

Field Seminar in American Politics
Politics G53.1300.001
Spring 2006

Professor Rebecca Morton

Why a Course in American Politics?

American politics is a strange field in political science – it is the only field at NYU and many other American academic institutions on the same level as those fields, which are not country specific, such as International Relations and Comparative Politics. Why does American politics get this special role?

At one level the answer is simple – there is a large demand for courses in American politics at the undergraduate level across the United States, larger typically than the demand for courses in other fields. Why? Many undergraduates want to go to law school or public policy school or study journalism or other social science and want to take courses in American Politics in preparation for those endeavors. Many state schools require that all undergraduates have exposure to courses in American studies or politics or history. These courses need teachers and to get a job teaching these classes, scholars need to study American Politics. Having a field in American Politics increases the job options for scholars looking for jobs in the U.S. without a doubt.

But there is also a more complicated answer. American Politics is a field where researchers have applied some of the most sophisticated formal modeling and econometric techniques in their research. In fact, these two branches of the science part of political science were first applied in the study of American politics and dominate the study of American politics more than in the fields of International Relations and Comparative Politics. As a result, the research that has been conducted in American Politics has served in numerous ways as impetus and exemplars for research in other fields. American Politics, as a field, has helped develop many of the micro level models and research strategies used to research other countries and many of the approaches to studying International Relations. Although the advantage of methodological sophistication in American Politics over other fields is decreasing (and some might argue no longer significant), the study of American Politics does involve the examination of some of the most “science” oriented work on the domestic politics of a particular country, which can be extremely useful for those interested in studying other countries or political situations.

What Will You Learn About American Politics In This Course?

As the core course in American Politics, the goal of this course is to give students an overview of current academic research in the area. It serves as the springboard for students who want to make American Politics one of their fields and as a summary of the field for those who do not. But we only have one semester and the literature on American Politics can be overwhelming. Sometimes instructors of core classes in

American Politics try to cover this literature by both having students read classics (works written before the advent of more sophisticated analyses) as well as more recent, sophisticated work. However, there is a cost to that approach, the more recent and usually more sophisticated work (which is the most useful for scholars who want to work in the area or use it as exemplars for research in other areas) gets less attention as the more simpler classical approaches are discussed. Students can finish the class and not have a good idea of what currently is of interest to scholars in the field. Most of these classics are classics for good reason, but they are also work that can generally be read independently and those who want to make American Politics their research focus will probably find them enjoyable. I assume if you are interested in an area that you will want to go back and read the earlier literature in that area. Finally, I believe that having classes of students reading the same classic treatments can have a harmful effect on our ability to break new ground in political science. That is, I believe that the classics have been so overused by other scholars looking for insights that you are probably more likely to find a gem of new knowledge in a previous reading that has been neglected by most or in doing some original empirical research than spending time debating and reading the classics. Thus, our focus in class will be on recent, modern, scientific work on American Politics, not the classics.

Many of the readings will be organized around a text I recently completed for advanced undergraduate students, *Analyzing Elections*, for W.W. Norton, which summarizes a significant portion of the current literature on American politics with a particular emphasis on the electoral process. These chapters may be especially useful for students who are unfamiliar with the American system or some of the formal literature that has been applied to that system. These chapters and occasional other readings will be listed on the syllabus as background readings and considered optional. The book is supposed to be published before the spring semester begins and you can order it online. Whatever royalty I get from having you read the book will be made up with some treats during the semester.

There are a few other books that we will read during the semester as well as articles. I recommend that you purchase these books through Amazon.com. The articles, if published, are easily found through electronic sources. If an article is not available electronically, and I have a copy, I will attempt to provide it to the class. It is a good idea for you to go through the course schedule as soon as possible and order books that we will be reading.

Finally, this class is restricted to students who are in the PhD program and have completed both the first year math class and the first semester quantitative methods class. Completion or simultaneous enrollment in Game Theory is also desirable as many of the papers we will consider apply game theoretic models to American Politics.

Class Procedures

Each week there are required readings. I have limited the required readings to two articles (in some cases books) per class. We will devote approximately one hour to each

reading. I find that if there are too many required readings we are not able to get into any one of them in depth enough to learn anything as a class. As noted above, I have selected for required readings only articles or books published in the last few years. I have restricted my selection so that after taking this class you should have a good idea of what is of current interest in the areas covered. I have also listed recommended readings that serve as background for the required readings, which you should consult if you have trouble understanding the arguments in the required readings or just are interested in further study on the particular topic. The older articles listed are often considered by some “classics” in the field, although some are just articles that I think should be considered classics.

One important caveat – oftentimes the required reading is not significantly of different quality or importance than some other articles or books listed in the recommended readings and sometimes a recommended reading is actually more important in my view. The required readings were sometimes chosen over other alternatives in order to present a variety of methods and approaches as well as perspectives on the area and to find things that we could fruitfully discuss in class. Just because I selected something as required and something else as recommended does not mean that I value the required more than the recommended. If you decide to work further in any of these areas, you should read both the required and recommended readings.

I have also listed the relevant optional review readings for the week, which can also serve to help illuminate the required readings. Note that in some cases the background readings are the same for different weeks, for example one background reading for the week on candidates, parties, and policy choices may also be a background reading for the week on Congressional elections if the reading’s focus is on these choices in Congressional races.

For each required reading you should be able to do the following after reading:

- Describe the main *themes* of the reading
- Explain what its *contributions* are to our understanding of politics
- Provide specific *criticisms* of the study (e.g., its theoretical argument, empirical analysis, etc.)
- Raise *questions* about specific theoretical or empirical issues that you did not understand

The success of our class discussions will depend on your being able to do all of these things for each of the assigned readings. This means that when we meet as a class, you should be prepared to discuss the themes, contributions, criticisms, and questions.

Each week two of you will act as a “defender” for the readings, one for each reading. In this role, you will: 1) spend no more than 10 minutes summarizing the reading, 2) discuss the main contributions made by the reading, and 3) discuss the potential shortcoming raised by fellow students in critiques and defend against them. The defender will be in charge of leading the discussion of the readings for the week. In some cases, it

may be necessary for the defender to go through some of the mathematics of the formal model (if relevant to the discussion) or the assumptions and techniques used in the empirical analysis (if relevant to the discussion). In some cases the assigned reading refers to a formal model in an optional background reading or an empirical analysis or discussion there. The defender will be expected to have read that optional reading and be able to explain the formal model or empirical analysis in the optional reading. The defender should therefore know the reading backwards and forwards as well as relevant optional background readings in order to do discuss these aspects of the reading.

Students not assigned as a defender for the week will be expected to read critically each of the week's readings.

Summary:

- Each reading will have a Defender.
- Defenders should be prepared to go through all the details of a particular paper and the relevant background reading that the paper refers to (formal models and empirical analysis included).
- If not a Defender for the week, each student will read the two assigned readings .
- Each reading is discussed for approximately one hour in a discussion led by its Defender.

Course Grades

Final course grades are calculated as follows:

Participation in Class	30%
Defender Role	30%
Final Research Paper	40%

The specifics on the research paper will be discussed in class.

Weekly Schedule

You should note that some of the required readings below are books and you should order them immediately so that you are sure to have them prior to the week that they are required.

January 26th – Political Participation: Dissolving Myths and Solving Puzzles

Required Readings:

Coate, S. and M. Conlin. 2004. "A Group Rule-Utilitarian Approach to Voter Turnout: Theory and Evidence," *American Economic Review*, 94(5):1476-1504, December.

Levine, David and Thomas Palfrey. 2005. "The Paradox of Voter Participation? A Laboratory Study," working paper,
http://www.princeton.edu/~tpalfrey/turnout_091405.pdf

Optional Background Readings:

Feddersen, Timothy J. and Alvaro Sandroni. 2002. "A Theory of Participation in Elections with Ethical Voters," working paper, Northwestern University, MEDS, forthcoming, *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*.

Filer, John, Lawrence Kenny, and Rebecca Morton. 1993. "Redistribution, Income, and Voting," *American Journal of Political Science*, 37 (February): 63-87.

Gerber, Alan, and Donald Green. "The Effects of Canvassing, Telephone Calls, and Direct Mail on Voter Turnout: A Field Experiment," *American Political Science Review* 94(3):653-663, September 2000.

Gerber, Alan and Donald Green, "Correction to Gerber and Green (2000), replication of disputed findings, and reply to Imai," *American Political Science Review*, May 2005.

Harvey, Anna, *Votes Without Leverage*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Holbrook, TM, SD McClurg, "The mobilization of core supporters: Campaigns, turnout, and electoral composition in United States presidential elections," *American Journal of Political Science* 49 (4): 689-703 OCT 2005

Imai, Kosuke. 2005. "Do Get-Out-the-Vote Calls Reduce Turnout? The Importance of Statistical Methods for Field Experiments," *American Political Science Review*.

McDonald, Michael P. and Samuel L. Popkin, "The Myth of the Vanishing Voter," *American Political Science Review*. 95(4):963-974, December, 2001.

Morton, Rebecca, "Groups in Rational Turnout Models," *American Journal of Political Science*, 3 (1991): 758-76.

Oliver, J. Eric. 1996. "Who Votes at Home? The Influence of State Law and Party Activity on Absentee voting and Overall Turnout." *American Journal of Political Science* 40:498-513.

Overbye, E. 1995. "Making a Case for the Rational, Self-Regarding, Ethical Voter And Solving the Paradox of Not Voting in the Process," *European Journal of Political Research* 27 (3):369-396, April.

Palfrey, Thomas R. and Howard Rosenthal. 1983. "A Strategic Calculus of Voting," *Public Choice* 41(1):7-53.

Palfrey, Thomas R. and Howard Rosenthal. 1985. "Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty," *American Political Science Review* 79 (March 1985) 62-78.

Schuessler, Alexander A. 2000. *A Logic of Expressive Choice*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Shachar, R. and B. Nalebuff, "Follow the Leader: Theory and Evidence on Political Participation," *American Economic Review* 89(3):525-547, June, 1999.

Stein, Robert M. and Patricia A. Garcia-Monet. 1997. "Voting Early, but Not Often." *Social Science Quarterly* 78:657-71.

Optional Review Readings:

Analyzing Elections, Chapters 2 & 3

Feddersen, Timothy. 2004. "Rational Choice Theory and the Paradox of Not Voting," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 18:99-112.

Schlozman, Kay Lehman. 2002. "Citizen Participation in America: What Do We Know? Why Do We Care?" in Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner, eds., *Political Science: State of the Discipline (Centennial Edition)*, 433-461.

February 2nd – Who Influences Candidates' Policy Choices: Valence Voters and Polarizing Parties?

Required Readings:

Groseclose, Timothy. 2001. "A Model of Candidate Location When One Candidate Has a Valence Advantage," *American Journal of Political Science* 45(4):862-886, October.

Ansolabehere, Stephen, James Snyder, and Charles Stewart. 2001. "Candidate Positioning in U.S. House Elections," *American Journal of Political Science* 45(1):136-159, January.

Optional Background Readings:

Ansolabehere, Stephen and Alan Gerber. 1996 "The Effects of Filing Fees and Petition Requirements on U.S. House Elections," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 21:249-64.

Ansolabehere, Stephen and James Snyder. 2000. "Valence Politics and Equilibrium in Spatial Election Models," *Public Choice* 103(3-4):327-336, June.

Ansolabehere, Stephen, James Snyder, and Charles Stewart. 2001. "Candidate Positioning in U.S. House Elections," *American Journal of Political Science* 45(1):136-159, January.

Aragones, E and Thomas Palfrey. 2002. "Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model with a Favored Candidate," *Journal of Economic Theory* 103(1):131-161, March.

Calvert, Randall. 1985. "Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model: Candidates' Motivations, Uncertainty, and Convergence," *American Journal of Political Science*, 29, 69-95.

Francis, Wayne and Lawrence W. Kenny. 1999. *Up the Political Ladder: Career Paths in US Politics*, Sage Publications.

Francis, Wayne, Lawrence W. Kenny, Rebecca B. Morton, and Amy Schimdt, "Retrospective Voting and Political Mobility," *American Journal of Political Science*, 38 (1994): 999-1024.

Kanthak, Kristin and Rebecca Morton, "The Effects of Primary Systems on Congressional Elections." 2001. In Galderisi, Peter and Mike Lyons, eds. *Congressional Primaries and the Politics of Representation*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

Ledyard, John. 1984. "The Pure Theory of Large Two-Candidate Elections," *Public Choice* 44(1):7-41.

Londregan, John and Thomas Romer. 1993. "Polarization, Incumbency, and the Personal Vote," In *Political Economy: Institutions, Competition, and Representation*, ed. William A. Barnett, Melvin J. Hinich, and Norman J. Schofield. New York: Cambridge U. Press.

Meirowitz, Adam. "Informational party primaries and strategic ambiguity," *JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS* 17 (1): 107-136 JAN 2005

Snyder, James M. and Michael M. Ting. 2002. "An Informational Rationale for Political

Parties,” *American Journal of Political Science* 46, 90-110.

Wittman, Donald A. 1977. “Candidates with Policy Preferences: A Dynamic Model,” *Journal of Economic Theory* 14 (February, 1977)180-9.

Optional Review Readings:

Analyzing Elections, Chapters 4 & 5

Fiorina, Morris P. 2005. *Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America*, with Samuel J. Abrams and Jeremy C. Pope, New York: Pearson/Longman.

February 9th – Money in Politics: Who Gains and Who Loses?

Required Readings:

Ashworth, Scott, “Campaign Finance and Voter Welfare with Entrenched Incumbents,” forthcoming, *American Political Science Review*.

Gordon, Sanford C. and Catherine Hafer. “Flexing Muscle: Corporate Political Expenditure as Signals to the Bureaucracy,” *American Political Science Review*.

Optional Background Readings:

Abrajano, Marisa and Rebecca Morton. 2005. “The Strategic Calculus of Campaign Advertising,” working paper, NYU Department of Politics.

Austen-Smith, David. 1987. “Interest groups, campaign contributions, and probabilistic voting,” *Public Choice*, 54, 123-139.

Baron, David. 1994. “Electoral Competition with Informed and Uninformed Voters,” *American Political Science Review*, 88, 33-47.

Coate, Stephen. 2003a. “Political Competition with Campaign Contributions and Informative Advertising,” forthcoming, *Journal of European Economic Association*.

Coate, Stephen. 2003b. “Pareto Improving Campaign Finance Policy,” forthcoming, *American Economic Review*.

Gordon, Sanford C., Catherine Hafer, and Dimitri Landa. 2005. “Consumption or Investment: Campaign Contributions and the Structure of Executive Compensation,” Working paper, NYU Department of Politics.

Grossman, Gene M. and E. Helpman, “Competing for Endorsements,” *American Economic Review*, 89(3):501-524, June 1999.

Grossman, Gene M. and El. Helpman, 1996. "Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics," *Review of Economic Studies*, 63, 265-286.

Lau, Richard R. and Gerald M. Pomper. 2002. "Effectiveness of Negative Campaigning in U.S. Senate Elections," *American Journal of Political Science* 46(1):47-66.

Morton, Rebecca B. and Roger B. Myerson. 2003. "Decisiveness in Contributors' Perceptions," working paper, New York University Department of Politics.

Myerson, Roger B., Thomas Rietz, and Robert J. Weber. 1998. "Campaign Finance Levels as Coordinating Signals in Three-Way, Experimental Elections." *Economics and Politics*, 10, 3, 185-217, November

Petrocik, J. R. 1996. "Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, With a 1980 Case Study," *American Journal of Political Science* 40:825-50.

Prat, Andrea. 2002. "Campaign Advertising and Voter Welfare," *Review of Economic Studies*, 69(4):999-1017, October.

Shaw, D. R. 1999. "The Effect of TV Ads and Candidate Appearances on Statewide Presidential Votes, 1988-1996," *American Political Science Review* 93: 345-61.

Snyder, James. 1989. "Election Goals and the Allocation of Campaign Resources," *Econometrica* 57(May, 1989), 637-60.

Snyder, James M. 1990. "Campaign Contributions as Investments: The U.S. House of Representatives, 1980-1986," *Journal of Political Economy* 98, 1195-1227.

Optional Review Readings:

Analyzing Elections, Chapters 6 & 7

Austen-Smith, David. 1997. "Interest Groups: Money, Information, and Influence," D.C. Mueller, ed., *Perspectives on Public Choice: A Handbook*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Morton, Rebecca B. and Charles M. Cameron. 1991. "Elections and the Theory of Campaign Contributions: A Survey and Critical Analysis," *Economics and Politics*, 4 (1992): 79- 108.

February 16th – Elections and Principal-Agent Problems: Pandering versus Accountability

Required Readings:

Canes-Wrone, Brandice and Kenneth W. Shotts. 2004. "The Conditional Nature of Presidential Responsiveness to Public Opinion," *American Journal of Political Science* 48(4):690-706.

Wolfers, Justin. 2002. "Are Voters Rational? Evidence from Gubernatorial Elections," working paper, Graduate School of Business, Stanford U., <http://bpp.wharton.upenn.edu/jwolfers/Papers/Voterrationality.pdf>

Optional Background Readings:

Austen-Smith, David and Jeffrey Banks, "Electoral accountability and incumbency" in *Models of Strategic Choice in Politics*, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor (1989).

Banks, Jeffrey S. and R. K. Sundaram, "Moral hazard and adverse selection in a model of repeated elections." In: W. Barnett, Editor, *Political Economy: Institutions, Information Competition, and Representation*, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge (1993).

Besley, Timothy and Anne Case. 2003. "Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence From the United States," *Journal of Economic Literature*.

Besley, Timothy and Stephen Coate. 2004. "Elected versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence," *Journal of the European Economic Association*, forthcoming.

Canes-Wrone, Brandice, Michael C. Herron, and Kenneth W. Shotts. 2001. "Leadership and Pandering: A Theory of Executive Policymaking," *American Journal of Political Science* 45(July):532-50.

Gerber, Elisabeth R., "Legislative Response to the Threat of Popular Initiatives," *American Journal of Political Science*, 40:99-128.

Gerber, Elisabeth R., *The Populist Paradox: Interest Group Influence and the Promise of Direct Legislation*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.

Gordon, Sanford C. and Gregory A. Huber. 2002. "Citizen Oversight and Electoral Incentives of Criminal Prosecutors," *American Journal of Political Science* 46:334-351.

Jacobs, L.R. and Robert Y. Shapiro. 2000. *Politicians Don't Pander: Political Manipulation and the Loss of Democratic Responsiveness*, Chicago: U. of Chicago Press.

Lowry, Robert C., James E. Alt, and Karen E. Ferree, "Fiscal Policy Outcomes and Electoral Accountability in American States," *American Political Science Review* 92(4) (1998)

Schmidt, Amy, Lawrence W. Kenny, and Rebecca B. Morton, "Evidence on Electoral Accountability in the U.S. Senate: Are Unfaithful Agents Really Punished?" *Economic Inquiry*, 34 (1996): 545-567.

Optional Review Readings:

Analyzing Elections, Chapters 9 & 10

Manza, Jeff and Fay Lomax Cook, "A Democratic Polity? Three Views of Policy Responsiveness to Public Opinion in the United States," *American Politics Research*, vol. 30, no. 6, November 2002, 630-667.

February 23rd – Public Information and Opinion: The Problems of Media Biases and Preference Conflicts

Required Readings:

Gentzkow, Matthew and Jesse M. Shapiro. 2005. "Media Bias and Reputation," working paper, University of Chicago School of Business
<http://gsbwww.uchicago.edu/fac/matthew.gentzkow/research/BiasReputation.pdf>

Berinsky, Adam J. 2002. "Silent Voices: Social Welfare Policy Opinions and Political Equality in America," *American Journal of Political Science* 46(2):276-287.

Optional Background Readings:

Althaus, S.L. 1998. "Information Effects in Collective Preferences," *American Political Science Review*, 92(3), 545-558.

Alvarez, R. Michael. 1997. *Information and Elections*. Ann Arbor: U. of Michigan Press.

Alvarez, R. Michael and John Brehm. 2002. *Hard Choices, Easy Answers: Values, Information, and American Public Opinion* Princeton, NJ: Princeton U. Press.

Arnold, R. Douglas. 2004. *Congress, the Press, and Political Accountability*, New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Baron, David. 2004. "Persistent Media Bias," working paper, Stanford U. Graduate School of Business

Bartels, Larry M. 1993. "Messages Received: The Political Impact of Media Exposure," *American Political Science Review* 87:267-85.

Bartels, Larry M. 1996. "Uninformed Votes: Information Effects in Presidential Elections," *American Journal of Political Science* 40:194-230.

Bartels, Larry M. "Partisanship and Voting Behavior," *American Journal of Political Science* 44:35-50.

Baum and Kernell. 1999. "Has Cable Ended the Golden Age of Presidential Television?" *American Political Science Review* 93:99-114.

Berinsky, Adam. 1999. "The Two Faces of Public Opinion," *American Journal of Political Science* 43, 1209-1230.

Berinsky, Adam. 2004. *Silent Voices: Public Opinion and Political Participation in America*.

Gentzkow, Matthew. 2005. "Television and Voter Turnout," working paper, University of Chicago School of Business,
<http://gsbwww.uchicago.edu/fac/matthew.gentzkow/research/TV.pdf>

Groseclose, Timothy and Jeffrey Milyo. 2003. "A Measure of Media Bias," working paper, UCLA Department of Political Science.

Husted, Thomas, Lawrence Kenny, and Rebecca Morton, "Constituent Errors in Assessing Their Senators," *Public Choice*, 83 (1995): 251-271.

Mullainathan, Sendhil and Andrei Shleifer. forthcoming. "The Market for News," *American Economic Review*.

Stromberg, David. 2004. "Mass Media Competition, Political Competition and Public Policy," *Review of Economic Studies* 71:265-84.

Stromberg, David. 2004. "Radio's Impact on New Deal Spending," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 119(1):189-221, February.

Zaller, John. *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*.

Optional Review Reading:

Analyzing Elections, Chapters 8 & 10

Manza, Jeff and Fay Lomax Cook, "A Democratic Polity? Three Views of Policy Responsiveness to Public Opinion in the United States," *American Politics Research*, vol. 30, no. 6, November 2002, 630-667.

March 2nd – Legislative Elections and Redistricting: How Gerrymandering and Voting to Get Reelected

Required Readings:

Cox, Gary W. and Jonathan N. Katz, *Elbridge Gerry's Salamander: The Electoral Consequences of the Reapportionment Revolution*, Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 2002.

Snyder, James and Michael Ting, "Why Roll Calls? A Model of Position-Taking in Legislative Voting and Elections," *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 12(1):153-178. April, 2005.

Optional Background Readings:

Ansolabehere, Stephen, Alan Gerber, and James Snyder. 2002. "Equal Votes, Equal Money: Court-ordered Redistricting and Public Expenditures in the American States," *American Political Science Review*, 96(4):767-777, December 2002.

Ansolabehere, Stephen, James Snyder, and Charles Stewart. 2001. "Candidate Positioning in U.S. House Elections," *American Journal of Political Science* 45(1):136-159, January.

Arnold, R. Douglas. 2004. *Congress, the Press, and Political Accountability*, New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Diermeier, Daniel, M. Keane, and A. Merlo. 2005. "A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers," *American Economic Review* 95(1):347-373, March.

Francis, Wayne, Lawrence W. Kenny, Rebecca B. Morton, and Amy Schimdt, "Retrospective Voting and Political Mobility," *American Journal of Political Science*, 38 (1994): 999-1024.

Kanthak, Kristin and Rebecca Morton, "The Effects of Primary Systems on Congressional Elections." 2001. In Galderisi, Peter and Mike Lyons, eds. *Congressional Primaries and the Politics of Representation*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

Lau, Richard R. and Gerald M. Pomper. 2002. "Effectiveness of Negative Campaigning in U.S. Senate Elections," *American Journal of Political Science* 46(1):47-66.

Lee, Frances. 1998. "Representation and Public Policy: The Consequences of Senate Apportionment for the Geographic Distribution of Federal Funds," *Journal of Politics*, February 1998.

Mayhew, David. 1974. *Congress: The Electoral Connection*.

Schmidt, Amy, Lawrence W. Kenny, and Rebecca B. Morton, "Evidence on Electoral Accountability in the U.S. Senate: Are Unfaithful Agents Really Punished?" *Economic Inquiry*, 34 (1996): 545-567.

Shotts, Kenneth W., 2002, "Gerrymandering, Legislative Composition, and National Policy Outcomes," *American Journal of Political Science* 46(2): 398-414.

Snyder, James M. 1990. "Campaign Contributions as Investments: The U.S. House of Representatives, 1980-1986," *Journal of Political Economy* 98, 1195-1227.

Snyder, James M. and Michael Ting, "Roll Calls, Party Labels, and Elections," *Political Analysis* 11 (4):419-444, Fall 2003.

Optional Review Reading: Analyzing Elections, Chapter 11

March 9th – Legislative Politics and Bicameralism: Parties, Bodies, and Geography

Required Readings:

Cox, Gary W. and Matthew McCubbins, *Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the US House of Representatives*, forthcoming, available online at Matthew McCubbins' web site at UCSD.

Ansolabehere, Stephen, James Snyder, and Michael Ting. 2003. "Bargaining in Bicameral Legislatures: When and Why Does Malapportionment Matter?" *American Political Science Review*, 97(3):471-481, August.

Optional Background Readings:

Arnold, Douglas R. 1990. *The Logic of Congressional Action*.

Dion, Douglas. 2001. *Turning the Legislative Thumbscrew: Minority Rights and Procedural Change in Legislative Politics*, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Knight, Brian. "Parochial interests and the centralized provision of local public goods: evidence from congressional voting on transportation projects," *JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS* 88 (3-4): 845-866 MAR 2004

Krehbiel, Keith. 1991. *Information and Legislative Organization*.

Krehbiel, Keith. 1993. "Where's the Party?" *British Journal of Political Science* 39:958-980.

Krehbiel, Keith. 1998. *Pivotal Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Krehbiel, Keith, Adam Meirowitz, and Thomas Romer. 2005. "Parties in elections, parties in government, and partisan bias," *POLITICAL ANALYSIS* 13 (2): 113-138 SPR 2005

Lee, Frances. 2004. "Bicameral Institutions and Geographic Politics: Allocating Federal Funds for Transportation in the House and Senate," *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, forthcoming May 2004.

Lee, Frances. 2003. "Geographic Politics in the U.S. House of Representatives: Coalition Building and Distribution of Benefits," *American Journal of Political Science*, November 2003.

Lee, Frances. 2000. "Senate Representation and Coalition Building in Distributive Politics," *American Political Science Review*, March 2000.

McCarty, Nolan, Keith Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2001. "The Hunt for Party Discipline in Congress," *American Political Science Review* 95:673-688.

McKelvey, Richard D. and Ray Riezman, "Seniority in Legislatures," *American Political Science Review*, 86(4):951-965, December, 1992.

Krehbiel, Keith. 2000. "Party Discipline and Measures of Partisanship," *American Journal of Political Science* 44(2):212-227.

Poole, Keith T. and Howard Rosenthal. 1997. *Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll- Call Voting* New York: Oxford University Press.

Rohde, David. 1991. *Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House*

Rogers, James R. 2001. "An Informational Rationale for Congruent Bicameralism," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 13(2):123-151, April.

Rogers, James R., "The impact of bicameralism on legislative production," *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 28 (4): 509-528 NOV 2003

Schickler, Eric. 2001. *Disjointed Pluralism: Institutional Innovation and the Development of the U.S. Congress*

Snyder, James M. and Timothy Groseclose. 2000. "Estimating Party Influence in Congressional Roll Call Voting." *American Journal of Political Science* 44:193-211.

Snyder, James M. and Michael Ting, "Roll Calls, Party Labels, and Elections," *Political Analysis* 11 (4):419-444, Fall 2003.

Snyder, James and Michael Ting, "Why Roll Calls? A Model of Position-Taking in Legislative Voting and Elections," *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 12(1):153-178. April, 2005.

Optional Review Reading:

Charles Stewart, *Analyzing Congress*, W.W. Norton

March 23rd – Presidential Elections: Inequalities Across the States

Required Readings:

Stromberg, David. 2002. "Optimal Campaigning in presidential Elections: The Probability of Being Florida," working paper, Stockholm University.

Strumpf, Koleman S. 2002. "Strategic Competition in Sequential Election Contests," *Public Choice* 111 (3-4): 3777-397, April.

Optional Background Readings:

Alesina, Alberto and Howard, Rosenthal, 1995. *Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Battaglini, Marco, "Sequential Voting with Abstention," forthcoming, *Games and Economic Behavior*

Battaglini, Marco, Rebecca Morton, and Thomas Palfrey, 2005, "Efficiency, Equity, and Timing in Voting Mechanisms," working paper, Princeton University.

Hill, N.D. "Sequential Primaries, Pandering, and Information Transfer," working paper, 2005, Johns Hopkins U. <http://www.econ.jhu.edu/people/ndhill/pander.pdf>

Holbrook, TM, SD McClurg, "The mobilization of core supporters: Campaigns, turnout, and electoral composition in United States presidential elections," *American Journal of Political Science* 49 (4): 689-703 OCT 2005

Lizzeri, Alessandro and Nicola Persico, "The Provision of Public Goods Under Alternative Electoral Incentives," *American Economic Review*, 91(1):225-239, March, 2001.

Mebane, Walter. 2000. "Coordination, Moderation, and Institutional Balancing in American presidential and House Elections," *American Political Science Review*, 94(1):37-57, March 2000.

Morton, Rebecca B. and Kenneth C. Williams, *Learning by Voting*, University of Michigan Press (2001).

Morton, Rebecca B. and Kenneth C. Williams. 1999. "Information Asymmetries and Simultaneous versus Sequential Voting," *American Political Science Review* 93(March):51-67.

Wolfers, Justin. 2002. "Are Voters Rational? Evidence from Gubernatorial Elections," working paper, Graduate School of Business, Stanford U.,
<http://bpp.wharton.upenn.edu/jwolfers/Papers/Voterrationality.pdf>

Optional Review Reading:

Analyzing Elections, Chapters 12 & 13

March 30th – Sharing Power and Executive/Legislative Relations: Bargaining Versus Blaming

Required Readings:

Cameron, Charles. 2000. *Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power*, Cambridge U. Press (should be ordered ahead of time)

McCarty, Nolan and Timothy Groseclose. 2000. "The Politics of Blame: Bargaining before an Audience," *American Journal of Political Science*. 45(1)100-119.

Optional Background Reading:

Baum and Kernell. 1999. "Has Cable Ended the Golden Age of Presidential Television?" *American Political Science Review* 93:99-114.

Canes-Wrone, Brandice. 2001. "The President's Legislative Influence from Public Appeals," *American Journal of Political Science* 45:313-329.

Canes-Wrone, Brandice and Kenneth W. Shotts. 2004. "The Conditional Nature of Presidential Responsiveness to Public Opinion," *American Journal of Political Science* 48(4):690-706.

Canes-Wrone, Brandice, Michael C. Herron, and Kenneth W. Shotts. 2001. "Leadership and Pandering: A Theory of Executive Policymaking," *American Journal of Political Science* 45(July):532-50.

Greenstein, Fred. 1994. *The Hidden Hand Presidency*

Greenstein, Fred. 2001. *The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Clinton*

Howell, William. 2003. *Power without Persuasion*.

Kernell, Samuel. 1997. *Going Public*, 3rd ed.

Mebane, Walter and J.S. Sekhon, "Coordination and Policy Moderation at Midterm," *American Political Science Review*, 96(1):141-157, March 2002.

McCarty, Nolan and Keith Poole. 1995. "Veto Power and Legislation: An Empirical Analysis of Executive-Legislative Bargaining from 1961-1986," *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*, 11:282-312.

McCarty, Nolan. 2000. "Presidential Pork: Executive Veto Power and Distributive Politics," *American Political Science Review* 94(1):117-129.

Optional Review Reading:

Analyzing Elections, Chapter 13

April 6th – The Politics of Delegation to Bureaucrats and State and Local Governments: Red Tape Versus Katrina

Required Readings:

Krause, GA and Bowman. "Adverse selection, political parties, and policy delegation in the American federal system," *JOURNAL OF LAW ECONOMICS & ORGANIZATION* 21 (2): 359-387 OCT 2005

Shipan, Charles, 2004. "Regulating Regimes, Agency Actions, and the Conditional Nature of Political Influence." *American Political Science Review* 98(3):467-480.

Optional Background Readings:

Bailey, Michael, "Welfare and the multifaceted decision to move," *AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW* 99 (1): 125-135 FEB 2005

Balla, Steven. 1998. "Administrative Procedures and Political Control of the Bureaucracy." *American Political Science Review* 92, 663.

Bendor, J. and Adam Meirowitz, "Spatial models of delegation," *AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW* 98 (2): 293-310 MAY 2004

Carpenter, Daniel P. 2001. *The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy*.

Epstein, David and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1999. *Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers*.

Huber, John and Nolan McCarty. 2004. "Bureaucratic capacity, delegation, and political reform," *AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW* 98 (3): 481-494 AUG 2004

Huber, John and Charles Shipan. 2000. "The Costs of Control: Legislators, Agencies, and Transaction Costs," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 25:25-32.

Huber, John and Charles Shipan. 2002. *Deliberate Discretion: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy*.

Sigman. H. 2003. "Letting states do the dirty work: State responsibility for federal environmental regulation," *NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL* 56 (1): 107-122 Part 1, MAR 2003

Strumpf, KS and Oberholzer-Gee, 2002. "Endogenous policy decentralization: Testing the central tenet of economic federalism," *JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY* 110 (1): 1-36 FEB 2002

Volden, Craig, "Intergovernmental political competition in American federalism," *AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE* 49 (2): 327-342 APR 2005

Optional Review Reading:

Inman, RP and Rubinfeld, "Rethinking federalism," *JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES* 11 (4): 43-64 FAL 1997

Miller, Gary, "The political evolution of principal-agent models," *ANNUAL REVIEW OF POLITICAL SCIENCE* 8: 203-225 2005

April 13th – Judicial Politics

Required Readings:

Cameron, Charles, Jeffrey A. Segal, and Donald Songer. 2000. "Strategic Auditing in a Political Hierarchy," *American Political Science Review* 94:101-106.

Huber, Gregory A. and Sanford C. Gordon. 2004. "Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind when it Runs for Office?" *American Journal of Political Science* 48, 247-263.

Optional Background Readings:

Baum, Larry. 1998. *The Puzzle of Judicial Behavior*

Bergara, Mario, Barak Richman, and Pablo Spiller. 2003. "Modeling Supreme Court Strategic Decision Making: The Congressional Constraint," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 28:247-280.

Caldeira, Greg, Marie Hojnacki, and John R. Wright. 2000. "The Lobbying Activities of Organized Interests in Federal Judicial Nominations," *Journal of Politics* 62:51-69.

Canes-Wrone, Brandice, 2003, "Bureaucratic Decisions and the Composition of the Lower Courts," *American Journal of Political Science* 47(2):205-214.

Moraski and Shipan. 1999. "The Politics of Supreme Court Nominations," *American Journal of Political Science* 43:1069-1095.

Segal, Jeffrey A. and Harold J. Spaeth. 2002. *The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited*

Segal, Jeffrey A. and Harold J. Spaeth. 1996. "The Influence of Stare Decisis on the Votes of United States Supreme Court Justices," *American Journal of Political Science*.

April 20th – Midwest Political Science Association Meetings

April 27th – American Politics Over Time, Minor Parties, & "Realignment"

Required Readings:

McCarty, Nolan, Keith Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2005. *Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches*, unpublished ms. (downloadable now if not yet published)

Miller, Gary and Norman Schofield. 2003. "Activists and partisan realignment in the United States," *AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW* 97 (2): 245-260 MAY 2003

Optional Background Readings:

Abramson, Paul, John Aldrich, Phil Paolino, and David Rohde, "Challenges to the American two-party system: Evidence from the 1968, 1980, 1992, and 1996 presidential elections," *POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY* 53 (3): 495-522 SEP 2000

Adams, Gregory D., "Abortion: Evidence of an Issue Evolution," *American Journal of Political Science*, 41(3):718-737, July, 1997.

Herron, Michael and Jeffrey Lewis. 2004. "Was Ralph Nader a Spoiler? A Study of Green and Reform Party Voters in the 2000 Presidential Election," working paper, Dartmouth College Department of Government.

Hillygus, D. S. 2003. "Stand by Your Man? Assessing the Dynamics of Nader Support in Election 2000," working paper, Department of Government, Harvard U.

Mayhew, David R. 2002. *Electoral Realignment: A Critique of an American Genre*, Yale University Press.

Poole, Keith T. and Howard Rosenthal. 1997. *Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll- Call Voting* New York: Oxford University Press.

Schofield, Norman, Gary Miller, and Andrew Martin. 2003. "Critical elections and political realignments in the USA: 1860-2000," *POLITICAL STUDIES* 51 (2): 217-240 JUN 2003

Optional Review Reading:

Analyzing Elections, Chapter 14

Note Classes Officially End on May 1st – but if we have time we might discuss the following on May 4th since we will miss class due to MPSA

May 4th (or some other day) – Minorities in American Politics

Required Readings:

Huber, Gregory and John Lapinski. 2004, "The 'Race Card' Revisited: Reassessing Racial Priming in Policy Contests," working paper, <http://pantheon.yale.edu/~gh64/papers/RaceCardRevisited.pdf>

Shotts, Kenneth W. 2001. "The Effect of Majority-Minority Mandates on Partisan Gerrymandering," *American Journal of Political Science* 45(1):120-35.

Optional Background Readings:

Banducci, SA, Donovan, T, Karp, JA, "Minority representation, empowerment, and participation," *JOURNAL OF POLITICS*, MAY 2004, VL 66, IS 2, 534-556

Barreto, MA, Segura, GM, Woods, ND, "The mobilizing effect of majority-minority districts on Latino turnout," *AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW*, FEB 2004, VL 98, IS 1, 65-75

Barreto, MA, "Latino immigrants at the polls: Foreign-born voter turnout in the 2000 election," *POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY*, MAR 2005, VL 58, IS 1, 79-86

Behrens, Angela, Christopher Uggen, and Jeff Manza. 2003. "Ballot Manipulation and the 'Menace of Negro domination': Racial Threat and Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 1850-2002," *American Journal of Sociology*, 109(3):559-605.

Bullock and Smith "BLACK SUCCESS IN LOCAL RUNOFF ELECTIONS," *JOURNAL OF POLITICS* 52 (4): 1205-1220 NOV 1990

Collet, C. "Bloc voting, polarization, and the panethnic hypothesis: The case of Little Saigon," JOURNAL OF POLITICS 67 (3): 907-933 AUG 2005

Gay, C, "Spirals of trust? The effect of descriptive representation on the relationship between citizens and their government," AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, OCT, 2002, VL 46, IS 4, 717-732

Epstein, D, O'Halloran, S, "Measuring the electoral and policy impact of majority-minority voting districts," AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 1999, VL 43, IS 2, 367-395

Gerber, ER, Morton, RB, Rietz, TA, "Minority representation in multimember districts," AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, MAR 1998, VL 92, IS 1, 127-144

Herron, MC, Sekhon, JS, "Black candidates and black voters: Assessing the impact of candidate race on uncounted vote rates," JOURNAL OF POLITICS, FEB 2005, VL 67, IS 1, 154-177

Jamal, "The political participation and engagement of muslim Americans," AMERICAN POLITICS RESEARCH 33 (4): 521-544 JUL 2005

Marschall, MJ, "Does the shoe fit? Testing models of participation for African-American and Latino involvement in local politics," URBAN AFFAIRS REVIEW 37 (2): 227-248 NOV 2001

Mendelberg, Tali. 2001. *The Race Card*.

Overby, LM, Brown, RD, Bruce, JM, Smith, CE, Winkle, JW, "Race, political empowerment, and minority perceptions of judicial fairness," SOCIAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, JUN 2005, VL 86, IS 2, 444-462

Pantoja, AD, Segura, GM, "Does ethnicity matter? Descriptive representation in legislatures and political alienation among Latinos," SOCIAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, JUN, PY 2003, VL 84, IS 2, 441-460

Sass, TR, "The determinants of Hispanic representation in municipal government," SOUTHERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL 66 (3): 609-630 JAN 2000

Sass, TR, and BJ Pittman, "The changing impact of electoral structure on black representation in the South, 1970-1996," PUBLIC CHOICE 104 (3-4): 369-388 SEP 2000

Shotts, Kenneth W. 2003a. "Does Racial Redistricting Cause Conservative Policy Outcomes? Policy Preferences of Southern Representatives in the 1980s and 1990s." *Journal of Politics* 65(1): 216-26.

Shotts, Kenneth W. 2003b. "Racial Redistricting's Alleged Perverse Effects: Theory, Data, and 'Reality'" *Journal of Politics* 65(1):238-243.

Tate, K, "The political representation of blacks in Congress: Does race matter?" *LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY*, NOV 2001, VL 26, IS 4, 623-638

Optional Review Reading:

Analyzing Elections, Chapter 15

Canon, David, "Electoral systems and the representation of minority interests in legislatures," *LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY* 24 (3): 331-385 AUG 1999,
Stable URL via jstor:

<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0362-9805%28199908%2924%3A3%3C331%3AESATRO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-4>