The Differential Impact of Gender Inequality on Male and Female International Migration

Natalie Kaminsky

Anna Harvey

Senior Honors Thesis

27 February 2006
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Question:

People migrate for a variety of reasons, in response to an amalgamation of push pull factors. Many emigrate because they are pushed by such factors as unemployment, famine, war, political and religious persecution, etc. And many immigrate, especially to the United States because they are drawn by pull factors such as job opportunities and relatively favorable immigration laws. Although there have been numerous studies done on immigration, women have been traditionally ignored because they were considered complicit followers in the male migration stream. Fortunately, there is a growing literature on female migrants, and both development and women’s studies literature vocalize the need for more research. However, these studies are inherently difficult as there is a dearth of data disaggregated by sex. The 2004 World Survey on Women and Migration (United Nations, 2005) describes the preeminence of gender equality in the female decision to migrate; even so, the survey also discusses the need for more analytical work on the role of women in international migration. No studies that I am aware of directly measure the differential impact of gender inequality in the aggregate on male and female emigration from all countries of the world. This thesis will attempt to fill this gap in research. Furthermore, since political institutions themselves impact the status of women in society, this thesis will also test the extent to which political institutions
differentially impact the male and female decision to migrate by using a new variable for measuring institutions, winning coalition size (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Silverson, & Morrow, 2003).

**Existing Studies**

Although relatively few studies have been done on female migration in particular, there is a workable base of migration theory in economics. This thesis does not attempt to prove or disprove these theories of migration. Rather, I will acknowledge that the factors from these theories that motivate migration spring from social, economic and political situations which themselves differentially affect women and men. The factors included in these theories will be important variables to control for in the empirical section of this thesis, when testing for the differential impact of specific indicators of gender inequality and political institutions on male and female migration. They will be discussed in greater detail in the section entitled “Testable Hypotheses.”

With respect to political science, migration research generally follows three themes, “the role of the nation-state in controlling migration flows and hence its borders…the impact of migration on the institutions of sovereignty and citizenship, and the relationship between migration, on the one hand, and foreign policy and national security, on the other…[and] the question of incorporation” (Brettell & Hollifield, 2000, p. 6). As a result, political scientists tend to give little emphasis to the political factors that contribute to the decision to migrate. However, political institutions do impact migration, and may
be relevant to a gendered understanding of migration, especially as they are relevant to the status of women in society.

With respect to existing literature on the effect of political institutions on migration, “The Logic of Political Survival” by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Silverson, and James D. Morrow (2003), sheds some insight into the discussion. To define terms, the variables they use for differentiating the types of political institutions are selectorate size (S) and winning coalition size (W). S is composed of residents within the state that have “a formal role in expressing a preference over the selection of the leadership that rules them, though their expression of preference may or may not directly influence the outcome” (p. 38). In the United States for example, the selectorate is composed of every eligible voter. W in contrast is “the subset of the selectorate whose support is essential if the incumbent is to remain in power…they control the resources vital to the political survival of the incumbent. If enough members of the winning coalition defect to a rival politician, the incumbent loses office” (p. 38). Again, in the United States, the current winning coalition is composed of those voters who elected George W. Bush. The relative sizes of W and S, as demonstrated in their book, are correlated with economic growth rates and the distribution of public and private goods, i.e. respectively goods provided for society collectively, and for a subset of society only.

According to selectorate theory, leaders spend government revenue amassed through taxation on both public and private goods. Important to note is that as the rate of taxation increases, the incentive to work, the take home wage, decreases. As a result, as taxation
increases, workers work less and overall production and GDP in these polities decreases. Thus, whether or not the absolute amount of government revenue accrued through taxation increases with increases in the tax rate depends on the elasticity of labor supply, i.e. how workers respond to changes in the take home wage. The incumbent and the challenger, when fighting for power, are thus forced to decide between tax policies, which determine the absolute amount of revenue that can be accrued, and the relative distribution of revenue to be spent on private and public goods. According to selectorate theory, the relative sizes of W and S determine what these policies will be.

In small W polities, the leader spends a disproportionately large amount of revenue on private goods. Although total revenue accrued decreases, the leader can afford to provide enough private goods to each member of the small coalition to ensure loyalty. Furthermore, in small W, large S, as opposed to small S, polities, coalition members are even more loyal because members of the selectorate outside the winning coalition are relatively much worse off. They must divide scarce public goods among a much larger population. Thus, in small W, large S polities, leaders stay in power through high tax rates and a large distribution of private goods because the support of their coalition members is thus ensured. As a result, small W, large S governments tend to have lower economic growth rates, and a lesser distribution of public goods than in large W, large S polities. In large W, large S polities, leaders cannot afford to distribute great amounts of private goods to coalition members; thus, the distribution of public goods and economic growth becomes more important to ensure political victory for the leader. As a result, combinations of large selectorates and large winning coalitions tend to promote lower tax
rates, faster economic growth rates and a greater distribution of public goods, which means greater protection of civil liberties and political rights.

With respect to immigration, “The Logic of Political Survival” demonstrates that when members of a polity are unhappy with their political institutions they can voice their discontent by exiting from bad circumstances. Exiting “…from a polity that produces private goods to which those outside the winning coalition have no access—can be achieved by migrating from resource-poor and public goods-poor polities to resource-rich societies that produce many public goods” (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, p. 356).

People that want to move, potential immigrants, move from small W countries with few natural resources to large W countries with many natural resources. In this way, individuals outside the winning coalition in the small W polity increase their chances for prosperity.

With respect to gender equality, the analysis in “The Logic of Political Survival” demonstrates that “the political institutions examined in the selectorate theory have a profound impact on the opportunities females have to gain equal access to secondary education” (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, p. 190). They use the percentage of pupils in secondary education that are female as an indicator that helps evaluate a society’s commitment to equal opportunities for males and females. According to their findings, there is a 5 to 9 percent improvement in “secondary school access for female students in the largest-coalition arrangements as compared to the smallest” (p. 190). Although this is the only test performed in the book with respect to the impact of political institutions on
opportunities for women in society, this finding does speak to the impact of the structure of political institutions on gender inequality. Furthermore, since large coalition sizes are correlated with increases in political rights, civil liberties and economic growth in general, and these factors in turn impact gender equality in a nation (countries with higher growth rates of income per capita have greater equality for women in many sectors of society (King & Mason, 2001)), it is logical to assume that coalition size, and thus political institutions also impact gender equality and thus the female desire to migrate.

The United States is a large coalition country, and some women that are outside their country of origin’s winning coalition should thus be among those who immigrate to the United States. Furthermore, they may be more likely than men to emigrate from small coalition systems where they may have fewer economic, social and political opportunities than in the United States and relative to men (there are few places in the world where women have equal rights to men). This thesis will test whether women do in fact demonstrate more of an impetus to emigrate from their countries of origin to the United States in response to small winning coalition governments than men.

With respect to existing literature on female migration, in response to the traditional absence of women, there were in fact numerous recent studies done both on female migrants specifically and the more general need for a gendered understanding of migration.
To begin, women constitute approximately one half of international migrants, and “in the case of the United States, which still receives the largest overall numbers of legal immigrants, women have constituted a majority of migration flows since the 1930s” (International Migration Policies, 1995, p. 1). However, their invisibility is still reinforced by the statistics on international migration commonly available, as the sex of migrants is many times not recorded, and when it is recorded “the information is not used in preparing tabulations for publication” (International Migration Policies, 1995, p. 1). In fact, prior to 1996, datasets on immigration to the United States by sex and country of origin are only available through the Department of Homeland Security and only in hard copy.

One rationalization for the lack of focus on gender specific migration is the belief that women and men migrate for the same reasons, and as such that their migration experiences are equivalent. Such arguments are inherently incorrect as women and men do not play identical socioeconomic roles in their countries of origin and destination; therefore, push pull migration factors are not equivalent for men and women.

According to Lais Abramo, an International Labour Organization gender specialist in Latin America, “‘the burden of family responsibilities, cultural restrictions on holding a paying job, difficulty in gaining access to networks that would help them find work, and a lack of vocational or professional training in non-traditional trades,’ ” (cited in Hecht, 2004, p. 1) testifies to the lack of gender equality in the region. Furthermore, according to Dollar and Gatti (1999):
In the poorest quartile of countries in 1990, only 5% of adult women had any secondary education, 51% of adult women had at least some secondary education, 88% of the level for men. Other measures of gender inequality (in health or legal rights) paint a similar picture. In the poorest countries, women are particularly inadequately served in terms of education, health, or legal rights. (p. 2)

These women clearly do not play identical socioeconomic roles as men in their countries of origin, they do not have the same opportunities for advancement, and thus cannot have identical migration experiences as well as employment opportunities once in the United States.

Similarly, traditional researchers omitted gender studies of immigration, especially immigration to the United States, because many women migrate for family reunification purposes and U.S. immigration policy favors this type of immigration. Even so, although women constitute a majority of second wave immigration, the traditional view of ignoring the study of female migrants because they are irrelevant to the decision-making process of migration is not justified. According to Zlotnik in “The South-to-North Migration of Women” (1995):

The fact that the proportion of women among immigrants [to the United States] varies considerably between regions of origin indicates that the policies of immigration may not be the major determining factor of the sex selectivity of
international migration...regions where the roles of women remain constrained and their independence is curtailed by a variety of cultural norms and values tend to produce considerably less international female migration than male migrants.

(p. 239)

Thus, U.S. immigration policy that favors family reunification as a manner of immigration does not fully explain the predominance of men as first-wave migrants. In states where women have very few rights relative to men, although women may have the desire to migrate, they will not have the opportunity to do so, and men will inevitably dominate first wave migration flows. This fact does not justify ignoring the plight of these women who may in fact have the desire to migrate, but are unable to voice their discontent with their situations by emigrating. Unfortunately, Zlotnik does not empirically test exactly how gender specific factors influence migration streams. As with so many researchers, she finds that “the exploration of how and to what extent factors such as these influence the sex selectivity of migration requires, at the very least, more detailed information about immigration flows, especially in terms of class of admission, region of origin, age and sex” (p. 239). This study hopes to add some analytical insight to this question by using data on immigration to the United States disaggregated by sex, and measuring the impact of specific indicators of gender inequality on these migration statistics.

Early in the study of female migration, the March 1990 Proceedings of the United Nations Expert Group Meeting on International Migration Policies and the Status of
Female Migrants outlined the main categories into which women fall. The report called on the need for gender specific studies of migration, and chastised the traditional assumptions discussed above, that caused researchers to assume that women simply follow men in migration and thus do not uniquely participate in the decision to migrate. This proceeding outlined four categories of female migration: legal migration for family reunification, legal employment-based immigration, illegal or undocumented migration, and refugee migration (International Migration Policies, 1995). There are large percentages of female migrants to the United States that fall into each category.

First, many women do migrate for family reunification. Females migrate in larger numbers to countries in which permanent resettlement is both possible and attractive, primarily because familial concerns are more of an impetus for women than for men. Consequently, since family reunification is strongly emphasized in U.S. immigration policy—it is much easier to immigrate to the United States as a dependent than as an independent person—and whole families migrate together with permanent resettlement in mind, women proportionally migrate to the United States at a higher rate than men. “In fact, almost two-thirds of all legal immigrants to the United States have been women and children” (Houston, Kramer, & Barrett, 1984, p. 913). This is part of the reason why women predominate in flows to the United States. These flows of women as dependents are also reinforced by “the greater propensity of American males to marry foreigners, which likely results from the thriving mail-order bride industry in this country (Simmons, this volume)” (Kelson & DeLaet, 1999, p. 4). Female migration is thus clearly an important U.S. issue, especially with respect to the vulnerability of these women who
migrate to join husbands, boyfriends etc., as dependents are inherently more vulnerable than independents under U.S. law. For instance, if a woman is a dependent to her husband, and her husband dies before she has the opportunity to become naturalized, she may be forced to return to her country of origin without being given the opportunity to become a U.S. citizen. Thus, many female migrants are legally vulnerable to the government as well as their male counterparts they migrate to join from the time they arrive in the country until they themselves become naturalized citizens.

Second, many women also migrate for legal employment-based opportunities. “One-third of the skilled and unskilled workers admitted to the US in the 1970s were women, and a significant proportion of women were admitted under the preference category for professionals of exceptional ability (Houstoun, Kramer, and Barrett 1984, p.926)” (Kelson & DeLaet, 1999, p. 6). Thus, women do migrate for better employment opportunities.

Additionally, it is evident that women comprise a large percentage of illegal or undocumented migrants. “In the U.S., women accounted for roughly 45 percent of the 1.5 million individuals who participated in the legalization program created under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (Zlontnik, 1995, 237: United Nations, 1994, pp 77-8.)” (Kelson & DeLaet, 1999, p. 7). Thus, in 1986 there were almost as many female as there were male undocumented immigrants.
Furthermore, a recent report from the International Labour Organisation (ILO) called “The feminisation of international migration” states that, “…in the market, the search for higher profits by reducing costs has increased the demand of undocumented workers in industrialised countries. Both women and men–undocumented workers–are increasingly hired because they accept lower wages and working conditions that others would reject” (Bahuguna, 2004, p. 2). Thus, female migrants are everyday in greater demand, especially in industrialized nations such as the United States, and take jobs that native Americans do not want.

Similarly, although some female immigrants in the U.S. end up in exploitative unsafe working conditions equal to men, there are others who fare much worse. “To a large extent, legal and illegal intermediaries [the recruiters and agents in sending and receiving countries] exploit women migrant workers.” The report from the ILO discusses the worst-case scenarios of female migrants, namely those women who are forced into prostitution upon entering the country of destination. “Although restrictive regulations are in place in several receiving countries, these tend to drive the process further underground. It forces women migrants into more vulnerable positions and increases their need for brokers to help them migrate clandestinely” (Bahuguna, 2004, p. 2). These female migrant workers have no rights under the U.S. Constitution, and are completely at the whim of those who arrange their migration. Although the government has stated that any undocumented female migrant found to have been forced into prostitution will be granted asylum, these women are not aware of this right and are usually too scared and
embarrassed at the possibility of being arrested for prostitution to come forward to the authorities.

And finally, although women additionally constitute a large percentage of world migrants that flee their countries of origin in search of asylum, “the United Nations notes that women have been underrepresented in the numbers of refugees admitted for resettlement and among asylum-seekers in developed countries” (Kelson & DeLaet, 1999, p. 9). Female migration is many times limited in terms of the number of women that want to come to the United States to flee persecution, and the number that are admitted as refugees. The United Nations found that “the under-representation of women in refugee flows reflects, in part, the legal criteria for granting refugee status (United Nations, 1994, p. 80). Under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol to this convention, to be granted refugee status you must prove a ‘well-founded fear’ of persecution ‘for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group of political opinion’ ” (Kelson & DeLaet, 1999, p. 9). Thus women that are fleeing gender persecution, which can range from genital mutilation to domestic violence to rape, may not be granted status on these grounds. Although many women are granted status, especially after the mid-nineties for female genital mutilation, many are still being denied entrance for other gender discrimination issues such as domestic violence and rape. The face of immigration law is now more than ever, in light of the Immigration and Naturalization Service now falling under the control of the Department of Homeland Security, under the scrutiny of lawmakers and enforcers. The government is tightening borders and making it more difficult to be granted asylum and entrance to the United
States. As a result, many persecuted women of the world are being denied entrance and asylum.

Thus, there are numerous reasons for gender specific studies of international migration. Furthermore, it is clear, from various studies mentioned above, that although taking a gendered view of migration is relatively new, and there is a dearth of data disaggregated by sex, there is growing knowledge on the subject of female migration.

There have been numerous gendered studies on international migration from Mexico to the United States. With respect to the differential impact of various factors on male and female migration, there is evidence for the differential impact of male and female migrant networks on male and female migration. According to a study done by Estela Rivero-Fuentes and Sara R. Curran (2003), “Engendering Migrant Networks: The Case of Mexican Migration,” Mexican female migrant networks in the United States influence further female migration to the United States. There are multiple reasons for this, one of which is that many Mexican fathers are opposed to their daughters migrating to the United States to join husbands or boyfriends, and thus these women rely on female social networks in the United States for support. Thus Mexican women who have previously migrated to the United States play a part in additional Mexican women migrating to the United States to join husbands or boyfriends.

Although networks lower the costs of migration for all migrants from Mexico, Lindstrom argued they have a differential impact on women. Immediate family already in the United States protect the women who migrate and thereby encourage female migration, which is consistent with traditional family and gender norms that govern opportunities for Mexican women. Thus, active family networks in the United States were more important for the migration of women than men. (p. 751)

The first study testifies to the differential impact of female and male network groups in the United States on female migrants, and the second demonstrates a differential impact of network groups on male and female immigrants to the United States. Thus, there is reason to believe women and men are differentially affected by this factor in migration.

Next, Kossoudji and Ranney’s (1983) study on “The Labor Market Experience of Female Migrants” speaks to the employment-spurred female migration from Mexico to the United States. According to their study, migrant networks are associated with higher wage earning ability once in the United States. “Having contacts in the U.S. or information from letters or returning relatives and friends is likely to reduce the risk of crossing the border (if undocumented) and increase job market opportunities in the U.S.”
(p. 1126). This further confirms the network theory of migration, and also provides evidence that women migrate in search of employment opportunities.

Additionally, according to the study, once working in the United States, “…within each occupational category, women have 1.5 to 2.5 years more schooling than men. Skilled and unskilled men have about 4 years of education, while women in those occupations average about 6” (p. 1134). Thus, in Mexico the level of education has more of an impact on the ability and/or decision to migrate for women than for men. The women that are migrating from Mexico have more education per occupation than the men in the same occupations. As such, since education is important for Mexican women, it will be interesting to see whether gender inequality in access to education is an important factor in spurring immigration for women from all countries of the world to the United States.

The study also finds that while in the United States “men’s wages exceed women’s wages” especially “for white collar workers, where women have the same potential job experience and have more education than men” (p. 8). Furthermore, this study emphasizes the fact that the “‘stereotypical’ woman [married woman] represents only one-fourth of all woman migrants.” Accordingly, one of the reasons white-collar women on average receive lower pay than men is precisely because most emigrate while unmarried and must take what jobs they can find immediately upon entering the United States. “Married women, for example, tend to enter much higher paying occupations” (Kossoudji & Ranney, 1983, p. 1139). Thus, the understanding that women come for labor purposes, not just to join men as wives and dependents, and that the incomes they
receive are lower than men’s, is important in the sense that U.S. policy should recognize
the relatively disadvantaged position of immigrant women. This thesis will take this
finding, that labor migration is important for women, and test whether gender inequality
in employment opportunities are relevant factors in migration from all countries to the
United States.

Also, Cerrutti and Massey’s 2001 study, “On the auspices of female migration from
Mexico to the United States,” measured the differential determinants of male and female
migration, and found that men are initially more likely to move for employment and
women are more likely to migrate for family reasons. Even so, although women,
especially married women are more likely than men to begin migrating to reunite their
families, as discussed above this is not the sole avenue for female migration to the United
States, and the stereotypical married woman represents only one-fourth of all women
migrants from Mexico. Furthermore, according to Cerrutti and Massey (2001), “although
our analysis suggests that family considerations still are prominent in the initiation of
female migration, especially among wives, female labor force participation may be more
important in individual and family migration decisions about whether to continue
migrating, whether to settle in the United States, and whether to remit money and invest
at home, or how much” (p.198). Thus, again opportunities for employment are important
in both the female and male migratory decision making from Mexico, and it will be
interesting to see how gender equality in economic rights differentially impacts the male
and female decision to migrate from all countries to the United States.
The above-mentioned studies are only a few of many studies done on female migration from Mexico to the United States with the individual or household as the base of analysis. As far as I know, none directly test the differential impact of gender inequality on male and female migration.

In terms of the sociology and anthropology literature available on female migration, Pedraza put forth a particularly relevant work, “Women and Migration: The Social Consequences of Gender” in 1991. In the same vein as the United Nations 2004 World Survey on Women and Development (2005), she calls for the need to “develop a truly gendered understanding of the causes, processes, and consequences of migration” (Pedraza, 1991, p. 304). According to her, “paying attention to the relationship between women’s social position and migration will help fill the void regarding our knowledge of women as immigrants and contribute to a greater understanding of the lives of women. It will also elucidate those aspects of the process of migration that were neglected by the exclusive focus on men” (p. 304). Her work again discusses the fact that women do not come primarily for family reunification; they come for reasons comparable to those of men, for work, for greater opportunities.

Unlike most of the previous work on Mexican female migrants, Pedraza describes the factors contributing to the emigration of Irish women in the 1840s. According to Pedraza:
More than half of the Irish immigrants to the United States were women, and as the century wore on the migration became basically a female mass movement. As Diner (1983:4) demonstrated, the root cause was that social and economic conditions in Ireland were such that ‘Ireland became a country that held out fewer and fewer attractions to women.’ Women had few realistic chances for marriage or employment; to attain either most had to turn their backs on the land of their birth. (p. 312)

These Irish women did not simply emigrate to reunite their families; rather, the majority of women migrating were young and single. And, the networks they created became a “female migratory chain in which women brought over other women—sisters, mothers, nieces, aunts, friends” (Pedraza, 1991, p. 313). Thus, in Ireland of the 19th century, as in Mexico, there is evidence that women’s status relative to men in society contributed to their decision to emigrate. Their lack of economic opportunities spurred their migration while Irish men stayed behind.

As discussed by Pedraza, opportunities for women are different from those of men in many countries of the world. And, women should be more likely to emigrate from countries where there are fewer opportunities for women relative to men, where there is greater gender inequality. This thesis attempts to provide quantitative evidence for the differential impact of specific indicators of this inequality on male and female migrants.
Furthermore, as Pedraza describes Grasmuck & Pessar’s *Between Two Islands* (1991), a gendered case study on Dominican migration to New York, she comments that, “through their use of interdisciplinary methods and understandings [economic, sociological and anthropological], Grasmuck & Pessar reached a depth of analysis each method alone could not have sounded and produced a truly gendered understanding of the social process of migration” (Pedraza, 1991, p. 310). Pedraza is correct. An interdisciplinary approach is necessary to achieve a truly gendered vision of migration. This thesis will attempt to add political science to the anthropological, sociological, and economic perspectives of migration already promoted in these studies of female migration.

Finally, in terms of the relevance of gender inequality as a factor in migration, “according to Grieco and Boyd (1998), gender has a core influence on the statuses of males and females, their roles, and stages in the life-cycle. These help determine people’s position in society and therefore the opportunities women and men have to consider in moving to the pre-migration stage” (De Jong, 2000, p. 307). Women have different socioeconomic roles from men, and thus are affected differently by the economic, social and political atmospheres in each particular country. According to the United Nations “2004 World Survey on the Role of Women and Development: Women and International Migration” (2005):

Asymmetrical relations of power between men and women exist because of prevailing gender norms and practices. However, the asymmetries are also embedded in societal institutions, ranging from the family and the educational
system to the political and economic systems and the legal systems. They are associated with unequal access to resources, diminished social and economic status, vulnerability to abuse and violence, and reduced life chances. (p. 24)

Gender inequality is not easy to eradicate as a social problem. It is deeply embedded in social, economic and political institutions across the globe. Its relevance to migratory research is thus logical. Some women who are unsatisfied with their positions in society relative to men will move for greater opportunities abroad. According to this survey, women’s status in society is relevant to their migratory decision-making. If their rights are completely constricted, women will be prevented from migrating entirely. For instance, if according to the culture of her social group, a woman is relegated to domestic work and prevented from interacting with the outside world except through her male family members, she will not have the opportunity to migrate, even if she may have the desire to change her circumstances. However, in response to other types of inequalities in society that are not so severe, for instance in the labor market, women will in many instances have both the desire and the opportunity to migrate. The 2004 World Survey discusses many studies done on the female migration experience, but does not provide analytical evidence of the direct impact of gender inequality on the decision to migrate. This thesis will test analytically various indicators, educational, economic and political, of gender inequality on male and female migration. Furthermore, as mentioned previously this thesis will test the differential impact of political institutions themselves, which may contribute to gender inequality, on the male and female decision to migrate.
In sum, the study of female migration is important for many reasons. Research must be done so that government policies can be modified and formulated specifically with the sex of migrants in mind. As we can see from the above-mentioned studies on migration, although many women migrate to reunite their families, many migrate for a plethora of other, general and gender specific reasons apart from family reunification, e.g. economic reasons, the desire to escape marital problems, and opportunities for more social independence. Furthermore, women experience migration in unique ways from men. Although there is growing literature on female migration, there are few studies that address factors that uniquely affect women in the aggregate—from all countries of the world. Furthermore, there are none that look at the differential impact of political institutions on female and male migration. This thesis will attempt to fill this gap in knowledge.

**Causal Model:**

This causal story is about intentions to migrate. As demonstrated by the literature discussed above, women are not complicit followers in the stream of migrants to the United States. They do not solely migrate to join husbands and fathers who make the decision to migrate; rather, they are driven by social, economic and political factors, as are men, which collectively spur their decision to migrate. As such, the status of women in their respective countries of origin, which uniquely affects women and their intentions to migrate, may be an additional part of the explanation as to why women and children
predominate in migration flows to the United States—apart from their preferential status as dependents of their male counterparts.

This study sets out to demonstrate that the fewer opportunities that exist for women relative to men, the greater will be the desire for women to emigrate. However, the caveat is that with great gender inequality, such as in some African countries for example, women will not have the opportunities or the resources to migrate. However, in countries with greater gender inequality than the United States, but with greater opportunities for women than in very unequal societies, such as in various Latin American countries for example, women will have both the ability and the desire to emigrate, and in greater numbers than men. Thus, in response to gender inequality, when they have sufficient access to resources and education, women should be more likely than men to migrate, controlling for other factors in migration.

Next, political institutions may also uniquely effect women’s desire to migrate, in the sense that political institutions influence the status of women in nations, as demonstrated to an extent by “The Logic of Political Survival” by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Silverson, and James D. Morrow (2003). The primary story with respect to political institutions, is that first of all, people should be more likely to emigrate to the United States, a large winning coalition country, from small winning coalition countries, in which they have relatively fewer economic, social and political rights. And second, women may be more likely than men to want to emigrate from these
small coalition governments because their freedoms are relatively more constricted than men in these governments.

In “The Logic of Political Survival,” greater gender equality in access to education is found in governments with large winning coalitions. Thus, there is reason to believe that political institutions, as characterized by winning coalition size, may also affect gender equality in other arenas. If political institutions do impact gender equality in many arenas, then in very small winning coalition governments, men should be more likely to voice their discontent by emigrating, because they will have relatively greater opportunities to do so. As coalition size increases however, before it becomes as large as the United States, women will be greater able to emigrate, and once they have the sufficient level of power, education and resources, they should dominate migration flows influenced by political institutions, to the United States. Controlling for other factors in migration, if political institutions do influence gender equality and if gender inequality is a factor in female migration, then women should have a greater desire to emigrate from small winning coalition governments than men, because they will be confronted with fewer opportunities than men in these polities. Even so, the relationship between coalition size and migration should be nonlinear for both men and women because even men will not have the ability to emigrate from very autocratic regimes.

Testable Hypotheses:
To test hypothesis one, the impact of gender inequality on male and female migration, I will use indicators for the level of gender equality in education (the percentage of pupils in primary, secondary and tertiary education that are female), in the labor force (the level of women’s wages in agricultural, non-agricultural and manufacturing sectors of the economy as a percentage of men’s wages and the ratio of the number of economically active women over the number of economically active men), in health (the ratio of female to male life expectancies) and in politics (the ratio of the number of women and men holding seats in the upper chamber of Parliament and the ratio of the number of women and men holding seats in the lower chamber or in a unicameral Parliament). And, initially, as the dependent variable I will have the number of female and male immigrants over twenty years old respectively over the female and male populations of the countries of origin in order to demonstrate the differential effect of these indicators on female and male migration.

Data from countries with the greatest levels of gender inequality are not available and as a result cannot be included in this study. Thus, in response to increases in the levels of equality in the indicators described above, there should be decreases in the rates of female emigration. Many women in these countries should have sufficient resources and opportunities to migrate.

Specifically, as the level of gender inequality in primary, secondary and tertiary education increases, the rate of female migration should increase. The increase in gender inequality in access to education should not have a direct effect on male migration. With
respect to the next indicator, as the level of gender inequality in economic rights increases, there should be an increase in the rate of female migration, as women will seek greater opportunities in the United States. There should not be a direct effect on the level of male migration. Next, as the health of women relative to men in society improves, there should be a decrease in the rate of female migration. There should not be a direct impact on the rate of male migration. And finally, as the level of gender inequality in political rights increases, there should be an increase in the rate of female migration to the United States. Again, there should not be a direct effect on the level of male migration.

In order to further test the marginal differential impact of these indicators on the female and male decision to migrate, I will have the ratio of the number of female migrants over twenty years old over the female population of the country of origin divided by the number of male migrants over twenty years old over the male population of the country of origin as the dependent variable. I will then measure the differential impact of each indicator on the relative level of female and male immigration to the United States. As the level of gender inequality increases, there should be an increase in the level of female relative to male immigration to the United States.

With respect to hypothesis two, I will again use the rates of female and male migration to the United States as the dependent variables. And, I will use winning coalition and selectorate size as the explanatory variables. As political institutions become more favorable, i.e. as winning coalition size increases, there should be a decrease in the level of both female and male migration to the United States. However, there should be a
nonlinear relationship between political institutions and immigration. In very autocratic polities, e.g. the Soviet Union, North Korea, people will not be able to emigrate. However, as political institutions become more democratic, more people will be able to emigrate, and will want to emigrate more from those with relatively smaller winning coalition sizes. But, once W becomes sufficiently large, the costs of emigrating will outweigh the benefits, and as W continues to increase, there should be a decrease in the rate of immigration to the United States in response to winning coalition size.

With respect to the differential impact of political institutions on female and male migration, again, few people will have the ability to emigrate from countries with very small winning coalitions. However, as W begins to increase, if my hypotheses are correct, males should initially predominate in migration flows, as they will initially have greater opportunities to voice their discontent with the political institution by emigrating. But, as coalition size continues to increase, women should gain greater access to those resources and opportunities necessary for migration, and should migrate at a greater rate than men in response to the gender inequality promoted by the political institutions. Then at a certain point, when W is sufficiently large, men and women should be affected in the same way by coalition size because there should be a relatively high level of gender equality in the country, and the rates of emigration of both men and women in response to W should decrease. The costs of emigrating will begin to outweigh the benefits.
The majority of immigration to the United States is from developing nations, which do not tend to have large winning coalition governments. Thus, if my hypotheses are correct, the majority of female and male migrants to the United States should be differentially affected by political institutions, and in the manner described above. This differential impact could partly explain the predominance of women in migration flows from many countries to the United States.

Again, to further test the marginal differential impact of these variables on female and male migration, I will include the ratio of female to male migrants as another dependent variable. The relationship between winning coalition size and the ratio of female to male immigration should again be nonlinear. Initially as W increases, there should be an increase the level of females relative to males migrating, as men will predominate initially from very small W polities, and the rate of female migration should increase as W increases and they gain greater opportunities to voice their desire to emigrate. Then once W reaches a certain size, gender equality will reach a level that the number of women relative to men migrating will begin to decrease, until W is sufficiently large that gender equality is promoted in the polity and the number of women is equal to the number of men migrating in response to coalition size.

Relevant controls for the above regressions include factors typically considered to promote migration in general to see whether they are the reason the variables I am testing are significant in explaining migration. The traditional theory of international migration is the neoclassical theory according to which people migrate in the search for higher wages,
from labor rich, capital poor countries that offer relatively lower wages to labor poor, capital rich countries, which offer higher returns to labor (higher wages). I will include the log of real GDP per capita to reflect the neoclassical theory of migration’s reasoning that people migrate in the search of higher earning potential. This theory assumes people make a cost-benefit analysis calculation when deciding whether to migrate. Thus the log of real GDP per capita will be a good indicator of the relative benefits of moving from the country of origin to the United States. I will take the log in order to take account of the diminishing marginal utility of each additional unit of wealth on migrants. The lower the log of real GDP per capita, the higher should be the level of male and female migration. I will include the total foreign-born population in the United States divided by the populations of the respective countries of origin to account for the network effect of the network theory of migration. Among other benefits, networks ease job and housing searches, and alleviate feelings of isolation once in the new country. The higher the number of foreign born in the U.S. from the country of origin, the greater should be the number of new migrants from that country. I will also include the annual rate of growth of foreign direct investment in a country, which reflects reasoning of the world systems theory of migration. This theory connects the level of market penetration in a country to the number of migrants from that country to the country responsible for the market penetration. World systems theorists “see capitalist development as inherently disruptive, bringing about social and economic transformations that displace people from traditional livelihoods and force them onto transnational labor markets” (Massey & Espinosa, 1997, p. 955). Massey and Espinosa’s study in 1997 on Mexican migration to the United States “indicated capitalist penetration of Mexico by the rate of growth in direct foreign
Furthermore in his study of out-migration from 18 Caribbean nations, Ricketts (1987) found that growth in direct foreign investment strongly predicted annual emigration to the United States (Massey & Espinosa, 1997, p. 955). As such, I will include this predictor in my model as well. The higher the growth rate of foreign direct investment, the greater should be the rate of migration. And from the segmented labor market theory of migration, I will include the growth rate of U.S. employment as a control. “Segmented labor market theorists such as Piore (1979) argue that immigration is inherent to the structure of postindustrial economic life...According to this view...migration is caused by a built in demand for immigrant labor that is intrinsic to advanced industrial societies (see Massey et al. 1993)” (Massey & Espinosa, 1997, p. 955). Massey and Espinosa’s study in 1997 assessed the role of “U.S. labor demand in generating migration from Mexico by including the annual rate of growth in U.S. employment as a predictor...(Massey; 1995)” (p. 955) in their model. As such, this is the variable that I will include in my model. As the growth rate increases, there should be more female and male migrants coming to the U.S. in search of this employment. Although a better variable would be far more specific in the types of employment offered to migrants, this is the best that can be hoped for in the aggregate, and with available data. The above-mentioned variables are accepted in various migration studies, however they may not be explanatory in this particular study because the migration we are limited to explaining is legal migration (this is due to difficulties in obtaining data, especially disaggregated by sex). As such, those migrants most influenced by economic factors, illegal immigrants, are not included in the study. As a result, the following controls may be more relevant to a study of the decision-making for legal immigrants to the United
States. The level of education for men and women will be included. Education may vary in importance to international migrants, depending on the country of origin; however, in many cases education plays a role in the socioeconomic opportunities available to an individual in their country of origin, and once in the United States. I will assume, that increases in educational attainment will promote greater rates of migration to the United States. And, the distance from the countries of origin to the United States as well as the number of radios per capita in the countries of origin should affect the number of migrants. Distance was found to be a significant factor in the proportion of females among immigrants admitted as spouses of U.S. citizens in 1971 according to data analysis performed by Guillermina Jasso and Mark R. Rosenzweig in 1990. The same study additionally included Voices of America broadcasts in the native language as a factor of migration to the United States. In this study, I will use numbers of radios per capita to represent contact with the outer world from these countries. Women and men should be more likely to immigrate to the United States from Mexico than from South Africa. And women and men should be more likely to emigrate from countries with larger numbers of radios per capita. In addition, I will include total populations to control for people’s desire to emigrate from relatively more populous regions, where resources are distributed among relatively larger populations.

**Description of Data:**

As discussed in the literature review there is a dearth of data disaggregated by sex. The earliest data on immigration to the United States by sex available on-line is 1996.
Fortunately, halfway through this study, I came in contact with the Department of Homeland Security through which I acquired immigration data by sex from 1948 onward. Even so, the data is available in hard copy only and prior to 1958 the data is by ancestry and not country of origin. As a result, the earliest year I included in this study is 1958. I then chose five later years each approximately a decade apart: 1964, 1970, 1982, 1991 and 1998. Each year’s dataset includes data on a different set of countries. I chose 1970 as the dataset to use as the baseline for countries included in this study because although 1982 includes more countries, 1970’s dataset includes more countries than the other years and also includes the majority of the countries that are also included in the rest of the datasets. Thus, using 1970’s countries as the baseline provides the most complete dataset in terms of having at least two years per country. The only countries I had to omit from the final dataset that appeared on the 1970 dataset were Korea, Germany and the Ryukyu Islands. Korea was omitted because the immigration data on this country is not divided by North and South Korea, and thus the explanatory variables that are divided by North and South Korea would bias the regression. Germany was omitted because the only year that Germany is divided into the Democratic Republic of Germany and the Federal Republic of Germany in the datasets is 1982; however, Germany was divided beginning in 1945 after World War II, and was united once again by 1982. As a result, in order not to bias the regressions, Germany was omitted from the dataset. And finally, there were no explanatory or control variables available for the Ryukyu Islands. As such, there was no reason to include them in the final immigration dataset. Additionally, in order to perform a clean analysis on the impact of gender inequality on the decision to migrate, I omitted data on migrants less than 20 years of age. A better sample would include
migrants in their late teens; however, the data available did not allow me to include these migrants without including all migrants under age 20. See Appendix A for a complete list of countries by year included in this study.

In order to control for differences in sizes of populations, I transformed each observation described above into the rate of immigration from each country of origin to the United States by dividing the number of immigrants by sex by the population of the country of origin by sex. Data on populations by country, sex, and all years included in the immigration dataset were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau’s International Data Base (2004) and the United Nations Demographic Yearbook, Historical Supplement (2003). Thus, the dependent variables in all my OLS regressions deal with the rates of immigration to the United States by sex, year and country of origin.

Next, in my search for indicators of gender inequality, I ran into the problem of finding data on the global status of women. The best dataset on these indicators I found is the “Women’s Indicators and Statistics Database, Version 4 (WISTAT)” published by the United Nations Statistics Division (2000). The percentage of women enrolled in primary and secondary education was taken from this source. Data on tertiary education was also taken from this source. However, this data came as the number of females and males enrolled in tertiary education by year. Thus, I included the ratio of females to males enrolled in tertiary education to represent gender equality of access to tertiary education. Gender equality in the economy as represented by female wages as a percentage of men’s wages in agricultural, nonagricultural, and manufacturing sectors of the economy, as well
as the ratio of the number of women economically active divided by the number of economically active men was also taken from the WISTAT dataset. And, data on gender equality in health, as represented by the ratio of female to male life expectancies in the countries of origin was also taken from WISTAT. The abovementioned data used in my regressions come for the years 1970, 1980, 1990 and the latest available year. As such, since these statistics do not change drastically from year to year, enrollment in 1970 is the explanatory variable included for immigration data from 1970, 1980 for 1982, 1990 for 1991 and the latest available year for 1998.

Gender equality in political rights as represented by the ratio of seats in the upper chamber of Parliament belonging to women over the seats belonging to men, as well as the number of seats either in the lower chamber of Parliament or in a unicameral Parliament belonging to women over the seats belonging to men was also taken from the WISTAT (2000) dataset. This data is available for the years 1980, 1987, 1991, 1993 and 1999. As a result, these explanatory variables for 1980 were included for the immigration data for 1982, 1991 for 1991, and 1999 for 1998. Working with the years is hardly a perfect solution to the lack of available data for the exact years included in this study’s immigration dataset; however, it is the best that can be hoped for considering the lack of available data on the status of women in societies across the globe.

Data on the explanatory variables winning coalition and selectorate size is available by country, and all the years included in the immigration dataset: 1958, 1964, 1970, 1982, 1991 and 1998. The variables themselves are on a scale of 0 to 1. S is created from the
“breadth of selectiveness of the members of each country’s legislature” (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, p. 134). And, W is a composite of other political indicators: regime type, the competitiveness of executive recruitment (heredity or rigged elections for example), the openness of executive recruitment (whether the political process is relatively open or closed) and the competitiveness of political participation (the relative endurance and stability of political groups). Unfortunately, since the theory is so new, “the measurement of selectorate size and winning-coalition size, especially in nondemocratic states, is in its infancy” (p.153). These indicators are crude representations of political systems. Nevertheless, the variables have withstood numerous empirical tests in “The Logic of Political Survival,” which substantiate the selectorate theory, and as such I will accept the imperfections in the data and proceed to use them as measures of cross-country differences in political institutions. Since I expect a nonlinear relationship between coalition size (W) and immigration to the United States and coalition size relative to selectorate size (WoverS) and immigration, I will include two squared terms (w^2 and WoverS^2) in the regressions involving political institutions.

Finally, data on the control variables described in the section “Testable Hypotheses” were taken from a variety of sources. The log of real GDP per capita, the level of foreign direct investment (net inflows as a percent of GDP), total population and the number of radios per capita were all taken from the “Logic of Political Survival Dataset,” (2003) but were originally taken respectively from the Penn World Tables, the World Bank Development Indicators (WBDI) 2001, the WBDI 2001, and Banks: The Cross National Time-Series Data Archive (CNTS). Depending on the country of origin, different years
were available for each variable; thus, there are gaps where there is no available data. This is an issue in terms of losing observations in the final regressions; however, the best that can be done is to work with the data that is available.

Next, historical data on the foreign born population from the country of origin living in the United States was taken from the U.S. decennial census. Since the data is only published every ten years, I used the 1960 census data for the 1958 and 1964 immigration data, 1970 for 1970, 1980 for 1982, 1990 for 1991 and 2000 for 1998. Again, the best that can be hoped for is to work with the available data.


Next, I chose the percentage of adults 25 and over that have completed a secondary education, from the Barro, Robert J. and Lee, Jong-Wha (2000) Harvard Dataset, to represent the level of educational attainment in the country of origin. The closest years to those in the immigration sample are 1960, 1965, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 1995. Thus, education data from 1960 is included for the immigration data for 1958, 1965 for 1964, 1970 for 1970, 1980 for 1982, 1990 for 1991 and 1995 for 1998. Again, working with the available years is not ideal, but this data does not change drastically from year to year. As such, including the closest available year in the regressions is the best solution that can be hoped for.
Finally, data on the distance to the United States from each country of origin is measured in kilometers and taken from Gleditsch and Ward’s 2001 Minimum Distance Data.

**Empirical Method:**

Cross-country time-series analysis through ordinary least square regression will measure the impact of the indicators of gender inequality and political institutions described above on the rates of female and male immigration to the United States. To begin, in order to see the differential impact of these explanatory variables on male and female migration, an interaction variable, the explanatory variable multiplied by the sex variable (a dummy coded 0 for men and 1 for women), will be included in each regression equation in addition to the explanatory variable and all controls. For instance, the first regression equation, measuring the impact of equality of access to primary education (with the percentage of females enrolled in primary education as the indicator) will have the form:

\[
\text{Immigrants/Population} = b_0 + b_1 \text{FemPrim} + b_2 \text{FemPrim*Sex} + b_3 \text{Sex} + \text{Log of Real GDP per capita} + \text{Growth Rate of FDI} + \text{Secondary Education} + \text{Distance} + \text{Radios} + \text{Foreign Born Population Divided by Population of the Country of Origin} + \text{Growth Rate of U.S. Employment}
\]

The coefficient on the primary education variable, \(b_1\), is consequently the impact of gender equality of access to primary education on the migration of men. If my
hypotheses are correct, there should not be a direct impact of gender inequality on male migration. Next, the coefficient on the interaction variable, $b_2$, is the additional impact of this variable on the migration of women. According to my hypotheses, this coefficient should carry a negative sign, as an increase in gender equality should cause a decrease in the rate of female migration to the United States.

All the indicators of gender inequality described in the section entitled “Description of Data” will be tested in separate equations similar to the one described above. However, the regressions including winning coalition and selectorate size as the explanatory variables will be slightly different as we will expect to see a well-defined nonlinear relationship between these variables and immigration to the United States. As a result these regression equations will have the form:

$$\text{Immigrants/Population} = b_0 + b_1W + b_2W*Sex + b_3Sex + b_4W^2 + b_5W^2*Sex + \log \text{Real GDP per capita} + \text{Growth Rate of FDI} + \text{Secondary Education} + \text{Distance} + \text{Radios} + \text{Foreign Born Population Divided by Population of the Country of Origin} + \text{Growth Rate of U.S. Employment}$$

$$\text{Immigrants/Population} = b_0 + b_1WoverS + b_2WoverS*Sex + b_3Sex + b_4WoverS^2 + b_5WoverS^2*Sex + \log \text{Real GDP per capita} + \text{Growth Rate of FDI} + \text{Secondary Education} + \text{Distance} + \text{Radios} + \text{Foreign Born Population Divided by Population of the Country of Origin} + \text{Growth Rate of U.S. Employment}$$
Given that my hypotheses are correct, we would expect to see a positive $b_1$ for both equations, and a negative $b_4$. This would demonstrate the nonlinear relationship between political institutions and the male decision to emigrate discussed above. We would then expect to see a significantly different $b_2$ and $b_5$ on the interaction variables to see the additional, again nonlinear, impact of political institutions on women. Although the signs on the coefficients should be the same, according to the hypotheses described above, we would expect winning coalition size to have an even greater impact on female than on male emigration. Thus, $b_2$ and $b_3$ should have respectively greater absolute values than $b_1$ and $b_4$.

Please refer to Appendix B for the results of the ordinary least square regressions described above. Where spaces are empty in the charts, variables were not included in the respective equations.

According to the regressions in Table 1, equality of access to education is not a significant factor in either the male or female decision to migrate. Although equality of access to primary and secondary education was statistically significant in the regressions without control variables, these education variables were not robust to controls; as a result, they do not hold much explanatory power in explaining migration to the United States.

Next, according to the regression equations involving gender equality in political representation found in Table 2, although there was no differential impact of these
explanatory variables on male and female migration, political equality did appear to significantly impact migration in general. When including all control variables, and all controls variables apart from the radios variable (I left this variable out because it was rarely significant in any of the regressions performed in this study), as the level of equality increases in the upper chamber of Parliament, the level of immigration to the United States, of both men and women, decreases. This is exactly what we expected to see for women, and it is interesting that this result is significant for men as well.

Equality in political representation as represented by equality in seats held in the lower chamber of a bicameral or in a unicameral Parliament did not prove to be as significant in these regressions, although the p values were below .2 in both the regression containing all controls and all controls except the radios variable. As such, there may be reason to believe political equality as represented by this variable is in fact important in explaining migration flows and the lack of statistical significance may be due to the lack of available data, given there were only 123 observations included in these regressions. Even so, if we believe this variable to be important, it seems that as the level of gender equality increases, the level of immigration increases for both men and women. This is an interesting, though unexpected finding and will be discussed later in the section entitled “Conclusions.”

Also according to the regressions in Table 2, the impact of gender equality in health, as measured by the ratio of female to male life expectancies, did not prove to be a
statistically significant explanatory variable in the decision to migrate for either men or women.

Next, according to the regressions in Table 3, there is no differential impact of economic equality on male and female migration. And, gender equality in wages is not a statistically significant factor in the decision to migrate for men or women. Even so, gender equality in the economically active populations does demonstrate a statistically significant impact on both male and female immigration. As the level of equality in economic rights increases, the rate of immigration of both men and women decreases. This finding is robust to all controls, and is exactly as predicted for women.

And finally, since according to the regressions in Tables 1-3, the indicators of gender equality did not demonstrate a differential impact on male and female migration, and we expected political institutions to differentially affect male and female migration because of gender inequality promoted by small winning coalition polities, it logically follows that political institutions would not have a significant differential impact on male and female migration. And, according to the equations in Table 4, they do not. Nevertheless, my primary hypothesis regarding the nonlinear relationship between winning coalition size and emigration has been supported by my findings.

I attempted numerous equations, each including a different set of control variables to test the impact of W and WoverS on immigration for various reasons. First of all, many of the control variables described in the section “Testable Hypotheses” were not available
for all countries and years included in this study and listed in Appendix A. As a result, including all controls reduces the number of observations in the regressions including $W$ and $S$ from 550 to 127, which greatly reduces the explanatory power of the analysis. Also, there is reason to believe many of the economic controls may not be as relevant to a study of legal migration than other types of illegal migration for which data is not readily available. Thus, the significance of these economic controls in this study is questionable. And finally, many of the control variables included in this study are believed to be endogenous to winning coalition size, according to “The Logic of Political Survival.” Consequently, leaving out various variables because they may decrease the clarity of the study for any of the reasons discussed above may be justified.

Including all controls variables in the regression produced a positive (though insignificant) coefficient on the $W$ variable and a statistically significant negative coefficient on the $W^2$ variable. The signs of the coefficients are as predicted; however, the insignificance of the $W$ coefficient is worrisome. Thus, in order to test the explanatory power of this finding I changed the control variables included in each ensuing regression for the reasons mentioned above.

First, I omitted the growth rate of foreign direct investment and the number of radios per capita from the regression. According to all the other equations involving $W$ and $S$, the radios variable and the growth rate of FDI were insignificant controls, and leaving out these two variables increased the number of observations from 127 to 302. Thus, leaving
out these two variables may be justified. And, as a result, the coefficients on both the W and $W^2$ variables were statistically significant and in the predicted directions.

Next, I included only the education, distance and radios variable as controls. By so doing, I included only non-economic variables and increased the number of observations in the regression from 127 to 492. Since the foreign born population is also a non-economic control, it may have made sense to also include this variable in this equation; however, doing so decreased the number of observations from 492 to 336. Thus, I decided to leave this variable out of the equation. And, as a result, the coefficients on the W and $W^2$ variables remained statistically significant and in the predicted directions.

I then omitted all controls that can be considered endogenous to winning coalition size, as they are associated with economic growth rates and the distribution of public goods: secondary education, GDP and the growth rate of foreign direct investment. As a result, the coefficient on the squared W term remained statistically significant and in the predicted negative direction. However, although W retained the positive coefficient, the variable lost its statistical significance.

Although two of the equations performed and listed in Table 4 did not produce statistically significant coefficients on the W variable, in all of the equations including controls the signs on the coefficients on the W and $W^2$ variables are as predicted, and the $W^2$ term remains statistically significant. Furthermore, playing with the controls may be justified for the reasons discussed above, and two equations in Table 4 produce
statistically significant coefficients on both the W and $W^2$ variables. As a result, after performing these regression analyses, I believe there is sufficient evidence to believe that there is a significant nonlinear relationship between winning coalition size of the country of origin and immigration from that country to the United States. Immigration is strictly limited from very small winning coalition governments. Then as winning coalition size increases, there is an increase in the level of immigration. And at a certain point, winning coalition size is large enough that the costs of emigrating outweigh the benefits and the rate of immigration of both men and women begins to decrease. This is an interesting finding that substantiates selectorate theory from “The Logic of Political Survival” (2003).

The same levels of significance and signs on the resulting coefficients are apparent when looking at the differing equations measuring the impact of winning coalition size relative to selectorate size as when looking solely at winning coalition size. Thus, I believe my findings also substantiate the hypothesis that there is a nonlinear relationship between winning coalition size relative to selectorate size and immigration to the United States.

Since none of the regression equations discussed above demonstrated a differential impact of the explanatory variables on male and female migration, I decided to alter the countries included in my immigration dataset. Women living in China for example, who may indeed emigrate in response to gender inequality, may migrate to Europe rather than the United States in response to this inequality. Thus, the regressions in this study, which measure the impact of inequality in China on immigration to the United States, may not
capture the total impact of this inequality on male and female emigration. As a result, I decided to perform the same set of regressions discussed above including only Latin American and Caribbean countries in my immigration dataset.

As it turned out, these regressions produced almost exactly the same results. The differences were slight and only in terms of the degrees of significance of the explanatory variables. As a result, I will not take the time to discuss them in greater detail. Since, this alteration in the dataset did not produce cleaner results, I then attempted to collapse the complete dataset, to take the average of all the observations across years, to then look at the data from a cross-country instead of a time-series standpoint, and in this way to increase the clarity of dataset. Alas, the data again failed to demonstrate a strong differential impact of any of the explanatory variables of gender inequality or political institutions on male and female emigration.

Nevertheless, although the above-mentioned regressions did not demonstrate a differential impact of gender inequality on male and female emigration, according to the data, gender inequality was statistically significantly in explaining the emigration of men as well as women, which is interesting in its own right. Thus, to get a better idea of the impact of gender inequality on emigration in general, I ran the same regressions discussed above without the interaction variables, to see a cleaner picture of the impact of gender inequality on the decision to emigrate.
According to the equations listed in Table 5, even without the interaction variables, equality of access to education did not prove to be significantly correlated with the rate of immigration to the United States.

Next, according to the results in Table 6, gender equality in political rights as measured by the ratio of seats held by women and men in the upper house of a bicameral Parliament remained statistically significant in explaining immigration when omitting the radios variable from the set of controls; however when including all control variables the p value increased to .135. Even so, I believe these results are sufficient to substantiate the previous finding that as gender equality in the seats of the upper chamber of Parliament increases, the rate of immigration to the United States decreases.

Interestingly, without the muddling effects of the interaction variable, gender inequality in the lower house of a bicameral or in a unicameral Parliament demonstrates a greater statistical impact on the rate of immigration. The coefficient is statistically significant when including all control variables and the p value when including all controls except for the radios variable decreases from .180 to .103. Thus, I believe without the interaction variable there is sufficient evidence to also support the finding that as the level of equality in the lower chamber of a bicameral or in a unicameral Parliament increases, the rate of immigration to the United States also increases. Again, this is a somewhat surprising relationship, and will be discussed in further detail in the section entitled “Conclusions.”
Also, when I ran these regressions without the interaction variables, gender inequality in health, as represented by the ratio of female to male life expectancy, again failed to demonstrate a statistically significant impact on the immigration of either men or women.

The results in Table 7, from those regressions measuring the impact of equality in economic rights, are exactly the same as those in the regressions including the interaction variables. The explanatory variables including wages did not prove significant in any regression. Nevertheless, equality in economic rights between the sexes, as represented by the ratio of the economically active female and male populations, remains a statistically significant factor in the decision to migrate for both men and women. As gender equality in economic rights increases, immigration to the United States decreases.

Finally, in Table 8, as demonstrated by the regressions involving the interaction variables, political institutions again appear to demonstrate a significant nonlinear relationship with immigration to the United States. The controls included in each equation differ for the reasons discussed prior. And, although the interaction variables were omitted from these equations, the results for each regression performed were equivalent to those performed in the regressions involving the interaction variables. Thus for more detailed discussion of these results please refer to Table 8 and the previous explanations.

Although various indicators of gender inequality demonstrated a statistically significant impact on migration in general, the above regressions did not elucidate the differential
impact of gender inequality on male and female migration. There are two possible explanations for these results. First, there may not be a differential impact of gender inequality on emigration. However, as discussed in detail in the literature review, women are not complicit followers in the male migration stream. They are uniquely affected by their circumstances, and as such, I do not believe their predominance in migration flows to the United States, as discussed by Zlotnik (1995), is completely explained by U.S. immigration policy favoring family immigration. Women are differentially impacted by gender inequality in their countries of origin, and as such I still believe women’s decision to migrate is also differentially impacted by gender inequality. Another explanation for my results is that the data available is just not adequate to demonstrate this differential relationship that does exist in reality. If this is the case and the data failed to demonstrate a differential relationship because of the lack of adequate data available, there is reason to proceed with the next step of my testable hypotheses, to again attempt to elucidate the reasoning behind the differential in male and female migration to the U.S.

In the next regressions, I altered the dependent variable from the above regressions from the rates of female and male migration to the ratio of the female and male rates of migration to the U.S. Women and men are similarly impacted by many factors in migration. And, these additional regressions measuring the impact of inequality and political institutions on the relative migration of women and men will shed light on whether these indicators of gender inequality can explain at least on the margin, the differences in migratory decision-making between men and women that result in the sex differential in migration streams to the United States.
The same set of explanatory variables was used in these regressions as in the regressions discussed above. The regression equations involving indicators of gender inequality have the following form:

\[
\frac{\text{Female Immigrants} / \text{Female Population}}{\text{Male Immigrants} / \text{Male Population}} = b_0 + b_1 \text{FemPrim} + \log \text{Real GDP per capita} + \text{Growth Rate of FDI} + \text{Secondary Education} + \text{Distance} + \text{Radios} + \frac{\text{Foreign Born Population Divided by Population of the Country of Origin}}{\text{Population of the Country of Origin}} + \text{Growth Rate of U.S. Employment}
\]

According to my hypotheses, as equality increases, there should be a decrease in the ratio of women relative to men migrating to the United States. $b_1$ should be significant and negative for all indicators of gender inequality.

Again, as in the previous regressions, the equations involving winning coalition and selectorate size should be slightly different and have the following nonlinear form:

\[
\frac{\text{Female Immigrants} / \text{Female Population}}{\text{Male Immigrants} / \text{Male Population}} = b_0 + b_1 W + b_2 W^2 + \log \text{Real GDP per capita} + \text{Growth Rate of FDI} + \text{Secondary Education} + \text{Distance} + \text{Radios} + \frac{\text{Foreign Born Population Divided by Population of the Country of Origin}}{\text{Population of the Country of Origin}} + \text{Growth Rate of U.S. Employment}
\]
According to my hypotheses, $b_1$ should be positive and $b_2$ should be negative. Initially, at very small $W$ sizes, more men than women will have the abilities to migrate. Then as coalition size increases, and women gain the resources and opportunities to migrate, their migration rates should increase relative to men’s migration rates, until they dominate migration flows in response to winning coalition size. Then at some point, when $W$ is sufficiently large, and gender equality is promoted in the polity, the rate of female relative to male migration should decrease, until $W$ is sufficiently large that women and men respond equivalently to further increases in winning coalition size.

Please refer to Appendix D for the results of these regressions. According to Table 9, equality of access to education is important in explaining the differences in the number of female and male migrants to the United States. Equality of access to primary, secondary and tertiary education is statistically significant and robust to all controls. As the level of equality increases, the ratio of women relative to men migrating decreases. This is exactly as predicted.

Next, according to Table 10, gender equality in political rights as represented by the ratio of women to men holding seats in the upper chamber of Parliament is statistically significant and robust to controls when leaving out the radios control variable. When including all control variables, this explanatory variable has a p value of .109. Given the data limitations, I believe there is reason to believe that although the variable is not strictly statistically significant when including all controls, political equality is still important in explaining the differential in male and female migration. According to the
results, as equality in the upper chamber increases, there is a decrease in the ratio of women relative to men migrating. Again, this finding is exactly as predicted.

Equality in political rights as represented by the ratio of women to men holding seats in either the lower chamber or in a unicameral Parliament in contrast, did not prove significant in these equations.

Also in Table 10, gender inequality in health, as represented by the ratio of female to male life expectancies, is demonstrated as statistically significant in explaining the differences in male and female migration when the regression omits all controls. As predicted, this regression supports the hypothesis that as the health of women improves in society, the ratio of women relative to men migrating decreases. However, this variable is not robust to controls, as such this regression carries little explanatory power.

In Table 11, equality in economic rights as represented by women’s wages as a percentage of men’s wages in various sectors of the economy did not prove to be significant in explaining the differences in male and female migration. However, equality in economic rights as represented by the ratio of economically active women relative to men was statistically significant and robust to all controls. As predicted, as equality in economic rights increases, there is a reduction in the number of women relative to men migrating.
And finally, Table 12 shows the results of the regression equations involving W and WoverS as the explanatory variables. Without controls variables, W and W^2 are statistically significant and in the manners predicted. Although these two variables are not robust to including all controls in the equation, the number of observations decreases from 275 to 64 when including all controls. And as mentioned prior, there is reason to believe that several of these controls can justifiably be left out of the equations. Refer to the paragraphs describing the prior equations involving W and S for further details. The numerous equations listed in Table 12 each include the different set of controls described prior. I believe that since each equation in Table 12 produces a positive coefficient on the W variable and a negative coefficient on the W^2 variable, and each W^2 coefficient is statistically significant except for the equation including all controls, and furthermore, the W coefficient is also significant in two equations, that there is sufficient evidence that political institutions as represented by winning coalition and selectorate size help explain the differences in the male and female decision to migrate. These results substantiate the hypothesis that as winning coalition size increases the rate of female relative to male migration also increases as women gain the resources and ability to emigrate. Then, at a certain level of W, as gender equality increases in the polity, the costs of migrating for women are outweighed by the benefits, and the rate of female relative to male migration begins to decrease.

Conclusion:
Over the past century, women have dominated migration flows to the United States. U.S. immigration policy favoring family migration is part of the explanation of their preponderance, but it is not the complete story as there is variance in the proportion of women migrating from different countries of origin to the U.S. In my opinion, the sex differential also exists because gender inequality differentially affects the male and female decision to migrate. As such, I set out in this study to first of all empirically demonstrate the impact of gender inequality on the decision to migrate, and then the differential impact of gender inequality on male and female migration.

Additionally, political science is rarely included in studies of migratory decision-making, and I believe the impact of political institutions, as they are relevant to the status of women in society, are relevant to a study of the sex differential in migration to the United States. Thus, I also set out to first of all demonstrate the impact of political institutions on emigration, and then the differential impact of political institutions on the male and female decision to migrate.

First of all, through my analyses, I came to realize that gender inequality influences the emigration of men as well as women. According to my findings, increases in gender equality in the upper chamber of a bicameral Parliament translate into decreases in the migration rates of both men and women. And, similarly increases in gender equality in economic rights also translate into decreases in the migration rates of both men and women. These findings contribute to the literature currently available on both migration
and gender inequality and are line with previous researchers findings of the adverse impacts of gender inequality on society in general.

According to the World Bank policy report, “Engendering development through gender equality in rights, resources and voice” (King & Mason, 2001) countries that prevent women from working and fail to invest in female education experience lower levels of output as a result. Also, “greater women’s rights and more equal participation in public life by women and men are associated with cleaner business and government and better governance” (King & Mason, 2001, p. 12). That is to say unequal treatment of women results in greater levels of corruption in both business and government. For instance, “a study of 350 firms in the republic of Georgia concludes that firms owned or managed by men are 10 percent more likely to make unofficial payments to government officials than those owned or managed by women” (King & Mason, 2001, p. 13). These are only a few examples of how gender inequality negatively impacts society. And there is no country in the world where women are completely equal to men. Thus, there is reason to believe, and this study provides evidence for the fact that even when women come as dependent family members, the family’s decision-making is also influenced by gender inequality in the country of origin.

Even so, with respect to my findings involving the regressions testing the impact of gender inequality on both men and women, I feel that I must draw attention to certain important caveats, especially with respect to equality in political rights. Equality of access to education did not prove to be a significant factor in the decision to migrate for
either sex. As I mentioned above, equality in economic rights clearly impacted the decision to migrate. And, political equality demonstrated varying results.

Overall, increased equality in political rights as measured by the ratio of seats held by women and men in the upper chamber of a bicameral Parliament produced decreased immigration for both men and women. But, strangely increased equality in either the lower house of a bicameral or in a unicameral Parliament produced increased immigration of both men and women. The reason for this strange result may have to do with the lack of adequate data available and/or the nonlinear behavior of emigration in response to inequality discussed previously. In terms of the latter explanation, women as well as men must first have the resources and ability to pay the costs of emigrating before they can translate their discontent with their circumstances into migratory actions. And in fact, the mean value for the ratio of women to men holding seats in the lower chamber of a bicameral or in a unicameral Parliament, when taking the data directly from the source, WISTAT (2000), is .133. And, when controlling for all variables in migration in my regression equations, the mean drops to .081. Thus, my findings may demonstrate that in countries with low levels of gender equality, .081 is fairly low, increases in gender equality increase the rate of emigration, as more people gain the resources to emigrate. Even so, the mean of the ratio of seats held by women and men in the upper chamber of Parliament is .119 when taking the average of all observations from WISTAT (2000) and also .081 when looking only at those observations included in the regressions including all control variables. And, improvements in gender equality in the upper chamber result in decreases in immigration rates. Nevertheless, there may be less stringent criteria to
gain office in the lower rather than the upper chamber of a bicameral Parliament, such as in the United States or in England, in other countries across the globe; thus, increases in gender equality in these chambers could represent that women and men in these countries are gaining the sufficient means necessary to emigrate. While increases in equality in the upper chamber represent adequate enough improvements in quality of life that the costs of emigration after said improvements outweigh the benefits. Even so, the validity of this explanation is unclear. However, although the direction of impact is under question, my findings demonstrate nevertheless a statistically significant relationship between gender equality in political rights and immigration to the U.S.

Also, the coefficients measuring the impact of gender inequality, even when statistically significant, at times have values to the ten thousandth decimal place. Thus, the regressions demonstrate relatively low levels of impact of gender inequality on emigration. However, I personally believe this and the lack of any differential relationship on male and female migration in the regressions involving interaction variables to be due to the lack of adequate data available rather than the lack of the predicted relationship. Cleaner analyses performed in the future with better data will hopefully produce stronger results; however, I believe the significance of the explanatory variables in my regressions testify to the importance of further investigation for both men and women.

With respect to the differential impact of political institutions, since the regressions involving the interaction variables did not demonstrate a strong differential relationship
between the various indicators of gender inequality and male and female migration, it makes sense that political institutions would also fail to demonstrate a differential impact on the immigration of men and women in these regressions. However, the results nevertheless provide evidence for the nonlinear relationship between emigration and winning coalition size, which provides new evidence in support of selectorate theory from “The Logic of Political Survival” (2003).

Next, as gender inequality deeply impacts the lives of women across the world, I believe that although the findings in Appendices B and C demonstrate that women and men are similarly impacted by gender inequality, there is still reason to believe women’s desire to emigrate is impacted to a greater extent by this inequality. And the lack of a differential relationship in the regressions may be due both to the lack of available data on the status of women in the majority of countries across the globe and the lack of immigration data disaggregated by sex.

As such, I believe my findings with respect to the relative migration rates of men and women, utilizing the ratio of the rates of female and male migration, are immensely important and provide important evidence that gender inequality impacts the differences in the female and male rates of emigration. According to my findings in Appendix D, gender equality in education, political life, and economic rights all help explain the sex differential in migration to the United States. As equality increases there are decreases in the rates of female relative to male migration. Specifically, as gender equality of access in primary, secondary and tertiary education increases, the rates of migration of women
relative to men decreases. As gender equality in political rights as represented by the upper chamber of a bicameral Parliament increases, the rates of migration of women relative to men decreases. Interestingly, gender equality in the lower chamber or in a unicameral Parliament, which had strange results in the previous regressions, is not significant in explaining the differential in male and female migration flows. And finally, as gender equality in economic rights increases, there is again a decrease in the rate of migration of women relative to men. Gender equality in health is the only indicator that did not prove significant in explaining the relative migration rates of men and women.

Furthermore, according to these same regressions, political institutions as represented by W and S also demonstrate statistical significance in explaining the relative migration rates of men and women. My findings support my hypothesis that initially, men predominate migration streams from small W polities. Then as W increases, the ratio of women to men emigrating increases until W is sufficiently large that the polity promotes gender equality, at which point the ratio of women to men decreases as women and men are similarly impacted by large W polities.

Although these results demonstrate that these indicators of gender inequality and political institutions explain the differential in male and female migration, and in the manners predicted, these results are somewhat ambiguous because it is unclear whether an increase in the ratio of female to male immigrants translates into an increase the rate of female immigration or a decrease in the rate of male immigration or a combination of the two. Nevertheless, although the directions of impact on male and female migration are
unclear when including a ratio as the dependent variable, the fact that these indicators demonstrated statistical significance in explaining the relative migration of men and women is telling and important. And, if we want to look at the specific direction of impact we can look at the cleaner regressions including interaction variables; however, they have not demonstrated differential relationship, in my opinion, because better data is necessary. Nevertheless, according to the regressions involving interaction variables including political (at least in the upper chamber of Parliament) and economic equality, there is evidence that as equality increases, the rates of immigration of both men and women to the United States decreases. Thus, when looking at the ratio variable, there is strong reason to support the finding that as political (again in the upper chamber at least) and economic equality increases, the relative number of women relative to men migrating decreases because women experience greater decreases in migration than men in response to the increase in equality. We can rule out the possibility that the ratio decreases because of an increase in the rate of male migration because both male and female migration should decrease in response to the increase in equality. Thus, even if the initial empirical work including the rates of immigration as the dependent variables was not able to demonstrate gender inequality as strongly explaining the differential impulse to migrate, my findings from the regressions involving the ratio as the dependent variable nevertheless provide evidence in support of the hypothesis that gender inequality and political institutions explain, on the margin, the differential in the decision-making between women and men.
In sum, my empirical analyses provide insight into both the impact of gender inequality and political institutions on international migration and the sex differential in migration to the United States. First of all, according to my analyses involving interaction variables both women and men are more likely to emigrate from countries with high levels of gender inequality in economic and political rights. And, there is a nonlinear relationship between winning coalition size and emigration. Second, according to my analyses involving the ratio of female to male immigration as the dependent variable, women migrate at a higher rate than men in response to gender inequality in education as well as economic and political rights. And, there is a nonlinear relationship between winning coalition size and the ratio of female to male immigration to the U.S.

I believe these findings provide needed insight into the forces that affect female migration that will hopefully provide a basis from which future policies can be created that will better safeguard and protect female migrants to the United States. Gender inequality is relevant to migration research and data accumulation, and further studies should be done as improvements in available data will enhance the explanatory power of empirical analyses of the differential impact of gender inequality on male and female migration performed in this study.
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United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for the


