

G53:1700.001: Core Graduate Course in International Relations
Fall 2006, Tuesday 10-12
Alastair Smith, Office hours Monday 9-12.

The core graduate course in international relations is designed to explore the main issues and research strategies in the study of international relations. Despite the “core” nature of this class, I do not intend it to be a survey of the entire field. I believe that it is simply impossible to cover all the pertinent questions in international relations in a single class. Rather than superficially skim many topics, we shall examine a limited set of problems and focus on the research methodologies involved. It is much better to take your intuitions about how the world works and develop them in a scientific manner than it is to be able to recall what everyone has previously said on a topic. A good question pursued in an appropriate way makes for good research! Knowing everything that has been written in the past does not!

I have limited the number of readings each week. I want us to focus on the key concepts of the arguments made, the logic used, the falsifiability of the argument and how the arguments are tested. There is a strong focus on articles by people at NYU and the sort of topics they research: I make no apology for this. First, I believe that these are some of the most important developments in the field. Second, this is the material I can most effectively teach. Third, it helps NYU students identify the research interests and methodological approaches of the NYU faculty.

Students are expected to come to class prepared to discuss the week’s readings, with special emphasis on the way in which hypotheses are developed, the fundamental elements of research design, and with ideas about how the research questions in the readings might be better examined or about future directions in research on the topic under discussion. Critiques of the reading assignments should focus on any problems in logic or evidence and should offer concrete and feasible ideas about how to improve on the research. Students will be assigned to lead the discussion of the readings.

Each student needs to write three short papers (1-3 pages) and a longer term paper. The short paper should be “think pieces” which focus on research ideas inspired by the readings (or other sources) which consider an appropriate research question and how it might be pursued. These papers should not be summaries of the readings or other forms of surveys of the literature. I want you to think about how you would do research. The final paper, due at noon on December 22nd, should be a research paper—perhaps developing and carrying out the ideas in one of the think pieces. Reviews of the literature are not acceptable. The final paper could be a theoretical idea used to derive hypotheses. Alternatively, you might consider testing existing arguments within the literature. However, it absolutely can not be a list of what other people have said.

The readings are predominately articles. However, in addition I am assigning one book: Robert Powell. (1999) *In the Shadow of Power* (Princeton University Press). As yet I have not assigned topics for the last two weeks. Instead I have suggested a series of topic. We will either look at these or other topics depending upon students’ interests.

1) (September 5th) Introduction to key conceptions

James Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” *International Organization* (Summer 1995)

Erik Gartzke, "War is in the Error Term," *International Organization* 53(1999):567-88.
Banks, Jeffrey S. 1990. Equilibrium Behavior in Crisis Bargaining Games. *AJPS* 34(3)
599-614.

Powell 1999 chapt. 1.

2) (Sept. 12th) Realism/Polarity

Powell 1999 chapt 2&3.

Kenneth Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," *APSR* (December 1997)

John Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative versus Progressive Research
Programs, *APSR* (December 1997)

Jack Levy, "The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace," *Annual Review of Political
Science* (1998).

3) (Sept 19th) System Structure and Power Transition

A.F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The Power Transition. In Manus Midlarsky
Handbook of War Studies. Michigan 171-194 (available in a folder at the front reception
desk in the politics department).

Woosang Kim and James Morrow, "When do Shifts in Power Lead to War?" *American
Journal of Political Science*, 1992;.

Robert Powell, 1999 chapt 4.

Fearon, James 1996 Bargaining over objects that influence future bargaining power.
Working paper

4) (Sept. 26th) Nature of War

Wagner, R. Harrison. "Bargaining and war," *American Journal of Political Science*
44,3(2000):469-484.

Smith "Fighting Battles, Winning Wars." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* June 1998 Vol.
42, No. 3, pp.301-320.

Branislav Slantchev 2003. The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed
States. *American Political Science Review* Vol. 97, No. 1 February 2003

Smith and Stam 2004. Bargaining and the Nature of War *JCR*, Vol. 48 No. 6, December
2004 783-813.

Suzanne Werner, "The Precarious Nature of Peace: Resolving the Issues, Enforcing the
Settlement, and Renegotiating the Terms," *American Journal of Political Science* 43
(July 1999): 912-934.

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5) (Oct. 3rd) Deterrence and Alliances

Alastair Smith, "Alliance Formation and War," *International Studies Quarterly*
(December 1995)

Morrow, James D. 1994. Alliances, Credibility and Peacetime Costs. *JCR* 38(2):270-297.

Paul Huth, "Deterrence and International Conflict," *Annual Review of Political Science*
(1999).

Fearon, "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs," *Journal
of Conflict Resolution* 41(1997):68-90.

6) (Oct. 10th) Alliance Formation

Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry," *American Journal of Political Science* 35(1991):904-33.

Christensen and Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks." *International Organization* 44(1990):137-68.

Morrow, "Arms Versus Allies," *International Organization* 47(1993):207-233.

Leeds, "Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes," *American Journal of Political Science*, 47,3(2003):427-439.

7) (Oct. 17th) Democratic Peace

Required Readings: Ray, "Does Democracy Cause Peace?," *Annual Review of Political Science* 1(1998):27-46.

Bueno de Mesquita et al, "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace," *American Political Science Review* 93(1999):791-807, or Bueno de Mesquita et al., *The Logic of Political Survival*, Ch. 6.

Rosato, "The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory," *American Political Science Review* 97(2003):585-602.

Bueno de Mesquita et al 2004. Testing novel implications From the selectorate Theory of war. *World Politics*.

Ward and Gleditsch, "Democratizing for Peace," *American Political Science Review* 92(1998):51-62.

8) (Oct. 24th) Audience Costs

James Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," *American Political Science Review* (September 1994)

Peter Partell and Glenn Palmer, "Audience Costs and Interstate Crises: An Empirical Assessment of Fearon's Model of Dispute Outcomes," *International Studies Quarterly*, June 1999

Kenneth Schultz, "Looking for Audience Costs," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* February 2001

Smith, Alastair. 1998. "International Crises and Domestic Politics." *American Political Science Review* 92(3):623-638.

9) (Oct. 31st) Liberalism/Cooperation

Axelrod and Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy," *World Politics* 38 (1985):226-54.

Fearon, "Bargaining, Enforcement and International Cooperation," *International Organization* 52(1998):269-306.

Guisinger and Smith, "Honest Threats: The Interaction of Reputation and Political Institutions in International Crises," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46(2002):175-200.

McGillivray and Smith. 2000. Trust and Cooperation Through Agent-specific Punishments. *International Organization* 54, 4, Autumn 2000, pp. 809-824.

Robert D. Putnam 1988. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games *International Organization* Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer, 1988), pp. 427-460

10) (Nov 7th) International Dimensions of Internal Conflict

Fearon and Laitin. "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation," *American Political Science Review* 90,4(1996):715-735.

Fearon and Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97,1(2003):75-90.

Lake and Rothchild. "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," *International Security* 21,2(1996):41-75.

Walter, "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement," *International Organization*. 51,3(1997):335-364.

Regan, "Third-Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46,1(2002):55-73.

Doyle and Sambanis, "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis," *American Political Science Review* 94,4(2000):779-801.

Bueno de Mesquita, "Conciliation, Counterterrorism, and Patterns of Terrorist Violence," *International Organization* 59,1(2005):145-176.

11) (Nov. 14th) Political Survival and Foreign Policy Choice

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita; Randolph M. Siverson. 1995. War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability *American Political Science Review* Vol. 89, No. 4 (Dec., 1995), pp. 841-855

Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003. Logic of political survival chapter 9

H. E. Goemans. 2000. Fighting for Survival: The Fate of Leaders and the Duration of War *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 44, No. 5. (Oct., 2000), pp. 555-579.

Alejandro Flores TBA.

Matthew O. Jackson and Massimo Morelli 2006. Political Bias and War. Working paper

11) (Nov. 21st)

12) (Nov. 28th)

Classes on the following two of the following topics depending upon interest.

A) Economic Sanctions

B) Economic Factors and Conflict

C) Ethnic Conflict and Civil War

D) Diversionary War Theory.

13) (Dec. 5th) Student Presentations

