Wednesday
2-4 p.m.
Prof. William Roberts
Clark
Department of Politics Room 449 Tel: 212-998-8525 Office Hours: TBA |
Prof.
Andrew Moravcsik
(Visiting
from Harvard University) Department
of Politics Phone,
Office, and Hours: TBA |
The Substance of the Course
This
seminar serves as a graduate level introduction to the field of International
Relations. It is divided into two parts. In the first four weeks, we deal
with a few large questions at a high level of abstraction: What is “International
Politics”? How ought we best to study it? What are the main theoretical
approaches? After addressing (but not likely resolving) these “big questions”,
we will examine a set of issues that scholars have addressed in order to
see what, if anything, they have learned about substantively and theoretically
important research questions. The goal of this survey is to provide the
student with a flavor for important debates in the field, identify areas
where progress has been made, and help the student determine areas where
they might like to concentrate future class work and research during their
graduate study. No attempt has been made to be comprehensive; the readings
instead reflect a main stream of systematic research in International Relations.
To complement other courses in the department, it focuses disproportionately,
but not exclusively, on security studies rather than international organization
or international political economy. Note also that, unlike many of its
kind, this course has not been oriented around a comparison of “approaches,”
methodologies, levels of analyses, etc.Rather,
the bulk of the reading is aimed at answering specific research questions;
we believe that it is ultimately in such concrete settings that alternative
approaches can be most fruitfully compared.
Requirements of the Course
Students
will be required to write three short papers, between 5 and 7 double-spaced
pages (no more than 2000 words) each. Each paper will be due on the Monday
before class by 5 p.m. It is to be sent in the body of a simultaneous e-mail
to both professors, with the word count included at the upper left.Late
papers or papers with no word count will be graded down. The first paper
will be due on Monday, Sept. --th
at 5 p.m. It is to be an essay critically
discussing political realism and the scientific method; further details
will be distributed by the second class meeting. The remaining papers will
be a critical review essay and a proposed research design – each dealing
with one week’s readings. The critical review will summarize and critically
engage at least two readings from the week in question. The research design
will use at least one of the research papers as a jumping off point and
lay out a plan for addressing an empirical question the author feels has
been inadequately answered in the assigned readings. In addition to written
work, students are expected to do all the readings in a thoughtful and
timely fashion and participate actively in the seminar discussion. If a
student has not completed a reading, he or she should inform both professors
at the start of class; otherwise the student is fully responsible for all
readings. One or two missed readings over the semester, if the professors
are informed before the start of class, are permitted; under any other
circumstances, any student who has not done reading, or is absent without
excuse, will receive a zero for that session. Written work will make up
60% of your grade and class participation 40%. Students writing either
research designs or critical essays on a week’s readings will be viewed
as “firsts among equals” – our expectation is that you will be particularly
prepared to lead the discussion that week. Consequently, 25% (10% of the
final grade) of your participation grade will derive from your performance
of this role. The remaining 75% (30% of the final grade) derives from general
class participation.
Books
Available for Purchase
Charles
Lave and James G. March. Introduction to Models in the Social Sciences.
University Press of America, 1991 [1975]. H61 L342
Robert
Keohane, ed., Neo-Realism and its Critics. Columbia University Press,
1986. JX 1391.
N
46
Robert
Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate.
Columbia University Press, 1993.
Hans
Morgenthau. Politics Among NationsKnopf,
1985 [1948 ]. JX 1391.M6
Bruce
Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman. War and Reason. Yale University
Press, 1992. JX 1391. B83
Robert
Keohane. After Hegemony. Princeton University Press, 1984. HF 1411.
K 442
Michael
Gilligan. Empowering Exporters: Reciprocity, Delegations, and Collective
Action in
American
Trade Policy, University of Michigan
Press, 1997.HF 1455. G 488
Stephen
Walt. The Origins of Alliances. Cornell University Press, 1987.
Ronald
Rogowski. Commerce and Coalitions. Princeton University Press, 1989.
Schedule
Week
1 – September 8 – Introduction: Defining International Politics
Week 2 – Sept. 15 –
The Science of International Politics: Evaluative Criteria
Required:
Carl
G. Hempel, Philosophy of Natural Science. Prentice-Hall, 1966. Chap.
4. (pp. 33-46) (Packet)
Thomas
Kuhn “The Historical Structure of Scientific Discoveries,”
Imre
Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programs."
In Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds., Criticism and the Growth of
Knowledge. Cambridge University Press, 1970, pp.
91-138. (Packet)
Charles
Lave and James G. March Introduction to Models in the Social Sciences.
Harper and Row, 1975 or University Press of America, 1991, Chapters 1-3,
pp. 1-84. (Packet)
David
Dessler, “What’s at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?” International
Organization 43:3 (Summer 1989), pp. 441-473.(JSTOR)
Gary
King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba, eds., Designing Social Inquiry:
Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton University
Press, 1994, pp. 1-33, 99-114, 208-230. (for purchase).
Fearon,
James D.1991. “Counterfactuals and
Hypothesis Testing in Political Science” World Politics 43(1): 169-95.
Recommended:
James
D. Fearon, "Causes and Counterfactuals in Social Science: Exploring an
Analogy between Cellular Automata and Historical Processes," in Philip
E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, eds., Counterfactual Thought Experiments
in World Politics: Logical, Methodological and Psychological Perspectives.
Princeton University Press, 1996, pp. 39-67.
Peter
J. McClelland, Causal Explanation and Model Building in History, Economics
and the New Economic History. Cornell University Press, 1975, pp. 65-104.
Martin
Hollis and Steve Smith. Explaining and Understanding International Relations.
Oxford University Press, 1990.
Morton
A. Kaplan. 1966. The New Great Debate: Traditionalism vs. Science in International
Relations World Politics 19: 1 (October 1966), pp. 1-20.
Week 3 – Sept. 22 –
Realism and its Variants
Required:
Thucydides
The History of the Peloponnesian War, Penguin Edition, 1954, Book
Five, Sections 84-116. (pp. 400-408)
(Packet)
Hans
Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace.
3rd edition. Knopf, 1960, Chaps. 1, 3, 8, 15, 31. (pp. 3-15,
27-37, 101-109, 227-232, 539-551) (for purchase)
Kenneth
Waltz, Theory of International Politics, selected chapters reprinted
in Robert Keohane, ed. Neo-Realism and its Critics. Columbia University
Press, 1986, pp. 27-132 )
(for purchase)
Robert
G. Gilpin. “The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism” in Keohane,
ed., Neorealism and its Critics, pp. 301-321. (for purchase)
Jeffrey Legro and Andrew
Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?” International Security 24:2
(Fall 1999), 49 pp. (Packet).
Recommended:
Thucydides
The History of the Peloponnesian War. Penguin Edition, 1954, pp.
35-49 (Book I/1-23), 72-87 (Book I/66-88), 103-108 (Book I/118-125), 118-123
(Book I/139-146), 143-164 (Book II/34-65), 212-223 (Book III/36-50), 236-245
(Book III/69-85), 400-408 (Book V/84-116).
E.H.
Carr The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study
of International Relations. Macmillan, 1939.
Kenneth
Waltz, Man, the State, and War. Columbia University Press, 1959.
R. Harrison Wagner. “Economic
Interdependence, Bargaining Power and Political Influence” International
Organization 42:3 (Summer 1988), pp. 461-483.
Required:
Robert
Keohane, “Realism, Neo-Realism, and the Study of World Politics,” and “Theory
of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond,” in Keohane, ed., Neo-Realism
and its Critics, pp. 1-26, 158-203. (for purchase)
Joseph
Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the
Newest Liberal Institutionalism”; Duncan Snidal, “Relative Gains and the
Pattern of International Cooperation”; Stephen Krasner, “Global Communications
and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier,” in David A. Baldwin,
ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate. Columbia
University Press, 1993, pp. 116-142, 170-208, 234-249. (for purchase)
Robert
Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal
Debate," International Organization 48 (Spring 1994), pp. 313-344.(Jstor)
Andrew
Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: Liberalism and International
Relations Theory” International Organization (Autumn 1997), pp.
513-554. (Packet)
John
Ruggie, “Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist
Synthesis,” in Keohane, ed., Neorealism and its Critics, pp. 98-130.(For
purchase)
Alex
Wendt,“Anarchy is What States Make
of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization46
(Spring 1992), pp. 391-426. (Jstor)
William
Roberts Clark, "Agents and Structures: Two Views of Preferences, Two Views
of Institutions," International Studies Quarterly 42:2 (June 1998),
pp. 245-270. (Packet)
Recommended:
Robert
W. Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations
Theory,” in Keohane, ed., Neorealism and its Critics, pp. 204-254.
Richard
K. Ashley. “The Poverty of Neorealism,” in Keohane, ed., Neorealism
and its Critics, 255-300.
John
Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics : From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism.
Cambridge University Press, 1998.
John
Vasquez, “Coloring it Morgenthau: New Evidence for an Old Thesis on Quantitative
International Politics,” British Journal of International Studies
5:3 (October1979),
pp. 210-228.
Robert
Keohane, After Hegemony: Discord and Collaboration in World Politics.
Princeton University Press, Chaps. 1-2. (pp. 5-30)
Week
5 – October 6 – Applied Realism I: The Balance of Power
Required:
*
Inis Claude, Power and International Relations. Random House, 1962.
Ch. 1-3. (pp. 3-93)(Packet)
*
Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 3rd ed. Knopf, 1960. Part
IV. (pp. 167-220) (for purchase)
* Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics. Addison-Wesley, 1979, pp. 116-28. (In Keohane, ed. Neorealism and its Critics)
*
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason. Yale University
Press, 1992, Chap. 6. (pp. 181-217) (for purchase)
*
Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances. Cornell University Press,
1987, Chapters 1-2, 5-6, 8 (pp. 1-49, 147-217, 262-285). (for purchase)
Dan Reiter, "Learning, Realism, and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past," World Politics 46 (July 1994), pp. 490-526.(Jstor)
John
A. Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm and Degenerate versus Progressive Research
Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing
Proposition,” American Political Science Review, 91:4 (December
1997), pp. 899-912, and replies by Kenneth Waltz (“Evaluating Theories”),
pp. 913-917; Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder (“Progressive Research
on Degenerate Alliances”), pp. 919-922; Colin Elman and Miriam Elman (“Lakatos
and Neorealism: A Reply to Vasquez”) pp. 923-926; Randall Schweller (“New
Realist Research on Alliances: Refining, not Refuting, Waltz's Balancing
Proposition”) pp. 927-930; and Stephen Walt, (“The Progressive Power of
Realism”) pp. 931-935. (Packet)
Recommended:
R.
Harrison Wagner, "The Theory of Games and the Balance of Power," World
Politics 38 (July 1986), pp. 546-76.
R.
Harrison Wagner, "Peace, War, and the Balance of Power," American Political
Science Review 88 (September 1994), pp. 593-607.
Emerson
Niou, Peter Ordeshook, and Gregory Rose. The Balance of Power. Cambridge
University Press, 1989.
Emerson
M. S. Niou, Peter C. Ordeshook. “Stability in Anarchic International Systems,”
American Political Science Review 84:4 (December 1990), pp. 1207-1234.
Robert
Powell, "Stability and the Distribution of Power," World Politics 48
(January 1996), pp. 239-67.
J.
David Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stucky, "Capability Distribution,
Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965," in John A. Vasquez and Marie
T. Henehan, eds., The Scientific Study of Peace and War. Macmillan/Lexington
Books, 1992. Chap. 2.
Bruce
Bueno de Mesquita, “Risk, Power Distributions, and the Likelihood of War,”
International Studies Quarterly 25:4 (December 1981), pp. 541-568.
Bruce
Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, "Empirical Support for Systemic and
Dyadic Explanations of International Conflict," World Politics 41
(October 1988), pp. 1-20.
Bruce
Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, James and Ethan R. Zorick, “Capabilities,
Perception, and Escalation,” American Political Science Review 91:1
(March 1997), pp. 15-27.
Alastair
Smith, "Alliance Formation and War." International Studies Quarterly
39 (December 1995), pp. 405-25.
*
Alastair Smith, "To Intervene or Not to Intervene: A Biased Decision,"
Journal of Conflict Resolution 40:1 (March 1996), pp. 16-40.
James
D. Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation
Model of Alliances," American Journal of Political Science 35:4
(November 1991), pp. 904-933.
Mancur
Olson and Richard Zeckhauser, “An Economic Theory of Alliances,” Review
of Economics and Statistics48:3
(August 1966), pp. 266-79.
Jack
S. Levy, "Alliance Formation and War Behavior: An Analysis of the Great
Powers, 1495-1975," Journal of Conflict Resolution 25 (December
1981), pp. 581-613.
Suzanne
Werner and Douglas Lemke, "Opposites Do Not Attract: The Impact of Domestic
Institutions, Power, and Prior Commitments on Alignment Choices," International
Studies Quarterly 41:3 (September 1997), pp. 529-46.
Required:
Christopher
Achen and Duncan Snidal, "Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case
Studies," World Politics 41 (January 1989), pp. 143-69. (Jstor)
George
W. Downs, "The Rational Deterrence Debate," World Politics 41 (January
1989), pp. 225-37. (Jstor)
Alexander
George and Richard Smoke, "Deterrence and Foreign Policy," World Politics
41 (January 1989), pp. 170-82. (Jstor)
Robert
Jervis, "Rational Deterrence: Theory and Evidence," World Politics
41 (January 1989), pp. 183-207. (Jstor)
Richard
Ned Lebow and Janice Stein, "Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore
I Deter." World Politics 41 (January 1989), pp. 208-24. (Jstor)
George
W. Downs and David M. Rocke, “Tacit Bargaining and Arms Control,” World
Politics 39:3 (April 1987), pp. 297-325.(Jstor)
James
D. Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical
Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model," Journal of Conflict Resolution 38
(June 1994), pp. 236-69. (Packet)
Recommended:
Thomas
Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict. Harvard University Press, 1980,
Chapters 1-4.
Steven
J. Brams and Walter Mattli, "Theory of Moves: Overview and Examples," Conflict
Management and Peace Science 12: (Spring 1993), pp. 1-39.
James
D. Morrow, "Signaling Difficulties with Linkage in Crisis Bargaining,"
International Studies Quarterly 36 (March 1992), pp. 153-72.
George
W. Downs and David M. Rocke, Tacit Bargaining, Arms Races, and Arms
Control. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990.
James
D. Morrow, "A Spatial Model of International Conflict," American Political
Science Review 80 (December 1986), pp. 1131-50
Paul
Huth and Bruce Russett, "General Deterrence between Enduring Rivals: Testing
Three Competing Models," American Political Science Review 87 (March
1993), pp. 61-73.
Week 7 – Oct. 20 – Applied
Realism III: Hegemony, Polarity, and Power Transitions
Required:
John
J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold
War,” International Security 15:1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56. Interchange
among John Mearsheimer, Stanley Hoffmann and Robert O. Keohane, International
Security 15 (Fall 1990), pp. 191-199. (Packet).
Jacek Kugler and A.F.K.
Organski, "The Power Transition: A Retrospective and Prospective Evaluation,"
in Manus Midlarsky, ed., Handbook of War Studies. London: Unwin-Hyman,
1989. Chap. 7. (pp. 171-194)(Packet).
Bueno
de Mesquita and Lalman, War and Reason. Yale University Press, 1992,
Chap. 7. (pp. 219-243)
Woosang Kim and James D.
Morrow, “When do power shifts lead to war?” American Journal of Political
Science 36:4 (November 1992), pp. 896-922.(Jstor)
Douglas Lemke and Suzanne
Werber, “Power Parity, Commitment to Change, and War International Studies
Quarterly 40:2 (June 1996), pp. 235-260.(Packet)
Levy,
Jack and Jonathon DiCicco“ ,” JCR
(forthcoming).
Recommended:
James E. Alt, Randall L.
Calvert and Brian D. Humes, “Reputation and Hegemonic Stability: A Game-Theoretic
Analysis,” American Political Science Review 82:2 (June 1996 ),
pp. 445-466.
Douglas
Lemke and Jacek Kugler, "The Evolution of the Power Transition Perspective”;
John A. Vasquez, "When Are Power Transitions Dangerous? An Appraisal and
Reformulation of Power Transition Theory"; Randolph Siverson and Ross A.
Miller, "The Power Transition: Problems and Prospects," in Jacek Kugler
and Douglas Lemke, ed., Parity and War. University of Michigan Press,
1996, Chaps. 1-3.
Daniel
S. Geller, "Capability Concentration, Power Transition, and War," International
Interactions 17:3 (May 1992), pp. 269-84.
Robert
Gilpin, "The Theory of Hegemonic War," Journal of Interdisciplinary
History 18 (Spring 1988), pp. 591-614.
Robert
Gilpin, War & Change in World Politics. Cambridge University
Press, 1981, pp. 1-49, 85-105, 156-210.
Edward
D. Mansfield, "The Concentration of Capabilities and the Onset of War,"
Journal of Conflict Resolution
36 (March 1992), pp. 3-24.
Week
8 – Oct. 27 – Applied Realism IV: Trade, War and Polarity
Required:
Stephen
Krasner, “State Power and the Structure of International Trade,” World
Politics 28:3 (April
1976), pp. 317-343.(Jstor)
Robert
Keohane, After Hegemony, Chapters 3, 4, 8. (pp. 31-64, 135-181).(For
purchase)
Edward
Mansfield, Power, Trade and War. Princeton University Press, 1994,
pp. 3-33. (Packet)
David
A. Lake, "Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy: Naked Emperor
or Tattered Monarch with Potential?" International Studies Quarterly
37 (December 1993), pp. 459-489.(Packet)
David
Lake, “International Economic Structures and American Foreign Economic
Policy.” World Politics 35 (June 1983), pp. 517-543. (Jstor)
Timothy
McKeown, “A Liberal Trade Order?The
Long-Run Pattern of Imports to the Advanced Capitalist States,” International
Studies Quarterly 35 (July 1991), pp. 151-172. (Packet).
Recommended:
Joseph S. Nye
, Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power. Basic
Books, 1990.
Week
9 – Nov. 3 –
Applied Institutionalism I: Cooperation and Conflict in
Anarchy
Required:
Thomas
C. Schelling, "The Reciprocal Fear of Surprise Attack," In Schelling, Strategy
of Conflict. Harvard University Press, 1960, Chap. 9. (pp. 207-229)
(Packet).
James Fearon “Rationalist
Explanations for War” International Organization 49 (Summer 1995)
49:3, pp. 379-414. (Packet).
Smith and McGillivray (Packet)
Robert
Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics 30
(January 1978), pp. 167-186. (Jstor)
Kenneth A. Oye, "Explaining
Cooperation under Anarchy," World Politics 38 (October 1985), pp.
1-24. (Jstor)
Robert Axelrod. The Evolution
of CooperationBasic Books,
1984, Chaps. 1, 4 and 9. (pp. 3-26, 73-87, 169-191) (Packet)
Arthur
A. Stein, “The Hegemon's Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and
International conomic Order,” International Organization 38: 2 (Spring
1984), pp. 355-386. (Jstor)
Keohane,
After Hegemony, Chap. 5. (pp. 65-84)(for purchase)
Recommended:
Jonathan Bendor, “In Good
Times and Bad: Reciprocity in an Uncertain World,” American Journal
of Political Science 31:3
(August 1987), pp. 531-558.
Robert
Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton
University Press, 1976, Chap. 3 (pp. 58-113, especially pp. 62-78 on the
spiral model).
Kenneth
A. Oye, ed., Cooperation Under Anarchy. Princeton University Press,
1986.
Week 10 – Nov. 10
– Applied Institutionalism II:
International Regimes
and Compliance with International Agreements
Required:
Stephen
D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences,” and “Regimes and
the Limits of Realism,” in Krasner, ed., International Regimes.
Cornell University Press, 1982, pp. 1-21, 355-368.Also
in International Organization 36(2) (1982) 185-205, 497-510 respectively.(Jstor)
Keohane, After Hegemony,
Chaps. 6, 7 and 9?
Lisa Martin, "Interests,
Power, Multilateralism," International Organization 46 (Autumn 1992),
pp. 765-792.(Jstor)
James Fearon, “Bargaining,
Enforcement, and International Cooperation,” International Organization
52 (Spring 1998), 269-306.(Packet)
Charles
A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, “Concerts, Collective Security, and
the Future of Europe,” International Security 16: 1 (Summer 1991),
pp. 114-161.(Packet)
* Abraham Chayes and Antonio
Handler Chayes, “On Compliance,” International Organization 47 (Winter
1993), pp. 175-205. (Jstor)
* George Downs, David Rocke
and Peter Barsoom, “Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation?”
International
Organization 50 (Winter 1996), pp. 379-406. (Jstor)
Peter Haas, “Do Regimes
Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control,” International
Organization 43 (Summer 1989), pp. 377-405. (Jstor)
Robert
D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics," International Organization
42 (Summer 1988), pp. 427-461. (Jstor)
Recommended:
George Downs and David Rocke, Optimal Imperfection. Princeton University Press,1995.
Lisa Martin, “Credibility,
Costs, and Institutions: Cooperation on Economics Sanctions,” World
Politics 45.3 (April 1993), pp. 406-432.
Oran Young. International
Governance: Protecting the Environment in a Stateless Society. Cornell
University Press, 1994.
Robert
O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power. Westview
Press, 1989.
Helen Milner and B. Peter
Rosendorff. “Trade Negotiations, Information, and Domestic Politics,” Economics
and Politics 8:2 (July 1996), pp. 145-89.
Andrew
Moravcsik, “Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic Theories
of International Bargaining,” in Peter Evans, Harold Jacobson, and Robert
Putnam, eds., Double-Edged Diplomacy. University of California Press,
1993, pp. 3-43.
William
Roberts Clark and Erick Duchesne, “Executive-Legislative Relations and
‘the Schelling Conjecture’: a Limited Information Rubinstein Bargaining
Model of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement,” MS.
Required:
Ernst
B. Haas, "Technocracy, Pluralism and the New Europe," in Stephen Graubard,
ed.
The New Europe. Houghton Mifflin, 1964, pp. 62-88.(Packet)
Stanley
Hoffmann, "Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation State and the
Case of Western Europe," Daedalus 95 (Summer 1966), pp. 892-908.
(Packet)
Andrew
Moravcsik, "Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and
Conventional Statecraft in the European Community," International Organization
45:1 (Winter 1991), pp. 19-56. (Jstor)
(Packet)
Anne-Marie
Burley and Walter Mattli, "Europe before the Court: A Political Theory
of Legal Integration," International Organization 47 (Winter 1993),
pp. 41-76. (Jstor)
Exchange
between Geoffrey Garrett and Mattli/Slaughter, International Organization
49:1 (Winter 1995), pp. 171-190.(Jstor)
Paul Pierson, "The Path
to European Union: An Historical Institutionalist Account," Comparative
Political Studies 29:2 (April
1996), pp. 123-164. (Packet)
George
Tsebelis, "The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda-Setter,"
American Political Science Review 88 (March 1994), pp. 128-142. (Jstor)
Giandomenico
Majone, Regulating Europe. Routledge, 1996, pp. 61-79, 289-301.
(Packet)
Recommended:
Andrew
Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from
Messina to Maastricht. Cornell University Press, 1998.
Andrew
Moravcsik, ed. Centralization or Fragmentation? Europe facing Deepening,
Diversity and Democratization. Council on Foreign Relations/Brookings
Institution, 1998.
Wayne
Sandholtz and Alec Stone-Sweet, eds. European Integration and Supranational
Governance. Oxford University Press, 1998.
Peter
Stirk and David Weigall, eds. The Origins and Development of European
Integration: A Reader and Commentary. Pinter, 1999.
Joseph
H. H. Weiler, The European Constitution. Oxford University Press,
1999.
Week 12 – Nov. 24 –
NO CLASS
Week 13 – Dec. 1 – Applied
Liberalism I: Domestic Institutions and Values
Required:
Morgenthau,
Politics among Nations. 3rd edition., pp. 145-148, 552-555.
(for purchase)
Edward
D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War,”
International Security 20:1 (Summer 1995), pp. 5-38. (Packet)
Michael Doyle, “Liberalism
and World Politics,” American Political Science Review 80(December
1986), pp. 1151-1169. (Jstor)
Zeev
Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic
Peace, 1946-1986," American Political Science Review 87
(September 1993), pp. 624-638. (Jstor)
Bueno
de Mesquita and Lalman, War and Reason., Chap. 5. (pp. 145-177)
(for purchase)
* James D. Fearon, “Domestic
Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” American
Political Science Review88 (September1995),
pp. 577-92. (Jstor)
*
Kenneth A. Shultz, “Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting
Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War,” International
Organization 53 (Spring 1999), pp. 233-266.(Packet)
Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after
the Cold War," International Security 15:3 (Winter 1990/91), pp.
7-57. (Packet)
Recommended:
BruceRussett.
Grasping the Democratic Peace. Princeton University Press, 1993.
Chaps 1-2.
David Lake “Peaceful Pacifists,”
American Political Science Review 86:1 (March 1992), pp. 24-37.
Henry S. Farber and Joanne
Gowa, “Polities and Peace,” International Security 20 (Fall 1995),
pp. 123-46.
T. Clifton Morgan and Sally
Howard Campbell. “Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints, and War:
So Why Kant Democracies Fight?” Journal of Conflict Resolution.
35/2(June 1991), pp. 187-211.
Harvey Starr, “Democracy
and War: Choice, Learning and Security Communities,” Journal of Peace
Research. 29:2 (May 1992), 207-213.
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita
and David Lalman, “Domestic Opposition and Foreign War,” American Political
Science Review 84:3 (September
1990), pp. 747-765.
Required:
Helen
Milner, “Trading Places: Industries for Free Trade.” World Politics(1988). (Jstor)
Jeffrey
Frieden and Ronald Rogowski, “The Impact of the International Economy on
National Policies: An Analytical Overview,” in Robert O. Keohane and Helen
V. Milner, eds., Internationalization and Domestic Politics. Cambridge
University Press, 1996, 25-47. (Packet)
Ronald
Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions. Princeton University Press, 1989,
Chs. 1, 4, 6-7 (pp. 3-20, 88-128, 163-180). (for purchase)
Michael Gilligan, Empowering
Exporters: Reciprocity, Delegations, and Collective Actions in American
Trade Policy.University of
Michigan Press, 1997. (Chapters TBA).
Susanne Lohmann and Sharon
O’Halloryn “Divided Government and U.S. Trade Policy,” International
Organziation 48 (Autumn 1994), (Jstor)
Joanne Gowa, “Public
Goods and Political Institutions: Trade and Monetary Policy Processes in
the United States,” International Organization 42 (Autumn 1988),
pp. 15-32. (Jstor)
Jeffry A. Frieden,
“Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World
of Global Finance,” International Organization 45 (Summer 1991),
pp. 425-452. (Jstor)
John
Gerard Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded
Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,” in Krasner, ed. International
Regimes, pp. 195-231. Also in International Organization 36:2
(1982) 379-415.
(Jstor)
Recommended:
James E. Alt, Jeffry Frieden,
Michael J. Gilligan, Dani Rodrik, and Ronald Rogowski, “The Political Economy
of International Trade: Enduring Puzzles and an Agenda for Inquiry,” Comparative
Political Studies 29 (December 1996), pp. 689-717., (Packet)