New York University
Department of Politics
Professor Richard Fleisher
G53.1300
Spring 2002
American Political Institutions and Processes
The purpose of this course is to develop an understanding of the policy-making institutions and processes in the American political system. It is designed as a survey course, presenting literature across a wide range of topics in the study of American politics. The course requires a fair amount of required readings as noted below. Since I intend to conduct the class as a seminar, I expect that you will come to class ready to discuss the readings assigned for that session. For each session, prepare a list of five questions that are relevant to the week’s readings. These questions will help guide our discussion. Grades for the course will be based on a paper, a take-home final examination and class participation. For the paper, select one of the topics from the list found on the last page of this syllabus and critically review the available literature (both books and journal articles) relevant to your topic. The paper is not to be an annotated bibliography but must be organized conceptually. In the course of reviewing the literature, you should be particularly sensitive to issues that need additional research and to where there are major flaws in the existing research. Only one student will be permitted to select any of the topics and selection will be based on when the request is made. As a result, there is some benefit derived from making your choice early in the semester. Be sure to use the American Political Science Association’s citation rules when citing material in the paper. The final examination in this course will be a take home. I will give you the questions during the last class session and the exam is to be turned in one week later. Finally, when determining your final grade I reserve the right to raise or lower your grade based on the quality of your contributions to our class discussions.
During the course of the semester, I can be reached by phone at 718-817-3952 or by email at fleisher@fordham.edu. If the need arises, do not hesitate to give me a call or send an email. Contact me if you wish to make an appointment to meet with me. During most weeks, I can be available either before or after class.
The following books may be purchased in the NYU Book Store:
Aldrich, John. 1995. Why Parties. University of Chicago Press.
Baumgartner, Frank and Bryan Jones. 1992. Agendas and Instability in American Politics. University of Chicago Press.
Bond, Jon and Richard Fleisher. 2000. Polarized Politics. CQ Press.
Brady, David, John Cogan and Morris Fiorina. 2000. Continuity and Change in House Elections. Stanford University Press.
Cameron, Charles. 2000. Veto Bargaining. Cambridge University Press.
Jacobs, Lawrence and Robert Shapiro. 2000. Politicians Don’t Pander. University of Chicago Press.
Krehbiel, Keith. 1998. Pivotal Politics. University of Chicago Press.
Lee, Frances and Bruce Oppenheimer. 1999. Sizing Up the Senate. University of Chicago Press.
Maltzman, Forrest. 1998. Competing Principals. University of Michigan Press.
Stimson, James. 1999. Public Opinion in America, 2 nd edition. Westview Press.
In addition, there are a number of readings on reserve in Bobst Library:
Neustadt, Richard. 1990. Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents, chs. 1,3,4,5. Free Press
Kernell, Samuel. 1997. Going Public, chs. 1,2,4,7. CQ Press.
Light, Paul. 1999. The President’s Agenda, 3 rd edition. chs. 1,2, Johns Hopkins University Press.
Shepsle, Kenneth. 1989. "The Changing Textbook Congress." In John Chubb and Paul Peterson (eds.) Can The Government Govern? pp. 238-266. Brookings Institution Press.
Finally, journal articles that are more than three years old are available on JSTOR. Articles that are less than three years old may be available through one or more of the databases available in the library or in hard copy in Bobst Library.
Reading Assignments
Theories of Presidential Power - Jan. 29
Neustadt, R.1990. Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents. chs. 1,3,4,5. (Reserve).
Kernell, S. 1997. Going Public, chs. 1,2,4,7 (Reserve).
Light, P. 1999. The President’s Agenda, 3rd edition. chs. 1,2. (Reserve).
Classic Conceptions of Congressional Politics - Feb. 5
Polsby, N. 1968. “The Institutionalization of the House of Representatives.” American Political Science Review, 62: 144-168. (JSTOR)
Fenno, R. 1977. "US House Members in Their Constituencies." American Political Science Review, 71: 883-917. (JSTOR)
Cooper, J. and D. Brady, 1981. "Institutional Context and Leadership Style: The House from Cannon to Rayburn.” American Political Science Review, 75: 411-425. (JSTOR)
Kingdon, J. 1977. "Models of Legislative Voting," Journal of Politics, 39: 563-595. (JSTOR)
Shepsle, K. 1989. "The Changing Textbook Congress." In J. Chubb and P. Peterson (eds.) Can The Government Govern? (Reserve).
Public Opinion and Public Policy - Feb. 12
Stimson, J. Public Opinion in America, 2nd edition
Stevenson, R. 2001. “The Economy and Policy Mood: A Fundamental Dynamic of Democratic Politics.” American Journal of Political Science, 45: 620-633.
Public Opinion and Public Policy - Feb. 19
Jacobs, L. and R. Shapiro. Politicians Don’t Pander
Political Parties and Elections- Feb. 26
Aldrich, J. Why Parties?
The Politics of Agenda Setting - Mar. 5
Baumgartner, F. and B. Jones, Agendas and Instability in American Politics,
Baumgartner, F. and B. Leech. 2001. “Interest Niches and Policy Bandwagons: Patterns of Interest Group Involvement in National Politics.” Journal of Politics, 63: 1191-1213.
Congressional Elections - Mar. 19
All of the chapters in Brady, D, J. Cogan and M. Fiorina, Continuity and Change in House Elections
Jacobson, G. “Party Polarization in National Politics: The Electoral Connection.” In J. Bond and R. Fleisher (eds.). Polarized Politics, pp. 9-30.
Bicameralism - Mar. 26
Lee, F. and B. Oppenheimer. Sizing Up the Senate
Decentralized Nature of Congressional Policy Making - Apr. 2
Maltzman, F. Competing Principals
Hall, R. 1987. “Participation and Purpose in Committee Decision Making.” American Political Science Review, 81: 105-127.
Carsey, T. and B. Rundquist. 1999. “Party and Committee in Distributive Politics: Evidence from Defense Spending.” Journal of Politics, 61: 1156-1169.
Political Parties, Separation of Powers and Policy Making - Apr. 9
Krehbiel, K. Pivotal Politics
Aldrich, J. and D. Rohde. “The Consequences of Party Organization in the House: The Role of the Majority and Minority Parties in Conditional Party Government.” In J. Bond and R. Fleisher (eds.). Polarized Politics, pp.31-72.
Binder, S., E. Lawrence, and F. Maltzman. 1999. “Uncovering the Hidden Effect of Party.” Journal of Politics, 61: 815-831.
Schickler, E. 2000. “Institutional Change in the House of Representatives, 1867-1998: A Test of Partisan and Ideological Power Balance Models.” American Political Science Review, 94: 269-288.
The President and Congress in a Polarized Environment - Apr. 16
Remainder of the chapters in J. Bond and R. Fleisher (eds.). Polarized Politics,
Binder, S. 1999. “The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947-96.” American Political Science Review, 93: 519-534.
Edwards, G. and B.D. Wood. 1999. “Who Influences Whom?: The President and the Public Agenda.” American Political Science Review, 93: 327-344.
Canes-Wrone, B. 2001. “The President’s Legislative Influence from Public Appeals.” American Journal of Political Science, 45: 313-329.
Bond, J., R. Fleisher and B.D. Wood. 2002. “The Marginal and Time Varying Effect of Public Approval on Presidential Success in Congress.” Journal of Politics, forthcoming. (on reserve).
The Presidential Veto and Presidential Power - Apr. 23
Cameron, Charles. Veto Bargaining
Judicial Politics - Apr. 30
George, T. and L. Epstein. 1992. "On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision Making." American Political Science Review, 86: 323-337. (JSTOR)
Mishler, W. and R. Sheehan. 1993. "The Supreme Court as a Countermajoritarian Institution? “The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions." American Political Science Review, 87: 87-101. (JSTOR)
Norporth, H. and J. Segal; W. Mishler and R. Sheehan. 1994. "Popular Influences on Supreme Court Decisions." American Political Science Review, 88: 711-724. (JSTOR)
Songer, D., J. Segal, and C. Cameron. 1994. "The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions." American Journal of Political Science, 38: 673-696. (JSTOR)
Epstein, L., J. Segal, and H. Spaeth. 2001. “The Norm of Consensus on the U.S. Supreme Court.” American Journal of Political Science, 45: 362-377.
American Political Institutions and Processes
Topics for research paper. Select one of the topics from the following list and critically review the available literature (both books and journal articles) relevant to your topic. Although I do not expect you to include all of the written work on your topic, failing to do a thorough, comprehensive review will result in a lower grade. The paper is not to be an annotated bibliography but must be organized conceptually. As a guide, most papers will be approximately 20 to 25 pages in length (actual length will vary according to the topic selected and your writing style). Let me know as soon as you decide on a topic because only one student will be allowed to research any topic. By choosing early, it should allow sufficient time to identify and digest most of the published research related to your topic.
Competition in Congressional Elections
Party Voting in Congress
Presidential Success in Congress
Presidential Approval Ratings
PACs and Campaign Financing
The White House Staff
Presidential Vetoes
The Politics of the Budgetary Process
The Power of Congressional Committees
The Political Business Cycle
The Presidential Nomination Process
Congressional Oversight and Control of the Bureaucracy
Effect of Public Opinion on Policy
Causes and Consequences of Divided Government
Congress and Constituency Representation
Presidential Control of the Bureaucracy
Effect of Bicameralism on Congressional Decision Making
Supreme Court Decision Making
Models of Policy Implementation
President and Economic Policy Making
The Changing Nature of Interest Group Politics
The Congressional Committee System
Agenda Setting