Voting Blocs, Coalitions and Parties

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Abstract

In this paper I study the strategic implications of coalition formation in an assembly. A coalition forms a voting bloc to coordinate the voting behavior of its members, acting as a single player and affecting the policy outcome. I prove that there exist stable endogenous voting bloc structures, and in an assembly with two parties I show how the incentives to join a bloc depend on the types of the agents, the sizes of the parties, and the rules the blocs use to aggregate preferences. I also provide an empirical application of the model to the US Supreme Court and I show that justices face a strategic incentive to coalesce into voting blocs.

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1 Introduction

Democratic deliberative bodies, such as committees, councils, or legislative assemblies across the world choose policies by means of voting. Members of an assembly can affect the policy outcome chosen by the assembly by coordinating their voting behavior and forming a voting bloc. A voting bloc is a coalition with an internal rule that aggregates the preferences of its members into a single position that the whole coalition then votes for, acting as a single unit in the assembly. From factions at faculty meetings in an academic department, to alliances of countries in international relations or political parties in legislative bodies, successful voting blocs influence policy outcomes to the advantage of their members. For instance, in international politics organizations such as the European Union or the Arab League strive -not always fruitfully- to stand for a common policy position. In national politics, the political gain that results from forming a voting bloc provides an incentive for legislators to coalesce into strong political parties and accept the party discipline that requires every member to vote according to the party line.

However, agents are not identical and the benefits of forming a voting bloc are not equally shared by all. Some members of a voting bloc may prefer to leave the bloc, making it unstable. Who benefits when agents with diverse preferences form a voting bloc? What makes a voting bloc stable? What configuration of voting blocs do we expect to find in an assembly with heterogeneous voters? These are some of the questions that I address in this paper, modeling an assembly with a finite number of agents who can coordinate with each other to form voting blocs before they vote to pass or reject a policy proposal.

Political parties are particularly predisposed to form voting blocs. Party members already belong to an organization -the party- that can coordinate their votes if every member accepts the party discipline and agrees to vote for the party line chosen according to some internal party rule. In an assembly with two parties, one on each side of the political spectrum, I analyze whether party discipline is accepted by every member of a party or not depending on factors such as the types of the agents, the polarization of the assembly, the sizes of the parties, the internal rule that a party uses to aggregate the preferences of its members, and the process that leads to the formation of a voting bloc.

I find that in each party there is one extreme party member who is the least likely to benefit from the coordination of votes in her party, and this extreme agent determines whether or not the party can form a stable voting bloc that imposes voting discipline upon its members. I show that for some preference profiles a party cannot form a stable voting bloc that always imposes party discipline upon its members, but it can form a stable voting bloc with laxer party discipline using an internal voting rule that lets members vote freely when there is substantial disagreement within the party. I also show that for some other preference profiles, a party cannot form a stable voting bloc even though the formation of a bloc would benefit every member because the party faces a collective-action problem: Each member individually benefits more by staying out of the bloc and letting others coordinate their vote, but if they can all commit
to form a voting bloc, they all become better off. With respect to polarization of preferences, I find that party discipline becomes increasingly difficult to sustain as a stable outcome as the parties become more extreme. In fact, a party of sufficiently extreme agents can only form a voting bloc if it uses a very permissive rule that lets members vote freely as soon as two of them disagree with the party line.

Voting blocs are not only a consequence of political parties and their sophisticated partisan strategies. Rather, the coordination of votes and the gains to be made by forming a voting bloc propitiate the endogenous formation of parties. In an assembly in which any subset of voters can coordinate and coalesce to form a voting bloc, I show that given the configuration into blocs by the rest of the assembly, any arbitrary coalition of agents who form a voting bloc attains a net gain in the sum of expected utilities of its members. I analyze the endogenous formation of voting blocs in the assembly and I seek voting bloc structures -partitions of the assembly into voting blocs- that are stable. I show that there exist Nash stable voting bloc structures. In these structures, no agent has an incentive to leave the bloc she belongs to and join some other bloc. I find that Nash stable voting blocs must be of size less than minimal winning.

To obtain sharper predictions about the configuration of voting blocs, I apply the model to a small assembly and I introduce a new “Split stable” concept that allows for coalitional deviations in which at most one bloc splits. I show that in a stylized assembly with 9 members whose types are symmetrically distributed, all Nash and Split stable voting bloc structures have two voting blocs one at each side of the ideological spectrum and a group of independents including the median in between the two blocs. In the last section of the paper I compare this result with the predictions derived from empirical data on the voting patterns of the United States Supreme Court from 1995 to 2004.

Using data on the 419 non-unanimous decisions that the Court reached in this period, I provide estimates of the ideal position of each justice in one and two dimensional spaces and I calculate how the formation of voting blocs would have changed the decisions of the Court. For each hypothetical connected voting bloc structure I find the decisions that would have been reversed due to the coordination of votes inside the blocs if this voting bloc structure had formed. I assume that the justices that dissented (voted with the minority) on a decision would have liked a reversal of the decision, and those who in the data voted with the majority and won would have been worse off had the decision been reversed. Aggregating over all the decisions, I calculate the net balance of beneficial minus detrimental reversals for each justice induced by the given voting bloc structure, relative to the original data. Assuming that these individual net balances of reversals are payoffs to the justices, I calculate which connected voting bloc structures are stable if justices form voting blocs to maximize their payoff. The only two Nash and Split stable partitions involve two voting blocs of size three: Three of the four liberal justices (Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter, Breyer) in a liberal bloc, and the three most conservative justices, namely Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas in a conservative voting bloc. This empirical exercise shows that justices have strategic incentives to coalesce into voting blocs.

The theory of this paper draws inspiration from different literary subfields.
In the coalition formation literature, the seminal work of Buchanan and Tullock [7] analyzes the costs and benefits of forming a coalition and praise the virtues of unanimity as internal voting rule. Hart and Kurz [18] study the endogenous formation of economic coalitions under the restriction that the overall partition of the society into coalitions is efficient. Carraro [8] surveys more recent non-cooperative theories of coalition formation, but mostly with economic, and not political applications.

The voting blocs I study are political coalitions in nature, and the theory I develop adds a novel insight about endogenous party formation. In previous formal theories of party formation Snyder and Ting [33] describe parties as informative labels that help voters to decide how to vote, Levy [21] stresses that parties act as commitment devices to offer a policy platform that no individual candidate could credibly stand for, Morelli [24] notes that parties serve as coordination devices for like-minded voters to avoid splitting their votes among several candidates of a similar inclination. All these theories explain party formation as a result of the interaction between candidates and voters. Baron [6] and Jackson and Moselle [19] note that members of a legislative body have incentives to form parties within the legislature, irrespective of the interaction with the voters, to allocate the pork available for distribution among only a subset of the legislators. My theory shows that legislators also have an incentive to form parties -voting blocs- in the absence of a distributive dimension, merely to influence the policy outcome over which they have an ideological preference.

Focusing on the US Congress, Cox and McCubbins [9] find that legislators in the majority party use the party as means to control the agenda and the committee assignments, and Aldrich [1] explains that US parties serve both to mobilize an electorate in favor of a candidate, and to coordinate a durable majority to reach a stable policy outcome avoiding the cycles created by shifting majorities. I complement their explanations proving that voting blocs of size less than minimal winning also influence the outcome even if they are not big enough to guarantee a majority, and they generate an ideological policy gain to their members.

Two recent papers in the political economy literature deal with the selection of the voting rule for a single coalition: Barberá and Jackson [5] define self-selecting rules as those that would not be beaten by any other rule if the given voting rule is used to choose among rules; Maggi and Morelli [22] study self-enforcing rules such that agents would want to undertake collective action under such rule. The voting power literature, exemplified by the work of Gelman [17], takes a different approach on coalition formation, and assumes that agents want to maximize the probability of being pivotal in the decision, instead of maximizing the probability that the outcome is favorable to their interests. A last strand of relevant literature deals with the formation of government coalitions by competing parties in a legislature; four decades after Riker [27] showed the advantages of forming minimal winning coalitions, Schofield and Sened [30] present the most advanced theories and the newest empirical findings in the formation of coalition governments in multiparty democratic systems.

In the following sections I attempt to apply the game-theoretic insights of the coalition formation literature to shed light on the political economy problem of coordinating the voting
behavior of the members of a coalition.

2 Motivating Examples

In this section I present three examples to illustrate how the formation of voting blocs affects voting results and policy outcomes. After a simplistic example that illustrates how voting blocs work, I present a more complete example in which two stable voting blocs form in a small assembly, and an application to a larger assembly.

Example 1 Suppose there is an assembly with five agents who have to take a binary choice decision -to approve or reject some action- by simple majority. Suppose that the agents face uncertainty about preferences, in particular, the probability that an agent $i$ favors the action is $\frac{1}{2}$ for each $i$, and these probabilities are independent across agents. Consequently, the probability that exactly $x$ agents favor the action is $\frac{5!}{x!(5-x)!}\left(\frac{1}{2}\right)^{5}$ and the probability that at least three agents favor the action and the action is approved is $\frac{1}{2}$. The outcome coincides with the preference of a given agent $i$ if at least two other agents have the same preference as $i$. This event occurs with probability $\frac{11}{16}$.

Suppose three agents form a voting bloc, such that all three members vote according to the preferences of a majority of members of the bloc -that is, if two members agree, the third votes with them regardless of her own preference. Then the decision reached by the assembly depends exclusively on the preferences of the members of the bloc. The probability that the outcome coincides with the preference of a member $i$ is equal to the probability that at least one other member of the voting bloc has the same preference, which is $\frac{3}{4} = \frac{12}{16} > \frac{11}{16}$. Hence, the agents who form a voting bloc increase the probability that the policy outcome coincides with their wishes. The probability for non-members drops to $\frac{8}{16}$.

A bloc of three agents in Example 1 is stable in the minimal sense that no member wants to leave the bloc. If a member leaves, the new situation with a bloc of size two is identical to the original situation with no blocs, because a bloc of two agents is always ineffective: Either both members agree and vote together as they would in the absence of a bloc, or if they disagree, no side holds a majority so each agent is free to vote her true preference, just as if they were not in a bloc.

However, the bloc with three members is not stable if outsiders are free to join in. Indeed, both outsiders want to join. If one or both of them join, the probability that any agent in the assembly obtains her desired outcome becomes $\frac{11}{16}$, which represent a loss for the three original members of the bloc, but a gain to the entrant. The outsiders cannot achieve anything by forming a new bloc of their own because the old bloc of size three is big enough to act as a dictator in an assembly of size five. Some intuitions gained in this example generalize, as I shall show below: Forming a voting bloc always generates a gain in aggregate utility to its members (Proposition 8) relative to remaining singletons, but if entry to the bloc is open to outsiders, stable blocs cannot be too big relative to the size of the assembly (Proposition 13).
In Example 1, the agents are identical random voters, so that only the size of the bloc matter, and not the characteristics of its members. In the rest of the paper I study heterogeneous agents, some of whom are ex-ante more likely than others to favor the action or policy proposal that is put to a vote.

We can interpret the uncertainty about preferences in two complementary ways: First, suppose there is a time difference between the moment when agents coalesce in voting blocs, and the time of voting in the assembly. Then, when the agents make the commitment to act together they do not fully know which outcome they will prefer at the time of voting. Three legislators may sign a pact today to vote together in votes to come in the future, but they do not know today the agenda or the details of the policies they will vote on in the future. Alternatively, in a world of complete information in which agents vote repeatedly, a legislator who votes for the liberal policy with a certain frequency \( x \) can be modeled as a legislator with a probability \( x \) of voting for the liberal policy in a one-shot voting game.

The random voting model used in Example 1 and in the voting power literature is an extreme case of uncertainty, when agents not only do not know exactly how they will feel about future policy proposals, but they can’t even take a guess. In my paper, I assume that there is some uncertainty about how agents vote, but that ex-ante it is possible to differentiate agents according to their expected preferences. For instance, it is not a foregone conclusion that a Republican legislator in the US Senate will vote in favor of future tax cuts and a Democratic senator against them, but it is ex-ante more probable that the Republican, rather than the Democrat, will favor the tax cuts.

The ex-ante differences in the preferences of the agents are key determinants of the strategic incentives to form voting blocs. Let us see how a polarized small assembly splits into two different voting blocs, none of which is minimal winning.

**Example 2** Suppose there is an assembly with seven agents who have to take a binary choice decision -pass or reject some policy proposal- by simple majority. Suppose that agents have uncertain preferences, so that each agent \( i \) favors the proposal with an independent probability \( t_i \). Suppose \( t_1 = t_2 = t_3 = \frac{1}{4} \) and \( t_4 = t_5 = t_6 = t_7 = \frac{3}{4} \). The following table shows the probability that the policy proposal gathers at least four votes and passes unconditional (column one) and conditional on agent 7 favoring the policy proposal (column two), and the probabilities that the outcome coincides with the preferences of agents 7 (column three), 4 (column four) and 1 (column five), given that no blocs form (row one), that agents 5, 6, 7 form a bloc (row two), that agents 1, 2, 3 form a bloc (row three), that both blocs form (row three) and that 1, 2, 3 form a bloc and 4, 5, 6, 7 form another bloc (row four). If a bloc forms, the whole bloc votes according to the preference of the majority of its members, and in case of a tie, each member votes according

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1 For instance, the countries of the European Union regularly discuss the notion of a common foreign policy. If some day they sign a treaty establishing a binding common foreign policy, they will sign the treaty with incomplete information about the foreign policy issues that will be salient after the treaty is ratified and comes to effect.

2 Within this literature, see Felsenthal and Machover [16] for a study of voting blocs.
None of her own preferences.

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Table 1: Probabilities that the proposal passes and that agents like the outcome.

The numbers on the table come from simple binomial calculations, left to the reader. Glancing at the table it is evident that the formation of different voting blocs has a significant effect on the outcome. Note that regardless of whether the three low types form a bloc or not, three high types are better off forming a voting bloc if they take the actions of the other members as given, and similarly, given that a bloc with three high types form, or given that it doesn’t form, the three low types are better off forming their bloc. The outcome with two blocs of size three is Nash stable - no member of a bloc wants to leave, no other agent wants to enter.

Note that agent 4 in Example 2, identical in all respects to agents 5, 6, 7 does not want to join the bloc of high types. Rather, with two opposing blocs the remaining independent agent is better off, since the two blocs are likely to counterbalance each other and the outcome is then often left for the independent to decide. With only the purely ideological motivation of caring for the policy outcome and no rents from office to distribute among the members of the winning coalition, agent 4 has no incentive to join the bloc of high types, and blocs will not be of minimal winning size.

The insights gained in the previous abstract two examples have important applications to voting in committees, councils, assemblies, and, in particular, in legislatures where legislators can coalesce into political parties that function as voting blocs. For ease of calculation and exposition, the agents in the following example have very specific preference profiles; this is only for illustration, and the body of the paper generalizes the intuitions provided in the example.

Example 3 Consider an Upper House with 100 members in a bicameral system such that a bill approved in the Lower House requires 51 favorable votes in the Upper House to become Law, otherwise a status remains in place. Suppose that the Lower House is under liberal control and always passes liberal bills, while legislators in the Upper House come in three types: 20 conservatives, 30 moderates and 50 liberals. Conservatives oppose every bill, liberals favor every bill, and each moderate favors exactly one third of the bills, in such a way that exactly one third of the moderates favor any given bill. Then, in the Upper House every bill has 60 supporters (10 moderates and 50 liberals) and 40 opponents (20 conservatives and 20 moderates) and in the absence of voting blocs the advocates of the bill always win.
Suppose all 30 moderates and 10 conservatives in the Upper House form a voting bloc which they call the Coalition, and they commit to always vote together by first meeting in a Coalition Caucus and reaching a common position by simple majority in the caucus. For each bill that comes to the Upper House, the Coalition Caucus gives the same outcome: 10 – 30 against the bill. Then, if all the members follow the dictates of the voting bloc they have just formed, in the division of the Upper House none of them votes for the bill, each bill then receives only 50 votes in the floor of the Upper House, all coming from liberal legislators, and the bill is defeated.

The formation of a voting bloc by a minority in Example 3 crucially affects voting results, policy outcomes, the utilities of the legislators involved and, ultimately, the utility of their constituencies. Conservative legislators now always achieve their desired outcome (defeating the bill). Moderate legislators achieve their desired policy in two out of three cases (those in which they oppose the bill), which is twice as often as without a voting bloc. But the example shows only the potential gains of forming a bloc, not the difficulties in making it stable to safeguard these gains. The minoritarian Coalition dominates the Upper House in Example 3 because it manages to forge a voting bloc that quashes internal dissent and shows no fissures in voting patterns.

The Coalition is not stable. Every moderate has an individual incentive to leave. Suppose one moderate defects and becomes an independent. If the independent opposes the bill, the defection has no effect; the bill gathers only 50 votes and fails. But in the event that the independent favors the bill, the bill passes 51 – 49. The independent is now pleased with the outcome with certainty, thus she benefit from her defection to the detriment of those legislators who remain in the Coalition.

The probabilities over events in this example are contrived to make calculations trivial, but two important intuitions generalize.

First, note that while every moderate has an incentive to abandon the Coalition, the ten conservatives gain nothing by leaving. In Proposition 2 below I show that given a voting bloc that leans towards one side of the political spectrum, it is only the most moderate members of the bloc who threaten the stability of the bloc; if the moderate members benefit from participating in the bloc, it follows that the extreme members also benefit from participating. Rewording, it is only the liberal wing of a conservative party, and the conservative wing of a liberal party who determine whether the party can form a stable voting bloc. Intuitively, if the most left-leaning legislator in the US House of Representatives introduces a bill to her liking, the hope that it passes must lie in gaining the favorable vote of Democrats, as it is implausible that a progressive liberal bill - say raising taxes to provide higher unemployment benefits- could pass against the opposition of Democrats by gathering enough Republican votes. If a majority of Democrats opposes the bill, the bill is doomed anyway, so the legislator has nothing to gain by defecting from the Democratic Party.

Second, suppose that the Coalition Caucus changes its rules and adopts the following supermajority internal voting rule: Members have freedom to vote in the Upper House according
to their own wishes unless three quarters of the members of the Coalition share the same view, in which case the whole Coalition must vote together. In a bloc of either 39 or 40 members this rule requires that at least 30 members share the same opinion before the minority is forced to vote with the majority. If all moderates stay in the Coalition they always achieve the threshold and the bloc functions equally as if it was using simple majority: Thirty members oppose the bill, so the whole Coalition votes against it and the bill fails with just 50 liberal votes. Now consider the incentives of a moderate given the new rule. As a member of the bloc, the legislator attains the outcome she wants whenever she opposes the bill, which occurs with probability two thirds. Suppose she leaves the bloc and she opposes the bill. Then there are only 29 legislators left opposing the bill inside the bloc, not enough according to the new rule to force the minority of dissenters to reverse their vote. Hence 10 moderates vote for the bill, and the bill passes 60 − 40. The deviant is now worse off as an independent, because her vote is necessary for the Coalition to act together as a voting bloc, and as a result the Coalition with the new supermajority rule becomes stable.

This result generalizes, as shown in Proposition 5: Under weak conditions on the size of the parties that compose the assembly, and for any size of the assembly, there exist type profiles such that a party cannot form a stable voting bloc if it chooses simple majority as its internal voting rule, but it can form a stable voting bloc with some supermajority internal voting rule. The first preliminary insight into the gains reaped by voting blocs is the following: Whenever the bloc changes the outcome by casting all its votes according to the preferences of its internal majority instead of splitting its vote according to the preferences of all its members, it benefits a majority of members and hurts only a minority, thus producing a net gain for the bloc as a whole.

The second basic insight is that generating a gain is not sufficient for the bloc to be stable -or to form in the first place. Rather, it must be that every agent has a strategic incentive to participate in the bloc. The rest of the paper explores the individual incentives to participate in blocs, and the resulting stability properties of different voting bloc formations as a function of the preferences of the members of the assembly and of the voting rules used by the voting blocs.

3 The Model

Let \( \mathcal{N} = \{1, 2, ..., N\} \) be an assembly of voters, where \( N \geq 7 \) is finite and odd. This assembly must take a binary decision on whether to adopt or reject a policy proposal pitted against a status quo. The division of the assembly is a partition of the assembly into two sets: The set of agents who vote in favor of the proposal, and the set of agents who vote against the proposal. The assembly makes a decision by simple majority and the policy proposal passes if at least \( \frac{N+1}{2} \) agents vote in favor.

A voter \( i \in \mathcal{N} \) receives utility one if the policy outcome coincides with her preference in favor or against the proposal and zero otherwise, hence there is no intensity of preferences.
Let $s_i = 1$ if agent $i$ prefers the proposal to pass, and zero otherwise; let $s = (s_1, \ldots, s_N)$ be a preference profile for the whole set of voters, and let $s_{-i} = (s_1, \ldots, s_{i-1}, s_{i+1}, \ldots, s_N)$ be the profile without the preference of $i$. Similarly, let $v_i = 1$ if agent $i$ votes in favor of the proposal in the division of the assembly, and $v_i = 0$ otherwise.

Agents face uncertainty at the initial stage. They do not know the profile of preferences in favor or against the proposal. They only know, for each profile of preferences $s \in S = \{0, 1\}^N$, the probability that $s$ will occur. Let $\Omega : \{0, 1\}^N \rightarrow [0, 1]$ be the probability distribution over profiles and assume $\Omega$ is common knowledge. Let $t_i$ be the type of agent $i$, which is the probability that $i$ favors the policy proposal, so $t_i = P[s_i = 1]$. If these probabilities are not correlated across agents, then I say that types are independent.

**Definition 1** Types are independent if $\Omega(s) = \prod_{i \in N} [t_i s_i + (1 - t_i)(1 - s_i)]$ for all $s \in S$.

If types are independent the probability that $i$ favors the policy proposal is $t_i$ for any given realization of preferences by the rest of agents, that is, $P[s_i = 1|s_{-i}] = t_i$ for all $i \in N$ and all $s_{-i} \in S_{-i} = \{0, 1\}^{N-1}$.

Let the assembly be composed of two exogenously given coalitions $L$ and $R$, which I call “parties” and a set $M$ of independent agents who belong to neither of the two parties, so $N = L \cup R \cup M$. Let $N_L$, $N_R$ and $N_M$ be the respective sizes of $L$, $R$ and $M$ and assume for simplicity that all three sizes are odd. This setting applies to a legislature such as the US House of Representatives or the US Senate in which legislators affiliate to one of the two dominant political parties, or remain independent. Each of the two parties $C = L, R$ can coordinate the voting behavior of its members by forming a voting bloc $V_C = (C, r_C)$ with an internal voting rule $r_C$ that maps the preferences of its members into votes cast by the bloc in the division of the assembly. Then it becomes a strong party that exhibits party discipline in voting. I assume that joining a voting bloc is voluntary, so the party as a whole forms a voting bloc only if every member wants to participate in it, otherwise only a coalition of agents representing the subset of party members who want to participate form a voting bloc, and the rest of party members do not coordinate their votes, effectively becoming independents. Independent agents who are not originally affiliated to a party do not coordinate their votes.

The timing of events is as follows.

Given an arbitrary pair of internal voting rules $r_L$ and $r_R$, each member in party $L$ simultaneously chooses whether to join the voting bloc with rule $r_L$ or remain outside the bloc to act independently, and similarly each member in $R$ chooses whether to join the voting bloc with rule $r_R$ or not. Two voting blocs thus form, each bloc containing the members of a party who choose to join it. Then a preference profile $s$ is realized, each agent $i$ learns her own preference $s_i$, and the two voting blocs hold their internal meetings. Finally the whole assembly meets and agents vote according to the outcome of their voting bloc’s internal meeting if they have joined any, or according to their own wishes otherwise.

Given a coalition $C$ of size $N_C$ that forms a voting bloc, in their internal meeting the members of $C$ determine their coordinated voting behavior according to their own internal
rule $r_C$, where $r_C = r_L$ if $C \subseteq L$ and $r_C = r_R$ if $C \subseteq R$ and I assume that the voting bloc has commitment mechanisms such that the outcome of this internal meeting is binding. In particular:

1. If $\sum_{i \in C} s_i \geq r_CN_C$, then $\sum_{i \in C} v_i = N_C$. If the fraction of $C$ members who prefer the policy proposal is at least $r_C$, then the whole bloc votes for the proposal in the division of the assembly.

2. If $\sum_{i \in C} s_i \leq (1 - r_C)N_C$, then $\sum_{i \in C} v_i = 0$. If the fraction of $C$ members who are against the policy proposal is at least $r_C$, then the whole bloc votes against the proposal in the division of the assembly.

3. If $(1 - r_C)N_C < \sum_{i \in C} s_i < r_CN_C$, then $\sum_{i \in C} v_i = \sum_{i \in C} s_i$. If neither side gains a sufficient majority within the voting bloc, each member votes according to her own preference in the division of the assembly.

I assume that $r_L$ and $r_R$ are such that the thresholds $r_LN_L$ and $r_RN_R$ are integers weakly larger than $\frac{N_L+1}{2}$ and $\frac{N_R+1}{2}$ respectively. With an $r_C$ - majority internal rule, the integer $r_CN_C$ is the number of votes the majority in the voting bloc $(C, r_C)$ must gather in order to roll the internal minority and act as a unitary player in the division of the assembly, casting all $N_C$ votes in favor of the policy advocated by the majority of the bloc. A rule $r_C = \frac{N_C+1}{2N_C}$ is simple majority, and $r_C = 1$ is unanimity, which is identical to not coordinating any votes -members only vote together if they all share the same preference.

Members of a voting bloc reveal their private preference by voting in the internal meeting of the bloc. Since there are only two alternatives, and the rules of both blocs and the assembly are such that the probability that each alternative wins is increasing in the number of votes it receives, sincere voting is weakly dominant; voting against her preference can only make an agent worse off. Therefore, it is safe to assume that members of a bloc reveal their preference truthfully and then it is without ambiguity that I use the same notation for the true preference $s_i$ and the vote of agent $i$ inside the bloc. In a more straightforward interpretation that bypasses internal voting, a bloc learns the true preferences of its members and its aggregation rule maps the internal preferences into a number of votes to be cast in favor of the policy proposal in the division of the assembly.

Since non-dominance alone results in sincere voting, the only remaining strategic consideration in the model is about membership in a voting bloc. Participation in a voting bloc is voluntary and members of a party choose to join their party’s voting bloc according to their own individual incentives. Agents seek to maximize the ex-ante (before preferences are revealed) probability that the policy outcome in the assembly coincides with their policy preference. They only participate in a voting bloc if belonging to the bloc increases this ex-ante probability.

I seek to explain under what conditions a party can behave as a cohesive unit, forming a stable voting bloc in which every member voluntarily participates. While the equilibrium

3 To be formally precise, I would need to define a new variable $\hat{s}_i$ to denote the preference expressed by $i$ in the internal meeting of coalition $C$, and let $\sum_{i \in C} \hat{s}_i$ determine the outcome of the internal meeting, but since sincere voting is weakly dominant, $\hat{s}_i = s_i$ for all $i \in C$, all $C \subseteq \mathcal{N}$ and all $s \in S$. 

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properties of the entry game I have described are interesting, I focus on a narrower question: When is a party stable? Rather than searching for equilibria after the original parties break up and subsets of these parties form voting blocs, I find under what conditions a party can form a voting bloc imposing voting discipline upon its members and every member accepts the party discipline so that the voting bloc is stable. The stability concept that I use is merely a voluntary participation condition. Whoever belongs to a bloc must be weakly better off as a member of the bloc than deviating to become an independent. If a single party member doesn’t want to join the bloc given that every other member does, the party cannot form a stable voting bloc with voluntary participation.

**Definition 2** A voting bloc $V_C = (C, r_C)$ is Individual-Exit stable if every member $i \in C$ weakly prefers to join the bloc than to become an independent and let the bloc $(C \setminus i, r_C)$ form instead.

Members of a voting bloc must be weakly better off ex-ante, at the time they commit to participate in the bloc, before they learn their own preferences. Once voting blocs form, I assume that there are binding mechanisms so that ex-post the losing minority within a bloc cannot renege from the commitment to vote with the bloc’s majority; that is, the outcome of the internal meeting of the voting bloc is enforced.

This is a partial-equilibrium definition: For $C = L, R$, a voting bloc $V_C = (C, r_C)$ is Individual-Exit stable if it is a best response in the entry game for every agent in $C$ to join the voting bloc given that every other agent in $C$ joins the bloc, and taking as given the outcome of the formation process in the other party. Each party may then be Individual-Exit stable conditional on the formation or not of a voting bloc in the other party. I study the stability of the assembly as a whole at the end of the section, providing a more formal extension of Definition 2 to encompass the incentives to deviate by all agents in multiple voting blocs. First, I focus on the formation of a bloc by a given party as a best response to the strategies of the other party.

To capture the insight that party membership is correlated with policy preferences, I assume that party $L$ leans left and tends to vote in the aggregate against the policy proposal, while party $R$ leans right and with high probability a majority of its members favor the policy proposal. To make this informal statement more precise, I introduce some notation.

Given the probability distribution $\Omega$ over preference profiles, for any $C \subseteq \mathcal{N}$, let $g^C(x)$ be the probability that $\sum_{i \in C} s_i = x$. For any $i, h$ in $C$, let $g^C_i(x)$ be the probability that $\sum_{k \in C \setminus i} s_k = x$ and let $g^C_{ih}(x)$ be the probability that $\sum_{k \in C \setminus \{i, h\}} s_k = x$.

**Definition 3** A set of agents $C$ of odd size $N_C$ leans right if for any non-negative $k$

$$g^C\left(\frac{N_C - 1}{2} - k\right) \leq g^C\left(\frac{N_C + 1}{2} + k\right).$$

$C$ leans left if the inequality signs are reversed and is symmetric if the condition holds with equality.
For a set of even size, the relevant inequalities are:

\[ g^C \left( \frac{N_C}{2} - k \right) \leq g^C \left( \frac{N_C}{2} + k \right) \text{ for any positive } k. \]

Definition 3 is best interpreted as follows: A coalition \( C \) leans right if for any size of the internal majority and minority within the coalition, it is at least as likely that the majority favors the policy proposal than that the majority rejects the proposal. Similarly, if for any majority-minority split of preferences it is more likely that the majority rejects the alternative, then the coalition leans left.

Assuming that one party leans left, a second party leans right, and the set of independent agents is symmetric, the following results show the necessary and sufficient condition on the types of the members of a party for this party to be able to form a stable voting bloc, given that the opposing party forms (or doesn’t form) its own bloc.

**Lemma 1** Let \( N = L \cup M \cup R \). Suppose types are independent, \( L \) leans left and forms a voting bloc \((L, r_L)\), \( M \) is symmetric and for any \( i \in R \), \( R_i \) leans right. Let \( l \in R \) be such that \( t_l \leq t_i \) for all \( i \in R \). Suppose \( R \) forms a voting bloc with an internal rule \( r_R \). If agent \( l \) prefers to participate in the voting bloc \((R, r_R)\) than to become an independent, then every \( i \) in \( R \) prefers to participate.

Lemma 1 provides an important insight: The stability of the voting bloc \((R, r_R)\) depends only on the agent with the lowest type in \( R \). The intuition is that if the most leftist member in party \( R \) has an incentive to participate in a right-leaning voting bloc, then every other party member has an even greater incentive to belong to the bloc. The left-most agent is the least likely to benefit from the actions of the bloc and the most likely to be rolled to vote against her wishes, hence if she doesn’t want to deviate, no one else will.

Lemma 1 and other results below assume that \( M \) is symmetric and \( L \) leans left and forms a voting bloc \((L, r_L)\). This assumption can be weakened. First, since the result holds if \( r_L \) is unanimity, it implicitly holds as well if no voting bloc forms in \( L \) - since forming a voting bloc with unanimity is identical to not forming a bloc. More generally, it suffices to assume that the distribution of votes cast in the division of the assembly by the set of agents \( L \cup M \) (those not in \( R \)) is such that given any size of the majority vote in \( L \cup M \), with probability at least \( \frac{1}{2} \) this majority is against the proposal. Formally, it suffices that:

\[
P\left[ \sum_{i \in L \cup M} v_i = \frac{N_L + N_M}{2} - k \right] \geq P\left[ \sum_{i \in L \cup M} v_i = \frac{N_L + N_M}{2} + k \right] \text{ for any positive } k.
\]

This condition is similar to \( L \cup M \) leaning left, but it applies to the probability distribution of actual votes cast in the division of the assembly after accounting for the coordination of votes inside \( L \), and not to the probability distribution over true preferences.

Lemma 1 shows that inside each party only one extreme agent matters to determine whether the party can form a stable voting bloc. In particular, I next show that a party leaning right can form a stable voting bloc if and only if its left-most agent is not too far to the left, or, in other words, if the lowest type in the party is high enough.
**Proposition 2** Let $\mathcal{N} = L \cup M \cup R$. Suppose that types are independent, $L$ leans left and forms a voting bloc $(L, r_L)$, $M$ is symmetric and for any $i \in R$, $R_{-i}$ leans right. Let $l \in R$ be such that $t_l \leq t_i$ for all $i \in R$. Suppose $R$ forms a voting bloc with an internal rule $r_R$. The voting bloc $(R, r_R)$ is Individual-Exit stable if and only if $t_l$ is higher than a cutoff function $t^{inR}(r_R, r_L, t_{-l})$.

If the type of agent $l$ is high enough, she wants to participate in the $(R, r_R)$ voting bloc; if she wants to participate, every other member of $R$ wants to participate and the bloc is Individual-Exit stable. Intuitively, if $R$ forms a voting bloc the main consequence is that with a high probability most members of $R$ favor the policy proposal, those who don’t are rolled and compelled to vote in favor of it, and the policy proposal passes with a higher probability. An agent $l$ only wants to join such a bloc that essentially turns around nay-sayers to make them support the policy proposal if $l$ likes the proposal with a high enough probability. The cutoff is a function of the sizes of the blocs, the internal rules they use, and the types of all the other agents in the society.

A symmetric result applies to the left party. Given that $(R, r_R)$ forms, the voting bloc $(L, r_L)$ is stable only if the highest type $t_h$ among the members of $L$ is below a cutoff function $t^{inL}(r_L, r_R, t_{-h})$. Taking both results together, a corollary follows:

**Corollary 3** Let $\mathcal{N} = L \cup M \cup R$. Suppose that types are independent, $L_{-i}$ leans left for all $i \in L$, $M$ is symmetric and $R_{-j}$ leans right for any $j \in R$. Let $h \in L$ be such that $t_h \geq t_i$ for all $i \in L$ and let $l \in R$ be such that $t_l \leq t_j$ for all $j \in R$. Then it is a Nash equilibrium of the entry game for every agent in $L$ and $R$ to respectively join $(L, r_L)$ and $(R, r_R)$ if and only if

$$t_h \leq t^{inL}(r_R, r_L, t_{-h}) \text{ and } t_l \geq t^{inR}(r_L, r_R, t_{-l}).$$

The two parties can each form a stable voting bloc if the highest type in the left bloc is not too high, and the lowest type in the right bloc is not too low. Note that the types of the members of each bloc may overlap, i.e. the right-most member of the Left bloc may be to the right of the left-most member of the Right bloc, but not too far to the right, and similarly agents too far to the left will not belong to the Right bloc.

The exact threshold $t^{inR}(r_R, r_L, t_{-l})$ above which an agent with type $t_l$ wants to join the voting bloc $(R, r_R)$ depends on the size and voting rule of the bloc $(L, r_L)$, the number of independents and the type profile of all agents other than $l$ in the assembly, all of which are variables exogenous to $R$. But it also depends on party $R$, both on its size and the voting rule it uses to aggregate preferences within its own bloc.

Simple majority, $r_C = \frac{N_C + 1}{2}$, is the internal rule that maximizes the sum of utilities of the members of a voting bloc $V_C = (C, r_C)$. I show this in detail in Proposition 8 below, but the intuition is as follows: A voting bloc only has an effect in utilities if the coordination of the voting behavior of its members alters the policy outcome in the division of the assembly. A voting bloc subtracts votes from the position supported by its internal minority, adding them to the internal majority position. Hence, if the bloc alters the outcome in the assembly, it changes
it from the outcome preferred by a minority of the members of the bloc to the one preferred by a majority of members of the bloc. Since there is no intensity of preferences, it follows that the sum of utilities in the bloc increases. Simple majority always rolls the minority votes, so it maximizes the probability that the bloc alters the outcome in the division of the assembly and gains a surplus, so it maximizes the sum of utilities of the bloc.

Notwithstanding the advantages of simple majority, for some parameters a bloc with simple majority is not stable: Agents face a temptation to leave and “free-ride” from the coordination of votes by the bloc. Other supermajority \( r_C \) internal rules reduce the surplus gained by the bloc, but in some instances make the bloc stable. I explore this possibility in the following two results.

**Proposition 4** Let \( \mathcal{N} = L \cup M \cup R \). Suppose types are independent and \( R \) is composed of \( N_R \) homogeneous agents with a common type \( t_R \). Then the voting bloc \((R,r_R)\) with \( r_R = \frac{N_R-1}{N_R} \) is Individual-Exit stable.

The voting bloc thus formed is stable regardless of the formation process of other voting blocs or the types of other agents in the assembly. Indeed, irrespective of the other agents, forming a bloc generates a surplus for its members, as discussed briefly above and proved below for a more general case in Proposition 8. Identical members of a homogeneous bloc all benefit from the surplus. Under a supermajority rule \( \frac{N_R-1}{N_R} \), if the bloc loses a single member, it effectively disbands, since with the reduced membership it would only reach the internal threshold for a sufficient majority if all agents agree, in which case the bloc never affects the outcome and generates no surplus. For example, imagine a bloc with 7 members and a 6/7 rule, so that only minorities of one are rolled. If an agent deviates and leaves the bloc, the new bloc with 6 members and a 6/7 rule is irrelevant: A majority of 5 to 1 does not represent a 6/7 majority, so the bloc never rolls its minorities. Thus, a stringent supermajority rule that makes every agent essential to roll a minority deters exit -at least in a homogeneous bloc. The loss in surplus is significant with such a stringent rule, since the bloc forsakes the opportunity to roll bigger minorities granted by simple majority. However, as shown in the next proposition, there are some parameters for which a bloc with simple majority is not stable, and if a party wants to form a stable bloc, it would need a more stringent internal voting rule.

**Proposition 5** Let \( \mathcal{N} = L \cup M \cup R \). Suppose that types are independent with \( t_i \in (0,1) \) for all \( i \in \mathcal{N} \setminus R \). Suppose that \( L \) leans left and forms a voting bloc \((L,r_L)\), \( M \) is symmetric, \( N_L \leq \frac{N_R-1}{2} \) and \( 3 < N_R \leq \frac{N+1}{2} \). There exists a vector of type profiles for the members of \( R \) such that \( R \) leans right and \((R,r_R)\) is not Individual-Exit stable if \( r_R \) is simple majority, but it is Individual-Exit stable for some supermajority internal rule \( r'_R \).

Parties that cannot form a voting bloc with simple majority (because their members would leave), can form a stable voting bloc that only coordinates the votes of its members when the internal majority in the party is more substantial than a mere majority of one. Figure 1
Figure 1: Individual-Exit stability of \((R, r_R)\) for \(r_R \in \{1/2, 2/3, 8/9\}\).

illustrates this result. To be able to plot \(t_{lnR}(r_R, r_L, t_{-l})\) as a function of a single parameter, I let \(N_L = 11\), \(N_R = 9\), \(N_M = 31\), \(t_i = 0.3\) for all \(i \in L\), \(r_L = 6/11\) (simple majority), \(t_m = 0.5\) for all \(m \in M\) and \(t_h = t_R\) for all \(h \in R \setminus l\). Given these values, I plot \(t_{lnR}(r_R, r_L, t_{-l})\) as a function of \(t_R\) for \(r_R = 5/9\) (simple majority), 2/3 and 8/9. It is clearly observed that the more stringent the internal voting rule of \(R\), the lower the type of \(l\) can be such that \(l\) wants to participate in the voting bloc \((R, r_R)\).

While I do not study in this paper the endogenous selection of voting rules for a party, it follows that the internal voting rule that maximizes the sum of utilities of the members of a voting bloc among the class of \(r\) – majority rules, subject to the constraint that the voting bloc be Individual-Exit stable is the lowest possible rule such that the bloc is stable. For some parameters, this rule is a supermajority.

This result contrasts with the findings of Maggi and Morelli [22] who study a single coalition that votes on whether or not to take a collective action. They find that the optimal self-enforcing rule in an infinitely repeated game is always either the rule that maximizes the social welfare if agents are patient enough, or unanimity if agents are impatient, and never an intermediate rule. A key difference between this paper and theirs is that they restrict attention to homogeneous agents (or in their terminology, “symmetric” agents) who all share the same type. A second important difference is that in their model the collective action of the coalition does not generate an externality to non-members. I show that once we take into account that agents are heterogeneous and that the actions of a coalition generate externalities to non-members, a supermajority rule that is not welfare-maximizing for the coalition sometimes becomes the optimal internal rule given the constraint that agents cannot be forced to join a voting bloc to participate in the collective action -in my case, the coordination of votes- undertaken by the coalition.

This formal result is consistent with the “conditional party government” applied theory of

\footnote{The assumption that the \(L\) members have a common type 0.3 is arbitrary, and a very similar graph would result for any vector of types in coalition \(L\) such that \(L\) will vote no with probability close to one.}
Rohde [29] and Aldrich and Rohde [2], who look at party discipline in the US Congress and conclude that back-benchers delegate authority to their leaders to impose a party line only when there is little disagreement within the party. In the words of Cox and McCubbins [9], page 155:

The gist of conditional party government is that the party leadership is active only when there is substantial agreement among the rank and file on policy goals. If this hypothesis is true, one would expect that decreases in party homogeneity should lead, not to decreases in support given to the leaders when they take a stand, but rather to leaders taking fewer stands. This is essentially what we find.

Proposition 5 show that this finding is not an idiosyncrasy of the Democratic and Republican parties in the US Congress, but rather, a general principle is at work: Party leaders find it easier to make their party work as a disciplined voting bloc if they only enunciate a party line when the minority of dissenters inside the party is small, and they let members vote freely whenever the internal minority is large.

Next I study how the possibility that a party forms a stable voting bloc depends on the extremism of the types of its members. I show that a sufficiently extreme party cannot form a stable voting bloc unless it uses the very restrictive almost-unanimity internal voting rule considered in Proposition 4.

**Proposition 6** Let $N = L \cup M \cup R$. Suppose types are independent, $M$ is symmetric, $R$ leans right and forms a voting bloc $(R, r_R)$ and $N_L < N_R + N_M$. Let $(x_1, ..., x_{N_L})$ be an arbitrary vector such that $x_i \in [0, 1]$ for all $i = 1, ..., N_L$. Suppose the types $(t_1, ..., t_{N_L})$ of the members of $L$ are of the form $t_i = \alpha x_i$. If $\alpha$ is low enough, $(L, r_L)$ with $r_L \leq \frac{N_L - 2}{N_L}$ is not Individual-Exit stable.

A corollary to Proposition 6 is that no extreme party of size more than three but less than minimal winning can form a voting bloc with simple majority, even if its members all share a common type. The intuition for this negative result on the stability of extreme parties is that the preference of the internal majority is all but certain: In an extreme-left party, the majority rejects the policy proposal with probability very close to one. In the -almost complete- absence of uncertainty about the result of the internal vote, agents prefer to step out of the voting bloc to avoid being rolled when they happen to favor the policy proposal. Only if $r_C N_C = N_C - 1$ the result in Proposition 4 applies and a party of extremist is stable because if one of them steps out of the bloc, the bloc dissolves and there is no possibility to enjoy the benefits of the formation of the bloc while remaining out of it.

With simple majority as internal voting rule, the maximum size up to which a minority voting bloc is stable is inversely related to the extremism of its members. I show this in a numerical example, which tracks the maximum size of parties capable of forming stable voting blocs as a function of the polarization of both a symmetric and an asymmetric assembly, split
into two homogeneous parties one at each side of the political spectrum and a number of moderate independents in between.

**Example 4** Let $\mathcal{N} = L \cup M \cup R$. Suppose $N = 101$, types are independent, $t_i = 1/2$ for every agent $i \in M$, $t_j = t_L$ for every member $j \in L$ and $t_k = t_R$ for every member $k \in R$. Columns two and three of the following table show the maximum size of the two parties $L, R$ such that $(L, r_L)$ and $(R, r_R)$ are Individual-Exit stable with $r_C = \frac{N_C + 1}{2N_C}$ for $C = L, R$, for a symmetric assembly where $N_L = N_R$ (column two) and an asymmetric assembly where $N_L = 2N_R - 1$ (column three), given the degrees of polarization specified in the different rows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$(t_L, t_R)$</th>
<th>$N_L = N_R$</th>
<th>$N_L = 2N_R - 1$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$0.45, 0.55$</td>
<td>31, 31</td>
<td>29, 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$0.4, 0.6$</td>
<td>23, 23</td>
<td>25, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$0.3, 0.7$</td>
<td>13, 13</td>
<td>17, 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$0.2, 0.8$</td>
<td>7, 7</td>
<td>9, 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$0.1, 0.9$</td>
<td>3, 3</td>
<td>5, 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The example illustrates the plausible intuition that extremists are only able to coordinate in small numbers, while moderate agents can form larger voting blocs.

Sometimes a party cannot form a stable voting bloc because it faces a free-riding problem. Every party member would be better off if the party forms a voting bloc, but some individual party members benefit even more if the bloc is formed without them, so they have an incentive to leave the party and let others coordinate their votes. To address this collective action problem, suppose that a party does not allow a single member to step out of the bloc and free ride on the advantages provided by the voting bloc, but rather, the party only forms a voting bloc if all of its members participate. In other words, the party renounces to enforce any voting discipline if a single member refuses to accept it.

If a party is able to commit to an “all or none” outcome in which either the whole party forms a voting bloc or every party member votes independently, individual incentives to participate change: Now an agent cannot leave the party and expect to reap the benefits from the rolling of minority votes inside the bloc while facing no risk of ever being forced to vote against her own preference. In the new calculation each agent weighs the gain brought by the bloc, and not the marginal advantage of being in or out of a bloc that forms. It follows that under some circumstances, agents who would prefer not to participate in the bloc now choose to join only because their participation becomes essential to the very existence of party discipline. By committing to form a bloc only by unanimous agreement, a party can sometimes overcome the collective action problem it faced under individual participation.

Given that the opposite party forms a voting bloc, suppose party $C \in \{L, R\}$ plays the following game $\mathcal{G}_C$: Every $i \in C$ simultaneously chooses whether or not to sign a conditional participation contract, by which $i$ joins the voting bloc if and only if every other member in $C$ joins the bloc too. If every $i \in C$ signs the contract, then the party forms the voting bloc $(C, r_C)$, otherwise member of $C$ do not coordinate their votes.
The players in the closed membership game $G_C$ are the $N_C$ members of party $C$. The set of pure strategies of each player is binary: Sign or not sign. Payoffs for each agent are given by the probabilities over policy outcomes determined by $\Omega$ and by the voting blocs resulting from the game. The internal voting rule for the bloc is in this description exogenous, but it could be incorporated into the strategy of the players, making the party form a bloc if and only if all the members agree on a common rule, and those who do not want to participate can merely propose unanimity, assuring that no bloc with a rule different than unanimity can form. Let $G$ describe a larger game in which both parties choose simultaneously whether or not to form a voting bloc by signing conditional contracts.

Results similar to Lemma 1 and Proposition 2 apply to the closed membership game $G_C$ just described (these results are available from the author). If the type of the member with the lowest type in party $R$ is high enough then this member benefits from the formation of the bloc $(R, r_R)$ and it is a weakly dominant strategy for her to commit to participate in the voting bloc. If so, it is a weakly dominant strategy for every member to commit to participate.

Party $C$ has something to gain by playing the game $G_C$ to form a voting bloc instead of trying to form a bloc with whoever wants to join. For some parameters, by threatening not to form a bloc if a single party member fails to join, in the equilibrium of the game $G_C$ party $C$ forms the voting bloc $(C, r_C)$ even though this bloc is not Individual-Exit stable if the bloc does not dissolve after an individual deviation. Proposition 7 states this result formally.

**Proposition 7** Let $N = L \cup M \cup R$. Suppose that types are independent, $M$ is symmetric, $R$ leans right and forms a voting bloc $(R, r_R)$ and $N_L < N_M + N_R$. Then there exists a vector of types $(t_1, ..., t_{N_L})$ for the members of $L$ for which the voting bloc $(L, r_L)$ with $r_L \leq \frac{N_L - 2}{N_L}$ is not Individual-Exit stable, but in the game $G_L$ it is a Nash equilibrium in weakly undominated strategies for every $i \in L$ to commit to participate in $(L, r_L)$.

In short, if the dissolution of the voting bloc follows the departure of a single party member, then such departure -which would occur if the bloc did not react to the deviation and continued functioning with a shrunk membership- is forestalled. This result extends to the game $G$ in which both parties use conditional contracts to determine the formation of their respective voting blocs: There exist vector of types for which, regardless of whether $R$ forms or not a voting bloc, party $L$ cannot form an Individual-Exit stable voting bloc with $r_L \leq \frac{N_L - 2}{N_L}$, but nevertheless in the Nash equilibrium of the game $G$ every member of $L$ commits to participate in the voting bloc $(L, r_L)$. Conditional contracts to form a voting bloc only with unanimous participation allow parties to solve the collective-action action problem that sometimes arises when parties try form a voting bloc to coordinate the votes of their members.

I have studied the incentives of each of two parties to form a voting bloc. Proposition 2 shows the necessary and sufficient condition for a voting bloc with a majority rule to be Individual-Exit stable. Propositions 5 and 7 propose two solutions that can help a party form a voting bloc when a bloc with simple majority is not stable: Either to use a supermajority,
or to commit not to form the voting bloc unless every party member participates, if such a commitment is possible.

In the following subsection, I generalize the model by weakening several assumptions and allowing new voting blocs to form.

3.1 Generalization. Endogenous Voting Blocs

The model so far applies to an established assembly that uses simple majority as its voting rule and has two well-defined parties. The results have shown under what conditions these parties can form stable voting blocs that coordinate the votes of all their members.

Now imagine instead an assembly $\mathcal{N}$ where all agents are free to coalesce with whomever they wish, with no pre-assigned cleavages or factions to restrict their coordination with any other member of the assembly. If parties exist they are unorganized entities, mere labels that represent no hindrance to the formation of voting blocs across party lines. The assembly uses a majority voting rule $r_\mathcal{N}$ which may differ from simple majority, such that the (still exogenous) policy proposal passes if it gathers at least $r_\mathcal{N}N$ votes and a status quo stays in place otherwise.

The probability distribution over preference profiles is as before $\Omega$, but types need not be independent. Rather, the only restriction that I impose for some results below is that $\Omega$ has full support, that is, $\Omega(s) > 0$ for all $s \in S = \{0, 1\}^N$.

Agents form voting blocs facing uncertainty over preferences, then they privately learn their own preference, they vote internally in the voting bloc they belong to, and then they vote in the assembly according to the outcome of their bloc, or according to their own wish if they are not members of any bloc.

I am interested in the problem of finding a configuration of the assembly into voting blocs that is stable. Let $C_0$ denote the subset of agents who remain independent and do not coordinate their votes with any other agent. I treat this subset of agents as if they formed a voting bloc with unanimity as its internal voting rule, so that they only vote together if they all agree. Then, I refer to the configuration of agents into voting blocs in the assembly as the voting bloc structure of the assembly.

Definition 4 A voting bloc structure $(\pi, r)$ is a pair composed of a partition of the assembly $\pi = \{C_j\}_{j=0}^J$ and a corresponding set of voting rules $\{r_j\}_{j=0}^J$ such that $r_0 = 1$ and for $j \in \{1, \ldots, J\}$, $V_j = (C_j, r_j)$ is a voting bloc with internal rule $r_j$.

Note that the voting bloc structure specifies both the membership of each voting bloc, and the rule that each bloc uses to aggregate its internal preferences. I assume that for any voting bloc $V_C = (C, r_C)$, the rule $r_C$ is such that $r_C N_C$ is an integer weakly larger than $\frac{N_C + 1}{2}$, where $N_C$ is the size of coalition $C$. When I consider deviations from the voting bloc $(C, r_C)$, I assume that $r_C$ doesn’t change following the defect of some members or the entry of a new member; as a result, in the new voting bloc $(C', r_C)$ with size $N_C'$ that follows the deviation it is possible that $r_C N_C'$ is no longer an integer.
The voting bloc structure \((\pi, r)\), together with the preference profile \(s\) determines the vote of agent \(i\) in the division of the assembly, which I denote \(v_i(\pi, r, s)\). Let \(u_i(\pi, r)\) be the ex-ante expected utility for agent \(i\) with the voting bloc structure \((\pi, r)\).

An important result is that any coalition of agents attains a non-negative net change in aggregate utilities if they form a voting bloc instead of remaining independent, regardless of the configuration of the rest of the assembly.

**Proposition 8** Given a voting bloc structure \((\pi, r)\), suppose a subset \(C'_{J+1} \subset C_0\) deviates and forms a new voting bloc \((C'_{J+1}, r'_{J+1})\). Denote the resulting voting bloc structure in which no further deviations from \((\pi, r)\) take place by \((\pi, r)\). Then \(\sum_{i \in C'_{J+1}} u_i(\pi', r') \geq \sum_{i \in C_{J+1}} u_i(\pi, r)\). A simple majority internal voting rule \(r'_{J+1}\) maximizes the sum of utilities for the members of the new voting bloc \(\{C'_{J+1}, r'_{J+1}\}\).

As discussed in the previous subsection, a voting bloc only has an effect if it reverses the policy outcome. If it does, it favors its internal majority at the expense of its internal minority, generating a net gain. With simple majority the bloc always rolls its internal minority, maximizing the probability that the bloc alters the outcome in the division of the assembly and generates the mentioned net gain. Consequently, simple majority is the internal rule that maximizes the sum of utilities of the members of the bloc, just as it is the rule for the assembly that maximizes the utilitarian social welfare if all agents vote independently, as shown by Curtis [10].

Not only the members of the new bloc benefit. Agents whose preference coincides with the majority of the new bloc with high enough probability also benefit from the formation of the bloc.

Individual utility maximizing agents, however, are not concerned with social welfare or the effect of a bloc on the rest of society. They are only concerned from the benefit they derive from joining a voting bloc. Proposition 8 assures members of a bloc that collectively they benefit from its formation, but if agents cannot make compensating transfers, a surplus for a coalition does not guarantee a benefit to each of its members, and even if they all benefit, some agents may still have an incentive to leave and receive the benefits of the bloc as an externality without bearing the costs. The main goal in this subsection is to find stable voting bloc structures in the assembly when any arbitrary coalition of agents can form a voting bloc. I consider alternative definitions of stability.

The first notion is the already familiar Individual-Exit stability, which only requires voluntary participation in voting blocs, so that each agent is free to leave and become an independent. I now define the concept more rigorously for a voting bloc structure.

**Definition 5** A voting bloc structure \((\pi, r)\) is Individual-Exit stable if \(u_i(\pi, r) \geq u_i(\pi', r)\) for any \(i \in \mathcal{N}\) and any partition \(\pi' = \{C'_j\}_{j=0}^J\) such that:

(i) \(l \in C'_j \iff l \in C_j\) for all \(l \in \mathcal{N}\setminus i\) and all \(j \in \{0, 1, ..., J\}\), and

(ii) \(i \in C'_0\).
Informally, a voting bloc structure is Individual-Exit stable if each of its voting blocs is itself Individual-Exit stable. This stability concept is similar, but less restrictive than the Individual Stability used by Drèze and Greenberg [12].

**Definition 6** A voting bloc structure \((\pi, r)\) is **Individually stable** if \(u_i(\pi, r) \geq u_i(\pi', r)\) for any \(i \in N\) and any partition \(\pi' = \{C'_j\}_{j=0}^J\) such that:

(i) \(l \in C'_j \iff l \in C_j\) for all \(l \in N \setminus i\) and all \(j \in \{0, 1, ..., J\}\), and

(ii) for \(j \in \{1, ..., J\}\), if \(i \in C'_j\) then \(u_i(\pi', r) \geq u_i(\pi, r)\) for all \(l \in C'_j\).

Individual-Exit stability considers deviations only by departure from a bloc; Individual Stability allows for entry if it benefits every member of the coalition that receives an entrant. Entry is even more fluid under Nash stability; in a Nash stable voting bloc structure each agent is free to leave its bloc to become an independent or to migrate to any other bloc. In a Nash stable voting bloc structure every agent belongs to the bloc she likes most.

**Definition 7** A voting bloc structure \((\pi, r)\) is **Nash stable** if \(u_i(\pi, r) \geq u_i(\pi', r)\) for any \(i \in N\) and any partition \(\pi' = \{C'_j\}_{j=0}^J\) s.t. \(l \in C'_j \iff l \in C_j\) for all \(l \in N \setminus i\) and all \(j \in \{0, 1, ..., J\}\).

It follows from the definitions that the set of voting bloc structures that are Nash stable is contained in the set that are Individually Stable, which is itself contained in the set of Individual-Exit stable voting bloc structures.

Once stable voting bloc structures are identified, it is important to know if they have any effect in the outcome. Taking the structure with no voting blocs in which all agents act as independents as a benchmark, I analyze whether or not the formation of voting blocs affects the policy outcomes at least under some preference profile. If it never affects the policy outcomes, the coordination of voting behavior prompted by the voting blocs is irrelevant.

**Definition 8** Let \((\pi^0, r^0)\) be the voting bloc structure in which all agents remain independent. A voting bloc structure \((\pi, r)\) is **relevant** if with positive probability the policy outcome under the structure \((\pi, r)\) differs from the outcome under \((\pi^0, r^0)\).

In short, if there is a relevant stable voting bloc structure, the coordination of voting behavior inside the blocs affects the policy outcome. It is possible to apply a similar definition to specific voting blocs, rather than to the whole structure. A particular voting bloc \((C, r_C)\) is relevant if the coordination of votes inside the bloc \((C, r_C)\) affects the policy outcome with positive probability. Formally:

**Definition 9** Let \((\pi, r)\) be a voting bloc structure with \(J\) blocs \(j = \{0, 1, ..., \widehat{j}, ..., J\}\) such that \(r_0 = 1\). Let \((\pi, r')\) be such that \(r'_0 = 1\) and \(r'_j = r_j\) for all \(j \in \{0, ..., J\}\) \(\setminus \widehat{j}\). The voting bloc \(V'_j = \{C'_j, r'_j\}\) is **relevant** in the structure \((\pi, r)\) if with positive probability the outcome under the structure \((\pi, r)\) differs from the outcome under \((\pi, r')\).

The next result shows that there exist relevant stable voting bloc structures.
Proposition 9 Suppose $\Omega$ has full support and $r_N \leq \frac{N-1}{N}$. Then there exists a relevant Individually stable voting bloc structure. If $r_N \in \left(\frac{N+1}{2N}, \frac{N-1}{N}\right)$, then a voting bloc structure with a single bloc $(C,r_C)$ such that $C = N$ and $r_C < r_N$ is relevant and Individually stable.

Two corollaries immediately follow.

Corollary 10 Suppose $\Omega$ has full support and $r_N \leq \frac{N-1}{N}$. Then there exists a relevant Individual-Exit stable voting bloc structure.

Nash stability implies Individual stability, which implies Individual-Exit stability. However, if the grand coalition forms a voting bloc, there is no opportunity to deviate by entering a bloc (since every agent is already a member), hence in this case the voting bloc structure is Nash stable if and only if it is Individual-Exit stable.

Corollary 11 Suppose $\Omega$ has full support and $r_N \in \left\{\frac{N+1}{2N}, \frac{N-1}{N}\right\}$. Then there exists a relevant Nash stable voting bloc structure. In particular, a voting bloc structure with a single voting bloc $(C,r_C)$ s.t. $C = N$, $r_C < r_N$ is relevant and Nash stable.

If the voting rule of the assembly is simple majority, then Proposition 9 shows that a relevant Individually stable voting bloc structure exists. In particular, a voting bloc structure with a unique voting bloc $(C,r_C)$ such that $N_C = N - 2$ and $r_C$ is simple majority is relevant and Individually stable. The bloc acts as a dictator and its members don’t want to leave and would not benefit by admitting any of the two non-members into the bloc. This particular voting bloc structure is not Nash stable because the two non-members, who are essentially excluded from the decision-making process, would enter the bloc is such a deviation was feasible for them. In fact, for some probability distributions over preference profiles, there is no relevant Nash stable structure. The next result shows existence of a Nash stable structure, and the following one describes characteristics of relevant Nash stable structures, provided they exist.

Proposition 12 A Nash stable voting bloc structure exists.

The grand coalition $C = N$ with $r_C \in [r_N, 1]$ is irrelevant, but Nash stable. In a bloc $(N, r_C)$ with $r_C \geq r_N$, if the majority in the bloc had enough supporters to roll $i$, then it has enough supporters to win in the division of the assembly, regardless of the rolled votes. Thus, an agent cannot change the outcome by leaving, and the bloc is Nash stable.

Proposition 12 relates closely to Corollary 11: If the coalition of the whole forms a bloc with a lower internal voting rule than the rule used in the division of the assembly, the voting bloc is relevant. If it forms a bloc with a higher internal voting rule, it is irrelevant. In both cases it is Nash stable, but in the first one it effectively functions as if it endogenously changed the voting rule of the assembly, and in the second case it merely makes some proposals pass (or fail) with unanimity when they would have passed (or failed) just by majority.

If they exist, Nash stable voting blocs have to be of size smaller than minimal winning.
Proposition 13 Suppose $\Omega$ has full support and $r_N = \frac{N+1}{2N}$. Then in any relevant Nash stable voting bloc structure $(\pi, r)$, $N_C < \frac{N+1}{2}$ for any voting bloc $\{C, r_C\}$ with a simple majority internal voting rule, and if there exist at least one singleton in $(\pi, r)$, then $N_C < \frac{N+1}{2}$ for any relevant voting bloc $\{C, r_C\}$.

Proposition 13 tells us that a relevant voting bloc cannot be large enough to act as a dictator. If it is, every agent would like to join. To illustrate this result, think of the solid Democratic South of the US during the first half of the 20th century. In an essentially one-party system, any politician with some aspirations of furthering his ideal policies through the State legislatures had a strong incentive to become a Democrat, irrespective of his political ideology. With no barriers to enter blocs, competition among opposing blocs only occurs if the weaker blocs also have a hope of influencing the policy outcomes.

A complete characterization of Nash stable voting bloc structures in full generality is an overly ambitious task, since the solution varies with the size of the assembly and the probability distribution over preference profiles of its members. Instead, in the following section I illustrate the model at work applying the theory to a small assembly of size nine, using the empirical data from the United States Supreme Court.

4 A Small Assembly. The US Supreme Court

The theoretical model of endogenous voting blocs at the end of the previous section showed that there exist stable partitions of an assembly into voting blocs, but besides predicting that Nash stable voting blocs are of size less than minimal winning, it provided limited information about the features of these stable voting bloc structures. In this section I seek a more detailed description of the voting blocs that we expect to find in a small assembly. First I provide the theoretical prediction in a stylized assembly of size nine and then I look at data from the United States Supreme Court from 1995-2004.

4.1 Endogenous Voting Blocs in a Small Assembly

Consider an assembly with nine voters who have independent and symmetric types distributed as follows: $t_1 = t_2 = 0.5 - \alpha - \beta; t_3 = t_4 = 0.5 - \alpha; t_5 = 0.5; t_6 = t_7 = 0.5 + \alpha; t_8 = t_9 = 0.5 + \alpha + \beta$, with $\alpha, \beta \geq 0$ and $\alpha + \beta \leq 0.5$. That is, types are symmetrically distributed around one half.

The parameters $\alpha$ and $\beta$ have an intuitive interpretation: $\alpha$ measures the polarization of preferences within the assembly. A hypothetical coalition of moderates comprising agents 3 through 7 (enough to become a majority centered around the median) spans an interval of types of length $2\alpha$. The more polarized the members of the assembly are, the larger $\alpha$ and the larger the differences in types that a coalition of moderates must accommodate in order to form a voting bloc. The parameter $\beta$, albeit crudely, reflects the heterogeneity in types within each side of the assembly, or in other words, the extremism of the left-most and right-most wings.
An intuitive conjecture is that intense polarization in the assembly would make a central voting bloc unstable and would induce the formation of two opposing voting blocs, one on each side of the median.

Proposition 12 on the existence of Nash stable voting bloc structures allowed for a multiplicity of solutions under the most restrictive solution concept -Nash stability- that only considers individual deviations. Indeed, several Nash stable voting bloc structures exist in the particular assembly presented in this subsection.5

None of the solution concepts that I have studied so far allows members of a bloc to coordinate a coalitional deviation. Hard as it may be for agents to communicate and coordinate across blocs, it seems easier to scheme a deviation in which a subset of members in a bloc defect together, and possibly form a new voting bloc. The following stability concept allows for a coalitional deviation in which one bloc faces a split, a number (possibly zero) of its members defect, and at the same time a (possibly empty) subset of the defectors and previously independent agents form a new voting bloc.

**Definition 10** A voting bloc structure \((\pi, r)\) with \(J\) blocs is **Split stable** if there exists no partition \(\pi' = \{C'_j\}_{j=0}^{J+1}\), rule \(r_{J+1}\) and coalition \(C'_j \in \pi\) such that:

(i) For all \(j \in \{1, \ldots, J\}\), \(r'_j = r_j\),

(ii) for all \(j \in \{1, \ldots, J\}\) and all \(i \in N\), \(i \in C'_j \iff i \in C_j\),

(iii) for all \(i \in N\), \(i \notin C'_j \implies i \notin C'_j\),

(iv) for any \(i \in N\) s.t. \(i \in C'_0\) and \(i \notin C_0\), \(u_i(\pi', r \cup r_{J+1}) \geq u_i(\pi, r)\) and for any \(i\) s.t. \(i \in C'_{J+1}\), \(u_i(\pi', r \cup r_{J+1}) > u_i(\pi, r)\).

Conditions (i) and (ii) say that all other blocs remain unaffected by the coalitional deviation involving independent agents and members of bloc \(V'_j\); both the internal rules and the membership of these blocs remain the same, and the internal rule \(r'_j\) of the bloc \(V'_j\) is also kept intact. Condition (iii) states that in the new partition the bloc that suffered the defection gains no new members. Condition (iv) states that agents who defect become better off. When agents are indifferent between deviating or not, this fourth condition incorporates an intuitive discrimination: Agents would abandon a bloc to become independents when indifferent, but they only deviate to a new bloc for a strict improvement. That is, agents break indifference as if they had a lexicographic preference for independence.

The intuition for the Split notion of stability is that coalitional deviations across blocs are harder to coordinate, perhaps because communication is limited across blocs, or because different blocs are antagonistic and suspicious of each other (i.e. Western and Soviet blocs during the Cold War); whereas, a disaffected subset of a bloc can more easily break apart and possibly recruit some independent agents for a new voting bloc. As an example, the moderate wing of the UK’s Labour party broke off in 1981 and formed the Social Democratic Party, which

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5 The complete Mathematica file with the results and figures in this subsection is available at www.hss.caltech.edu/~jon, or by email directly from the author.

25
attracted up to 28 former Labour MPs.\textsuperscript{6}

The notion that some members of a coalition may organize a coordinated defection even though deviations across coalitions are not feasible is common to two previous concepts of equilibrium in the non-cooperative coalition formation literature: The Coalition-Proof equilibrium by Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston \cite{Bernheim1995} and the Equilibrium Binding Agreements by Ray and Vohra \cite{Ray1997}. In these two concepts, agents negotiate as if each coalition was in a separate room, and any group of agents in the same room could leave and find a new room for themselves, with the important proviso that every deviation must itself be immune to further deviations (once they deviants reach their new room, it must be that no subset of them would want to leave for yet another room), so the definitions are recursive.

Split stability is different first in that it is not a recursive concept, since I don’t require a coalition of deviants to be immune to further deviations. Second, while I do not consider deviations across coalitions, I allow deviants to coordinate with independents. Under Split stability, agents negotiate as if each coalition was in its own room, but the independents were all in a central lobby, so that when a set of deviants departs from a coalition they can recruit any number of independents in their way to a new room.

Why use Split stability? First, although the requirement that deviations be themselves immune to further deviations adds consistency to the Coalition-Proof and Equilibrium Binding Agreements solution concepts and makes them theoretically more elegant, it also adds a layer of unwelcome complexity. Allowing for best-response type of deviations makes Split stability a much simpler concept to define and use in applications. Second, agents may prefer to proceed with a deviation even if this deviation is itself unstable. If it is difficult to predict the stream of deviations that will follow an initial departure and agents cannot anticipate the ultimate outcome propitiated by their deviation, a subset of agents displeased with the original configuration may choose to deviate for a short-sighted gain even if subsequent deviations by other agents could potentially undo the improvement brought by their first move. If so, Coalition-Proof and Equilibrium Binding Agreements solutions will be unstable.

In this section I find the connected voting bloc structures in a nine agent assembly that are relevant and Nash and Split Stable.

\textbf{Definition 11} A voting bloc structure \((\pi, r)\) is \textbf{connected} with respect to the order \(<\) if for all \(C \in \pi\) and for all \(i, j, k \in N\), \((i, k \in C \text{ and } i < j < k)\) implies \(j \in C\).

Using numerical simulation for a fine grid of values of \(\alpha\) and \(\beta\), I find which connected voting bloc structures are such that no agents would have an incentive to deviate to a different structure. The order of agents is according to their type, so a voting bloc is connected if its members are in consecutive positions in the ordering by types. Axelrod \cite{Axelrod1997} provides a detailed argument in favor of connected coalitions over non-connected ones.

\textsuperscript{6}Admittedly, cross-party deviations are sometimes also successful, as illustrated by the new Kadima party in the Israeli Knesset.
The intuition that in a very polarized assembly there won’t be a unique moderate bloc, but rather, two blocs one in each side of the political spectrum is verified. There are only four connected voting bloc structures that are Nash and Split stable. These are all such that exactly two blocs \( L \) and \( R \) form with simple majority internal voting rules, each with three members, and \( L \subset \{1, 2, 3, 4\}, R \subset \{6, 7, 8, 9\} \). That is, three of the four members of the assembly with a low type form a voting bloc, and three members with a high type form another bloc. It is easy to visualize the \( L \) bloc as a pro-status quo party, which tends to vote against the policy proposal, and the \( R \) bloc as a reform party, which tends to vote for the policy proposal.

Figure 2a,b,c shows in black the parameter values for which each voting bloc structure is Nash and Split stable. For any \( \alpha < 0.5 \), the voting bloc structure is relevant.

The three figures share the common characteristic that only for a high \( \alpha \) the voting bloc structure is stable. If the assembly is not polarized and agents share similar types, then each agent in voting bloc \( L \) has an incentive to defect to \( R \), effectively disbanding \( L \) since no bloc can function with only two members. If there is enough polarization, defections across blocs no longer occur.

As a summary, this subsection has shown that if the assembly is sufficiently polarized, there is a stable and relevant connected voting bloc structure composed of two opposing blocs, located one at each side of the median. In the rest of the section I depart from the stylized assumptions of the modelled assembly (symmetry and independence of types), looking instead at real data from the United States Supreme Court. After introducing the Court and the policy preferences of its members, I calculate the effect of voting blocs upon the outcome of the Court.
4.2 The United States Supreme Court

The United States Supreme Court is the ultimate appellate court in the United States judicial system, and the arbiter of the United States Constitution. It is composed of nine justices and it uses a simple majority rule, so that the vote of five justices are enough to decide a case. The Court makes a binary decision on the merits of each case: It either affirms or reverses the ruling of a lower court. In an accompanying Opinion, the Court provides the argumentation for its decision, and this Opinion serves as precedent for future cases.

I use the data on the decisions of the Court from The United States Supreme Court Judicial Database compiled by Spaeth [34] and I select all non-unanimous cases with written opinions in which all nine justices participate.\(^7\) Spaeth codes the votes of each justice as zero or one depending on whether the vote to affirm or reverse the decision of the previous court is interpreted as more liberal or more conservative. An alternative binary coding of the votes which is unambiguously objective divides the votes between votes with the majority, and dissents - votes with the minority.

Table 2 shows the number of liberal votes and the number of dissents that each justice cast in the 419 non-unanimous decisions recorded from 1995 and 2004. The nine justices, abbreviated by the first three letters of their surname, are: Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter, Breyer, O’Connor, Kennedy, Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas.

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<td>307</td>
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<td>71</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>115</td>
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Table 2: Liberal and dissenting votes in 419 decisions.

The most extreme justices, either liberal or conservative find themselves in the minority of dissenters more often than the moderate justices. Justice O’Connor, traditionally regarded as the swing justice, dissents in only about one in six cases, while Justice Stevens, who is the most liberal member of the Court, dissents from the majority in roughly a half of the cases.

If justices formed voting blocs, the coordination of votes would change the voting record of the justices, the composition of the majority and dissent justices in each case, the outcome of some decisions, and, assuming that justices are policy-oriented, the utility or satisfaction of the justices with the outcome of the Court. I calculate the changes brought by any possible connected voting bloc structure in the Court.

The notion of a connected voting bloc requires an ordering of justices from one to nine. In the tables and the text I of this section I use the ordering according to the number of liberal votes cast as recorded by Spaeth [34]. I check if this ordering is robust by means of calculating the ideal location of the justices in a space vector using three mathematical methods that

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\(^7\)The unit of analysis in my data is the case citation (ANALU=0), the type of decision (DEC_TYPE) equals 1 (orally argued cases with signed opinions), 6 (orally argued per curiam cases) or 7 (judgments of the court), and I drop all unanimous cases and all cases in which less than 9 justices participate in the decision.
abstract from the substantive content of each case and attend only to the voting patterns and correlations across the justices. Although my basic goal is to obtain an objective and robust ordering of the justices, these analyses have an intrinsic value in that they provide estimates of the location of each justice in a vector space with an easy interpretation in ideological terms such as a liberal/conservative scale.

The three methods I use are: Singular Value Decomposition of the original data, Eigen Decomposition of the square matrix of cross-products of the locations of the justices, and the Optimal Classification method developed by Poole [25], and I compare these three estimates with the findings of Martin and Quinn [23] and [20], who use Bayesian inference in a probabilistic voting to estimate the ideal points of the justices. In Table 3 I provide the ideal position of the justices estimated by Single Value Decomposition and Eigen Decomposition, the rank ordering given by the Optimal Classification method in one dimension, the estimate of the position in the first dimension given by the Optimal Classification method in two dimensions, and the estimates obtained by Martin and Quinn. First I briefly explain each of the methods.

Mathematically, the Singular Value Decomposition of a rectangular matrix $X_{419 \times 9}$ is

$$X_{419 \times 9} = U_{419 \times 419} D_{419 \times 9} V_{9 \times 9} \text{ s.t. } U'U = I \text{ and } V'V = I.$$  

The matrix $X$ contains the original data of zeroes (dissents) and ones (votes with the majority), each case in a row and each justice in a column. This original data is decomposed into two orthogonal matrixes and a diagonal matrix. The vectors in the square matrix $V$ represent the estimates of the ideal point of each justice in nine new dimensions, such that the estimates for the first dimension represents the best fit to the original data with only one dimension; the estimates for the second dimension are the best fit adding a second dimension but taking the estimates for the first dimension as given, and the estimates for the $k$-th dimension are the best fit in $k$ dimensions taking the previous $k-1$ dimensions as given. Here, “best fit” means the approximation that minimizes the sum of the squared error between the approximation and the original data. The “single values” along the diagonal of $D$ are all positive and represent the weights of each of the dimensions. See Eckart and Young [13] for the original mathematical idea.

The Single Value Decomposition generates nine new coordinates capturing the most frequent alignments of voting in the Court, and gives the location of each justice in all nine dimensions, so that taking only the first one or two dimensions gives the best approximation of the location of the justices in this reduced subspace.

The Eigen Decomposition and the Optimal Classification method require some previous steps. First, I calculate the disagreement matrix, which is a $9 \times 9$ matrix that shows for each pair of justices, the proportion of cases in which they do not vote together. Second, I convert the disagreement score matrix into a matrix of squared distances, just by squaring each cell. Third, I double-center the squared distances matrix by subtracting from each cell the row mean and the column mean, adding the matrix mean, and dividing by (-2). Double centering the squared distances matrix removes the squared terms and produces a cross-product matrix of
the legislator coordinates. For details of these steps, see Poole [25]. The Eigen Decomposition
of the cross-products matrix produces nine eigenvectors, which we can interpret as estimates
of the location of the justices in nine dimensions, and nine corresponding eigenvalues, which
assign weights to each of the dimensions. Mathematically, the Eigen Decomposition of a square
matrix $X_{9 \times 9}$ is

$$X_{9 \times 9} = U_{9 \times 9} D_{9 \times 9} U_{9 \times 9}^{-1},$$

where the elements of the diagonal are the eigenvalues, and the vectors of $U$ the eigenvectors.

The Optimal Classification method in one dimension applied to the Supreme Court data
ranks justices from one to nine, and ranks each case in between a pair of justices, predicting
that all justices to one side will vote one way, and all justices on the other side will vote the
other way. For instance, if a case is ranked between 2 and 3, the OC method predicts that
justices 1 and 2 vote in the minority and the other seven justices in the majority. If in the real
data justice 3 also votes with 1 and 2, then that’s one classification error and the OC method
aims to minimize the number of these errors.

The algorithm used in the Optimal Classification method is as follows. Starting with the
rank ordering of the justices given by the first vector of the Eigen Decomposition of the double-
centered squared-distances matrix, assign a rank to every case in such a way that the ranks
minimize the total number of errors. Then, given the rank of every case, assign a new rank to
the justices to minimize the number of errors given the ranking of cases. The algorithm proceeds
iteratively re-ranking cases given the ranking of justices and then re-ranking justices given the
ranking of cases until it converges to a solution that jointly gives a rank of both justices and
cases that minimizes the number of classification errors. In two dimensions, instead of rank
orderings, the OC method assigns a position in the space for each justice -or, more precisely,
an area where the justice is located- and for each case it gives a cutting line partitioning the
space into the area where it predicts that justices vote with the majority and the area where it
predicts that justices vote with the minority. Poole [25] provides a careful explanation of this
method.

To my best knowledge, the most complete analysis of the location of the ideal policies of
recent Supreme Court justices is the Supreme Court Ideal Point Research conducted by Martin
and Quinn [23] and [20], who use a probabilistic voting model and Bayesian inference to estimate
the ideal policies of the justices in a unidimensional space. A particularly useful feature of their
project is that they study the dynamics of the Court, and they update they results year by
year at the homesite of the project at adw.wustl.edu/supct.php. I take the average of the
and the Optimal Classification method range from minus one (most liberal) to plus one (most
conservative). Martin and Quinn’s estimates could take any value in the real line, but since
the scaling of their estimates is arbitrary, I rescale their estimates dividing by five to ease the
comparison across rows in Table 3.

As shown in the table, the different methods produce similar estimates that mostly corrob-
Table 3: Estimates of the location of the ideal policies of the justices.

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The ordering according to Martin and Quinn and according to the Single Value Decomposition (SVD) coincides exactly with the ordering according to the proportion of liberal votes. It is important to note that the estimates from the SVD in the table correspond to the second dimension of the SVD. The first dimension is an “agreement dimension” in which all justices get a very similar value; this dimension captures the insight that justices tend to vote together very frequently and it is only the second vector that provides the relevant information of the location of the justices in the dimension of interest. I report the estimates for the first dimension and the weight for all nine dimensions in the appendix. Sirovich [32] used the same method to study the voting patterns of the Court from 1995 to 2002, and his estimates are similar to mine as was to be expected, with two differences. First, he fails to omit the unanimous decisions. As a consequence, the first dimension in his analysis is more accurately an agreement dimension in which all justices get an approximately equal estimate, and this (uninteresting) “agreement dimension” carries more weight than in my analysis. Second, in my data Justice Souter appears to be more liberal. This reflects the fact that Justice Souter gradually drifted during his tenure in the Court, a fact also recorded by Martin and Quinn.

The estimates according to the first eigenvector of the Eigen Decomposition of the cross-product of justices’ coordinates switch the positions of Souter and Breyer by a very slim margin, and otherwise coincide with the proportion of liberal votes or the estimates by SVD.

The Optimal Classification method with one dimension again switches the ordering of Souter and Breyer, but with two dimensions, Optimal Classification returns Souter back to the left of Breyer and it alters the ordering of Scalia and Thomas.

All estimates agree in the following partial order ≺:

Ste ≺ Gin ≺ Sou ≺ O’Co ≺ Ken ≺ Reh ≺ Sca ≺ Tho.

The only open questions are the relative ordering of Breyer and Souter, and the relative ordering of Scalia and Thomas. Rather than making a questionable assumption about these two pairs of justices, I consider all four lineal orders consistent with the partial order ≺ and I evaluate all the voting bloc structures that are connected according to one of these four lineal orders. Formally, a partial order is a binary relation that is reflexive, transitive and antisymmetric.
A lineal order adds the property of being total, that is, it orders every pair of elements. For instance, the coalition $C = \{Ste, Gin, Sou\}$ is connected given the partial order $\prec$ because it is connected given the linear order that ranks Souter third and Breyer fourth and the coalition $C' = \{Ste, Gin, Bre\}$ is also connected given $\prec$ because it is connected given the linear order that ranks Breyer third and Souter fourth. But if a coalition contains both Gin and O'Co, then it must contain both Bre and Sou to be connected given $\prec$.

4.3 Endogenous Voting Blocs in the US Supreme Court

“People ask me whether I was sorry that I was in the minority in Bush vs Gore. ‘Of course I was sorry!’ I’m always sorry when I don’t have a majority.” Justice Stephen Breyer of the US Supreme Court.8

To calculate the effect of voting blocs upon the utility of the justices, it is necessary to make an assumption about the utility function of the justices.

I assume that justices are outcome oriented: Each individual justice has policy preferences over the outcome of each decision, and, as quoted from Justice Breyer, wants the Court to reach a decision according to the preference of the justice. This assumption is consistent with the attitudinal model of the Court by Segal and Spaeth [31], who consider competing models of the functioning of the Court and conclude that a model of sincere voting by policy-oriented justices best explains the decisions of the Court. In earlier work, Rohde [28], studied the formation of coalitions in the writing of opinions in the Warren Court (1953-1968) and assumed that the optimization problem of the justices is to have the policy output of the Court approximate as closely as possible his own preference. If Segal and Spaeth [31] are correct and justices vote sincerely, then each justice wanted the decision of the Court to coincide exactly with the vote that the justice cast and every dissent is a defeat. Even if justices do not always vote sincerely, it would be difficult to discern the true preferences of the justices beyond their revealed preferences, so I assign utilities according to the actual votes cast by the justices.

The Court makes a binary decision on the merits of each case: It either affirms the ruling from a lower court, or it reverses it; it sides with the plaintiff, or with the defendant; with the liberal position, or the conservative one. For instance, in a case in which a lower court took a conservative view and sided with the plaintiff, the outcome of the decision is either affirm-plaintiff-conservative or reverse-defendant-liberal. I assume that each justice prefers one of these two outcomes over the other and each justice gets a higher utility if his preferred outcome is the one selected by the Court by majority voting. Then I assume that for the aggregate of all 419 cases from 1995 to 2004 the goal of each justice was to maximize the number of cases in which the decision of the Court coincides with the preference of the justices, as revealed by the vote of the justice. Table 2 then provides the ultimate satisfaction of each justice with the series of decisions of the Court: 419 minus the number of dissents is my measure of the utility or satisfaction of each justice with the output of the Court from 1995 to 2004. This measure

---

of utility implicitly assumes that justices only care about how often they obtain a majority, or in other words, that they do not care more about some decisions over others. While this assumption is admittedly unrealistic, it is a simplifying step to circumvent the need to assign weights for each case and justice.

I calculate how the outcomes would have changed if justices had formed voting blocs, and how the satisfaction of each justice would have changed accordingly. For a given voting bloc structure in the Court, I assume that each bloc holds a private internal vote before the division of the Court, and in these internal votes I assume that each justice votes according to how the justice voted in reality in that case. Then I aggregate the votes inside each bloc according to the majority rule of the bloc, and I calculate the new outcome in the division of the Court, once I take into account that some justices now cast a vote against their preference along the lines dictated by the majority of their bloc. Finally, I calculate how many decisions change with the voting bloc structure under consideration relative to the original data, and for each justice I calculate the net balance of decisions that change to favor her preferences minus the number of decisions that change against her preference.

**Example 5** Suppose Ginsburg, Souter and Breyer form a voting bloc. Then the net change in the number of decisions in which each justice is satisfied with the outcome is as follows:

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Example 5 shows that had Ginsburg, Souter and Breyer committed to always vote together rolling internal dissent among the three, each of them would have achieved their preferred outcome more often even if sometimes they had to vote against their preference. Comparing these numbers to those in Table 2, Ginsburg would reduce the number of cases that end up against her preference by almost 8%. Souter and Breyer by about 3%.

If justices Ginsburg, Souter and Breyer had formed a voting bloc, 20 decisions out of 419 would have been reversed, *Atwater vs City of Lago Vista* (2001) among them. In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not forbid a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal offense, such as a misdemeanor seatbelt violation punishable only by a fine. Justices Souter, Kennedy, Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas voted with the majority. Justice O'Connor, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer, wrote a dissent arguing that a seatbelt violation is not a reasonable ground for arrest, and thus the arrest is in violation of the Fourth Amendment that prohibits unreasonable seizure. With the exception of Souters, there is a clean division of the Court between more liberal justices favoring broader Civil Rights, and more conservative justices favoring Law Enforcement. Had Souters voted with Ginsburg and Breyer, the Court would have found the arrest to be unconstitutional.

More recently, in two famous cases decided on June 27, 2005, the Court ruled that the display of the Ten Commandments in two courthouses in Kentucky is in violation of the First Amendment Establishment Clause for the Separation of Church and State, but it also ruled that a display of the Ten Commandments in the Texas State Capitol is not unconstitutional. Justices
Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter and O'Connor voted against the displays both in the Kentucky and Texas cases, while justices Kennedy, Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas voted in favor of the displays in both cases. Justice Breyer voted against the Kentucky displays in *McCreary County vs ACLU*, giving the liberals a 5-4 majority, but he voted in favor of the Texas display in *Van Orden vs Perry*, giving the conservatives a 5-4 majority. Had Breyer voted with Souter and Ginsburg in both cases, the Texas display would have been ruled unconstitutional, just as the Kentucky ones.

Note that when a justice in a voting bloc has to vote against his true preference in the division of the Court, he would only be satisfied with the outcome if his vote -along with the whole bloc he belongs to- ends up in the minority of the Court. Hence Example 5 doesn’t measure the extra number of times that Ginsburg, Souter or Breyer are in the majority, but the extra number of times that they are satisfied with the outcome. In so far as justices are ideologically motivated, it is reasonable to say that for a justice to win means that the preferred outcome of this justice prevails, regardless of whether the justice voted for or against her favored outcome in the division of the Court.

Epstein and Knight [15] argue that justices make strategic choices deviating from their preference for the sake of achieving the policy outcomes they desire so that the Law that emanates from the Supreme Court rulings is “the long term product of short-term strategic decision-making.” I argue that if justices are strategic in their actions, then they must be tempted to devise not just short-sighted strategies for one case, but rather long-term strategic plans such as forming a voting bloc. For instance, if Justice Breyer had formed a voting bloc with Ginsburg and Souter and no other justice had reacted to that bloc, Justice Breyer would have lost fewer cases, exactly four less.

Assume the counterfactual that Ginsburg, Souter and Breyer form a voting bloc. This bloc is Individual-Exit stable because all three members benefit from joining so none would want to deviate and leave disbanding the bloc. However, the voting bloc structure in which Ginsburg, Souter and Breyer form the only voting bloc is neither Nash stable, nor Split stable, because other justices have incentives to react to this bloc. Table 4 displays the net payoffs to each justice relative to the benchmark with no voting blocs if Stevens joins the bloc (first row), and if the Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas form another voting bloc (second row). A summary comparison between Table 4 and the table in Example 5 reveals that Stevens would benefit if he joined the liberal bloc, increasing his net utility from +12 to +13. Hence the voting bloc Gin – Sou – Bre is not Nash stable. The second row reveals that Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas would reduce their loses from the formation of the Gin – Sou – Bre bloc if they formed their own bloc.

A single bloc with the four liberal justices is Nash stable, but it is not Split stable, because Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas have an incentive to form their own bloc to counterbalance the four liberals just as much as they do against a bloc of three liberals.

On the other hand, the voting bloc structure with both a liberal bloc formed by Ginsburg, Souter, Breyer and a conservative bloc formed by Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas is Nash stable and
Split stable. With the partial ordering $\prec$ discussed above, the following result summarizes my findings on the stability of hypothetical voting blocs in a nine agent assembly whose members faced an agenda and preference profile identical to those of the US Supreme Court justices between 1995-2004.

**Result 14** Any voting bloc structure in which three of the four most liberal justices (Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter, Breyer) form a voting bloc and Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas form a second voting bloc is Nash and Split stable, and there exists no other Split stable connected voting bloc structure.

I show the payoffs -net changes in the number of cases that each justice wins- given that $\{\text{Ste, Gin, Sou}\}$ form a voting bloc, and the three most conservative justices form another voting bloc in row three of Table 4. For the sake of comparison, in rows four and five I show the payoffs if one member of the liberal bloc deviates and the bloc dissolves, leaving $\{\text{Reh, Sca, Tho}\}$ as the unique bloc, and the payoffs if the conservative bloc dissolves and $\{\text{Ste, Gin, Sou}\}$ remain as a bloc. It is clear that no justice wants to abandon the bloc he belongs to.

In the appendix I provide a table with the payoffs for each justice for a sample of voting bloc structures with a single bloc and for the two Split Stable voting bloc structures not already listed in Table 4. For all other connected voting bloc structures, I provide the payoffs for each justice and a deviation (if any exists) that makes such structure not Nash stable or not Split stable in an Excel file that also contains the original data and formulas to replicate the calculations. This file is available at www.hss.caltech.edu/~jon, or directly from the author.

According to Result 14, the stable voting bloc partitions are such that two opposing blocs - one at each side of the ideological spectrum- counterbalance each other, and the swing moderate agents, in this case O’Connor and Kennedy remain unaffiliated, independent. Stable voting bloc partitions merely reinforce the polarization of the Court into a liberal group and a conservative group of justices, and do not produce a major realignment of votes. As a curiosity, the most famous decision of this court, the 5-4 division in Bush vs Gore (2000) which stopped the recount of the Florida votes and gave Bush the presidency would not have been reversed, since it was already the case that the four liberals voted together in the minority, and the two moderate conservatives and three conservatives voted together in the majority. The formation of a stable connected voting bloc would have made this particular 5-4 conservative-liberal division more
frequent, but this was already the most frequent split of the Court.

Consider the stable voting bloc structure in which Stevens, Ginsburg and Souter form a voting bloc, and Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas form another voting bloc. In terms of the location of each of the blocs in an ideological space, each of the blocs converges near the location of its median member. Indeed, the liberal bloc casts 313 liberal votes where Ginsburg alone casts 308 (Stevens and Souter cast 344 and 307, see Table 2) and its position in space according to SVD is -0.318, indistinguishable from Ginsburg’s in the dimension of interest, while the conservative bloc casts 72 liberal votes for 84 of Scalia (98 and 71 by Rehnquist and Thomas) and locates by SVD at 0.392, where Scalia alone is at 0.398.

Compare Result 14 with the stylized assembly with 9 agents who have symmetric and independent types. Note that the stable voting bloc structures in Result 14 are a subset of those in the idealized assembly. The theory predicted that stable voting bloc structures would consist of two blocs of size three, one with three of the four most liberal members, the other with three of the four most conservative members. The prediction with the empirical data fits within this set of stable voting bloc structures, and the only difference is that the conservative bloc has to be {789} and cannot be {678} instead. The cause of this difference is that the modelled assembly assumed that agents 3 and 4 and agents 6 and 7 are identical. In the empirical application, Souter and Breyer are indeed similar enough in their voting behavior, but Kennedy is markedly different from Rehnquist, and in particular Kennedy is not conservative enough to benefit from forming a bloc with Rehnquist and Scalia.

The following two comments suggest that Result 14 should be interpreted with caution.

First, theSplit stable voting bloc structures are in accordance to those predicted by the more abstract model and reinforce the intuition that the assembly is likely to split into two opposing voting blocs that counterbalance each other, one at each side of the ideological spectrum and leaving a number of unaffiliated moderate independents. However, this result is based on the particular stability concept that I have chosen. The question of which equilibrium refinement or which stability concept is appropriate is still open in the literature.

Second, this section has shown what voting bloc structures would be stable in an assembly with nine rational agents who are strategic and can coordinate their votes without constraints, and whose preferences are consistent with those revealed by the pattern of votes in the US Supreme Court for 1995-2004. It has not provided, nor did it intend to provide, a theory of voting in the Court. I leave to Supreme Court scholars these tasks. Restraints of a legal, normative or ethical nature may deter Supreme Court justices from committing to vote as a bloc and this section doesn’t attempt to explain voting in the US Supreme Court as much as it intends to illustrate how voting blocs could affect outcomes in practice, and what voting bloc structures would be stable. The data from the US Supreme Court serves by proxy to shed some light into the formation of voting blocs in committees, councils, small assemblies, and all sorts of political caucuses, in which the incentives to form the blocs will be salient and the restraints that Supreme Court justices face are probably absent -and, crucially, the data on the preferences of its members is also absent.
I have proved that members of a committee or assembly with size and preferences identical to those of the US Supreme Court face strategic incentives to coalesce into voting blocs. An explanation of whether or not the US Supreme Court justices act upon these strategic incentives is beyond the scope of this paper.

5 Conclusion and Extensions

Members of a democratic assembly - legislature, council, committee - can affect the policy outcome by forming voting blocs. A voting bloc coordinates the voting behavior of its members according to an internal voting rule independent of the rule of the assembly, and this coordination of votes affects the outcome in the division of the assembly.

I have shown that stable voting bloc structures exist for various concepts of stability in a model in which agents with heterogeneous preferences coalesce into voting blocs endogenously.

In a model with two parties that can each form a voting bloc I have shown the necessary and sufficient condition for every member in a party to have an incentive to join the bloc, and how these incentives change with variations on the type of the agents, the voting rule chosen by the parties, the sizes of the parties and the polarization of the assembly.

I have illustrated how voting blocs affect voting outcomes using data from the US Supreme Court decisions between 1995 and 2004.

The theory in this paper has multiple natural extensions: Comparing the results under other stability concepts, such as Coalition-Proofness or Equilibrium Binding Agreements; endogenizing the choice of the internal voting rule for each bloc and allowing for a richer class of rules, not just anonymous and majoritarian rules; studying the enforceability of the internal rules in a repeated game if binding commitments are not feasible; introducing intensity of preferences so that agents who like the proposal do so to varying degrees; considering unequally weighted individuals or even pyramidal structures, in which individual agents coalesce into factions, factions coalesce into parties (voting blocs of second order), parties into alliances (voting blocs of third order) and so on... Empirical applications range from revisiting the historical records of the early United States Congress to try to determine the incentives to coordinate votes along State lines or along parties, to salient current developments such as the theoretical advantages to each of the 25 European Union countries from pooling their votes under a common foreign EU policy. These questions constitute an agenda for further research.

6 Appendix

6.1 Proof of Lemma 1

To prove this lemma I first prove three intermediate steps. First I show that if a coalition $C$ leans right and the type of one of the members of $C$ shifts to the right (becomes higher), then the resulting coalition also leans right. Second I show that given a coalition $C$ that leads right,
if the left-most member of $C$ (the member with the lowest type) leaves the coalition, then the resulting coalition also leans right. Third, I show that if $M$ is symmetric and $L$ leans left and forms a voting bloc, then the distribution of the number of votes cast by $L \cup M$ in the division of the assembly is such that given any absolute difference between the number of votes $L \cup M$ casts for and against the proposal, the net difference is negative with probability at least a half. Readers who find these three claims obviously true may skip down to the proof of Lemma 1 itself below.

Claim 15 Let $C \subseteq \mathcal{N}$ be such that $N_C$ is even and $g_C^C\left(\frac{N_C}{2} - k\right) \leq g_C^C\left(\frac{N_C}{2} + k\right)$ for any positive integer $k$. Let $C' = l' \cup C \setminus l$ with $t_l > t_l$. Then

$$g_{C'}^C\left(\frac{N_C}{2} - k\right) \leq g_{C'}^C\left(\frac{N_C}{2} + k\right)$$

for any positive integer $k$.

Proof. Consider $C \setminus l$ and let $g_{C \setminus l}^C$ be the distribution function of $\sum_{i \in C \setminus l} s_i$. Its probability mass function $g_{C \setminus l}^C$ is determined by the aggregation of independent Bernoulli experiments, hence it is unimodal, as shown by Darroch [11]. Let $y$ denote the mode. Since preferences are independent, for any number $x$ and any agent $l$,

$$g_C^C(x) = t_l g_{C \setminus l}^C(x - 1) + (1 - t_l) g_{C \setminus l}^C(1 - x)$$

Hence

$$g_{C'}^C(x) - g_C^C(x) = (t_l - t_l)[g_{C \setminus l}^C(x - 1) - g_{C \setminus l}^C(x)]$$

(1)

Since $g_{C \setminus l}^C$ is unimodal, for any $x > y$ it follows that $g_{C \setminus l}^C(x) \leq g_{C \setminus l}^C(x - 1)$ and expression (1) is positive and for any $x \leq y$ it follows that $g_{C \setminus l}^C(x) \geq g_{C \setminus l}^C(x - 1)$ and expression (1) is negative. It also follows from the unimodality of $g_{C \setminus l}^C$ that the modes of $g_C^C$ and $g_{C'}^C$ are either $y$ or $y + 1$, call them $y^C$ and $y^{C'}$ respectively. Further, since $g_C^C\left(\frac{N_C}{2} - 1\right) \leq g_C^C\left(\frac{N_C}{2} + 1\right)$, it must be that $\frac{N_C}{2} \leq y^C \leq y + 1$. Hence $\frac{N_C}{2} - 1 \leq y$ and $g_{C'}^C\left(\frac{N_C}{2} - k\right) \leq g_{C'}^C\left(\frac{N_C}{2} - k\right)$ for any positive integer $k$.

For $k$ such that $\frac{N_C}{2} + k > y^{C'} \geq y$, it follows that

$$g_{C'}^C\left(\frac{N_C}{2} - k\right) \leq g_C^C\left(\frac{N_C}{2} - k\right) \leq g_C^C\left(\frac{N_C}{2} + k\right) \leq g_{C'}^C\left(\frac{N_C}{2} + k\right),$$

where the first and third inequalities hold by the sign of expression (1) and the second inequality by assumption.

For $k$ such that $\frac{N_C}{2} + k \leq y^{C'}$, $g_{C'}^C\left(\frac{N_C}{2} - k\right) \leq g_{C'}^C\left(\frac{N_C}{2} + k\right)$ by the unimodality of $g_{C'}^C$. ■

The proof is similar for $C$ of odd size, with $g_{C'}^C\left(\frac{N_C-1}{2} - k\right) \leq g_{C'}^C\left(\frac{N_C+1}{2} + k\right)$ for any non-negative integer $k$.

Claim 16 Let $C \subseteq \mathcal{N}$ be such that $N_C$ is even and let $t_l \leq t_i$ for any $i \in C$. Suppose that $g_C^C\left(\frac{N_C}{2} - k\right) \leq g_C^C\left(\frac{N_C}{2} + k\right)$ for all positive $k$. Then $g_{C \setminus l}^C\left(\frac{N_C}{2} - 1 - k\right) \leq g_{C \setminus l}^C\left(\frac{N_C}{2} + k\right)$ for any non-negative integer $k$. 

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Proof. Note that the statement is immediately true if \( t_l \geq 1/2 \). We only need to prove it for \( t_l < 1/2 \). First construct \( C' = \{ C \cup l' \} \setminus I \) with \( t_l = 1/2 \). By Claim 15, for any non-negative integer \( k \), coalition \( C' \) satisfies
\[
g^{C'}(\frac{N_C}{2} - k) \leq g^{C'}(\frac{N_C}{2} + k). \tag{2}
\]

The rest of the proof proceeds by induction. First, for \( k = \frac{N_C}{2} - 1 \), I prove that \( g^{C'}_{-l'}(0) \leq g^{C'}_{-l'}(N_C - 1) \).

From inequality (2), \( g^{C'}(0) \leq g^{C'}(N_C) \). It follows \( (1 - t_l)g^{C'}_{-l'}(0) \leq t_lg^{C'}_{-l'}(N_C - 1) \). Since \( t_l = 1/2 \), then \( g^{C'}_{-l'}(0) \leq g^{C'}_{-l'}(N_C - 1) \).

Suppose that \( g^{C'}_{-l'}(\frac{N_C - 2}{2} - k) \leq g^{C'}_{-l'}(\frac{N_C}{2} + k) \) holds for \( k = k' \). I then show that it holds for \( k = k' - 1 \).

From \( g^{C'}(\frac{N_C}{2} - k') \leq g^{C'}(\frac{N_C}{2} + k') \), get
\[
t_lg^{C'}_{-l'}(\frac{N_C - 2}{2} - k') + (1 - t_l)g^{C'}_{-l'}(\frac{N_C}{2} - k') \leq t_lg^{C'}_{-l'}(\frac{N_C}{2} + k' - 1) + (1 - t_l)g^{C'}_{-l'}(\frac{N_C}{2} + k') \tag{3}
\]
\[
g^{C'}_{-l'}(\frac{N_C - 2}{2} - k') \leq g^{C'}_{-l'}(\frac{N_C}{2} - k') \tag{4}
\]
\[
g^{C'}_{-l'}(\frac{N_C}{2} - k') \leq g^{C'}_{-l'}(\frac{N_C}{2} + k' - 1) \tag{5}
\]
\[
g^{C'}_{-l'}(\frac{N_C - 2}{2} - (k' - 1)) \leq g^{C'}_{-l'}(\frac{N_C}{2} + k' - 1) \tag{6}
\]
Expression (3) implies (4) because \( t_l = (1 - t_l) = 1/2 \). Expression (4) implies (5) because \( g^{C'}_{-l'}(\frac{N_C - 2}{2} - k') \leq g^{C'}_{-l'}(\frac{N_C}{2} + k') \) by assumption. Expression (6) is merely a reformulation of (5). The induction argument is then complete. \( \square \)

Claim 17 Let \( N = L \cup M \cup R \). Suppose \( g^M(\frac{NM}{2} - 1) = \frac{g^M(NM+1)}{2} \), \( g^L(\frac{NL}{2} - 1) = \frac{g^L(NL+1)}{2} \) for all non-negative \( k \) and \( L \) forms a voting bloc \((L, r_L)\). Then:
\[
\text{Prob}[\sum_{i \in L \cup M} v_i = \frac{NL + NM}{2} - k] \geq \text{Prob}[\sum_{i \in L \cup M} v_i = \frac{NL + NM}{2} + k] \text{ for any positive } k.
\]

Proof. Let's first define \( L \) to be active given a preference profile \( s \) if it rolls its internal minority given the rule \( r_L \), so that \( s_i \neq v_i \) for some \( i \in L \) and let us define \( L \) to be inactive otherwise. Then the probability that \( L \cup M \) casts \( x \) votes in favor of the policy proposal is
\[
\text{Prob}\left[\sum_{i \in L \cup M} v_i = x|L \text{ active}\right] \text{Prob}[L \text{ active}] + \text{Prob}\left[\sum_{i \in L \cup M} v_i = x|L \text{ inactive}\right] \text{Prob}[L \text{ inactive}].
\]
I first want to show that
\[
\text{Prob}\left[\sum_{i \in L \cup M} v_i = \frac{NL + NM}{2} - k|L \text{ active}\right] \geq \text{Prob}\left[\sum_{i \in L \cup M} v_i = \frac{NL + NM}{2} + k|L \text{ active}\right]. \tag{7}
\]
Noting that if $L$ is active then $\sum_{i \in L} v_i \in \{0, N_L\}$, that $\sum_{i \in M} v_i = \sum_{i \in M} s_i$ for all preference profiles, and that

$$P[\sum_{i \in M} s_i = \frac{N_M - 1}{2} - k] = P[\sum_{i \in M} s_i = \frac{N_M + 1}{2} + k]$$

for any $k$, rewrite inequality 7 as:

$$P[\sum_{i \in L} v_i = N_L|L \text{ active}]P[\sum_{i \in M} s_i = \frac{N_M - N_L}{2} - k] + P[\sum_{i \in L} v_i = 0|L \text{ active}]P[\sum_{i \in M} s_i = \frac{N_M + N_L - 2}{2} - k] \geq$$

$$P[\sum_{i \in L} v_i = N_L|L \text{ active}]P[\sum_{i \in M} s_i = \frac{N_M + N_L - 2}{2} - k] + P[\sum_{i \in L} v_i = 0|L \text{ active}]P[\sum_{i \in M} s_i = \frac{N_M - N_L}{2} - k].$$

Regrouping terms:

$$\left( P[\sum_{i \in L} v_i = N_L|L \text{ active}] - P[\sum_{i \in L} v_i = 0|L \text{ active}] \right) \left( P[\sum_{i \in M} s_i = \frac{N_M - N_L}{2} - k] - P[\sum_{i \in M} s_i = \frac{N_M + N_L - 2}{2} - k] \right) \geq 0.$$

Since $L$ leans left, the first term is weakly positive; since the distribution of the number of agents in $M$ who favor the policy proposal is symmetric (and unimodal), the second term is negative. Thus the expression is weakly negative, as desired.

Second, I want to show that

$$P \left[ \sum_{i \in L \cup M} v_i = \frac{N_L + N_M}{2} - k | L \text{ inactive} \right] \geq P \left[ \sum_{i \in L \cup M} v_i = \frac{N_L + N_M}{2} + k | L \text{ inactive} \right]. \quad (8)$$

Note that $L$ is inactive if and only if $(1 - r_L)N_L < \sum_{i \in L} s_i < r_L N_L$.

$$P \left[ \sum_{i \in L \cup M} v_i = \frac{N_L + N_M}{2} + k | L \text{ inactive} \right] - P \left[ \sum_{i \in L \cup M} v_i = \frac{N_L + N_M}{2} - k | L \text{ inactive} \right] =$$

$$r_LN_L - \frac{N_M + 3}{2} \sum_{h=0}^{r_LN_L - \frac{N_L+3}{2}} \left\{ P[\sum_{i \in L} s_i = \frac{N_L+1}{2} + h | L \text{ inactive}] \left( P[\sum_{i \in M} s_i = \frac{N_M - 1}{2} + k - h] - P[\sum_{i \in M} s_i = \frac{N_M - 1}{2} - k - h] \right) + \right. \left. \right. \right\} \right.$$

$$= \sum_{h=0}^{r_LN_L - \frac{N_M + 3}{2}} \left\{ P[\sum_{i \in L} s_i = \frac{N_L+1}{2} + h | L \text{ inactive}] - P[\sum_{i \in L} s_i = \frac{N_L - 1}{2} - h | L \text{ inactive}] \right\} \left\{ P[\sum_{i \in M} s_i = \frac{N_M - 1}{2} + k - h] - P[\sum_{i \in M} s_i = \frac{N_M - 1}{2} - k - h] \right\}.$$
**Proof.** For any \( h \in R \), let

\[
A_h = P[ \sum_{i \in R_{-h}} s_i = r_RN_R - 1 ] P[ \sum_{m \in M \cup L} v_m \in \left[ \frac{N_L + N_M}{2} - \frac{N_R - 1}{2}, \frac{N_L + N_M}{2} + \frac{N_R - 1}{2} - r_RN_R \right]]
\]

\[
= -P[ \sum_{i \in R_{-h}} s_i \leq (1 - r_R)N_R - 1 ] P[ \sum_{m \in M \cup L} v_m = \frac{N_L + N_M}{2} + \frac{N_R - 1}{2} ]
\]

and similarly let

\[
B_h = P[ \sum_{i \in R_{-h}} s_i = (1 - r_R)N_R ] P[ \sum_{m \in M \cup L} v_m \in \left[ \frac{N_L + N_M}{2} - \frac{N_R - 1}{2} + r_RN_R, \frac{N_L + N_M}{2} + \frac{N_R - 1}{2} \right]]
\]

\[
= -P[ \sum_{i \in R_{-h}} s_i \geq r_RN_R ] P[ \sum_{m \in M \cup L} v_m = \frac{N_L + N_M}{2} - \frac{N_R - 1}{2} ]
\]

Then \( h \) prefers to participate in the voting bloc \((R, r_R)\) if and only if \( t_hA_h + (1 - t_h)B_h > 0 \). Suppose \( t_lA_l + (1 - t_l)B_l > 0 \). We want to show that

\[
t_hA_h + (1 - t_h)B_h - t_lA_l - (1 - t_l)B_l \geq 0
\]

which implies \( t_hA_h + (1 - t_h)B_h > 0 \).

Let

\[
P_1 = P[ \sum_{m \in M \cup L} v_m \in \left[ \frac{N_M + N_L}{2} - \frac{N_R - 1}{2}, \frac{N_M + N_L}{2} + \frac{N_R - 1}{2} - r_RN_R \right]],
\]

\[
P_2 = P[ \sum_{m \in M \cup L} v_m \in \left[ \frac{N_M + N_L}{2} - \frac{N_R - 1}{2} + r_RN_R, \frac{N_M + N_L}{2} + \frac{N_R - 1}{2} \right]],
\]

\[
P_3 = P[ \sum_{m \in M \cup L} v_m = \frac{N_L + N_M}{2} + \frac{N_R - 1}{2} ], \text{ and } P_4 = P[ \sum_{m \in M \cup L} v_m = \frac{N_M + N_L}{2} - \frac{N_R - 1}{2} ].
\]

Then, \( t_hA_h + (1 - t_h)B_h \) is equal to:

\[
t_h \left[ \begin{array}{c}
\left( t_lP[ \sum_{i \in R_{-l}} s_i = r_RN_R - 2] + (1 - t_l)P[ \sum_{i \in R_{-l}} s_i = r_RN_R - 1] \right) P_1 \\
- \left( t_lP[ \sum_{i \in R_{-l}} s_i \leq (1 - r_R)N_R - 2] + (1 - t_l)P[ \sum_{i \in R_{-l}} s_i \leq (1 - r_R)N_R - 1] \right) P_3 \\
+ (1 - t_l) \left[ \left( t_lP[ \sum_{i \in R_{-l}} s_i = (1 - r_R)N_R - 1] + (1 - t_l)P[ \sum_{i \in R_{-l}} s_i = (1 - r_R)N_R] \right) P_2 \\
- \left( t_lP[ \sum_{i \in R_{-l}} s_i \geq r_RN_R - 1] + (1 - t_l)P[ \sum_{i \in R_{-l}} s_i \geq r_RN_R] \right) P_4 \right]
\end{array} \right]
\]  \( (9) \)
and \( t_l A_l + (1 - t_l) B_l \) is equal to

\[
\begin{align*}
&\left( t_h P\left[ \sum_{i \in R_{-l}} s_i = r_R N_R - 2 \right] + (1 - t_h) P\left[ \sum_{i \in R_{-l}} s_i = r_R N_R - 1 \right] \right) P_1 \\
&- \left( t_h P\left[ \sum_{i \in R_{-l}} s_i \leq (1 - r_R) N_R - 2 \right] + (1 - t_h) P\left[ \sum_{i \in R_{-l}} s_i \leq (1 - r_R) N_R - 1 \right] \right) P_3 \\
&+ (1 - t_l) \left[ \left( t_h P\left[ \sum_{i \in R_{-l}} s_i = (1 - r_R) N_R - 1 \right] + (1 - t_h) P\left[ \sum_{i \in R_{-l}} s_i = (1 - r_R) N_R \right] \right) P_2 \\
&\quad - \left( t_h P\left[ \sum_{i \in R_{-l}} s_i \geq r_R N_R - 1 \right] + (1 - t_h) P\left[ \sum_{i \in R_{-l}} s_i \geq r_R N_R \right] \right) P_4 \right]
\end{align*}
\]  

Therefore \( t_h A_h + (1 - t_h) B_h - t_l A_l - (1 - t_l) B_l \) is equal to

\[
(t_h - t_l) \left( P\left[ \sum_{i \in R_{-l}} s_i = r_R N_R - 1 \right] P_1 - P\left[ \sum_{i \in R_{-l}} s_i = (1 - r_R) N_R - 1 \right] P_2 \\
+ P\left[ \sum_{i \in R_{-l}} s_i \geq r_R N_R - 1 \right] P_4 - P\left[ \sum_{i \in R_{-l}} s_i \leq (1 - r_R) N_R - 1 \right] P_3 \right].
\]  

Since \( M \) is symmetric and \( L \) leans left, it follows by Claim 17 that \( P_1 \geq P_2 \) and \( P_3 \leq P_4 \), and since \( R_{-l} \) leans right, by Claim 16 \( R_{-l} \) leans right as well. Then, the expression (11) above is weakly positive.

\[ \blacksquare \]

### 6.2 Proof of Proposition 2

**Proof.** By Lemma 1, if \( l \) prefers to participate in the voting bloc, every member of \( R \) does. Therefore, \((R, r_R)\) is Individual-Exit stable if and only if \( l \) wants to participate in the bloc. Using the notation from Lemma 1, \( l \) wants to participate in the bloc if and only if \( t_l A_l + (1 - t_l) B_l \geq 0 \). Suppose \( A_l \geq B_l \), then the expression is increasing in \( t_l \) and the cutoff that makes the agent indifferent is at \( t_{InR}(r_R, r_L, l_{-l}) = \frac{-B_l}{A_l - B_l} \). Hence, it suffices to show that \( A_l \geq B_l \).

\[
A_l = P\left[ \sum_{i \in R_{-l}} s_i = r_R N_R - 1 \right] P\left[ \sum_{m \in M \cup L} v_m \in \left[ \frac{N_M + N_L}{2} - \frac{N_R - 1}{2}, \frac{N_M + N_L}{2} + \frac{N_R - 1}{2} - r_R N_R \right] \right]
\]

\[
- P\left[ \sum_{i \in R_{-l}} s_i \leq (1 - r_R) N_R - 1 \right] P\left[ \sum_{m \in M \cup L} v_m = \frac{N_M + N_L}{2} + \frac{N_R - 1}{2} \right];
\]

\[
B_l = P\left[ \sum_{i \in R_{-l}} s_i = (1 - r_R) N_R \right] P\left[ \sum_{m \in M \cup L} v_m \in \left[ \frac{N_M + N_L}{2} + \frac{N_R - 1}{2} \right] \right]
\]

\[
- P\left[ \sum_{i \in R_{-l}} s_i \geq r_R N_R \right] P\left[ \sum_{m \in M \cup L} v_m = \frac{N_M + N_L}{2} - \frac{N_R - 1}{2} \right].
\]

Since \( R_{-l} \) leans right, for any \( r_R \geq \frac{N_R + 1}{2N_R} \),

\[
P\left[ \sum_{i \in R_{-l}} s_i = r_R N_R - 1 \right] \geq P\left[ \sum_{i \in R_{-l}} s_i = (1 - r_R) N_R \right]
\]

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and

\[ P[ \sum_{i \in R} s_i \geq rR N_R ] \geq P[ \sum_{i \in R_{-l}} s_i \leq (1-rR) N_R - 1 ] \]

Since \( M \) is symmetric and \( L \) leans left,

\[ P[ \sum_{m \in M \cup L} v_m \in \left[ \frac{N_L + N_M}{2} - \frac{N_R - 1}{2}, \frac{N_L + N_M}{2} + \frac{N_R - 1}{2} - rR N_R \right] ] \]

\[ \geq P[ \sum_{m \in M \cup L} v_m \in \left[ \frac{N_L + N_M}{2} - \frac{N_R - 1}{2} + rR N_R, \frac{N_L + N_M}{2} + \frac{N_R - 1}{2} \right] ] \]

and

\[ P[ \sum_{m \in M \cup L} v_m = \frac{N_L + N_M}{2} + \frac{N_R - 1}{2} ] \leq P[ \sum_{m \in M \cup L} v_m = \frac{N_L + N_M}{2} - \frac{N_R - 1}{2} ] \]

Therefore, \( A_I \geq B_I \). ■

6.3 Proof of Proposition 4

This proof and the proof of Proposition 7 use the result in Proposition 8 below. While it is in principle unadvisable to use latter results in proofs that appear earlier in the text, Proposition 8 shows that voting blocs generate a gain in utility in a more general model with an endogenous number of voting blocs. To prove the result first for two blocs to use it here and then prove it again in greater generality would be redundant. I also use the notion of a “voting bloc structure” from Definition 4. In short, a voting bloc structure \((\pi, r)\) is a pair composed of a partition of the assembly \(\pi\), and a vector \(r\) that contains one rule for each voting bloc resulting from the partition \(\pi\).

**Proof.** Let \((\pi, r)\) be a voting bloc structure in which \(R\) does not form a voting bloc. Let \((\pi', r')\) be another voting bloc structure in which \(R\) forms a voting bloc with \(r_R = \frac{N_R - 1}{N_R}\) and all else remains equal. From Proposition 8, \( \sum_{i \in R} u_i(\pi', r') \geq \sum_{i \in R} u_i(\pi, r) \). Let \((\pi'', r'')\) be a third voting bloc structure in which \(i\) deviates and leaves the bloc \((\pi', r')\) to become an independent, so the bloc shrinks to \((R \setminus i, r_R)\). Note that the new size of the bloc is \(N_R - 1\). Hence the number necessary to command a sufficient majority to roll the minority inside the bloc is

\[ r_R(N_R - 1) = N_R - 1 - \frac{N_R - 1}{N_R} > N_R - 2. \]

The new bloc only votes together if the internal majority is of size \(N_R - 1\). In other words, \(r_R\) is effectively unanimity once \(i\) leaves the bloc. Under this rule \(R \setminus i\) behaves exactly as if it didn’t form a bloc and all agents were independent. Thus,

\[ \sum_{i \in R} u_i(\pi'', r'') = \sum_{i \in R} u_i(\pi, r) \leq \sum_{i \in R} u_i(\pi', r'). \]

Since all agents in \(R\) are identical, it follows that for all \(i \in R\),

\[ u_i(\pi'', r'') \leq u_i(\pi', r'). \]

Therefore, no agent wants to leave \(R\) and \(R\) is Individual-Exit stable. ■
6.4 Proof of Proposition 5

Proof. From Proposition 4, if \( r_R = \frac{N_R}{N_R} - 1 \) and \( R \) is homogeneous, then \((R, r_R)\) is Individual-Exit stable. Hence it suffices to show that there exist a homogeneous type profile for \( R \) such that with simple majority the bloc is not stable. Let \( P[\sum_{i \in M \cup L} v_i = \frac{N_R + 1}{2} - N_R] = \lambda \). By the assumption on sizes and types of \( M \) and \( L \), \( \lambda > 0 \). Let the common type of agents in \( R \) be \( 1 - \varepsilon \). Let \( E \) be the event that \( i \in R \) rejects the proposal, a majority of \( R \) favors the proposal, and \( \sum_{i \in M \cup L} v_i = \frac{N_R + 1}{2} - N_R \). In this event, \( i \) is better off if she is not part of the bloc. Note that

\[
\lim_{\varepsilon \to 0} \frac{1}{\varepsilon} P[E] = \lambda.
\]

Agent \( i \) is better off inside the bloc only if the rest of the bloc is tied. But

\[
\lim_{\varepsilon \to 0} \frac{1}{\varepsilon} P[\sum_{j \in R} s_j = \frac{N_R - 1}{2}] = 0.
\]

Therefore, for a sufficiently low \( \varepsilon \) the probability that \( i \) is better off outside the bloc outweighs the probability that \( i \) is better off inside the bloc and \( i \) prefers to leave the bloc. \( \blacksquare \)

6.5 Proof of Proposition 6

Proof. Let \( x_h \) be the highest coordinate of the vector \( x \) and let \( \varepsilon = \alpha x_h \) be the highest type in \( L \). \( L \) is stable if \( \varepsilon A_h + (1 - \varepsilon) B_h > 0 \).

\[
A_h = P \left[ \sum_{i \in L_{-h}} s_i = r_L N_L - 1 \right] P \left[ \sum_{m \in M \cup L} v_m \in \left[ \frac{M + N_R}{2} - \frac{N_L - 1}{2}, \frac{M + N_R}{2} + \frac{N_L - 1}{2} - r_L N_L \right] \right] - P \left[ \sum_{i \in L_{-h}} s_i \leq (1 - r_L) N_L - 1 \right] P \left[ \sum_{m \in M \cup R} v_m = \frac{M + N_R}{2} + \frac{N_L - 1}{2} \right].
\]

\[
B_h = P \left[ \sum_{i \in L_{-h}} s_i = (1 - r_L) N_L \right] P \left[ \sum_{m \in M \cup R} v_m \in \left[ \frac{M + N_R}{2} - \frac{N_L - 1}{2} + r_L N_L, \frac{M + N_R}{2} + \frac{N_L - 1}{2} \right] \right] - P \left[ \sum_{i \in L_{-h}} s_i \geq r_L N_L \right] P \left[ \sum_{m \in M \cup R} v_m = \frac{M + N_R}{2} - \frac{N_L - 1}{2} \right].
\]

Let

\[
P_5 = P \left[ \sum_{m \in M \cup R} v_m \in \left[ \frac{M + N_R}{2} - \frac{N_L - 1}{2}, \frac{M + N_R}{2} + \frac{N_L - 1}{2} - r_L N_L \right] \right],
\]

\[
P_7 = P \left[ \sum_{m \in M \cup R} v_m \in \left[ \frac{M + N_R}{2} - \frac{N_L - 1}{2} + r_L N_L, \frac{M + N_R}{2} + \frac{N_L - 1}{2} \right] \right],
\]

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\[ P_6 = P \left[ \sum_{m \in M \cup R} v_m = \frac{M + N_R}{2} + \frac{N_L - 1}{2} \right] \quad \text{and} \quad \gamma = \frac{(N_L - 1)!}{(r_LN_L - 1)!(N_L - r_LN_L)!}. \]

Then,
\[ \varepsilon A_h + (1 - \varepsilon)B_h < \varepsilon \gamma^{r_LN_L - 1}P_6 - \varepsilon (1 - \varepsilon)^{N_L - 1}P_6 + (1 - \varepsilon)\gamma^0 (1 - r_L)^{N_L - 1}P_7. \]

Divide the right hand side by \( \varepsilon \) and take the limit as \( \varepsilon \) goes to zero.
\[
\lim_{\varepsilon \to 0} \gamma^{r_LN_L - 1}P_6 - (1 - \varepsilon)^{N_L - 1}P_6 + (1 - \varepsilon)\gamma^0 (1 - r_L)^{N_L - 1}P_7 = -P_6 < 0.
\]

Hence, if \( \varepsilon \) is low enough, \( \varepsilon A_h + (1 - \varepsilon)B_h < 0 \) and the voting bloc is not Individual-Exit stable.

\section*{6.6 Proof of Proposition 7}

\textbf{Proof.} Let the vector of types be such that \( t_i = t_j \) for all \( i, j \in L \). Then, by Proposition 8, every \( i \in L \) weakly benefits from the formation of the voting bloc \( (L, r_L) \) and hence it is a weakly undominated strategy for every \( i \in L \) to commit to participate in the bloc. By Proposition 6, if the common type of \( L \) is low enough, \( (L, r_L) \) is not Individual-Exit stable.

\section*{6.7 Proof of Proposition 8}

Proposition 8 and its proof follow very closely Propositions 1 in Eguia [14], extending the result from one to several voting blocs.

\textbf{Proof.} Let \( (\pi, r) \) be the initial voting bloc structure and \( (\pi', r') \) the new voting bloc structure in which \( r' = \{r_j\}_{j=0}^J \cup r'_{J + 1} \) and \( \pi' = \{C_j^\prime\}_{j=0}^{J + 1} \) is a finer partition of \( \pi \) such that \( C_{J + 1}' \cup C_0' = C_0 \) and \( C_j' = C_j \) for all \( j = 1, ..., J \). For notational simplicity, let \( C_{J + 1}' \) be just \( C' \) and \( r'_{J + 1} \) simply \( r'_C \).

Given \( s \), suppose \( \sum_{i \in C'} s_i \leq (1 - r'_C)N_C' \). Then \( \sum_{i \in C'} v_i(\pi', r', s) \leq \sum_{i \in C} v_i(\pi, r, s) \) and since the votes of other agents are unaffected by the formation or not of a bloc \( (C', r'_C) \), it follows that \( \sum_{i \in N} v_i(\pi', r', s) \leq \sum_{i \in N} v_i(\pi, r, s) \). Hence, either the outcome is the same under \( (\pi, r) \) and \( (\pi', r') \), or if the outcome changes, it must be that the policy proposal passes under \( (\pi, r) \) but fails under \( (\pi', r') \) and then every agent who is against the proposal benefits from the formation of the bloc \( (C', r'_C) \) and every agent who likes the policy proposal is hurt. If the outcome changes, the aggregate gain in utility for the coalition \( C' \) is equal to \( N_{C'} - 2 \sum_{i \in C'} s_i \geq (2r'_C - 1)N_{C'} \geq 1. \)

Suppose instead that \( (1 - r'_C)N_{C'} < \sum_{i \in C'} s_i < r'_C N_{C'} \). Then the formation of the voting bloc \( (C', r'_C) \) does not affect the voting behavior, the policy outcome or the utility of any agent.

Finally, suppose that \( \sum_{i \in C'} s_i \geq r'_C N_{C'} \). Then, by a symmetric logic to the one in the first case, the outcome can only change from rejecting to accepting the policy proposal, which benefits a majority of members of the new bloc.
Hence, either the bloc has no effect, or if it has an effect, it generates a strictly positive surplus of utility for its members.

Simple majority maximizes this surplus because with simple majority the bloc always rolls its internal minorities, maximizing the number of preference profiles $s$ for which it alters the outcome in favor of the majority of the voting bloc. ■

6.8 Proof of Proposition 9

First consider the case with $r_N \in \left(\frac{N+1}{2N}, \frac{N-1}{N}\right]$ and let $(\pi, r)$ be any voting bloc structure with a unique voting bloc $(C, r_C)$ such that $C = N$ and $r_C < r_N$. Let $s^0 \in S$ be a preference profile such that $\sum_{i \in C} s^0_i = r_C N < r_N N$ so the proposal would not pass in the absence of a voting bloc. Then $\sum_{i \in C} v_i(\pi, r, s^0) = N$ and the proposal passes. Thus, $(\pi, r)$ is relevant. Since $C = N$, there is no agent outside the bloc and there is no possible deviation by entering, only by leaving. Consider the incentives that any $i \in C$ has to leave the bloc. For any $s$ such that $v_i(\pi, r, s) = s_i$, member $i$ is at least equally well off staying in the bloc, since she is already voting for her own preference and by leaving she can never increase the number of other agents that vote for her preference in the division of the assembly. For any $s$ such that $v_i(\pi, r, s) \neq s_i$, it must be that the number of other members who share the preference of $i$ is at most $(1-r_C)N - 1$. If $i$ leaves, the new size of the bloc is $N_C - 1 = N - 1$ and then $(1-r_C)N - 1 < (1-r_C)(N_C - 1)$ so the members of the reduced bloc who share the preference of $i$ are rolled and the whole bloc votes against the preference of $i$, hence $i$ loses in the division of the assembly. Thus, $i$ cannot be better off deviating and leaving the bloc and the bloc is Individually stable.

Second, suppose instead that $r_N = \frac{N+1}{2N}$. Let $(\pi, r)$ be any voting bloc structure with a unique voting bloc $(C, r_C)$ such that $N_C = N - 2$ and $r_C = \frac{N+1}{2N}$ so that $r_C N_C = \frac{N+1}{2} = \frac{N-1}{2}$. For $s^0 \in S$ such that $\sum_{i \in C} s^0_i = \sum_{i \in N'} s^0_i = \frac{N-1}{2}$, the proposal fails without a voting bloc, but it passes with a the bloc $(C, r_C)$, so the voting bloc structure is relevant. Suppose a non-member $l$ deviates and enters the bloc, so that the new bloc is now $(C \cup l, r_C)$. The deviation affects the outcome in the division of the assembly only if $\sum_{i \in C \cup l} s_i = \frac{N-1}{2}$. In this case, the result in the new bloc is a tie. Without $l$, the result was an internal majority of $1$ against the preference of $l$ and the whole bloc casting all its votes against the preference of $l$ in the division of the assembly. If by entering the bloc and bringing a tie inside the bloc $l$ reverts the outcome in the division of the assembly, then a majority of members of $C$ are hurt by the inclusion of $l$. Thus, there is a net loss of utility for the members of $C$. It must then be that in expectation at least one of them is ex-ante worse off by the entry of agent $l$, so member $l$ cannot deviate by entering. Consider the incentives of any $i \in C$ to leave the bloc. For any $s$ such that $v_i(\pi, r, s) = s_i$, member $i$ is at least equally well off staying in the bloc. For any $s$ such that $v_i(\pi, r, s) \neq s_i$, it must be that the number of other members who share the preference of $i$ is at most $\frac{N-5}{2}$. If $i$ leaves, the new size of the bloc is $N - 3$ and the $\frac{N-5}{2}$ members who share the preference of $i$ are a minority of the new bloc, so the whole bloc votes against the preference of $i$ in the division of the assembly.
and $i$ loses. Thus, $i$ cannot be better off deviating and leaving the bloc. Therefore, the bloc is Individually stable.

6.9 Proof of Proposition 12

Proof. The grand coalition $C = \mathcal{N}$ with $r_C \in [r_N, 1]$ is irrelevant, but Nash stable. For any $s$ such that agent $v_i(\mathcal{N}, r_C, s) = s_i$, agent $i$ is at least equally well off remaining in the bloc. For any $s$ such that $s_i = 0$ but $v_i(\mathcal{N}, r_C, s) = 1$ it must be that $\sum_{j \in \mathcal{N}\setminus i} s_j \geq r_C N \geq r_C (N - 1)$ so if $i$ leaves the bloc, all $N - 1$ members vote in favor of the proposal and the proposal passes, so $i$ is not better off. For any $s$ such that $s_i = 1$ but $v_i(\mathcal{N}, r_C, s) = 0$ it must be that $\sum_{j \in \mathcal{N}\setminus i} s_j \leq (1 - r_C) N - 1 \leq (1 - r_C) (N - 1)$ so if $i$ leaves the whole bloc votes against the proposal, the proposal fails and $i$ is not better off. Overall, an agent can never change the outcome towards her preference by leaving the grand coalition, so $(\mathcal{N}, r_C)$ with $r_C \in [r_N, 1]$ is Nash stable. ■

6.10 Proof of Proposition 13

Proof. By contradiction. Suppose $\exists (C, r_C)$ such that $r_C$ is simple majority and $\frac{N+1}{2} \leq N_C$. If $N_C = N$, then the bloc is not relevant -a contradiction. Suppose $N_C < N$. For any $s$ such that $\sum_{h \in C} s_h \neq \frac{N_C}{2}$, it follows that $\sum_{h \in C} v_h \in \{0, N_C\}$ and the policy outcome in the division of the assembly coincides with the vote of the bloc; since the policy outcome is independent of the votes outside the voting bloc, any $i \notin C$ is at least equally well-off entering the voting bloc. For any $s$ such that $\sum_{h \in C} s_h = \frac{N_C}{2}$, any $i \notin C$ which joins the bloc causes $\sum_{h \in C \cup i} v_h = s_i N_C$ and $i$ wins in the division of the assembly with all the votes of the bloc; if $i$ was winning outside of the bloc, $i$ is indifferent between winning outside the bloc or being pivotal to win inside the bloc, and if $i$ was losing $i$ is strictly better off entering the bloc. There is no preference profile $s$ for which an agent $i$ is better off staying out of the bloc.

If the bloc is odd-sized, ties cannot occur. To find a case in which $i$ is strictly better off entering a bloc of odd size, let $s$ be such that $\sum_{h \in C} s_h = \sum_{h \in \mathcal{N}} s_h = \frac{N_C + 1}{2}$. Then $\sum_{h \in C} v_h = \sum_{h \in \mathcal{N}} v_h = N_C \geq \frac{N+1}{2}$ and the proposal passes. If one of the non-members -who oppose the proposal- joins the bloc, then the expanded bloc is tied, $\sum_{i \in \mathcal{N}} v_i = \sum_{h \in C \cup i} v_h = \sum_{h \in C} s_h < \frac{N+1}{2}$ and the proposal does not pass in the assembly. Therefore, regardless of whether ties can occur or not in the bloc, for any non-member $i$ there exist preference profiles for which $i$ is strictly better off joining the bloc. Since $\Omega$ has full support, every preference profile occurs with positive probability and every non-member strictly prefers to join the bloc. Then, if $C \neq \mathcal{N}$, the voting bloc structure is not Nash stable -a contradiction.

Suppose the voting bloc structure $(\pi, r)$ is such that $C_0 \neq \emptyset$, and $\exists (C, r_C)$ relevant such that $N_C \geq \frac{N+1}{2}$. Let $(\pi', r)$ be a new voting bloc structure such that $C' = C \cup i$ and $C'_0 = C_0 \setminus i$ and all else is unchanged. Let $s$ be a preference profile such that $v_i(\pi', r, s) = s_i$. Then $u_i(\pi', r, s)$

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\(u_i(\pi, r, s)\) since \(i\) joining the bloc can never reduce the number of votes cast by other bloc members for the option preferred by \(i\). Suppose instead that \(s\) is such that \(v_i(\pi', r, s) \neq s_i\). Since the bloc is a dictator in the assembly, then \(u_i(\pi', r, s) = 0\). But note that the bloc would also vote against \(i\) if \(i\) remained out of the bloc. Since the bloc without \(i\) is also a dictator, \(u_i(\pi, r, s) = 0\). So the agent is in this case indifferent about joining the bloc. In either case, an agent is never worse off joining the bloc. Let \(s\) be such that \(\sum_{h \in C} s_h = (1 - r_C)N_C\) and \(s_k = 1\) for all \(k \notin C\). Then \(\sum_{h \in C} v_h = 0\) and the proposal fails in the division of the assembly. Since the voting bloc is relevant, \(\sum_{h \in C} s_h + \sum_{k \notin C} s_k \geq \frac{N+1}{2}\) and the proposal would pass if the members of the voting bloc voted sincerely in the assembly. Suppose \(i \notin C\) enters the bloc, so that \(C' = C \cup i\). Then \(\sum_{h \in C'} s_h > (1 - r_C)N_{C'}\) and \(\sum_{h \in C} v_h = \sum_{h \in C} s_h\) so that the policy proposal passes in the division of the assembly and \(i\) is better off—a contradiction. 

### 6.11 Estimates by Eigen-D, SVD and OCM-2D

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<tr>
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<td>-0.250</td>
<td>-0.253</td>
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<td>-0.146</td>
<td>-0.348</td>
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<tr>
<td>SVD 1st Dim</td>
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<td>-0.306</td>
<td>-0.331</td>
<td>-0.326</td>
<td>-0.404</td>
<td>-0.397</td>
<td>-0.359</td>
<td>-0.301</td>
<td>-0.304</td>
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<tr>
<td>SVD 2nd Dim</td>
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<td>-0.382</td>
<td>-0.351</td>
<td>-0.335</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td>0.294</td>
<td>0.398</td>
<td>0.402</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCM 1st Dim</td>
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<td>-0.583</td>
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<td>-0.498</td>
<td>0.169</td>
<td>0.274</td>
<td>0.489</td>
<td>0.704</td>
<td>0.661</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCM 2nd Dim</td>
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<td>0.087</td>
<td>0.387</td>
<td>-0.730</td>
<td>-0.710</td>
<td>-0.182</td>
<td>-0.524</td>
<td>0.482</td>
<td>0.661</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension (i)</th>
<th>1st</th>
<th>2nd</th>
<th>3rd</th>
<th>4th</th>
<th>5th</th>
<th>6th</th>
<th>7th</th>
<th>8th</th>
<th>9th</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eigenvalue (\lambda_i) SVD</td>
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<td>0.082</td>
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<tr>
<td>Weight Dim (\alpha_i)</td>
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<td>0.072</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>0.047</td>
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The top table contains the first and second eigenvectors obtained by the Eigen Decomposition of the double-centered matrix of squared distances of the justices, the estimates of the location of the justices in the first and second dimension by Single Value Decomposition and the estimates of the location in the first and second dimensions obtained by the Optimal Classification method with two dimensions. Note that the first dimension with SVD is an “agreement dimension” where all justices take a similar position, and it is only the second dimension that is the relevant and meaningful one, comparable to the first dimension in the other methods. The bottom table provides the nine single values of the Eigen Decomposition, and the weights of the nine dimensions from the SVD (to obtain the single value of each dimension, multiply by 11.065).
### 6.12 Table following Result 14

<table>
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<td>−1</td>
<td>−1</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
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<td>−89</td>
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</table>

The first column in each row contains the voting bloc structure as a list of the blocs that form; the numbers inside each bloc correspond to the justices in the order given in the top row. The other cells detail the payoff to each justice. The first two voting bloc structures are Split and Nash Stable voting bloc structures. The others are not.

### References


