G53.1500
Comparative Politics Core  
Fall 2001

Tuesday 4-6PM
715 Broadway, Room 433

William Roberts Clark
715 Broadway
Room 449
Office Hours: M-T 3-4 PM
998.8525
William.clark@nyu.edu

http://homepages.nyu.edu/~wrc2/

 

            This is a one semester graduate level introduction to Comparative Politics. 

Requirements:

1. Write a seminar paper related to class readings.   A seminar paper addresses all 5 questions in “What do we do”.

Or

2. Write a series of 3 critical reviews/research designs. Critical reviews addresses questions 1-4 in “What do we do” as they relate to particular class readings.

AND

3.  Homework Assignments.

Seminar Paper

Work will be judged in terms of clarity and originality.  A clear paper is well written, unambiguous, and logically coherent. Clarity is important because no matter how original your paper is, if readers can’t understand it they will not read it, build upon it, or cite it (and at least one these should be important to you).  An original paper offers insights that are not already present in the works we have read and/or answers questions that the existing works do not answer clearly.  Originality is important because reading your paper is time consuming and your readers expect some value added in exchange for their time.  If you only tell them what others have already said they will feel cheated.  While originality is important, value added is best demonstrated if your contribution is closely tied to existing work.  Consequently, you may want to take an existing work and change only one or two things about it.  Perhaps an author has raised an interesting questions and provided a compelling explanation, but has used a flawed research design.  An improved research design can lead to a better evaluation of the author’s explanation.  In a seminar paper you demonstrate this possibility by implementing the new research design.  This can mean collecting new data, combining existing data sources in a new way, or merely re-estimating the author’s model with a more appropriate technique.

Critical Reviews/Research Designs

Critical reviews/research designs are expected to make original contributions as well.  Merely, telling me what the author’s answers to the questions are is not enough.  You must critically engage those answers and suggest ways in which the author’s contributions can be built upon in future research.  A research design provides a plan for using empirical evidence to evaluate an answer to a question raised by assigned readings.  It should tell the reader everything they need to know in order to implement the research, but it needn’t actually examine empirical evidence.  More information to follow.

Schedule

  1.  Introduction - What is Comparative Politics
    1. Stanley Lieberson, (1992) "Small N's and big conclusions: an examination of the reasoning in comparative Studies based on a small number of cases," in Charles C. Ragin & Howard S. Becker, eds., What is a Case? Exploring the Foundations of Social Inquiry (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press): 105-118
    2. Lave and March An Introduction to Models in the Social Sciences
    3. Clark, Willam Roberts “The Use of Small-N Comparisions for Hypothesis Testing.”
  1.   Political Theory
    1. Hirschman, Albert O. Exit, Voice, and Loyalt Chapter 2,3, 4, and 9.
    2. Olson, Mancur  The Rise and Decline of Nations Chapter 2.
    3. Shepsle, Kenneth "Discretion, Instituions and the Problem of Government Commitment" in Bordieu and Coleman, eds., Social Theory for a Changing Society, pp.245-263.
  1. Origins of the Modern State
    1. Tilly, Charles "War-Making and Statemaking as Organized Crime" in
    2. North, Douglas Structure and Change in Economic History
    3. North and Weingast "Constitutions and Commitment: The evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England." Journal of Economic History 49:4: 803-32.
    4. Stasavage, David. 2000. "Political Institutions, Partisan Politics, and Credible Commitment in Early Modern Europe: North and Weingast Revisited,"
    5. Bates, Robert and D.-H. Lien, "A Note on Taxation, Development and Representative; Government." Politics and Society, v. 14, 1, 1985, 53-70.
  1. Political Parties - What do they do?
    1. Downs, Anthony An Economic Theory of Democracy Chapters 2,3,4,7,8. or 1957 article
    2. Strom, Kare. 1990. “A Behavior Model of Political Parties,” AJPS
    3. Iversen, T. 1994. “Political Leadership and Representation in West-European Democracies – A Test of 3 Models of Voting.” AJPS 38(1):45-74.
    4. Macdonald, SE and G Rabinowitz. 1998. “Solving the paradox of nonconvergence: Valence, position, and direction in democratic politics” Electoral Studies 17(3):281-300.
  1. Political Consequences of Electoral Systems: Parties
    1. Riker, William. "Duverger's Law Revisited" American Political Science Review.
    2. Cox, Gary Making Votes Count Chapter 3-7,
  1. Explaining Party Systems - Empirical Studies
    1. Ordeshook and Shvetsova "Ethnic Heterogeneity, District Magnitude
    2. Amorin Neto, Octavio and Gary W. Cox, 1997."Electoral Institutions, Cleavage Structures, and the Number of Parties," American Journal of Political Science 41:1 (January) :149-174. (Drop?)
    3. Taagepera, R and MS Shugart. 1993. “Predicting the number of parties – a Quantitative Model of Duberger Mechanical Effect,” APSR 87(2) June: 455-464.
    4. Taagepera, R. 1999. “The Number of Parties as a function of Heterogeneity and Electoral System.” CPS 32(5): 531-548 Aug 1999.
    5. Lijphart, Arend. 1990. “The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws” APSR 84:2 (June):481-496.
    6. Cox, Gary Making Votes Count Chapters 10 & 11.
  1.  From Parties to Governments
    1. Laver, Michael and Kenneth Shepsle. 1990. "Coalitions and Cabinet Government" APSR 84(3):873-890.
    2. Gallagher, Michael, Michael Laver and Peter Mair, “Building and Maintaining a Government” ch.12 Representative Government in Modern Europe. 3rd edition.
    3. Strom, Kaare “Minority Government in Parliamentary Democracies.
    4. Huber, JD. 1996. “The Voter of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies.” APSR 90(2): (June) 269-282.
    5. Shepsle and Bonchek, Analyzing Politics Chapter 16.
  1.  The Effect of Institutions on Government Behavior I
    1. Cox, Gary. 1990. "Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems," American Journal of Political Science 34: 4 (Nov). 
    2. Adams, G.D. 1996. “Legislative effects of single-member vs. multi-member districts.” AJPS 40(1):129-144.
  1.  The Effect of Institutions on Government Behavior II
    1. Tsebelis, George . 1995. "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism, and Multipartyism"  Journal of Political Science 25:289-325..
    2. Tsebelis, George. 1999. "Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis." APSR 93(3):591-608.
    3. Tsebelis and Chang, 2001. “Veto Players and the Structure of Budgets in Advanced Industrialized Countries.” Ms. UCLA.

  2. The Effect of Institutions on Government Behavior III
  1. Alvarez,  R. Michael, Geoffrey Garrett and Peter Lange. 1991. Government Partisanship, Labor Organization, and Macroeconomic Performance. APSR 85:539-556.
  2. Hall, Peter A. and Robert J. Franzese, Jr. 1998. Mixed Signals: Central Bank Independence, Coordinated Wage-Bargaining, and European Monetary Union International Organization  52: 505-535 .
  3. Iversen, Torben. 1998. Wage Bargaining, Central Bank Independence, and the Real Effects of Money International Organization  52: 469-504.
  4. Clark, William R. and Mark Hallerberg. 2000. Mobile Capital, Domestic Institutions, and Electorally-Induced Monetary and Fiscal Policy" American Political Science Review. 94 (2):323-346.
  1.  Is Democracy Representative?
    1. Huber, John D. and G. Bingham Powell, "Congruence between Citizens and Policymakers in Two Visions of Liberal Democracy." World Politics 46 April 291-326.
    2. Przeworski and Wallerstein. 198?. "The Structural Dependence of the State on Capital." APSR
    3. Powell, GB and GS Vanberg. 2000. “Election laws, Disproportionality and Median Correspondence: Implications for Two Visions of Democracy” BJPS 30 (July) 383-411.
    4. Powell, G. Bingham, Jr. 2001. “Democratic Representation: Two Contributions from Comparative Politics”. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Political Science Association.
  1.  Revolution, Coups, and Social Action
    1. Anderson and Seligson. 1994. “Reformism and Radicalism among Peasants: An Empirical Test of Paige’s Agrarian Revolution.” American Journal of Political Science. 38(4):944-972.
    2. Kuran, Timur. 1991. “Know out of never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989.” World Politics 44(1): 7-48.
    3. Chwe, Michael. 2001. Rational Ritual: Culture, Coordination, and Common Knowledge. Princeton University Press. Selections TBA.
    4. Lichbach, Mark I. "What makes Rational Peasants revolutionary? Dilema, Paradox, and Irony in Peasant Collective Action" World Politics 46:3(1994) 383-418.
    5. Muller, Edward N. and Mitchell A. Seligson. 1987. "Inequality and Insurgency" APSR 81(2):425-452.
    6. Moore, Will 1995. "Rational Rebels: Overcoming the Free-Rider Problem." Political Research Quarterly 48(2):417-454.
    7. Jackman, Robert W., Rosemary H. T. O'Kane, Thomas H. Johnson, Pat McGowan, Robert O. Slater. 1986.  “Explaining African Coups d'Etat”  (in Controversies) Robert W. Jackman, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 1. (Mar. ), pp. 225-250.
    8. Johnson, Thomas H., Robert O. Slater, Pat McGowan. 1984.  “Explaining African Military Coups d'Etat,” 1960-1982 The American Political Science Review, Vol. 78, No. 3. (Sept.), pp. 622-640.
    9. Jackman, Robert W. 1978. “The Predictability of Coups d'etat: A Model with African Data “The American Political Science Review, Vol. 72, No. 4. (Dec.), pp. 1262-1275.
  1. Economic Determinants of Democracy
    1. Adam Przeworski and Limongi, "Political Regimes and Economic Growth." Journal of Economic Perspectives, v.7, 1993, 51-69.
    2. Acemoglu D. and J.A. Robinson. 2000. "Why did the west extend the franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective." QJE 115 (4): 1167-1199 (Nov).
    3. Przeworski, Adam, “Why Democracy Survives in Affluent Societies.”
  1.  Institutional Determinants of Democracy
    1. Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, (1993) "Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarianism versus Presidentialism," World Politics  46 (October):1-22.
    2. Scott Mainwaring (1993) "Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy: The Difficult Combination," Comparative Political Studies, 26:2 (July):198-228.
    3. Cheibub, Jose Antonio, Adam Przeworski, and Sebastian Seigh. 2001. “Government Coalitions Under Presidentialism and Parliamentarism.”