety within such a situation, or

\(^{1}\) James D. Fearon & David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War”, *American Political Science Review*, vol. 97 no. 1 (Feb 2003), pg. 77

\(^{2}\) Amitai Etzioni, “The Evils of Self-Determination”, *Foreign Policy*, vol. 89 (Winter ’92-’93), pgs. 22-23

risk destruction.⁴

Such a calculation is extremely difficult to make, however, for two distinct reasons. First, information is hard to come by, and may be considered unreliable by the opposing group. Fearon and Laitin cite this as one of the key causes of inter-ethnic tension. Neither side may have sufficient reason to believe the other will punish its own members for transgressions and, as a result, good faith relations become increasingly impossible.⁵ The tendency then becomes for ethnic groups to take matters into their own hands, in order to ensure they receive adequate justice.

Second, there is a time component to the determination of status: decisions must be made before relations within a new state harden, and one group or another is left at a disadvantage. Both sides will thus act quickly to increase their level of security, in order to ensure survival. This insecurity often expresses itself in terms of arms buildup. In an uncertain state, more security can be gained with a rifle than with a Constitution.⁶ This, naturally, only serves to complicate the situation. As Barry Posen points out in his work, it is very difficult to distinguish offensive military measures from defensive military measures.⁷ Subsequently, opposing groups may misread aggression into what is simply an attempt at fortification. Further complications arise when groups in conflict are aware that offense will be more effective at establishing

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⁷ Ibid, pg. 106-107
security than defense. That is to say, it is better to attack before someone else attacks first. What results is a “security dilemma” for newly independent ethnic groups within a territory: they feel they must ensure their survival through action, or risk destruction. It is for these reasons that ethnic civil wars are so difficult to resolve.

Those who favor partition, lead by Chaim Kaufmann, seek to address this “security dilemma” in their work. Kaufmann reasons that the only way to resolve such ethnic conflict is to separate combating ethnic groups into defensible territories. Only through partition can ethnic groups be secure enough in their survival to progress. It is imperative that this separation be complete, Kaufmann continues, or the security dilemma will not be wholly resolved. Should a significant percentage, or concentrated pockets, of the opposition remain within an ethnic territory; the threat of a “fifth column” invasion will be present. This is to say, the remaining members of one post-partition ethnic minority group may stir up violence in an attempt to attract intervention by their ethnic homeland. It is fear of this eventuality that drives an ethnic majority to oppress the ethnic minority; perpetuating the cycle of violence. Complete separation through partition prevents this outcome.

Still, it is unusual to find a conflict wherein opposing ethnic groups are readily separable. More frequently, there is a level of heterogeneity between the groups. In such cases, Kaufmann argues that population transfers are essential. Such transfers have occurred in the past, and frequently with tragic results. Following independence in 1947, for example, the ad hoc

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population transfer that took place between India and Pakistan was plagued with violence. Of the 18 million Hindus and Muslims who crossed the partition, it is estimated that more than 500,000 lost their lives. Nevertheless, Kaufmann believes that the potential danger of maintaining heterogeneity outweighs the potential danger of mass population transfer. Further, advanced planning for population transfers, such as arranging for the security of refugees, would also ease many of the hardships associated with the process. Organizing these transfers will not be easy, but they are necessary to resolve the security dilemma.

Kaufmann’s reading of ethnic conflict and his application of partition is borne out by certain historical cases. One such case is that of Ethiopia and Eritrea. Eritreans, with their unique colonial heritage, began the fight for their independence from Ethiopia in 1961. This finally came in 1993 when the Ethiopian rebel government rewarded the Eritrean rebel forces for their assistance in overthrowing the established military dictatorship. Stable relations grew between the two states for the next few years, although a violent conflict suddenly broke out in 1998 over economic and border differences. The war raged for two years, until a UN-mediated conclusion was reached in 2000. Since then, with the presence of UN Peacekeepers, the two nations have lived in peace. Thus, despite the breakdown at the end of the decade, the Eritrean/Ethiopian partition has been successful.

9 Kaufmann; 1996: pg. 137


11 Ibid, pg. 150

Other partitions have been successful, as well. The former Soviet state of Georgia has twice accepted partition, and twice it has been successful. For both Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Georgia determined it was more prudent to cede autonomy than to continue the bloodshed. Other successful cases are found in Azerbaijan - where the Nagorno-Karabakh region won its independence - and the Republic of Cyprus following its 1974 partition. In each case, partition ended the conflict for at least two years, and frequently for much longer. The partition separated the combatants, proponents argue, and provided the necessary security to maintain peace.

III. Criticisms of the Utility of Partition

Partition has its critics, as well. Some authors feel that proponents are flawed in their reading of ethnic conflicts, and that the body of actual partition cases reflects the problems inherent in the solution. That is to say, simply separating the combatants is not sufficient to end a conflict. A number of points are common to such criticisms. First, opponents argue that partition does little more than transform a civil ethnic conflict into one with an international dimension. The core of a conflict is not addressed, and a wall is simply thrown up between combatants. This was true of the violence in Israel after independence in 1946. What had been an intrastate conflict swelled to include several Arab states after partition was enforced. The conflict effectively spread, rather than become contained.

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14 See Nicholas Sambanis, “Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War,” *World Politics* 52 (July 2000); Radha Kumar, “The Troubled History of Partition”; *Foreign Affairs* (Jan/Feb 1997); among others

15 Peter Robb, *A History of India*, Palgrave: New York 2002, pg 203-204, for example
Second, while partition may separate ethnic groups, it rarely creates homogeneous territories, even after the initial conflicting ethnic cleavage has been addressed. The result is that a new minority may feel threatened, and a new cycle of violence begun.\textsuperscript{16} Such fears are not without base. It is not uncommon for a post-partition ethnic majority to curb the rights of a post-partition minority.\textsuperscript{17} The history of Northern Ireland provides a good example. The British partitioned the island in order to end the Irish-British conflict, but in doing so gave birth to the Protestant-Catholic struggle. The majority Protestants excluded the minority Catholics from governance, and the oppressed Catholics ultimately turned to violence as a means of political expression. Ending one conflict only to cause another can hardly be considered firm resolution.

Finally, some authors consider the population transfers prescribed by Kaufmann and others to be little more than, in the words of one, “ethnic cleansing.”\textsuperscript{18} However well planned, significant population transfer will always involve hardship and loss. The Palestinians, even more dramatically, continue to wait for a territory in which to transfer at all. In the estimation of these authors, peace cannot be maintained in the face of such bitter shifts of population, and so partition cannot be successful in cases where it is required.

In addition to the above theoretical arguments, Nicholas Sambanis performed an empirical investigation into the success of partition. Sambanis sifted through the body of ethnic conflicts since 1945, and highlighted the 18 in which partition was enforced. The 18 cases were


\textsuperscript{17} Sambanis \textsuperscript{2000}, pg. 441,

then analyzed to determine if the key argument of partition proponents held: that partition reduces violence between ethnic groups. The results were mixed. In 5 of the 18 cases, war (defined as 1,000 deaths with at least 100 on both sides) broke out again within two years of the partition. This figure can be misleading, however. In both partitioned India and Ethiopia, war broke out again beyond the two-year limit. Sambanis also found that, in 9 of the 18 cases, residual violence (defined as deaths below the 1,000-death threshold that is the customary measure of war) was present within two years of the partition. Neither statistic supports the case for partition particularly well. In sum, partition may not be the ethnic conflict cure-all its proponents profess it to be.

No case better serves as an example of the failures of partition than that of India/Pakistan/Bangladesh. In 1947, the United Kingdom introduced partition to British India, granting all Hindu-majority states to India, and all Muslim-majority states to Pakistan. This, already, was hardly an ideal solution: one thousand miles of Indian territory separated the five states that became West Pakistan and the single state that formed East Pakistan. Nevertheless, the partition went ahead as scheduled, and problems began almost immediately. First, millions of Muslims and Hindus rushed to establish residence in their appointed states. These migrants were frequently attacked by religious extremists seeking to ensure their migration became permanent. It is estimated that, of the approximately 18 million people who migrated, more than

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19 Sambanis, 2000: Table 1, and pgs. 479-481


21 Robb, 2002: pg.203-204
500,000 were killed. Second, the partition did not end further conflict. War between the two nations began almost immediately after the partition was enforced, and has broken out periodically in the time since. The civil conflict has just been recast in an international mold. Finally, the partition has not dissuaded new ethnic conflict. The Sikhs in the Punjab region - which contains more than 70% of the total Sikh population - have fought the Pakistanis since the partition was enforced. A war even opened between East and West Pakistan, which required a new partition and the creation of Bangladesh to resolve. Thus, the case of India reflects many of the criticisms of partition theory. The partition transformed a civil conflict into an international one, new ethnic cleavages opened up, and the benefits of the population shift have not merited the cost.

Such troubles are not unique to the Indian case, either. Northern Ireland and Israel have both suffered tension and violence since the establishment of partition. As described above, institutional biases against Catholics in Northern Ireland led them to express their grievances violently. Many on both sides have died since the 1960s, and the Good Friday Accord has, at best, a tenuous grasp on peace. The partition of Palestine has also been problematic, to say the least. This stems largely from the fact that partition left Palestinians without a territory of their own. If anything, this was a partition that created, rather than resolved, an extremely tense and potentially violent situation. Since 1947, Israel and its Arab neighbors have fought three wars, and the resulting border-shifting has maintained tense relations. The situation was made further difficult by ongoing Palestinian efforts to secure self-governance, which intensified in the

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22 Tan & Kudaisya, 2000, pg. 7

23 Statistical Abstract for British India, His Majesty’s Stationary Office: London 1939, pg. 14
intifada of 1987. Thus, the arguments of partition opponents seem greatly supported by such examples of partition. In each, partition was unable to resolve the ethnic conflict.

**IV. Rebuttal and Response**

Kaufmann rebuts the above criticisms by arguing that many of the cases involve imperfect partitions. That is to say, they do not achieve the complete separation of contentious ethnic groups necessary for partition to be successful. The result is that the security dilemma is not properly resolved, and the renewal of violence should be expected. In Northern Ireland, for example, the partition was not designed to actually separate Catholics and Protestants, but simply to provide a territory in which Protestants would entertain a majority for self-rule. Further, no significant population transfers took place, and Catholics and Protestants remained side by side. If anything, it is remarkable significant fighting did not occur between the 1920s and the 1960s. In regards to Israel, Kaufmann reiterates that no Palestinian state was created into which Palestinian Arabs who felt threatened by the prospect of a Jewish state could retreat. Their only options were either to submit to Israeli rule, or to become refugees and flee to surrounding Arab states. In all of these cases, the basic security dilemma was not addressed, and the imperfect partitions naturally resulted in the conflicts and problems listed above.

Kaufman’s rebuttal is fair. Criticism does not take into account that many of the

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24 A similar argument is made by Mearsheimer, Van Evera & Lind (1995) against the potential success of the Dayton Accord partition in Bosnia

25 Kaufmann; 1998, pg. 121

26 Ibid, pg. 128
partitions have been imperfect in that they failed to adequately separate the combatants. This suggests that partition may yet be a useful solution to ethnic conflict, if only when it is correctly applied. At the same time, however, there remains some doubt as to whether the correct application includes the complete separation of ethnic groups. First, it is limited in that it is difficult to achieve such total separation, even with planned population shifts. Population shift would not have been tenable in Rwanda, for example, where the Hutu and the Tutsi tribes were so thoroughly intermixed throughout the population.\footnote{Philip Gourevich, \textit{We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families}, Picador: New York 1998, pg. 57} Forcing the division would have been extremely difficult, and it seems unlikely that such a partition could ever have brought successful conclusion to the bloodshed. Still, given the atrocities as took place during the genocide of 1994, there are few other solutions that could be sought. Ultimately, only a military coup succeeded in ending the genocide though tensions and mistrust between the Hutus and the Tutsis remain high.

In addition, even partitions set up between far more homogenous groups can provide difficulties. Borders may not be drawn up to the satisfaction of either of the combating ethnic groups. For some, the issue of self-rule of the “homeland” is not one for compromise. It has been argued this is due to the inextricable link between “homeland” and ethnic identity.\footnote{Ibid, pg. 144} The homeland is where an ethnic language may be spoken, or its culture freely expressed. Frequently, blood has been shed to defend a region, and it is considered sacred ground by such defenders. These claims may go back thousands of years, regardless of whether or not an ethnic group has controlled the territory in recent history. Zionists based their claim to Palestine on a
kingdom that existed in the Roman era. Modern Serbian designs on Kosovo were justified by a Serbian defense of that territory against Ottoman Turk invaders in the fourteenth century.  

Thus, links between a land and a people may run extremely deep. Indeed, the loss of a homeland may be equated with the loss of an ethnic identity. Kaufmann has argued that in such cases, ethnic groups will not be willing to maintain the cost of protracted ethnic warfare, but any number of groups have fought tirelessly to free their homeland throughout history. Further, granting independence to such groups may only serve to encourage others to maintain their own fight with increased fervor. They will see that sustained conflict ultimately wears the opponent down, and allows them to attain their goals. Increasing the level of violence becomes a more reasonable option. Thus, regardless of how well the people are separated, the partition alone may not serve to end conflicts at all but instead encourage new conflicts and cause others to grow more serious.

The same problem may arise from the opposite perspective, as well. Just as a minority may fight to control its homeland, the ruling ethnicity may fight to maintain its dominance over its provinces. Monica Duffy Toft examines this question in her book on the indivisibility of land in ethnic conflicts. States may consider a territory indivisible for two reasons. First, and not unlike the “homeland mentality,” the state believes the territory to be an inviolable part of the whole. To cede such a territory would be akin to severing a limb. Second, a state continues to

\[29\] See Toft 2003, Chapter 2
\[30\] Toft, 2003 pg. 23
\[31\] Kaufmann 1998, pg. 75
fight because it fears one successful insurrection will lead to others. In effect, cutting off one limb leads the others to clamor for amputation. There is clear incentive, then, for a government to try to block partition movements, or to overrun partitions. Such a stalemate is present in the current Russia/Chechnya conflict. Chechens seek independence, in order to exert greater autonomy over their traditional homeland and better express their Muslim heritage. Russia is unwilling to cede Chechnya because it fears it will set an unwelcome precedent of submission to insurrection that will encourage other members of the Russian Federation to strive for autonomy. This is why, even in the face of defeat, the Russian government continues to harass Chechnya. At the same time, the Chechens refuse to give up their fight for independence. Thus, even though both sides may be separated completely, a partition alone is unlikely to remain successful for any length of time.

V. Empirical Analysis of Partition Cases: The Importance of Third-Party Commitment

This leaves an important puzzle: how can the potential success of partitions be reconciled with the difficulty and problems of forcing ethnic homogeneity? Other factors must be influential in successful partitions, and perhaps absent in failed ones. One that has garnered increasing prominence in more general civil conflict resolution literature - particularly in the work of Barbara Walter - has been third-party guarantees. Walter has argued that the presence of credible third-parties allows combatants to enjoy a greater level of security and gives them

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32 Toft, 2003, pgs. 31-33

33 Ibid, pg. 84-85
incentive to pursue peace. In the absence of such credible commitments, combatants are more prone to continue violence rather than risk absolute destruction through demilitarization. It is not unreasonable to extend this general idea to the much narrower case-set of partition, where it has not previously received much attention. Indeed, Kaufmann addresses the issue only once, and concludes that in the absence of permanent third-party guarantees the “stable resolution of an ethnic civil war requires separation of groups into defensible regions.” His view, however, does not allow the possibility that, under the guarantees provided by third-parties, the combatant ethnic groups will build up enough of a working relationship that such guarantees will not be necessary. The intervention, then, need not be permanent to be effective. At the same time, his persistent support of ethnic separation is susceptible to the same chief criticism as before: merely separating the combatants will simply transform a civil conflict into an international one. A credible third-party commitment, then, may provide the link between the potential success of partition and the difficulty of attaining complete ethnic separation.

Several reasons have been provided by the literature of conflict resolution as to why this should be the case. The introduction of a third-party can raise the cost for both sides to reopen fighting. This cost may be prohibitive even in cases where an ethnic group is fighting for a homeland, or where a state is fighting to maintain a province. No ethnic homeland is worth the decimation of the corresponding ethnic group, and no province is worth the loss of the entire

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35 Kaufmann, 1996, pg. 161

state. Further, the introduction of a third-party force can alter the balance of power. Third-party troops may bolster a minority enough that it feels secure against an otherwise belligerent state. Or they may give a state enough strength to compel opposition forces to adhere to an agreement and discontinue a smaller guerilla war. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, third-party forces can provide guarantees between warring parties that could not otherwise exist. If the combatants will not trust each other, third-parties may serve as arbitrators between them, and help solve the “security dilemma.” It is extremely important, however, that this third-party be perceived as credible by all combatants. That is to say, not so partisan or weak as to give one combatant or other a sustained advantage. Otherwise the parties may not feel secure, the corresponding dilemma will perpetuate, and hostilities will again erupt. For these reasons, a strong commitment may have the greatest influence in the success or failure of partition.

This strong commitment can likely best be measured in the number of third-party troops sent to maintain a partition. It is easy to talk about guarantees, but actually providing troops sends a much more convincing message to all involved. The number of troops mobilized signals credibility, as well. A small contingent will obviously not have nearly the same impact as a larger one. Combatants will recognize the third-party is not an enthusiastic participant, and may conclude that they can afford to re-ignite the conflict to gain a greater advantage. A larger number of troops, however, indicate to warring ethnic groups that the third-party is willing to


38 Ibid, pg. 70

39 Ibid pg. 68-70
back up its rhetoric and act as necessary to maintain the partition. Barring some nihilistic
tendency, they will not be as likely to restart hostilities in such a case.

Of course, strong commitment cannot be measured in the number of troops alone. The
same number of troops may be effective in one case, and completely ineffective in another.
Thus, the number of troops must be put in context, as conflicts vary in their size and intensity.
One such factor to be considered is likely the size of the state. A 10,000 troop commitment will
send a much louder signal in a very small state than in a very large one. This will no doubt, then,
be considered as part of the credibility for a third-party commitment. A second such factor is
likely the number of troops possessed by the warring factions. A troop commitment will not be
as effective if it is hopelessly outnumbered by the number of opposition forces. The balance
must be more equal, or combatants may feel emboldened to restart hostilities.\textsuperscript{40} The population
of the state in question should also be considered. Just as the third-party troops should not be
dramatically outnumbered by the opposition, nor should it be so against the general population.
If the population turns against the intervention, the troops will rapidly find themselves
ineffectual. Such was the case in Somalia, where “Operation Restore Hope” disintegrated in the
face of local opposition fostered by militias.\textsuperscript{41}

The factors to be considered now in place, it remains to be seen how the empirical
examination of partition cases since the Second World War shapes the argument for the
importance of third-party guarantees. Nicholas Sambanis’ aforementioned paper on partition and

\textsuperscript{40}Ibid, pg. 69

\textsuperscript{41}Abdi-Nur Hagi Mohammed, \textit{Anatomy of a Failure}, pg. 124-126

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ethnic conflict provides a clear summary of all cases of partition between the end of the Second World War and 1997. In it, Sambanis records eighteen cases of ethnic conflict that ended in partition, along with the year in which the partition was enforced. This paper will make only one adjustment to the case set. Sambanis’ inclusion of Somalia as a conflict that ended in partition is slightly inaccurate. The northern secession of Somali land from the rest of Somalia has gone unrecognized by Somalia itself, as well as by the international community. As such, it will not be included hereafter. Two other cases - the second Eritrean/Ethiopian partition, and the partition of East Timor - will not be included either, as they are too recent to thoroughly analyze. This leaves a case-set of seventeen.

Sambanis rated the relative success of each case using a two-pronged test:

1) the cessation of civil war for a minimal period of two years
2) the cessation of residual violence for a minimal period of two years.

Civil War is defined as battle deaths totaling 1,000 with at least 100 deaths on each side. Residual violence is defined as fatalities below the 1,000 death threshold. These figures represent the standard “Correlates of War” definitions. They do not adjust for population, but it is not the purpose of this paper to establish new thresholds of measuring conflict. Any choices made, at this stage of research, would be largely arbitrary. As a result, this paper will rely on the standard definitions of conflict literature.

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42 Ibid, pg. 78

43 Sambanis 2000, pg. 478

44 For more information on the “Correlates of War” Project, see the work of J. David Singer
Sambanis goes to rate the partition is a *success* if civil war and residual violence end for at least two years. The partition is a *partial failure* if the war ends for two years, but residual violence continues. Finally, the partition is a *failure* if neither the civil war nor residual violence ends for the two-year period. These definitions are acceptable for two reasons. First, it is generally a long enough period of time to allow the possibility for war to begin again under the original set of differences. Such an event would certainly indicate that the partition was unsuccessful. Second, it is generally a short enough period of time to disallow the possibility of war starting again under a new series of differences. Such an event would indicate that the partition did succeed, at least in terms of ending the original conflict. The data set can be summed up in this table:

### Table 1 - Cases of Partition Since World War II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Failures</th>
<th>Partial Failures</th>
<th>Successes</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israel/Palestine (1948)</td>
<td>India/Pakistan (1965)</td>
<td>India/Pakistan (1948)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cyprus (1964)*</td>
<td>India/Pakistan (1994)</td>
<td>Pakistan (1971)</td>
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<td>Georgia/Abkhazia (1993)*</td>
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<td>Georgia/S. Ossetia (1994)*</td>
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<td>Yugo/Croatia (1995)*</td>
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<td>Azerbaijan (1996)</td>
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* Partition Guaranteed by a Third-Party
VI. Explanation of Partition Cases and Presence of Third-Party Commitment

Successes

To fully understand the significance and circumstances surrounding partition in these cases, it is necessary to provide a summary of each. Most important for the purposes of this paper is the presence or absence of third-party troops to enforce a partition. Some cases have already been touched upon, but more in terms of the level of ethnic separation and problems therein. Several of these cases are found in the “success” column. The Ethiopian and Eritrean partition went into effect in 1991 after rebels from both ethnic groups joined forces to overthrow the Ethiopian dictatorship. The two states existed in peace without third-party guarantees for several years until war erupted again in 1998 over economic differences, and a border dispute. Ethiopia repelled the Eritrean attack and, with the aid of the UN, the two states have lived in a tense peace.

The partition of India/Pakistan has also been touched upon. The partition as it was enforced after the initial Indian/Pakistani War in 1947 is classified as a success because it did manage to stave off war in excess of two years as each state began to lay the foundation for institutional development. No third-parties were present to enforce the agreement, and it did not achieve separation between the Hindus and Muslims. The successful 1971 Pakistani partition followed a similar path. In this case, as mentioned earlier, East Pakistan battled West Pakistan in order to assert its independence. The war ended when India intervened on the side of the East Pakistanis, and the West Pakistanis were forced to retreat. There has been no formal third-party commitment to the partition by India, but as a thousand miles of Indian territory provides an insurmountable boundary between Pakistan and Bangladesh, the Indian army may be considered
a tacit participant. Pakistan knows it will not be able to cross Indian territory unmolested.

Other partitions found in the “success” column have not yet been touched upon. The 1973 partition in Cyprus took effect after the Turkish Army invaded the island to protect Turkish Cypriots.\textsuperscript{45} Turkish Cypriots had lead a tenuous existence at the hands of the Greek Cypriot-majority, and a recent Presidential coup sponsored by the Greek Military \textit{junta} in Athens seemed ominous. The third-party commitment here was considerable, estimated in the range of 20,000-30,000 troops.\textsuperscript{46} This was not enough to conquer the whole of the island, but it was enough to create a balance between Greek and Turkish Cypriot forces. The Turkish Army forged a territory for Turkish Cypriots in the northern third of the island, and this arrangement has maintained the peace ever since. The Turkish Cypriot government is recognized only by Turkey itself, but the international community has come to accept the partition.

The Republic of Georgia has seen two partitions since its secession from the Soviet Union in the early 1990s.\textsuperscript{47} Almost immediately after its independence, two groups - the Abkhazians in northwest coastal Georgia, and the Ossetians in the northern mountainous Georgia - began clamoring for greater autonomy. Neither group had expressed self-rule within the Soviet Union, and both saw its collapse as an opportunity to do so. The war with the Abkhazians quickly became intense, with an estimated 17,500 combined battle deaths\textsuperscript{48}, but an agreement

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\begin{itemize}
  \item Information taken from: Clement H. Dodd, \textit{The Cyprus Imbroglio}, The Eothen Press: Huntingdon 1998
  \item \textit{The Military Balance}, International Institution for Strategic Studies, 1973-1974
  \item Information taken from: Jonathan Aves, \textit{Georgia: From Chaos to Stability?}, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London 1996
  \item Sambanis 2000 data set
\end{itemize}
was reached between the two parties under the mediation of Russia in 1993. Still, a considerable number of Georgians remain in the region, and many more migrate between Georgia and Abkhazia to work the annual harvest. The peace has thus been a tense one.

Fighting broke out between the Ossetians and the Georgians during this period, as well, for many of the same reasons as with the Abkhazian conflict. South Ossetians demanded greater autonomy, which they had lacked in the Soviet system. The war did not proceed as brutally as that in Abkhazia, but approximately 1,250 combined battle deaths were recorded by the combatants. Georgians in the region initially fled southward to Georgia, and even a number of South Ossetians fled to North Ossetia in Russia. Mediation was again here provided by the Russian government, and South Ossetia was granted autonomy. To enforce the agreement, the Russians have also maintained a military presence of 20,000 in the region. Since the agreement, many refugees on both sides have flowed back into the region, but the situation has remained stable.

The Yugoslavian/Bosnian and Yugoslavian/Croatian partition successes are similarly related. The situation here was notably violent and complex, with both Yugoslavia (led by Serbia) and Croatia using the nominally independent Bosnia as a forum to seize territory and settle their ethnic differences. Native Muslims were caught in the middle, and compelled to fight for their survival. Atrocities were committed by all sides, from genocide to mass rape, and the

49 Sambanis 2000 data set


51 Information taken from: Radha Kumar, Divide and Fall?: Bosnia in the Annals of Partition, Verso: London 1997
death toll quickly rose. The war continued in this fashion until 1995, when NATO intervened on the part of Bosnian Muslims and Croats against the Serbs and achieved military victory. The parties, under heavy pressure from the international community, reached a partition agreement shortly thereafter at Dayton Air Force Base. Muslims and Croats were given their own territory, as were the Serbs. To enforce the agreement, nearly 20,000 UN peacekeepers were dispatched to the region.\textsuperscript{52} This partition has held, despite its unusual ethnic heterogeneity, since the agreement was put into effect.

The final successful case of partition is that of Azerbaijan.\textsuperscript{53} As with Georgia, Azerbaijan gained its independence in the Soviet collapse of 1991. Much like Georgia, again, Azerbaijan faced an almost immediate challenge from one of its provinces for autonomy. The region of Nagorno-Karabakh - populated primarily by Armenians through quirks of history and circumstance - sought to declare its own independence and perhaps unite with the ethnic homeland across the border. The Azeri government found this claim ridiculous, as Nagorno-Karabakh is located entirely within central Azerbaijan, and is separated from Armenia by several hundred miles. War soon erupted and, with aid from the Armenian military, the Nagorno-Karabakh rebels forced the Azeri government to grant autonomy. The remaining Azeris in the region were also driven out by the conflict, leaving behind an almost entirely Armenian population. This agreement has not been enforced by any third-party within Azerbaijan, but a

\textsuperscript{52}The Military Balance 1995-1996


-22-
significant Russian military presence in nearby participant Armenia looms large.\textsuperscript{54}

\textit{Partial Failures}

Several of the partial failures have also previously been touched upon. The two partial failures of the India/Pakistan partition are related to the earlier success. In both 1965 and 1994, the earlier partition was re-enforced to bring an end to open warfare over claims to the Kashmir region.\textsuperscript{55} Kashmir was granted to India in the original partition, but the problems of a significant Muslim population in the territory attract the attention of Pakistan. In neither case was the partition effective in ending residual violence. Each time, extremist groups continued to harass the opposition after India and Pakistan had agreed to end the war. No third-parties - save for a handful of UN Observers - participated in either of these partitions.

Moldova is yet another Soviet successor state troubled by a separatist region.\textsuperscript{56} Moldova gained independence in 1991 and a majority of Russians in eastern Moldova, aiming to secure their own interests, declared their own independence in the form of the Transdniester Republic. These rebels were aided by the presence of 10,000 Russian soldiers in regional military bases.\textsuperscript{57} War erupted as the Moldovan government attempted to regain control of the territory. They were unsuccessful, and in 1994 they granted autonomy to the region. Nevertheless, insurgent

\textsuperscript{54}The Military Balance 1993-1994
\textsuperscript{57}The Military Balance 1994-1995
groups engage in residual violence in order to force the Transdniestra Republic to capitulate and rejoin Moldova. The situation in the region thus remains tense.

The story of the partition in Tajikistan follows much the same arc. Following independence in 1991, a number of factions began to compete for influence in the new state. While several of these groups fought under banners of democracy or Islam, most analysts agree that the war is more of a power struggle than an ethnic one. Each wants access to the resources of the state in order to reap the corresponding benefits. The government, meanwhile, has had great difficulty repelling these challenges to its authority. The partition in question here was enforced in northern Tajikistan after the government became convinced it could not maintain control there. Residual violence persists even in that region, however, despite the presence of 12,000 Russian troops. They have not been an effective deterrent to prevent residual violence either in the north, or in increasingly lawless eastern Tajikistan. That many of the rebel groups use northern Afghanistan as a staging area for attacks further complicates the struggle. The situation remains tense.

**Failures**

Several of the partition failures have been sketched earlier, as well. The partition in Israel/Palestine that followed the 1948 Israeli War of Independence failed to provide a territory for the Palestinian people. The portions of British Palestine not held by Israel at the end of the


conflict were absorbed into Jordan and Syria. The Palestinians have thus lacked a homeland ever since 1948, and have sought one ever since. The partition thus failed to end warfare or violence for any length of time. That the combatants are well intermixed contributes to the violence, as well. There are pockets of each ethnic group appearing throughout the region. Further, although no third-party troops were ever introduced in Israel/Palestine, it would be hard to imagine how they could be effective. There is no border to defend and the combatants are perpetually in contact. The Israel/Palestine partition has thus been very unsuccessful.

The 1964 Cyprus partition ended a conflict that began several years before with the founding of the Republic of Cyprus.\(^6\) The original constitution called for quotas within the government and military for the minority Turkish Cypriots. Other institutional features were also designed to protect their interests. In 1963 the Greek Cypriots, tired of facing Turkish Cypriot legislative vetoes and over representation, proposed a series of Constitutional amendments that would essentially revoke these protections. Violence began almost immediately thereafter, and continued until the partition agreement the next year. This partition was hardly all-encompassing, as it involved the creation of only a handful of Turkish-Cypriot “enclaves”, primarily in the capital city of Nicosia. Under these circumstances, the UN troop commitment of approximately 13,200 was unable to maintain the peace\(^6\). Fighting between the Cypriot groups continued until the successful 1973 partition.

The 1991 Yugoslavia/Croatia partition was enforced following Croatia’s war of

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\(^6\) Ibid, pg. 74

\(^6\) Information taken from: Dodd 1998

\(^6\) United Nations website: www.un.org
secession. The war occurred in response to the rising tide of Serbian nationalism in Yugoslavia throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s. Croatian leaders, not wanting to cede power to their Serbian counterparts, declared their independence. War raged for the next six months, until Yugoslavia agreed to cede autonomy to Croatia. No third-parties were asked to guarantee the agreement. Shortly thereafter, fighting began anew through the proxy struggle in Bosnia. Both ethnic groups claimed it was necessary to support their Bosnian kinsmen, and so the battle between the Serbs and Croats began anew. The partition was thus unsuccessful in preventing either warfare or residual violence for any significant length of time.

Finally, in 1996, the Chechen War of Independence came to a close after two years and an estimated 30,000 combined battle deaths. The Chechens had previously experienced brutal treatment under the Soviet system. Josef Stalin had branded the entire ethnic group “traitors” during World War II, and shipped them in cattle cars to Central Asia. It was not until Stalin’s death ten years afterwards that they were allowed to return. As a result, there was some understandable animosity between the Chechens and the Russians. With the Soviet collapse in 1991, the Chechens began to argue for independence. Russia felt that ceding autonomy to the region would only encourage other separatist movements, and refused. The brutal war that followed ended only when the Russians were unable to gain a military advantage. The agreement did not hold, however, as Russia renewed violence against the Chechens within two years of the initial agreement. Russia has since refused to reach another agreement, and has refused any third-party assistance, insisting the matter to be an entirely internal affair. The

63 Information taken from: Smith 2003

64 Sambanis 2000 data set
violence continues to this day, with Chechen rebels now performing terrorist strikes on Moscow itself.

VII. Analysis of Empirical Data of Third-Party Commitment

Now that the circumstances behind cases of partition since the end of the Second World War have been explained, the relevant data concerning third-party commitment should be explored. First, an analysis will be made of the partitions in regards to the presence of third-party guarantees. This will give an indication of the importance of third-party guarantees to the success of partition. Then, in order to measure the extent of third-party commitment, this paper will analyze the maximum number troops that third-parties - be they the United Nations, Russia, or others - committed to the adherence of a partition. The number of cases is too small to run meaningful regressions, so the troop figures will instead be compared to:

1) the combined number of combatant troops in a conflict
2) the population of the original state
3) the area in square miles of the original state

This will hopefully provide some guidance as to the level of troop commitment necessary for the successful implementation of partition. Troop figures for years since 1971 were primarily gathered from The Military Balance, an archive of military records and deployment. Other secondary sources were used for earlier interventions. In cases where only a range was available, the lower limit was used. The rest of the information was gathered from the data set provided by Nicholas Sambanis and Michael W. Doyle for their paper “International
Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis.\textsuperscript{65} The relationship between third-party commitment and partition success can be summarized in this table:

### Table 2 - Partition Success and Level of Third-Party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case &amp; Year</th>
<th>Result</th>
<th>Third-Party?</th>
<th># of Troops</th>
<th># per Enemy Combatant</th>
<th># per Capita</th>
<th># per square mile of territory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israel/Palestine (1948)</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India/Pakistan (1948)</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus (1964)</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>13200</td>
<td>0.389</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>1.430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India/Pakistan (1965)</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan (1971)</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>13200</td>
<td>0.389</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>1.430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus (1974)</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>20000</td>
<td>0.588</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>2.162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia/Eritrea (1991)</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugo/Croatia (1991)</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>13200</td>
<td>0.389</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>1.430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia/Abkhaz (1993)</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>20000</td>
<td>1.667</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan (1993)</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>13200</td>
<td>0.389</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>1.430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India/Pakistan (1994)</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>13200</td>
<td>0.389</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>1.430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia/Ossetia (1994)</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>20000</td>
<td>1.429</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan (1994)</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>12000</td>
<td>-*</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.084</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{65}Data set can be found online at: http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers/peacebuilding, see Doyle & Sambanis 2000, Appendix B for sources
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Inclusion</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>PE</th>
<th>VPE</th>
<th>PEF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moldova (1994)</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>9500</td>
<td>0.571</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugo/Croatia (1995)</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>19800</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugo/Bosnia (1995)</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>19800</td>
<td>0.139</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia/Chechnya (1996)</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* No solid estimates available for Tajik rebels

**Third-Party Commitment in Successful Partition Cases**

Several conclusions can be reached from the above table. An examination of the first three columns provides some evidence that the inclusion of third-parties influences the success or failure of partition. The comparison figures will be dealt with in later paragraphs. Of the nine “successes,” third-party commitments were present in five. This is not an overwhelming figure, by any measure, but in each of these cases the partition has been effective well beyond its two-year minimum. Neither war nor residual violence has erupted since its introduction. Third-party guarantees receive their best endorsement from the success of the Yugoslavian/Bosnian and Yugoslavian/Croatian partition. This is because the partition does very little to separate the combatant ethnic groups - the crucial factor for previous partition proponents. The partition is designed such that the Muslims and Croats co-habit the same territory. At the same time, there is a great deal of intermixing between the ethnic groups even within the territories. Indeed, this imperfection caused some partition proponents to predict its failure.\textsuperscript{66} It has not failed, however, and the primary reason has been the third-party guarantees provided by NATO and the UN. Since the partition, at least 20,000 troops have been stationed in the region to promote the peace
process. This sends a signal to the former combatants that the third-parties are serious in their commitment, and that opening further hostilities would be more costly than beneficial. This is why the partition has succeeded, and why no fighting has erupted since the 1995 Dayton Accords were reached.

At the same time, the four exception cases - Azerbaijan, Pakistan, India/Pakistan, and Ethiopia/Eritrea - each contain unique circumstances that may explain their success in the absence of third-party guarantees. Both the Azeri and Pakistani partitions are indirectly influenced by powerful third-party guarantees. For Azerbaijan - as summarized earlier - the Nagorno-Karabakh region receives tacit support from the Russian and Armenian troops stationed in next-door Armenia. Azerbaijan does not dare disturb the region for fear of retaliation. For the partition between Pakistan and Bangladesh - as also summarized earlier - the two nations are separated by a thousand miles of Indian territory. Any new conflict would soon involve the powerful Indian armed forces. Both cases are thus influenced by third-party guarantees, though the forces are not present on their soil.

Both the Ethiopian/Eritrean partition and Indian/Pakistani partition also share common factors that may explain why they were successful despite the absence of third-party guarantees. Each of the nations involved were struggling to build infrastructure and institutions at the time the partition was first enforced. The states were built from the bottom-up, or inherited from corrupt regimes. It is not hard to imagine that these concerns outweighed any territorial disputes for at least the first two years of their existence. There is, of course, no method for gauging a state’s preoccupation with administrative construction, but the assumption hardly seems

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66 Mearsheimer, Van Evera & Lind, 1995, pg. 16

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unreasonable. This is particularly true when one considers that each of these successes later erupted again into warfare (several times, in the case of the Indian/Pakistani partition). Thus, the partition only provided a brief respite as the newly-formed states settled into existence. Without third-party guarantees, however, the peace could not last.

Third-Party Commitment in Failed Cases of Partition

An argument for the importance of third parties can also be made from the cases in which the partition was unsuccessful. Five of the failed cases of partition contained no third-party guarantees. In each, the “security dilemma” could not be fully resolved, and violence erupted once more, either into open warfare, or smaller residual violence. It should be noted, however, that the Israel/Palestinian partition created no territory into which the Palestinians could retreat should they feel threatened. Thus, it is likely that no level of third-party commitment could have been successful. The other four cases cannot be so dismissed. Of the three cases where third-parties guarantees were present, only Cyprus may provide some explanation. As was the case in Palestine, the 1964 Cyprus partition did not provide a meaningful territory into which the Turkish Cypriots could escape. Only a handful of areas were partitioned. Thus, as in Palestine, it is unlikely that any level of third-party commitment short of complete control could have maintained the peace.

This leaves Moldova and Tajikistan, two cases wherein third-party guarantees provided by Russia could not prevent the onset of residual violence for at least a two-year period. At least some success could be claimed from the absence of open warfare, but the partial failure cannot

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67 As Kaufmann (1998) contends, pg. 144
be as readily addressed by circumstance. In the end, perhaps the third-party commitments simply were not credible. Extremists likely believed that Russia would be unwilling to provide the further military assistance necessary to offset their activities, and so felt secure in continuing them. The feeling may also have been that the Russian troops lacked credibility because they could not provide impartial guarantees. While the Russians received credit for their neutrality from state institutions themselves, there is no reason this understanding should be automatically extended to extremist groups. They may have believed in some overarching Russian bias and continued to fight for the protection of their interests. Thus, residual violence occurred.

Whether due to one of the aforementioned reasons, or some combination of them, the third-party intervention was unsuccessful in both Moldova and Tajikistan. It is easy to recommend, however, that Russia simply pour more troops into the region in order to create a successful partition. This is far too open-ended, and most potential third-parties would be unwilling to make such a commitment. There is also a fine line between providing guarantees and occupying a country. Occupation is extremely controversial, and may only serve to end a conflict by unifying the former combatants against the third-party. There must be some middle ground, then, some measure of minimal effectiveness. This may also be gleaned from Table 2.

*Measuring the Level of Commitment*

As described earlier, to measure the level of commitment, the number of third-party troops was compared against 1) enemy combatant forces 2) population and 3) area in square

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miles. One of these may provide a likely guide for a third-party as to what will be a minimally successful intervention. An analysis of Table 2, however, does not indicate that either the comparison to the number of enemy combatant forces, or the comparison to population provide any concrete answers. In terms of the former, both the highest rating (Georgia/Abkhazia (1993): 1.667), and the lowest rating (Yugoslavia/Croatia (1995): 0.118) were “successful” partitions. The partial and complete “failures” that involved third-parties fell at random between these values, and thus it would be an ineffective measure of potential partition success. The same problem arose when analyzing the comparison between the number of third-party troops and the population of the original state. In several cases the same value covered a number of outcomes. This indicates that the comparison to population is also ineffective at measuring the potential success or failure of partition.

There are reasons that may explain these findings. Though comparison to the total number of ethnic combatant troops may seem logical, these ethnic troops will possess varying levels of technical sophistication and motivation from one conflict to another. A 2:1 ratio of combatants to third-party troops may be enough to prevent fighting in one situation, but may not be as convincing in others. This will be particularly true where the combatants feel the third-party will be unwilling to contribute more troops or sustain their involvement. Similarly, in a number of cases the general population may be more antagonized than in others. Having one troop for every 5000 individuals will be less effective in such a case than where the general population is much more placid. Thus, while both should likely be considered, they alone are not useful measures of the level of third-party commitment. In each case, the ethnic groups need
only to outlast the patience of third-parties in order to try and gain an advantage.\textsuperscript{69}

Far more useful in gauging the level of commitment by third-parties is the comparison between troops and area of a territory in square miles. According to Table 2, each “success” fell above a level of .287 troops per square mile, which translates to about one troop for every 3.5 square miles. Of the complete and partial “failures,” only Cyprus (1964) stood as an outlier. This would indicate that as potential troop coverage over the state increases, the likelihood of success for the partition also increases. This may be due to such coverage being read as a credible commitment by the third-parties. A higher level of commitment per square mile would provide fewer potential places for combatants to conceal themselves, and grant the third party greater control over a territory. Such coverage would likely be a deterrent for combatants to resume hostilities, as a third-party dedicating that level of military resources will not likely be quick to withdraw. Thus, the comparison between third-party troops and territory is a better measure of the level of commitment than are the number of ethnic troops or the population.

\textit{Ethnic Separation Revisited}

The theoretical problems with achieving ethnic separation in partition have been discussed at length, but now a more empirical analysis may be worthwhile. This is especially true in light of the Cyprus (1964) outlier in the Table 2 measurements. Part of the argument for the failure of this partition, particularly in the face of such heavy third-party involvement, is that it was not a pure partition. That is, it did not provide a real territory for each group - Turkish Cypriots had only what amounted to “ghettoes” in a handful of cities. As a result, the two groups

\textsuperscript{69}Addressed in: Lake & Rothchild (1996), pg. 68
were never separated properly enough to address the security dilemma. Is it possible that the level of ethnic separation does play a significant role in the success of partition, even in light of the arguments against it?\textsuperscript{70}

A consideration of the successful cases of partition does not provide any evidence in support of ethnic separation. Of the nine “successful” partitions found in Table 1, a majority of five did not have significant ethnic separation. After the 1947 British India partition, a full 30 million Muslims remained in India even after the population shifts.\textsuperscript{71} Despite this fact, the partition held for more than fifteen years before finally succumbing to tensions in Kashmir. The partitions in Georgia during the 1990s also succeeded despite a lack of consistent ethnic separation. Even after the partition of Abkhazia, the Georgian Parliament estimates that the Abkhazians account for only 65\% of the population.\textsuperscript{72} This figure could be questioned as having been massaged for political purposes, but it cannot be wholly unreasonable. Abkhazians only accounted for 18\% of the pre-war population of Abkhazia.\textsuperscript{73} Significant numbers of Georgians remain in the region, and more are returning. The South Ossetian partition succeeded in driving out most Georgians initially, but more than 5000 have returned since the end of the war. This is a significant number, given that the pre-war population was approximately 100,000 and has no doubt fallen considerably from that figure due to the flow of refugees.\textsuperscript{74} Nevertheless both of the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{70}See sections 3 & 4 of this paper
\item \textsuperscript{71}Tai Yong Ian & Gyanesh Kudaisya, \textit{The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia}, Routledge: New York 2000, pg. 277
\item \textsuperscript{72}www.abkhazia-georgia.parliament.ge/Publications/Georgian/gachechiladze.htm
\item \textsuperscript{73}1989 Soviet Census
\item \textsuperscript{74}www.caucasus.dk/chapter4.htm
\end{itemize}
Georgian partitions have been successful, although the situation in Abkhazia has often been tense. Finally, the 1995 Dayton Accord partition - which ended the Serbian/Croatian/Bosnian conflicts - barely provided any ethnic separation at all. While the Serbs received their own territory, Muslims and Croats were forced to share. In all territories, there remains a great deal of intermixing between ethnic groups. Indeed, a few ethnic separation proponents predicted the failure of the Dayton partition due to its failure to adequately separate combatants.\(^{75}\) Despite this, the partition has held for all parties involved. Thus, it is very difficult to argue that the level of separation plays a primary role in the success or failure of partition.

Even if it is not primary, however, perhaps a case might be made that the level of ethnic separation has some positive influence on the effectiveness of third-party guarantees. To this end, an empirical analysis similar to those above is necessary. It is very hard, however, to attain the crucial figures necessary for gauging the level of separation provided by the partition. Ideally, this paper would refer to an index measuring the concentration of various ethnic groups within a country. That is to say, an index measuring whether ethnic groups are concentrated in largely homogenous communities, or more diffused throughout the nation. To date, no researcher has assembled such an index, and this paper will not be so bold as to make an attempt. In order to do so, one would need to refer to very detailed census data, and this is hardly available for every state. Even within those countries that have records, it will not always be possible to measure individual ethnic groups. In Ethiopia, for example, census records do not reflect the Ethiopian/Eritrean cleavage, but instead the division of various tribes within the nation. In many cases, rough estimations would have to suffice. Measuring the level of ethnic separation

\(^{75}\)Mearsheimer, Van Evera & Lind, 1995, pg. 17
concentration is thus extremely difficult.

In its place, this paper will make use of the degree of ethnicity as measured by James D. Fearon in his paper, “Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country.” This index has significant advantages over the traditional “Index of Ethnolingual Fractionalization” compiled by Soviet researchers in the 1960s. Problems with the ELF include questions about data assembly, its relevance after forty years, and certain coding inaccuracies. Fearon’s index addresses many of these concerns in its assembly by drawing from a number of alternate sources, and thus provides a better measure of ethnicity within the partition nations. It is true that the data set covers a considerable period of time, and that ethnic groups may have shifted within these countries between the time their partition was enforced and the time Fearon assembled the index. Nevertheless, lacking any better level of measurement, this paper will rely on the Fearon values.

In the table below, they are compared to relevant data:

Table 3 - Partition Success and Ethnic Separation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case &amp; Year</th>
<th>Result</th>
<th>Third-Party?</th>
<th>Ethnic Fractionalization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israel/Palestine (1948)</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>0.526</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Third-Party Guarantee</th>
<th>Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India/Pakistan (1948)</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>0.811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus (1964)</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0.359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India/Pakistan (1965)</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>0.811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan (1971)</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>0.532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus (1974)</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0.359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia/Eritrea (1991)</td>
<td>Success</td>
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<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugo/Croatia (1991)</td>
<td>Failure</td>
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<td>0.375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia/Abkhaz (1993)</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0.49</td>
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<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan (1993)</td>
<td>Success</td>
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<td>0.118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India/Pakistan (1994)</td>
<td>Partial</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Georgia/Ossetia (1994)</td>
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<td>Tajikistan (1994)</td>
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<td>Moldova (1994)</td>
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<td>Yugo/Bosnia (1995)</td>
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<td>0.681</td>
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<td>Russia/Chechnya (1996)</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>0.337</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Partitions with Third-Party Guarantees in Bold.

The analysis of the above empirical data further highlights the difficulty in assigning primary importance to ethnic separation, measured by ethnic fractionalization, as the driving force behind the success or failure of partition. The index crosses a wide variety of fractionalization
and results, and no discernable pattern can be determined. There does not seem to be a relationship between third-party commitment and ethnic separation, either. The overlapping cases, which appear in boldface in Table 3, again provide a range of fractionalization and results. While the range in which the third-parties saw fit to show commitment was narrow, the results were different from one case to another. Thus, it is likely that third-party commitment is of primary importance in the successful implementation of partition, and that ethnic separation may only aid in predicting where third-parties are more likely to commit resources. It is obviously easier to intervene where ethnic groups are more separated, because a third-party may better concentrate its efforts and require fewer resources.

The significance of the Cyprus (1964) outlier, then, may be simply be to show the importance of drawing effective borders once partition has been accepted as a solution. The Turkish Cypriots had no real territory to retreat to in an emergency, and thus the third-party was ineffective in preventing the failure of the partition. The same would likely have been true of Palestine, had there been a third-party intervention. Barring full occupation by a third-party, how would the Palestinians have ever been able to resolve their security dilemma? Thus it is absolutely crucial that the partition create two (or more, depending on the conflict) meaningful territories. Then, even if the groups do not immediately shuffle into their respective territories, they know at least the option is there. In this understanding, third-party commitments still retain their primacy as guarantors of the borders. The ethnic groups know they will be safe so long as they have a potential territory of their own, and credible guards at the gate.

VIII. Analysis of Cyprus as an Expression of the Importance of Third-Parties

The history of Cyprus is useful in understanding the power of third-party commitments.
Twice in its history, ethnic relations in Cyprus have erupted into civil conflict. Twice in its history, partition has been the means for resolving it. In 1964, the partition was limited, the groups were more widely dispersed, and the third-party guarantees were seen as weak. This led to the subsequent breakdown of the partition. It was a different story in 1974, however, when the Turkish Army made its entrance on the northern shores of Cyprus. This was executed to protect the distressed Turkish Cypriots, and to force a partition of the island. Turkish Cypriots fled to the stronghold, and an uneasy peace has been maintained for the last thirty years. Recently, with the pending admission of Cyprus into the European Union, there have even been signs of reconciliation between the two factions. It is thus reasonable to assume that the entrance of an extremely credible third-party made the 1974 Cyprus partition a success, where its ancestor had failed.

The history of ethnic conflict in Cyprus has its origin in the Ottoman conquest of 1571.\textsuperscript{77} It was in this era that Turks first began emigrating to the island and settling on a permanent basis. This trend continued until 1878, when the Ottomans leased Cyprus to Great Britain, ostensibly in exchange for protection against czarist Russia. It was the British who first made overtures towards returning Cyprus to Greece. In 1907, Winston Churchill spoke favorably towards Cypriot \textit{enosis} with Greece, and in World War I the island was even offered as enticement for the Greeks to enter the war on the Allied side. After the war, Britain received Cyprus from the dismantled Ottoman Empire, and Greek Cypriot nationalism continued to grow. During this time, Turkish Cypriots grew increasingly concerned, particularly in 1950 when a Greek Orthodox

Church - run referendum on *enosis* reported that 215,000 of the 224,700 who participated favored the measure.\(^7^8\) Tensions were further exacerbated with the ascension of Archbishop Makarios, who quickly became the leader of the *enosis* movement. The Turkish Cypriots feared the destruction of their culture under Greek rule, and made frequent complaints to the British governor.

The British Colonial Administration answered some of these concerns, first by sending Archbishop Makarios into exile, and then by fighting back against the pro-*enosis* paramilitaries that harassed Turkish Cypriots. Eventually, however, the British wearied of the Cyprus problem, and set in motion the machinery for Cypriot independence. Several conferences were held throughout the late 1950s - some actually including Cypriot representatives, some not - in order to forge a power-sharing agreement. All of these were rejected. Finally, in 1959, and with the aid of Britain, Turkey and Greece, the Cypriot factions reached an agreement. This agreement was designed to protect the interests of all involved. Greek and Turkish Cypriots would enjoy a 6:4 ratio in the planned armed forces, and a 7:3 ratio in the civil service. In addition, both the Greek Cypriot President, and the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President retained veto power. Within the legislature, issues involving religion or education were subject to separate majority voting within each faction. To guarantee this agreement the British retained several military bases, and both the Greek and Turkish armies were entitled to maintain 950 troops on the island.\(^7^9\) Peace seemed at hand, and did in fact last for a few years.

Soon, however, Greek Cypriots began to balk at perceived overuse of the Vice-

\(^7^8\)Dodd, 1998, pg. 10-11
\(^7^9\)Ibid., pg. 21
Presidential veto and Turkish Cypriot over-representation in government. Turkish Cypriots composed roughly 20% of the population, but were guaranteed 30% of government positions.\textsuperscript{80} The Turkish Cypriots, for their part, complained about the lack of an established army, for which the mostly Greek Cypriot National Guard had been substituted. Tensions rose to where Archbishop Makarios, who had been elected the first President of the Republic of Cyprus, proposed thirteen radical amendments in 1963. These amendments were designed to strip the Turkish Cypriots of many of their security guarantees.\textsuperscript{81} The Turkish Cypriot delegation to the legislature walked out of proceedings, and civil war erupted. During Greek Cypriot offensives, Turkish Cypriots began to gather in communities under their control. The fighting continued until the UN persuaded President Makarios to accept the United Nations Force in Cyprus (hereafter UNFICYP).

The result was a partition, if not a very complete one. The “Green Line” ran through the Greek and Turkish quarters of the Cypriot capital of Nicosia. A UNFICYP force of 13,200 was established to maintain the peace agreement. There were several problems with this agreement. First, in striking a deal with the Greek-Cypriot run Makarios government, the agreement offered tacit international support for the non-inclusion of Turkish Cypriots. Second, the 13,200-strong UNFICYP force was not large enough to offset the opposing factions in Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriot force numbered approximately 10,000 and the Greek Cypriot National Guard numbered approximately 24,000. Third, the “Green Line” partition did not provide territories into which threatened Turkish-Cypriots could flee. Their security dilemma was left unaddressed. There was

\textsuperscript{80}Hitchens, 1984, pg. 11

\textsuperscript{81}Dodd, 1998, pg. 22
thus no way UNFICYP could be successful. They were not a credible presence, and could not significantly affect the balance of power on the island short of a full occupation. Fighting soon broke out again as Turkish Cypriots fought both against enosis, and for political inclusion.

This status quo continued until 1974, when a coup supported by the military junta in Athens succeeded in overthrowing President Makarios and installed a much more nationalistic Greek Cypriot executive. Turkish Cypriots feared the worst, and looked to Turkey for military aid. The Turks delivered, sending an estimated 20,000 troops to the northern shores of Cyprus. They quickly took the northern 37% of the island and established a de facto line of partition.82 The Turkish Cypriots declared their independence, and though this independence has been recognized only by Turkey, the partition has held ever since.

The reason the partition has held is two-fold. First, unlike the partition in 1964, there is a credible third-party presence in the region. The Turkish Army maintains a presence of approximately 20,000 troops in addition to the UNFICYP force of approximately 1,000. Combined, these forces could shift the balance of power between the Cyprus National Guard of 24,000 and the Turkish Cypriot forces numbering 10,000. They are also a credible incentive to maintaining the peace. Second, the 1974 partition provided an actual territory for the Turkish Cypriots, a clear boundary between the two combatants. This boundary could reasonably be protected by a third-party. The number of troops committed by Turkey only added to their credibility. Providing credible third-party troop commitments thus made the difference between the failed partition of 1964 and the successful partition of 1974.

82Ibid. pg. 31
IX. Conclusion

Partition has frequently been put forth as a solution to the ever-growing number of unresolved ethnic conflicts in the world. Its proponents claim that it is the only solution that can address the security dilemma that underlies these conflicts. For proof they look towards cases such as Azerbaijan and Bosnia. Its opponents claim that partition does not solve the underlying ethnic conflict, but simply transform a civil war into an international war. Further, the partition may even expand violence and further partition. For proof they look towards the tenuous partitions between India/Pakistan and Israel/Palestine. Proponents rebut that these are cases of imperfect partition - they did not separate the combatants properly, and could not help but fail. This may be true, but some populations simply cannot be separated completely. Further, even populations that could be separated may fight over even the partition itself. Ethnic minorities may not compromise on the borders of their “homeland” and ethnic majorities may be unwilling to part with a province. Clearly the complete separation of ethnic groups cannot be the chief contributing factor to partition, if it is to be a relevant solution to ethnic conflict.

Instead, the primary factor may be credible third-party guarantees, which have not previously received much attention in partition literature. An empirical look into seventeen cases of partition since the Second World War indicates that this assertion carries some weight. The majority of successful cases contained third-party guarantees, while the majority of failures did not. Successful cases that did not contain third-party guarantees often contained unique circumstances that helped to explain why the partition may have succeeded in their absence. The same was true of unsuccessful partitions that did provide third party-guarantees. An exploration into possible measures of credible third-party commitment found that comparing the number of third-party troops to the combined combatant forces, or to the general population were not
significant. Comparing the level of third-party troop commitment to the area of the state, on the other hand, did provide some useful information. As troop coverage per square mile increased, the partition was more likely to succeed.

An empirical analysis of the importance of ethnic separation - long held as the most significant predictor for partition success or failure in the literature - did not provide much supportive evidence. A majority of successful partitions did not contain sustained levels of ethnic separation. Further analysis into the possible relation between ethnic separation (as measured by the Fearon index) and third-party intervention did not provide any significant evidence. The conclusion here, then, is that partition proponents have erred in declaring the level of ethnic separation to be the most significant factor in partition success. It is far more likely the credible commitment of third-parties that contributes to the success or failure of partitions. The case of Cyprus best expresses the importance of credible third-party commitment. An initial partition in 1964 lacked credible third-party commitment. Turkish Cypriots lacked a territory of their own, and there were not enough troops to resolve the security dilemma. Consequently, it soon collapsed, and the nation erupted into violence. In 1974 however, Turkey invaded, created a territory for the Turkish Cypriots, and afterwards made a strong third-party commitment to maintain the new partition. In this manner, a credible third-party commitment made the difference between the failure of 1964 and the success of 1974. The third-party intervention influence has thus been greatly underrated.

Future research may support this claim as well. A more accurate measure of ethnic distribution would be helpful in drawing final conclusions about ethnic separation. As suggested earlier, an in-depth study of census figures will likely yield a useful index. In cases where such figures were unavailable, or did not represent various ethnic groups, proxy measures could fill in
appropriate blanks. David Fearon, for example, has proposed that one could best identify the most significant ethnic groups in a state by polling a representative cross-section of the population.\textsuperscript{83} The identified groups - which may vary from official government categorizations - could then be estimated based on the number and circulation figures for ethnic newspapers, or by the number and type of religious buildings, or other such means. This index may even be useful in determining where partition might be useful. Jeffrey Herbst has argued in favor of redrawing the map of Africa to better reflect political realities of authority and control.\textsuperscript{84} An index of ethnic distribution then, given that much of Africa has a very low population density, could provide a guide as to where new borders might be set. In many places, large tracts of open land would serve as natural peacekeepers - as with the Pakistan (1971) partition - and important third-party guarantees could provide security for much closer partitions.

The extension of third-party guarantees into other types of agreements should also be further researched. Obviously, the two remaining partition cases - East Timor (2002) and Eritrea/Ethiopia (2000) - should be analyzed, but so should cases in which third-parties guaranteed other types of conflict agreements. The significance of third-party guarantees, as mentioned earlier, has gained credence in general conflict resolution literature. It would be interesting to see how the empirical data from partition interventions compares with other interventions. Such a comparison will certainly provide a larger case set, and perhaps make it possible to perform regression analysis of the various factors pertaining to third-party interventions: troop level, state area, opposition forces, etc. Ultimately, it may be possible to set

\textsuperscript{83}Fearon, 2001, pg. 199

\textsuperscript{84}Herbst, 2000, pg. 258
criteria for potential third-parties that would indicate what level of intervention would likely prove successful - not just in cases of partition, but in conflict resolution as a whole.
### APPENDIX: Data Set, Abbreviations and Sources Where Appropriate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ABBREVIATION</th>
<th>SOURCE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>yrbeg: Year conflict began</td>
<td>Doyle/Sambanis 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yrend: Year conflict ended</td>
<td>Doyle/Sambanis 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wardur: War duration in months</td>
<td>Doyle/Sambanis 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pop: Population of state</td>
<td>Military Balance &amp; Several secondary sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fac1troops: 1st faction troops</td>
<td>Military Balance &amp; Several secondary sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fac2troops: 2nd faction troops</td>
<td>Military Balance &amp; Several secondary sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interv: Third-party intervention coded yes (1), no (0)</td>
<td>Doyle/Sambanis 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>waren2: War ends for at least 2 years coded yes (1), no (0)</td>
<td>Sambanis 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>noviol2: No residual violence for at least 2 years coded yes (1), no (0)</td>
<td>Sambanis 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>partsucc: Partition success coded yes (2), partial (1), no (0)</td>
<td>Sambanis 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>area: Area of state in square miles</td>
<td>Doyle/Sambanis 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ethnicindx: Fearon level of ethnic fractionalization</td>
<td>Fearon 2003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

intcom
Intervention troops as compared to combatants

\textit{intpop}
Intervention troops as compared to population

\textit{intarea}
Intervention troops as compared to area in square miles
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