

Syllabus
Comparative Political Institutions
Fall, 2006

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Course Description:

This is a graduate seminar on political processes and institutions (e.g. parties, electoral systems, and branches of government) from a comparative perspective. Our main objective is to analyze the two central challenges confronting players in political institutions: namely, aggregation of interests and organization of the deliberative process. To do so, we will explore various propositions derived from the literature on these topics and consider their plausibility in different country cases.

There are four requirements for class participants:

1. Presentation: at the beginning of each class, a student will be assigned to introduce the key issues and debates from the readings. Each presentation should run approximately 10~20 minutes and they should be presented at the beginning of class. These presentations should describe key conceptual issues, define central arguments or debates in the literature, identify methodological challenges, suggest future avenues of research, and/or pose questions for further discussion. (20%)
2. Review Essay: along with the presentations, the student will also be required to submit a five page summary critique for one week's reading. This assignment should not cover the readings from the week for which the student is leading the presentation. (20%)
3. Attendance/Participation: each student should be prepared to discuss the readings each week. (20%)
4. Final paper: the final paper can be about a subject/topic of your choice just so long as it deals with political institutions. By about sixth week of class, you will be asked to prepare a proposal for your paper and present it to the class. For this session, each student will briefly (5~10 mins.) present their research question to the class and describe their approach. Hopefully, the feedback from this meeting will allow the student to fine tune their research for the final submission at the end of the semester. (40%)

Books:

Cox, Gary. 1997. *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems*. Cambridge University Press.

Morgenstern, Scott & Benito Nacif. 2002. *Legislative Politics in Latin America*. Cambridge University Press.

Helmke, Gretchen. 2005. *Courts under Constraints: Judges, Generals, and Presidents in Argentina*. Cambridge University Press.

Huber, John & Charles Shipan. 2002. *Deliberate Discretion? The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy*. Cambridge University Press.

Powell, Bingham. 2000. *Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions*. Yale University Press.

Przeworski, Adam, et. al. 2000. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*. Cambridge University Press.

Shugart, Matthew S & John M. Carey. *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*. Cambridge University Press.

Week 1 General Introduction

Riker, William. "Implications from the disequilibrium of majority rule for the study of institutions." *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 74, No.2. (Jun., 1980), pp. 432-446.

O'Donnell, Guillermo. 1994. "Delegative Democracy." *Journal of Democracy*. 5:1. 55-69.

Lijphart, Arend. "Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemma." *APSR*. 91 (1): 1-14.

Przeworski et. al. *Democracy and Development*. pp.1-78.

Elkins, Zachary. 2000. "Gradations of Democracy: Empirical Tests of Alternative Conceptualizations." *AJPS*. 44(2):293-301.

Week 2 Elections & Parties

Shugart & Carey. *Presidents and Assemblies*. Chs. 10-12.

Cox, *Making Votes Count*. Chs. 1-5 & 10-11.

Powell, *Elections as Instruments of Democracy*. Parts I and III.

Week 3 The Executive

Juan J. Linz & Arturo Valenzuela. 1994. *The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative Perspectives*. Volume I. Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, MD. Chs. 1-4.

Shugart & Carey. *Presidents and Assemblies*. Chs. 1-4.

Week 4 Executive Powers

Cameron, Charles. 2000. *Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power*. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1-4.

Shugart & Carey. Chs. 7 & 8.

Tsebelis, George. 1995. "Decision Making in Political Decisions: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism, and Multipartism." *BJPS*. 25:289-325.

Periera, Carlos; Timothy J. Power; & Lucio Renno. 2005. "Under what conditions do presidents resort to decree power? Theory and evidence from the Brazilian case." *SPSA*.

Negretto, Gabriel L. 2004. "Government capacities and policy making by decree in Latin America: the cases of Brazil and Argentina." *Comparative Political Studies*. 37:5. June. 531-62.

Recommended:

Howell, William. 2004. *Power without Persuasion: A Theory of Presidential Action*. Princeton University Press.

Week 5 The Legislature

Morgenstern & Nacif. Chapters 1, 6-9, 14-15

Jones, Mark P.; Sebastian Saiegh; Pablo Spiller; & Marianno Tommasi. 2000. "Professional Politicians – Amateur Legislators: The Argentine Congress in the 20th Century". Paper prepared for *Annual Conference of the International Society of New Institutional Economics*, September 22-24, 2000. Tübingen, Germany.

Week 6 The Judiciary

Helmke. *Courts under Constraint*. Chs. 1-5.

Iarczower, Matias, P. Spiller & M Tommasi. 2002. "Judicial Decisions Making in Unstable Environments: Argentina, 1935-1998" *AJPS*. 46.

Ramseyer, J. Mark & Eric B. Rasmusen. 1997. "Judicial Independence in a Civil Law Regime: The Evidence from Japan." *JLEO*. 13:2. 259-286.

Vanberg, Georg. 2001. "Legislative-Judicial Relations: A Game Theoretic Approach." *AJPS*. 45:346-61.

Week 7 Briefing Session for Final Research Paper

Week 8 Bureaucracies

Huber & Shipan. *Deliberate Discretion?*

McCubbins, Matthew D. & Thomas Schwartz. 1984. "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms." *AJPS* 21(1): 165-79.

Bender, Glazer and Hammond, "Theories of Delegation," *Annual Review of Political Science* 2001, Vol. 4 Issue 1, p235

Rauch, James & Peter Evans. 1999. "Bureaucracy and Growth: A Cross-National Analysis of the Effects of 'Weberian' State Structures on Economic Growth" *American Sociological Review* 64 (October): 748-765.

Week 9 Public Policy and Size of Government

Morgenstern & Nacif. Chapters 10-13

Downs, Anthony. 1960. "Why the Government's Budget is Too Small in Democracy." *World Politics*. 12:541-63.

Ferejohn, John & Keith Krehbiel. 1987. "The Budget Process and the Size of the Budget." *AJPS*. 31:296-320.

Boix, Carles. 2001. "Democracy, Development and the Public Sector." *AJPS*. 45:1-17.

Week 10 Corruption

Rose-Ackerman, Susan, *The Causes of Corruption*, part III, pp. 111-174.

Humphreys, Macartan. 2005. Natural resources, conflict, and conflict resolution: Uncovering the mechanisms. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49 (4): 508-37

Treisman, D., 2000. The causes of corruption: A cross-national study. *Journal of Public Economics* 76 (2000) 399-457.

Week 11 Economic Development

Przeworski et. al. *Democracy and Development*. Chs. 3-5.

Olson, Mancur. 1993. "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development." *APSR*. 87(September): 567-76.

Glaser, Edward; R. de la Porta, F. Lopez de Silanes & A. Schleifer. 2004. "Do Institutions Cause Growth?" *Journal of Economic Growth*. 9:271-303.

Rodrik, Dani; A. Subramanian; & F. Trebbi. 2004. "Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development." *Journal of Economic Growth*. 9: 131-65.

Week 12 Federalism

Riker, William. 1975. "Federalism" in F. I. Greenstein & N. Polsby's (eds) *Handbook of Political Science. 5: Governmental Institutions and Processes*, 93-172. Addison-Wesley: Reading, MA.

Tiebout, Charles. 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures." *Journal of Political Economy*. 64:416-24.

Buchanan, James. 1995. "Federalism as an Ideal Political Order and an Objective for Constitutional Reform." *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*. 25(2):19-28.

Weingast, Barry. 1995. "The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market Preserving Federalism and Economic Growth." *JLEO*. 11: 1-31.

Rodden, Jonathan & S. Rose-Ackerman. 1997. "Does Federalism Preserve Markets?" *Virginia Law Review*. 83(7): 1521-72.