Strategy and Defense
Policy
Politics G53.2701:
Spring 2003
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita
x8-3521
Office Hours: Monday
10-12 and whenever I am in my office.
Feel free to stop by.
This
course explores theories about conditions that promote cooperation or conflict
between states. The main objective
is to identify strategies that promote cooperative solutions to international
disputes and to evaluate those strategies in terms of their historical
effectiveness. We examine both external and internal factors that influence
relations between states.
The primary emphasis is on the application of rigorous theoretic models
and evidence as tools for assessing strategy between nations. I do not assume or require great facility
with mathematics, but I do assume students have a willingness to use
mathematical reasoning. Seminar
sessions will build on and expand beyond the required readings.
Students
are encouraged to prepare one-page to two-page papers every week. Although not required each week, I do
require at least four such short papers from each student spread across the
semester. These very short papers
should present a quick and dirty test of a hypothesis in the next week¹s
reading or a related hypothesis formulated by the student. Alternatively, short
papers can develop a theoretical argument that leads to a new proposition that
could be tested in a subsequent short paper. The short papers serve as a useful stimulus for identifying
a topic for the semester research paper.
Students are required to prepare a research paper of up to 35 pages
(i.e., an appropriate length for submission to a peer-reviewed journal) that
develops and/or tests one or more hypotheses about international cooperation or
conflict. Of course the paper can
be shorter. I will be happy
to discuss the paper with each student and will happily read preliminary drafts
or sections. Research papers are
due on April 28th with the expectation that students will present
their research findings during the final class session, on May 5th. I do not object to giving an
incomplete if the paper is not finished by the end of the semester provided
that there is sufficient progress on the paper that the student can present
core theoretical ideas or data analysis by May 5th.
The
core readings for the course are: George Downs and David Rocke, Optimal
Imperfection;
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason; and Douglas Lemke, Regions
of War and Peace. In addition, we read a number of journal articles
and portions of other books.
Everything should be read with an eye on identifying core assumptions,
the logical link between assumptions and hypotheses and evidence. Author names
followed by * indicate that the article can be downloaded from jstor. Articles
or author names followed by # indicate that the immediately preceding name
(author or publication) has a web site that contains a downloadable version of
the article. Several chapters are assigned from Bueno de Mesquita, Smith,
Siverson, and Morrow, The Logic of Political Survival. A downloadable version
is available at The login is logic and the password is
afsk. I recommend that you not print the file as it is about 1,000 pages long.
January 27: Intro: Modeling and Rationality
Required Reading: Downs
and Rocke, chapters 1 and 2; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, ³The Benefits of a
Social-Scientific Approach to Studying International Affairs,² in Ngaire Woods,
Explaining International Relations Since 1945, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1996.
Suggested Readings:
Robert Jackman, "Rationality and Political Participation." American Journal of Political
Science,
1993; Frank Zagare, "Rationality and Deterrence," World Politics 1990; Peter Ordeshook, Game
Theory and Political Theory, Ch. 1; Riker and Ordeshook, Introduction to Positive
Political Theory,
ch. 2.
Februar 3: Thinking
About War: Structural Views
Required Reading: Lemke,
chapters 1-3;Thomas Volgy and Lawrence Imwalle, ³Two Faces of Hegemonic Strength:
Structural Versus Relational Capabilities,² International Interactions 2000.
Suggested Readings:
Edward Vose Gulick, Europe¹s Classical Balance of Power; Colin Elman and John Vasquez, eds. Realism
and the Balancing of Power: A New Debate.
February 10: Thinking
About War: A Formalization
Required Reading: Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David
Lalman, War and Reason, Chaps. 2-3; James Fearon*, ³Rationalist Explanations for
War,² International Organization (Summer 1995); D. Scott Bennet and Allan C.
Stam, ³A Universal Test of an Expected Utility Theory of War,² International
Studies Quarterly
(September 2000); D. Scott Bennett# and Matthew Rupert, "Improving
Measures of Expected Utility: An Empirical Comparison Of Using S Or tB In The
Study Of International Conflict."
Suggested Readings: James Morrow, "A
Continuous-Outcome Expected Utility Theory of War," Journal of Conflict
Resolution,
1985; Curtis Signorino,²Strategic Interaction and the Statistical Analysis of
International Conflict,² American Political Science Review 1998; Alastair Smith, ³A Summary
of Political Selection: The Effect of Strategic Choice on the Escalation of
International Crises,² American
Journal of Political Science 1998.
February 17: Holiday
February 24: Balance of Power or . . .: War Outcomes
Required Readings: Emerson Niou, Peter Ordeshook and
Gregory Rose, Balance of Power, chs. 2-4; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman,
Chapter 6; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman*, ³Empirical Support for Systemic and
Dyadic Explanations of International Conflict,² World Politics October 1988.
March 3: . . .
Institutions: War Outcomes
James Fearon*, ³Domestic
Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,² American
Political Science Review 1994; Dan Reiter and Allan Stam, Democracies at War, Princeton 2002,
chapters 2-4; Peter Partell and Glenn Palmer, ³Audience Costs and Interstate
Crises: An Empirical Assessment of Fearon¹s Model of Dispute Outcomes,² International
Studies Quarterly,
June 1999; Kenneth Schultz, ³Looking for Audience Costs,²Journal of Conflict
Resolution
February 2001; Christopher Gelpi# and Michael Griesdorf, ³Winners or Losers?:
Democracies in International Crises, 1918-1994,² American Political Science
Review
2001.
March 10: Power Transition/Hegemonic War and
Appeasement
Required Readings: Woosang Kim and Morrow*, "When do
Shifts in Power Lead to War?" American Journal of Political Science, 1992; Robert Powell,
³Uncertainty, Shifting Power, and Appeasement,² In the Shadow of Power, Chapter 4; Lemke,
chapters 4-6.
Suggested Readings: Organski and Kugler, The War Ledger; Gilpin, War and
Change in World Politics; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, War and Reason chs. 7.
March 17: Spring Recess
March 24: Alliances:
Reliable or Unreliable Cooperation
Required Readings: Morrow*, "Alliances and
Asymmetry," American Journal of Political Science, 1991; Alastair Smith*,
"Alliance Formation and War," International Studies Quarterly 1995; Michael Altfeld
and Bueno de Mesquita*, ³Choosing Sides in Wars,² International Studies
Quarterly
March 1979; Randolph Siverson and Joel King*, ³Attributes of National Alliance
Membership and War Participation,² American Journal of Political Science, 1980.
Suggested Readings:
Michael Altfeld, "The Decision to Ally," Western Political
Quarterly,
1984; Lalman and David Newman, "The Enhancement of National Security
through the Formation of Alliances," International Interactions, 1991; Bruce Berkowitz,
"Realignment in ITO's," International Studies Quarterly, 1983; Morrow,
"Arms Versus Allies," International Organization 1993.
March 31: Democratic
Peace: Constraints or Norms or Both
Required Reading: Zeev
Maoz and Bruce Russett*, "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic
Peace, 1946-1986." American
Political Science Review, 1993; Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and Morrow,
chapter 6 of The Logic of Political Survival; Ahmer Tarar,
³International Bargaining with Two-Sided Domestic Constraints,² Journal of
Conflict Resolution
2001; Kenneth Schultz*, ³Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International
Crises,² American Political Science Review (December 1998).
April 7: Other
Democratic Peace Perspectives
Required Readings: Erik
Gartzke, ³Preferences and the Democratic Peace,² International Studies
Quarterly
(June 2000); Lars-Erik Cederman and Mohan Penubarti Rao, ³The Dynamics of the
Democratic Peace,² Journal of Conflict Resolution December 2001, pp.
818-833; Kelly Kadera, Mark Crescenzi# and Megan Shannon, ³Democratic Survival,
Peace, and War in the International System,² American Journal of Political
Science
2003; Patricia Weitsman and George Shambaugh, ³International Systems, Domestic
Structures, and Risk,² Journal of Peace Research May 2002.
April 14-21: Domestic
Institutions, Political Survival, and War
Required Reading:
Christopher Gelpi and Joseph Grieco, ³Democracy, Leadership Tenure, and the
Targeting of Militarized Challenges,² Journal of Conflict Resolution December, 2001; Downs and Rocke, chapter 3; Bueno de
Mesquita et al., The Logic of Political Survival, chapters 8-9; Hein E. Goemans
³Fighting for Survival: The Fate of Leaders and the Duration of War,² Journal
of Conflict Resolution (October 2000).
April 28: Forecasting Political Events
Required Readings: Bueno
de Mesquita, Predicting Politics, 2002; James L. Ray and Bruce Russett*, ³The
Future as Arbiter of Theoretical Controversies: Predictions, Explanations and
the End of the Cold War,² British Journal of Political Science July 1996; Stanley
Feder, ³Forecasting for Policy Making in the Post-Cold War Period² Annual
Review of Political Science#, 2002; Bueno de Mesquita, Rose McDermott and
Emily Cope, ³The Expected Prospects for Peace in Northern Ireland,² International
Interactions
2001; Jeffrey Berejikian, ³A Cognitive Theory of Deterrence,² Journal of
Peace Research,
March 2002.
Suggested Readings: Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and
Domestic Politics," International Organization, 1988; Bueno de
Mesquita and Frans Stokman, European Community Decision Making chs. 4,5,9, 10; Jacek
Kugler and Yi Feng, editors, ³The Expected Utility Approach to Policy Decision
Making: Assessments, Forecasts and Strategies,² International Interactions Special Issue, No. 3-4,
1997;
May 5: Conclusions
Papers Due