

# The Hispanic Vote in the 2004 Presidential Election: Insecurity and Moral Concerns

Marisa A. Abrajano, R. Michael Alvarez and Jonathan Nagler

February 14, 2007

Abrajano is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science, University of California - San Diego, and is the corresponding author, (mabrajano@ucsd.edu). Alvarez is Professor of Political Science, Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, (rma@hss.caltech.edu), and a Senior Fellow at the USC Annenberg Center for Communication. Nagler is Professor of Political Science, Wilf Family Department of Politics, New York University (jonathan.nagler@nyu.edu). We thank audiences at the 2006 Western and Midwest political science association annual meetings for their comments, as well as Rosalee A. Clawson, Lina Newton, and Nicholas J. G. Winter.

### **Abstract**

This paper examines Hispanic voting behavior in the 2004 Presidential election. This research makes a significant contribution to the literature on Hispanic politics, as this is the first study to apply theories of issue and economic voting to a nationwide sample of Hispanic voters. We demonstrate that, similar to Anglo, issues and ideology are highly influential in the vote choice of Hispanics in the 2004 election. However, using the best available data on Hispanic voting behavior for this election, a statewide aggregation of the National Election Pool (NEP), we show that in this election Hispanic voters placed more emphasis on moral values issues and national security than other domestic issues, and that this accounted for Republican gains beyond the overall increase in Bush's vote share from 2000 to 2004. And we show that moral values and national security had roughly equal importance in Bush's victory. In this election, Republicans successfully made inroads with Hispanic voters because the issues of moral values and national security weighed more heavily in the vote decisions of Hispanics at the aggregate level than did traditional domestic issues such as health care and education. Thus this paper also makes a significant contribution to our understanding of current politics, as by distinguishing between popular interpretations of the 2004 election we illuminate likely areas of future political competition.

# 1 Introduction

For more than 30 years, the Hispanic electorate's estimated support of the Democratic presidential candidate has never dropped below 60% (Schmal 2004).<sup>1</sup> Democrats, especially at the national level, have enjoyed strong support from Hispanic voters. However, in the 2004 presidential election, according to most exit polls, Bush's share of the Hispanic vote increased to 40% or more.<sup>2</sup> There are two main theories that can explain Bush's relatively strong performance among Hispanics in 2004. First, the set of issues collectively referred to as 'moral values' in 2004 may have been a major factor. This includes the issue of gay marriage, which gained unusual currency in 2004 with the Vermont decision to allow same-sex marriages and the issue's presence on the ballot in a number of states. This also includes abortion: since most Hispanics in the United States are Catholic, and are more religious than their Anglo counterparts, Republicans had hoped that this issue could attract Hispanic voters to Republican candidates. Second, the issue of national security could be what moved Hispanics to Bush in 2004. It was the first presidential election following the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, and it was held while the United States continued to suffer casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq. In all available polling data Bush held a large lead over Kerry in his perceived ability to deal with national security issues. These two explanations obviously have very different political implications. If moral values swayed Hispanic voters, then we argue that, if this is a Republican-owned issue, they may be able to consolidate their gains among Hispanic voters beyond 2004. However, if Bush's success in 2004 was based on his perceived strength over Kerry on national security, then Republican success with Hispanic voters might be restricted to the 2004 election for two reasons: first, Bush himself will not be running for office again; second, national security, as the issue was constructed in 2004, may not continue as a salient issue.

In this paper we demonstrate that national security issues and 'moral values' together dominated Hispanic voter choice in this election, relative to more typical domestic issues featured in past presidential elections such as education, or health care. We also show that they contributed roughly equally to Bush's victory. We see as well that one domestic issue,

the state of the economy, was potent. However, on issues of terrorism, national security, and Iraq, the candidates were clearly *not* waltzing in front of a blind audience (Aldrich, Sullivan & Borgida 1989). After estimating a multivariate model of voter choice, we show the impact of different issues at the level of the individual voter, and we present estimates of the effect of voters' views on national security, the economy, and moral values on the aggregate election results. Additionally, while the focus of our paper is on Hispanic presidential vote choice, we provide comparative results for Anglo voters.

In the next section we discuss past research on Hispanic political behavior, and then we provide our hypotheses regarding the determinants of voter choice in this election. We then discuss our data in more depth, and present the results of our analysis. We conclude by placing our results in the broader context of research about recent presidential elections, and more specifically, about the role of Hispanic voters in contemporary elections.

## 2 Hispanic Partisanship and Issue Preferences

There has been a dramatic increase in the amount of research on Hispanic politics in the U.S. in the past twenty years. The continuing growth of the Hispanic population has made them an attractive segment of the electorate for politicians, and their concentration in battleground locations like the Southwest and Florida has magnified their importance in presidential races. Thus, much of the research to date has focused on determining which Hispanics are likely to turnout, how they can be mobilized to vote, and what their partisan preferences are. But rather surprisingly, little research has examined another critical factor—what factors influence how Hispanics cast their ballots in Presidential elections? No study, to date, has applied the major theories of voting behavior (for example, the spatial model of voting, the economic voting or the partisanship model) on the presidential voting preferences of Hispanics.<sup>3</sup> Instead, the research on Hispanic vote choice has mainly focused on local and state elections (Graves & Lee 2000, Cain & Kiewiet 1984, Abrajano, Nagler & Alvarez 2005, Falcon 1989, Hero & Beatty 1989, Hill & Cue 2001, Hajnal, Gerber & Louch 2002). Several

edited volumes have looked at the Hispanic vote (de la Garza & DeSipio 2005, de la Garza & DeSipio 2000, de la Garza & DeSipio 1996, de la Garza & DeSipio 1992), but again, these are state-by-state analyses primarily regarding turnout and mobilization. Even the *Annual Review of Political Science* on Hispanic politics (de la Garza 2004), only discusses voting behavior with respect to a Hispanic's willingness to support a candidate based on shared ethnic identity, and these findings are limited to statewide samples. In conducting a comprehensive literature search on Hispanic or Hispanic voting using the Worldwide Political Science Abstracts (1972-2006), we found only eight refereed articles focusing on Hispanic voting behavior: presidential elections (1); senate (1); congressional (1); mayoral (3); and statewide (2).<sup>4</sup> The one article that examines Hispanic voting behavior at the presidential level (Welch & Sigelman 1993) does not account for respondents' issue opinions or ideology in explaining Hispanic vote choice. Moreover the research bibliography *Hispanics and Politics* (Garcia et al. 1991), includes no references pertaining to Hispanic voting behavior. So despite over thirty years of research in Hispanic politics, we know little about the factors which guide the way Hispanics casts their ballots in presidential elections, and little as to whether Hispanic voters adhere to the dominant theories of voting behavior. The aim of our research is to fill this gap in the Hispanic politics literature and establish the basis for additional work in this area.

Even with this gap in the literature, the research on Hispanic *partisanship* provides us with some basis of understanding which issues may influence Hispanic political behavior. In every presidential election for the past thirty years, the Democratic party has won a solid majority of the votes of Hispanics and other racial minorities (Schmal 2004). This is primarily because the Democrats have traditionally been more sympathetic to minority groups and minority interests (Cain et al. 1991). Such allegiance is evident in the rates of support from the Black and Hispanic electorate for Democratic presidential candidates. From 1960-2002, Black support for Democratic presidential candidates was consistently between 75%-80%, and Hispanic support of Democratic presidential nominees has always been greater than 60% (Schmal 2004). So why have Hispanics' partisan alliances remained so strong and stable over the past 30 years? Much of the reasoning rests in the historical experiences of Hispanics in

the United States. While Hispanic voters have generally supported the Democratic party (DeSipio 1996, de la Garza & DeSipio 1992, Garcia & de la Garza 1977), partisan differences exist in the Hispanic electorate, based largely on voters' country of origin. The historical experiences of Mexicans and Puerto Ricans has aligned them with the Democratic party (Pycior 1997), while the experiences of Cubans have led them to support the Republican party (Garcia 1996, Moreno 1997).

Beyond these historical and sociological explanations for Hispanic partisanship, efforts by Cain et al. (1991) and Alvarez and Bedolla (2003) explore other factors that could explain Hispanic party identification. Cain et al. (1991) test several hypotheses regarding the acquisition of partisanship by U.S. immigrants and find that Hispanic partisanship is best explained by the "minority group status hypothesis", which suggests that perceived economic discrimination experienced by Hispanics makes them more inclined to support the Democratic party, since Democrats have traditionally advocated the interests of minority groups. They do not find support for the "economic advancement" hypothesis, which contends that as Hispanics' economic status increases, second and third generation are more likely to become Republicans than are first generation Hispanics.

Others have looked to political issues and ideology as possible determinants of Hispanic partisanship. Popular discussions note that many Republicans, especially those in the Southwest (Alvarez & Bedolla 2003), believe that Hispanics' social conservatism may realign them to the Republican party if they emphasize issues that they believe will appeal to Hispanic voters. This appears to be a compelling strategy, given that issues play an important role in voters' assessment of presidential candidates and their vote decision (Carmines and Stimson 1980; Jackson 1975; Key 1966; Page and Brody 1972; Page and Jones 1979; Pomper 1972). One issue that many expected to work in the Republicans' favor was abortion. Using data from the 2000 presidential election, Alvarez and Bedolla (2003) argued that there was little support for the hypothesis that Hispanic Democrats would "convert" to the Republican party based on their pro-life position on abortion. But this does not mean that abortion, combined with other social issues, may not play joint roles in the vote decisions of Hispanics.

In particular, the theme of ‘moral values’ received much attention in the 2004 presidential election. This term encompassed the debate over gay marriage, and Bush and Kerry’s positions on this highly controversial issue. Since Hispanics are socially conservative, this issue was perceived to advantage Bush in his appeals to the Hispanic electorate.<sup>5</sup> It is also possible that other issues played important roles in whom Hispanics decided to support. Concerns over terrorism and the war in Iraq also took center stage in the 2004 presidential election. Hispanic surveys conducted by the Pew Hispanic Center in 2004 indicated that Hispanics felt that while terrorism was important, Bush should also concentrate on the economy.<sup>6</sup> So for Hispanics, along with the other salient issues of 2004, the economy and jobs were also on their list of issue priorities.

In addition to the specific issues that rose to prominence in the 2004 presidential election, voters’ ideology, partisanship, and perceptions of the economy play an important role in their vote decision (Page & Brody 1972, Carmines & Stimson 1980, Alvarez & Nagler 1995, Abramson, Aldrich & Rohde 2002). Hispanics are no exception to this rule, particularly with regards to their perceptions over the economy and jobs. In fact, according to a poll taken by Democracy Corps in July 2004, 40% of Hispanics reported that ‘the economy and jobs’ was the most important issue to them. Voters whose decisions are influenced by the economy evaluate the previous performance of the macroeconomy or their own personal finances under the incumbent party and tend to select the party possessing the best economic record (Fiorina 1981, Kiewiet 1983, Markus 1988, Rosenstone 1984, Tufte 1978, Alvarez & Nagler 1995). With respect to non-economic issues it is well established that voters tend to select the candidate whose issue positions are closest to their own issue preferences (Downs 1957, Enelow & Hinich 1985, Alvarez & Nagler 1995).

We contend that the combined concern for moral values and national security weighed more heavily in Hispanics’ vote choice than did domestic policy issues such as health care and education. Below we demonstrate that moral issues and national security played nearly equal roles in explaining Bush’s showing among Hispanic voters in 2004, and that each of these issues had a larger substantive effect on Hispanic voters than the traditionally-important

domestic issues like education and health care. And again, while not the main focus of this paper, we also show that moral values had a substantively larger impact on Hispanics than on Anglos.

### 3 Survey Methodology and Research Design

Our analysis uses survey data from the 2004 National Election Pool (NEP) state exit polls.<sup>7</sup> We include states whose Hispanic population comprises at least 6% of the total state population. Also, given our research question, we only examine states where voters were asked what they believe is the “most important issue” for the election. Our sample consists of voters from eight states: Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, and New Jersey.<sup>8</sup> This sample represents approximately 57% of Hispanics in the United States, and provides us with 1807 Hispanic voters.<sup>9</sup>

Exit polls are not often used for scholarly research. However, the only surveys from the 2004 election with sufficient Hispanic voters to test competing theories of Hispanic voter behavior are the NEP samples. Using the pooled state exit polls provides us with a sample of Hispanic voters large enough to draw reliable inferences from, which would not be possible with smaller surveys such as the National Election Study. We use the aggregation of the statewide NEP samples because they provide estimates that are somewhere near the midpoint of the range of exit poll or postelection survey estimates of the Hispanic vote in this election. The NEP also includes questions sufficient to test our hypotheses.

Given the debate about the extent of Hispanic support for Bush in the aftermath of the 2004 election, we are aware that these statewide exit polls may not produce point estimates of each candidate’s vote shares among Hispanic voters that are necessarily unbiased.<sup>10</sup> Since the various exit polls taken of Hispanic voters in the 2004 presidential election disagree, we cannot adjudicate which is producing unbiased estimates of the degree to which Hispanic voters supported Kerry or Bush. Rather we test competing theories that may account for *why* Hispanic voters cast ballots for the two candidates. Our analysis focuses less on inferences

drawn from the aggregated point estimates of candidate vote shares than from the results of our multivariate analysis of the voting decision and the counterfactual *differences* in vote-shares based on alternative hypothetical scenarios of voter preferences. To produce consistent estimates of a multivariate analysis of vote choice we do not necessarily need a sample of voters that is representative of the population.<sup>11</sup> As long as there is sufficient variation in the characteristics of the voters sampled, we can obtain consistent estimates of the model based on the data at hand and thus evaluate competing causal theories of voter behavior. In this goal we are successful, as the NEP statewide samples provide considerable leverage for testing competing hypotheses of Hispanic voter choice in this election.

The survey questions used in our analysis pertain to the voter's demographics, opinions on the war in Iraq, their evaluation of their personal finances, and their opinion as to the "the issue that mattered most in deciding how they voted for president." It would be desirable if we had a cardinal, as opposed to ordinal, measure of salience. It is possible that the voter ranks two issues as very close in salience, but is limited by the question to provide only one answer. We proceed knowing that we have a potential problem of measurement error, that might attenuate our estimate of the impact of issues on voter choice. In addition to these questions, voters were also asked their party identification and ideology. Since we are interested in determining what issues influenced Hispanic voters in their vote decision, we specify a vote choice model where the dependent variable is the probability of voting for Kerry over Bush.<sup>12</sup> As our dependent variable is a binary choice between Kerry or Bush, we use logit analysis. We describe the model in greater detail when we present the estimates. To determine the importance of the explanatory variables towards vote choice, we compute predicted probabilities and first difference estimates for different values of the explanatory variables. We use these predicted probabilities and first difference estimates to test a number of interesting counterfactuals. If Hispanics had strongly approved of the war rather than disapproving of it, would this have substantially decreased Kerry's share of the vote among Hispanics? Counterfactuals such as these allow us to determine which mattered more for the election outcome: moral values, national security, the economy, or other domestic issues? The following section presents our results.

## 4 Findings

We begin by presenting summary statistics on the political preferences of voters in the NEP exit poll samples, by their racial and ethnic identity. In the states included in our sample, Bush received 47.1% of the overall two-candidate vote; the exit poll estimate for the Bush vote from these states is 49.8%.<sup>13</sup> In Table 1 we present information from these statewide samples on presidential preferences, most important issue opinions, and assessments of each voter's personal finances and their opinion on the war in Iraq. First, note that our sample of voters from the statewide NEP surveys gives Bush 41.5% of support from Hispanics and Kerry 58.5% of support from Hispanics. These percentages differ from the estimates of the nationwide NEP, but are in line with the pre-election polling cited in the introduction to our paper. In these states, Hispanic voters were comparable with Asians in their support for Bush's reelection, though Hispanics were not as opposed to Bush as Blacks (Bush received the votes of 15.7% of Black voters in these states).

[Table 1 Here]

For Hispanics, the most important issue that influenced their support for the president was the economy (22.7%), followed by terrorism (21%), moral values (18.2%) and Iraq (18%). For Anglos the most important issue ordering differed, with terrorism (25%), Iraq (23.3%) and moral values (22.3%) being the three most important issues that influenced their vote decision; the economy ranked much lower for Anglos than Hispanics. Also, while all three non-Anglo groups had a largely shared set of issue concerns, Blacks were more concerned about the economy and jobs than Hispanics (by over 10%), but Asians were somewhat more concerned than Hispanics about both the war in Iraq and terrorism. This suggests that moral values may not necessarily be a major factor driving Hispanics to vote Republican; Hispanics were significantly *less* likely to name 'moral values' as the most important issue than were Anglos (18.2% versus 22.3%).<sup>14</sup>

Table 1 also presents the opinions of the various racial and ethnic groups towards their own pocketbook finances. Anglos were more likely to say their finances were better than

worse (34.9% vs. 23.7%). But Hispanics were mixed in their assessment of their pocketbook finances, with 38.5% seeing them as about the same, 31.4% seeing them as worse, and 30.1% seeing them as better. Blacks were the most pessimistic about their personal financial situation, with 40.1% saying that it had grown worse. While a majority of Anglo voters (56.8%) approved of the war in Iraq, more than a majority of Hispanic voters opposed the war (52.5%). Both Asian and Black voters were even more likely to be opposed to the war, with 58.9% of Asians stating disapproval of the war and 77.5% of Blacks in opposition to the war.

Of course knowing Hispanic's views on the issues is a precursor to knowing how they vote. In Table 2 we show how vote choice was a function of both respondent's views on the war, and their view of their personal financial situation. First, in parentheses, we give the percentages of Hispanic voters in our sample who had the various combinations of opinions. For example, 2.3% of Hispanic voters felt that their personal financial situation had become worse *and* strongly approved of the Iraq war. The entries below those in parentheses give the percentage of Hispanic voters in each cell who voted for Kerry; thus the first cell of data in Table 2 shows that of the 2.3% of Hispanic voters with that combination of opinions, 42.4% of them supported Kerry.<sup>15</sup>

**[Table 2 Here]**

What we see in Table 2 is the dramatic effect of these two issues on Hispanic vote choice in 2004. While few Hispanic voters are in the first row of this table (25.6%), note that no matter what their perception of their personal finances, Hispanic voters who strongly approved of the war were also supporters of President Bush. Yet in the next row, those who only somewhat approved of the war in Iraq are likely to be Kerry supporters, if they saw their own personal finances as having worsened (72.7% of Hispanic voters in that cell of the table supported Kerry). But if they felt their personal finances had improved they were likely to be Bush supporters (20.2% of Hispanic voters in that cell supported Kerry), yielding a more than a 50 percentage point difference across the columns of this row. But when we look at Hispanic voters who strongly disapproved of the war in Iraq, they strongly

supported Kerry (over 90%), no matter how they evaluated their own financial situation. Table 2 also includes Anglo voters, for comparison, and here it appears that opinion of the Iraq war was less influential for Anglos. We return to this point below.

#### 4.1 Multivariate Analysis of Hispanic Voter Choice

In order to gauge the relative importance of issues, economic perceptions, and reactions to the Iraqi war on Hispanic voting in the 2004 presidential election, we provide estimates of our logit model in Table 3. Our explanatory variables control for voters' partisanship, ideology, demographics, evaluation of their personal finances, and their view of the most important issue, and their perception of the war in Iraq. The demographic variables include the voter's education and income level, as well as their gender, age, which state they live in, and their religious affiliation. We included dummy variables for whether the voter was a Protestant or Catholic.<sup>16</sup> In terms of one's education we included dummy variables for those with no high school degree, a high school degree, some college, and college degree. The excluded category is voters with post-graduate education. For income we included dummy variables for middle- and high-income voters, with low-income voters serving as the omitted category. Voters were asked to choose the most important issue from a list that included taxes, education, Iraq, terrorism, the economy, moral values, and health care. Dummy variables were created for each issue and each dummy except for 'taxes' was included in the right-hand side of the model. We also include a direct measure of voter disapproval of the Iraq war, captured as a four category response ranging from strongly approve (1) to strongly disapprove (4).<sup>17</sup> And finally we include voters' assessments of their personal financial situation.<sup>18</sup>

[Table 3 Here]

As expected, the coefficients of partisanship and ideology are statistically significant and correctly signed. Controlling for other factors in the model, Protestants are significantly less likely to vote for Kerry than are other non-Catholics. Also, older voters, *ceteris paribus*, were less likely to vote for Kerry. None of the coefficients for education, nor any of the coefficients for income, were individually statistically significant. This is perhaps not surprising

given that partisanship, ideology, and several issue preferences are included in the model. More importantly, the estimates in Table 3 also demonstrate that issues played an important role in the way Hispanics voted in the 2004 presidential elections. The coefficients for voters' positions on the war and their evaluation of their financial situation were statistically significant. *Ceteris paribus*, voters with positive evaluations of the economy were more likely to vote for the incumbent. And the more negative a voter felt about the war in Iraq, the more likely they were to support Kerry. Here we also estimate an identical model for Anglo voters and the same pattern of coefficients emerge; Anglo voters who felt their personal finances had improved were less likely to vote for Kerry than were those who did not, and those who strongly disapproved of the war were more likely to vote for Kerry.

In addition, all of the coefficients on the “most important issue” variables are statistically significant for Hispanics, suggesting that the salience of specific issues to individual voters framed their vote choice. The issues that advantaged Kerry were health care, the economy, Iraq, and education. Voters who listed any of these as their most important issue were, *ceteris paribus*, more likely to vote for Kerry. But Hispanic voters who ranked moral values or terrorism as their most important issue were more likely to vote for Bush, controlling for other factors in the model. This would seem to bode well for Kerry as the issues that favored him among Hispanic voters were listed as the most important issue by 6.8% (health care), 22.7% (the economy), 18% (Iraq), and 8.4% (education) of Hispanic voters. When we compare these results to what we obtain for Anglo voters, the most striking difference regards moral values. The estimated coefficient on moral values (relative to taxes) as being the most important issue for Anglos was zero — thus, consistent with conventional wisdom, Hispanic voters were more susceptible to the Republican appeal on moral values issues than were Anglos.<sup>19</sup>

To determine the impact of each explanatory variable on vote choice, we compute the probability that a hypothetical voter supports Kerry under two circumstances: first when we define all values for our hypothetical voter at fixed positions; and second after we adjust the value of only one variable for our hypothetical voter. The difference between these two

estimated probabilities reveals the impact of changing the single variable, with all other explanatory variables held constant.<sup>20</sup> We constructed our hypothetical voter by setting all variables other than the most important issue variables to their mean or mode. Thus our hypothetical voter is female, identifies as a Democrat, and is ideologically moderate. She is also Catholic, between the ages of 30-39, has some college education, an income between \$50,000-\$74,999, and sees education as the most important issue in determining her vote.<sup>21</sup>

In the first seven rows of Table 4 we give the probability that our hypothetical voter supported Kerry for each of the possible most important issue responses. The first column gives the predicted probability of our hypothetical voter supporting Kerry if she lists the row variable as the most important issue. The second column gives the increase in the probability of voting for Kerry if the hypothetical voter gives the row variable as the most important issue rather than education (relative to the baseline probability). The third column gives the standard error of the difference. We see that a Hispanic voter who felt terrorism was the most important issue was .40 less likely to vote for Kerry than was an otherwise identical voter who felt that education was the most important issue. The corresponding difference for a voter who felt moral values was the most important issue was slightly larger (.44). But for voters who ranked economy or health care to be more important than education, this was to Kerry's advantage. Our hypothetical voter was .14 more likely to vote for Kerry if she thought the economy, rather than education, was the most important issue. Note that the largest possible swing based on evaluations of issue salience is .61; if our hypothetical voter had ranked moral values as the most important issue instead of health care, then she would have been .61 less likely to vote for Kerry. Finally, consistent with our results thus far, moral values was substantially less important for Anglo vote choice than it was for Hispanic vote choice; the estimated first difference for Anglos is barely half of what it is for Hispanics.

[Table 4 Here]

These calculations demonstrate the impact of specific issues on individual voters. Voters' views on Iraq, perceptions of personal finances, and view of the most important issues were all strong predictors of their vote choice. However, the more important questions con-

cern aggregate vote shares: how would the relative vote shares of Kerry and Bush change if voters adopted different positions on these issues? In order to test our central hypothesis, which contends that the effect of moral values and terrorism on Hispanic vote choice is greater than the effect of other domestic issues on Hispanic vote choice, we calculate aggregate estimated vote-shares based on counterfactuals about voters' issue opinions. Therefore, the first counterfactual examines a scenario where no voters considered moral concerns as the most important issue, while the second counterfactual looks at the case where no voters ranked terrorism as the most important issue.

To estimate the aggregate impact of moral values, we take every respondent who said that moral values was the most important issue, and reset their most important issue response to one of the other six issues listed. We distribute these respondents among the six other issues in proportion to the distribution across the six issues given by all other respondents in the sample. Using the estimated logit parameters in Table 3, we compute the predicted probability of these respondents voting for Bush and Kerry. These predicted probabilities are then aggregated over all the respondents in our sample, providing us with an aggregated predicted vote share for Kerry under the counterfactual condition. This value is reported in the first column of Table 5. We also compute the predicted probability for each respondent voting for Kerry given their actual responses to the most important issue question. We aggregate each of these to generate the baseline expected vote-share for Kerry (which we report as the first row in entry in Table 5.) The difference between the counterfactual prediction and the baseline prediction is the estimated total impact of the change.<sup>22</sup> The first column of Table 5 gives the predicted vote share for Kerry under the counterfactual condition, and the second column gives the estimated increase in Kerry's vote share (along with its standard error in parenthesis). So, looking at the last row of the table, we see that if all Hispanic voters who said that moral values was the most important issue had believed some other issue was the most important issue, Kerry's vote share would have increased by 2.2 percentage points. The equivalent number for terrorism is 2.6 percentage points.

[Table 5 Here]

Relative to these other issues, the economy had a similar effect on Kerry's share of the Hispanic vote; if all Hispanic voters who responded that the economy was the most important issue had instead ranked another issue as more important, Kerry's vote share would have dropped by 2.2 percentage points. However, the one issue that Kerry had a clear advantage on, education, provided him with very little traction; had all Hispanic voters citing education as the most important issue selected another issue, Kerry's share of the Hispanic vote would have dropped by only 0.4 percentage points. Clearly, this is not enough for a Democratic candidate, on a Democratic issue, among voters who consistently list education as their most important issue. And finally, while health care influenced an Hispanic individual's likelihood of supporting Kerry (the individual impact was .17), its impact on his total vote share was quite minimal. If each Hispanic voter who claimed that health care was their most important issue had preferred a different issue, Kerry's vote share would have decreased by less than one percentage point (0.6). So despite the importance of health care on a voter's decision-making process at the individual level, its aggregate impact on Hispanics was minimal.

From a comparative standpoint, differences do exist in the impact of issue preferences on Anglo and Hispanic vote choice. For instance, if no Anglo voters thought education was the most important issue, Kerry's vote share amongst them would have dropped by a statistically insignificant 0.1 percentage point, but for Hispanic voters, this drop in vote share is not insignificant (0.5). And where moral values could have increased Kerry's vote share among Hispanic voters by 2.2 percentage points, our estimates suggest that if all Anglos who said moral values was the most important issue had instead ranked another issue as more important, then Kerry's vote share amongst Anglos would have only increased by 1.1%. More than any other calculation we perform, the estimates from Table 5 confirm the conventional wisdom that "owning" the issue of moral values provided Republicans with a considerable advantage amongst Hispanic voters, to a much greater extent than for Anglo voters. All in all, by estimating the impact of these issues across many voters, we gain a better understanding of the dynamics of this election. Had the issue of terrorism not been so important to voters, Kerry would have picked up 2.6 percentage points among Hispanic voters. And because of Bush's advantage among Hispanics on moral values, Kerry lost

2.2 percentage points among Hispanic voters. The one issue that the Democratic party is traditionally advantaged on, education, was apparently neutralized by the Bush campaign; Kerry's "advantage" on this issue contributed to less than half a percentage point of his total share of the Hispanic vote.

But what if all those Hispanic voters who said that moral values was the most important issue had instead regarded the economy (arguably a better issue for Kerry) as the most important issue? Had this been the case, Kerry's vote share among Hispanics would have increased by 3.9 percentage points. Likewise, if those Hispanic voters who considered terrorism as the most important issue had instead felt that the economy was more important, then Kerry's share of the Hispanic vote would have increased by 3.9 percentage points. Thus, for voters who felt that moral values and terrorism were their most important issues, a shift to the economy as being the most important issue could have increased Kerry's vote share significantly. These estimates shed further light on the difficulties that Kerry faced in trying to hold onto the Hispanic vote in 2004.

Because the two campaigns appeared to have emphasized different issues, we should also study the *potential* impact of the various issues on Kerry and Bush's total vote share. For that, we perform similar counterfactual calculations to those presented in Table 5. However, for each issue, rather than resetting the voter's opinion so that the issue was *not* the most important issue, we reset every voter's opinion to make the row variable the most important issue. This means that the counterfactual estimates presented in first row of Table 6 indicate that had all Hispanic voters felt that the economy was the most important issue, Kerry's vote share among Hispanics would have been 9.1 percentage points higher. But if voters felt that education was the most important issue, Kerry's corresponding increase would have been 5.1 percentage points.

[Table 6 Here]

Health care was the one issue that had the greatest potential to increase Kerry's vote share; *if* all Hispanic voters ranked health care as their most important issue, his share of the Hispanic vote could have increased by 11.6 percentage points. However, the reality is

that only 6.8% of Hispanics considered health care to be the most important issue in this election. And consistent with our previous estimates, the two issues where Kerry suffered the most was on terrorism and moral values; had all Hispanic voters felt that terrorism was the most important issue, his share of the Hispanic vote would have dropped by 8.7 percentage points. If moral values ranked as the number one issue for Hispanics, his vote share from them would have fallen by 10.4 percentage points. Though for Anglos, a completely different picture emerges; even if they ranked moral values as the most important issue, Kerry's vote share amongst Anglos would have only decreased by 4.9 percentage points. Once again, these findings lend support to our claim that moral values has a bigger impact on Hispanic voters as opposed to Anglo voters.

## 5 Conclusion

As we have documented, the key to understanding the Hispanic vote in 2004 is to acknowledge that while economic concerns and other domestic issues loomed large for Hispanics, the combined concern that many Hispanic voters had for moral values and national security trumped domestic issues. Our analysis demonstrates that the domestic issues which traditionally advantage Democrats, such as health care and education, played a small role in this election. This is especially surprising given that Hispanics typically care the most about these “bread and butter” issues, and are generally less concerned about foreign policy matters.<sup>23</sup> But for this particular election, how the candidates defined the issues that rose to the forefront of the debate significantly influenced the decisions made by Hispanic voters. Thus, instead of health care and education determining the vote decision of Hispanics, the issues of moral values and terrorism dominated how Hispanic voters cast their ballots.

We again point out that our analysis enables us to distinguish between two competing explanations of the 2004 election with different implications for understanding Hispanic voting. While national security is likely to be a short-term issue, and not one on which the Hispanic electorate is generally identified as being distinct from the overall electorate, moral

values is an issue area which may well be a factor in United States national politics for the foreseeable future. And it is an issue area that Republicans had hoped to use in order to appeal to a large segment of the Hispanic electorate. Our research demonstrates that each of these views is half right. Bush *did* pick up a substantial number of votes among Hispanics based on moral values. We also demonstrated that moral values was a particularly effective issue with Hispanic voters relative to Anglo voters. But some of Bush's performance was due to the unique national security context of the election, a context future Republican nominees cannot count on inheriting. We therefore leave it to each political party to determine whether their glass is half-full or half-empty.

These insights also place the explanation for Hispanic voting in 2004 squarely within dominant paradigms in the political behavior literature for understanding electoral choice; issues matter, economic concerns matter, and elections revolve around how candidates prioritize issues and which positions candidates take on issues. Hispanic voters obviously perceived that they had choices, not echoes; the issues emphasized by the candidates influenced Hispanic vote choice. But these insights also raise new questions. That foreign policy issues loomed large in the voting decisions of Hispanics in the 2004 presidential election we find of particular interest, given that foreign policy issues rarely feature prominently in studies of voting behavior, especially Hispanic voting behavior. While we obviously lack the detailed data used by Aldrich et al. (1989b), given our results, it may be that the 2004 presidential election is like other past presidential elections (1972, 1980, or 1984) where foreign policy issues were highly salient and accessible to Hispanic voters, and where there were clear differences between the two major parties on certain issues. If so, this may imply that the Hispanic electorate can respond to appeals made to them on more complex and abstract issues (e.g. foreign policy), if they are given the necessary campaign information to make an appropriate decision. However, an analysis of the actual campaign content targeted at Hispanics in the 2004 election would be necessary to test this hypothesis.

The prominence of moral values as a priority and determinant of Hispanic voter choice is worthy of additional research. Without more finely-grained survey data, we cannot say

precisely what Hispanic voters see as the moral values that concern them: is it abortion, gay marriage, school prayer, religiosity or some combination of these and other social or value-laden issues? What were the messages that both Kerry and Bush tried to send to Hispanic voters about moral values, and what precise issues or values were they targeting? What role did other social institutions, especially churches, have in spreading moral value messages to Hispanic voters in the 2004 election? As there is little existing research on the general importance of moral values concerns in presidential election voting, not to mention their influence on Hispanic voters, this is a critical research agenda for the future (e.g., (Abramowitz 1995)).

Finally, our research implies that the fight for the Hispanic vote will continue in future elections, as this electorate is projected to increase in numerical terms and because Hispanics have issue concerns that both Democrats and Republicans can appeal to. Both parties obviously should pay attention to moral values if they want to win large numbers of Hispanic votes. However, if moral values has become an issue “owned” by the Republican party, then Democrats’ best strategy may be to restructure their campaign strategies so that voters make choices based on other domestic issues, such as health care and education. And while public opinion polls indicate that Hispanics care the most about domestic policy issues such as education, the economy and health care, this election demonstrates how candidates can successfully emphasize other issues in order to minimize the impact of these domestic issues on voter decision-making.

## Notes

1. Throughout this paper we will use the term “Hispanic”, though we could just as easily have used the term “Latino” to describe voters of Hispanic or Latino identity. We use the term “Anglo” to describe non-Hispanic Whites.
2. According to the national sample of the National Election Pool (NEP) exit poll, 44% of the Hispanic electorate supported George W. Bush. An independent national exit poll conducted by *The Los Angeles Times* found that 45% of the Hispanic electorate voted for Bush. The National Annenberg Election Survey estimated that 41% of the Hispanic electorate supported Bush in 2004, an increase of about 6 percentage points over the 2000 Annenberg estimate. The William C. Velasquez Institute’s 2004 exit poll gave Bush a lower share of the Latino vote, only 35.1%.
3. Welch and Sigelman (1993) examine the presidential exit polls from 1980-1988, but they do not control for respondent’s issue preferences. Leal, et al.(2005) examine the Hispanic vote in the 2004 election, but issue preferences are also omitted from the analysis.
4. We searched for the terms “Latino” or “Hispanic” and Voting, and found 160 matches. Of these, 8 focus on Latino voting behavior. There are three additional non-refereed articles: the 2004 presidential election (Barreto, et al 2005) and the 2004 L.A. mayoral election (Sonenshien and Pinkus 2005), and the 2003 gubernatorial recall election in California (Barreto, et al 2004).
5. A Democracy Corps survey (July 2004) reports that 29% of Hispanics “would not support a candidate who is open to gay marriage.”  
[http://democracycorps.com/reports/analyses/Bush\\_Faltering\\_Among\\_Hispanics.pdf](http://democracycorps.com/reports/analyses/Bush_Faltering_Among_Hispanics.pdf).
6. For more information on these polls, go to <http://www.pewHispanic.org/reports>
7. The state exit polls are distinct from the *national* NEP exit poll. For more information on the design of these exit polls, go to:  
<http://www.exit-poll.net/election-night/MethodsStatementStateGeneric.pdf>
8. Although the state population in Texas, Connecticut, Illinois and Massachusetts contains more than 6% of Hispanics, the statewide exit polls taken in Texas and Connecticut did not include the “most important issue” question. IL and MA were excluded from the sample due to multicollinearity. There was not enough variation in the responses provided by the Hispanic respondents living in these two states to estimate our model.
9. Had TX, CT, IL, and MA been included in the sample, this percentage jumps to 82%. These percentages were calculated using Census data on the Hispanic population from 2003.

10. For a summary of this debate, see Suro, Fry and Passel (2005).
11. Selecting on the dependent variables — vote choice — would give us a sample that would produce inconsistent estimates. But all hypotheses about potential sources of error in the exit poll estimates are based on problems of sampling on voter characteristics that are for us explanatory variables. For example, it would not cause any problem in estimating our multivariate model of vote choice if we our sample had ‘too many’ rich voters, though the likely impact would be for the sample to have a higher Bush vote than the population.
12. Too few respondents offered a candidate choice other than Kerry and Bush for reliable analysis, thus we restricted our analysis to those respondents who reported voting for either of the two major party candidates.
13. We present in Table 8 for interested readers and reviewers data from the eight states included in our analysis. Here we compare the overall unweighted exit poll estimates of the two-candidate vote, the weighted exit poll estimate, and the actual two-candidate vote as compiled from David Leip’s “Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections” ([http://www.uselectionatlas.org/USPRESIDENT/data.php?year=2004 &datatype=national&def=1&f=0](http://www.uselectionatlas.org/USPRESIDENT/data.php?year=2004&datatype=national&def=1&f=0)) We provide this table in the appendix.
14. Of course ‘moral values’ could mean different things to Hispanics than it does to Anglos, thus accounting partially for differences in overall issue importance.
15. We report the same information for Anglos in Appendix B.1.
16. The omitted category here includes all non-Christians as well as non-responses. We also estimated the model with an additional dummy variable for non-Christians; the results remain unchanged.
17. We are thus treating the variable as cardinal rather than simply ordinal. We also estimated the model with three separate dummies, thus dropping the cardinality assumption. Since the three estimated coefficients were almost perfectly linear, we report the more parsimonious model with the cardinality assumption.
18. Additional information on the coding of the variables is available in Appendix. To allow for comparisons to Anglos, we provide include estimates of the same model for Anglo voters in the Appendix.
19. This coefficient estimate is relative to the impact of the ommitted category, which is taxes. Thus the coefficient on moral values suggests not that moral values had no impact on the vote decision of Anglos, but that, *ceteris paribus*, Anglos who felt that moral values was the most important issue were no more likely to vote for Kerry than were Anglos who felt that taxes was the most important issue. Or, that, *ceteris paribus*, Anglos who felt that moral values was the most important issue were less likely to vote for Kerry than were Anglos who listed health care, the economy, Iraq, or education as the most

important issue. However, Anglos were more likely to vote for Kerry than were those who listed terrorism as the most important issue, all other things being equal.

20. The calculations are performed with the CLARIFY package in STATA (King & Wittenberg 2001) .
21. We performed similar calculations for Anglos. Our hypothetical Anglo voter is an independent, moderate, man of religion other than protestant or catholic, between the ages of 50-59, with some college education, an income between \$50,000-\$74,999, and felt that education was the most important issue in determining his vote.
22. To determine standard errors, we start with the logit estimates of the vote choice model, and we take 1000 draws of the parameter values from the estimated distribution. We then use these 1000 draws, and the original dataset of voters from which the parameters were estimated, to compute probabilities of Bush and Kerry support for each voter, for each of the 1000 draws. Aggregating these individual vote probabilities within each draw of the parameters gives an estimate (and standard error) for the vote share of Bush and Kerry. We then assume that the entire Hispanic electorate had a different distribution of opinions about a particular issue, and using the same 1000 draws of the parameter estimates, we recompute the probabilities that each voter in the sample would support Bush or Kerry in this counterfactual scenario. Again, within each draw we aggregate the individual probabilities into candidate vote shares. This allows us to determine how much changes in Hispanics' issue preferences or views would have affected the overall vote shares of Kerry and Bush, and to compute confidence intervals about those estimates.
23. See the "Pew Hispanic Center/Kaiser Family Foundation 2004 National Survey Of Hispanics: Politics and Civic Participation", (<http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?ReportID=33>).

Table 1: Vote and Issues by Race

Variable	Race or Ethnicity of Voter					All Voters
	Anglo	Black	Hispanic	Asian	Other	
<b>Presidential Vote</b>						
<i>Bush</i>	55.8	15.7	41.5	41.2	39.4	49.8
<i>Kerry</i>	44.2	84.3	58.5	58.8	60.6	50.2
<b>Most Important Issue</b>						
<i>Taxes</i>	5.0	5.8	4.8	7.9	6.3	5.1
<i>Education</i>	3.3	7.1	8.4	4.0	8.8	4.5
<i>Iraq</i>	23.3	20.6	18.0	23.7	19.8	22.2
<i>Terrorism</i>	25.0	10.5	21.0	21.5	16.9	23.1
<i>Economy</i>	15.2	33.5	22.7	25.7	23.2	18.0
<i>Moral values</i>	22.3	11.7	18.2	9.7	18.0	20.5
<i>Health care</i>	6.1	10.9	6.8	7.5	7.0	6.7
<b>Financial Situation</b>						
<i>Better</i>	34.9	19.0	30.1	30.7	26.1	32.6
<i>About the same</i>	41.5	40.9	38.5	42.7	40.6	41.0
<i>Worse</i>	23.7	40.1	31.4	26.6	33.3	26.4
<b>Iraq War</b>						
<i>Strongly approve</i>	32.4	8.1	25.5	24.3	20.4	29.0
<i>Somewhat approve</i>	24.4	14.5	22.0	16.8	17.6	23.0
<i>Somewhat disapprove</i>	13.1	21.4	17.8	21.6	18.5	14.7
<i>Strongly disapprove</i>	30.1	56.1	34.7	37.3	43.5	33.3

Entries in columns 2-6 are column percentages, computed from the statewide NEP surveys used in our analysis. These estimates have been weighted using the sample weights provided by the NEP.

Table 2: Support for Kerry, by Opinions on War and Financial Perceptions

<i>Opinion on Iraqi War</i>	<b>Hispanics</b>			<b>Anglos</b>		
	<i>Financial Situation</i>			<i>Financial Situation</i>		
	Worse	Same	Better	Worse	Same	Better
Strongly Approve	(2.3%)	(8.1%)	(15.2%)	(2.0%)	(11.5%)	(19.5%)
	42.4%	7.5%	3.6%	17.2%	2.4%	1.4%
Somewhat Approve	(3.8%)	(9.8%)	(8.5%)	(3.8%)	(10.7%)	(10.3%)
	72.7%	36.0%	20.2%	46.5%	18.8%	9.0%
Somewhat Disapprove	(7.5%)	(7.4%)	(2.8%)	(4.4%)	(6.0%)	(2.6%)
	89.5%	84.0%	72.5%	81.5%	75.6%	55.3%
Strongly Disapprove	(17.9%)	(13.1%)	(3.7%)	(13.4%)	(12.6%)	(3.3%)
	99.5%	92.5%	89.6%	97.7%	95.5%	89.7%

Entries in ( ) are the % of voters in the given category.

Entries not in ( ) are the % of voters in the given category who voted for Kerry. These estimates have been weighted using the sample weights provided by the NEP.

Table 3: Logit Estimates: Probability of Voting for Kerry

Variable	Hispanics		Anglos	
	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Constant	-1.69*	(0.72)	-3.07**	(0.36)
Democrat	1.25**	(0.25)	1.24**	(0.12)
Republican	-1.46**	(0.30)	-1.67**	(0.12)
Liberal	0.54*	(0.27)	0.79**	(0.14)
Conservative	-1.07**	(0.26)	-0.76**	(0.13)
<b>Demographics</b>				
Woman	-0.13	(0.21)	-0.35**	(0.10)
Protestant	-1.04*	(0.43)	-0.43**	(0.13)
Catholic	0.25	(0.23)	-0.34**	(0.12)
Age	-0.12*	(0.05)	-0.09**	(0.02)
No HS Degree	-0.03	(0.50)	-0.30	(0.33)
HS Degree	-0.07	(0.40)	-0.63**	(0.17)
Some College	-0.23	(0.38)	-0.26	(0.15)
College Degree	0.12	(0.40)	-0.20	(0.15)
Middle-Income	0.30	(0.26)	-0.14	(0.14)
High-Income	-0.09	(0.32)	-.016	(0.14)
<b>Most Important Issue<sup>a</sup></b>				
Health Care	2.10**	(0.57)	1.97**	(0.28)
Economy	1.85**	(0.43)	1.80**	(0.23)
Iraq	1.15**	(0.43)	1.65**	(0.22)
Education	1.08*	(0.47)	1.15**	(0.29)
Moral Values	-0.96*	(0.42)	-0.00	(0.22)
Terrorism	-0.74 <sup>†</sup>	(0.41)	-0.63**	(0.23)
<b>Other Issues</b>				
Personal Finances Better	-2.15**	(0.30)	-1.29**	(0.14)
Personal Finances Same	-1.36**	(0.28)	-0.58**	(0.12)
Strongly Disapprove of Iraqi War	1.59**	(0.12)	1.75**	(0.06)
<b>State Dummies</b>				
Arizona	-0.72 <sup>†</sup>	(0.43)	-0.01	(0.20)
Colorado	-0.11	(0.43)	-0.34	(0.18)
Florida	-0.61	(0.40)	-0.07	(0.19)
Nevada	0.29	(0.43)	0.14	(0.19)
New Mexico	-0.73*	(0.34)	-0.33	(0.23)
New York	0.31	(0.55)	0.08	(0.22)
New Jersey	-0.89 <sup>†</sup>	(0.52)	.07	(0.22)
<hr/>				
N	1807		8540	
Log-likelihood	-334.653		-1469.27	

<sup>a</sup> Taxes is the omitted issue.

Table 4: Predicted Probabilities and First Differences

Scenario	Hispanics			Anglos		
	<i>Pr</i> of Voting for Kerry	Marginal Impact	Std Error	<i>Pr</i> of Voting for Kerry	Marginal Impact	Std Error
Baseline	.66	–	–	.46	–	–
<b>Most Important Issue</b>						
Education	.66	–	(–)	.46	–	(–)
Health Care	.83	.17	(.10)	.65	.20	(.06)
Economy	.80	.14	(.08)	.62	.16	(.06)
Iraq War	.68	.02	(.09)	.58	.12	(.06)
Taxes	.42	-.24	(.11)	.21	-.24	(.06)
Terrorism	.26	-.40	(.08)	.13	-.33	(.06)
Moral Values	.22	-.44	(.09)	.21	-.24	(.06)
<b>Personal Finances</b>						
Personal Finances are Better	.49	-.18	(.06)	.29	-.16	(.03)
Personal Finances are the Same	.66	–	(–)	.46	–	(–)
Personal Finances are Worse	.87	.21	(.07)	.60	.14	(.03)
<b>Perceptions of the Iraqi War</b>						
Strongly Approve	.31	-.35	(.04)	.13	-.33	(.04)
Somewhat Approve	.66	–	(–)	.46	–	–
Somewhat Disapprove	.90	.23	(.07)	.82	.37	(.03)
Strongly Disapprove	.98	.31	(.11)	.96	.51	(.06)

Entries in the second and third columns are probability estimates. They are calculated using CLARIFY for a hypothetical voter described in the text.

Table 5: Aggregate Predicted Vote Share for Different Counterfactuals  
 Respondents are Moved **Out** of the Row-Variable Category

Variable of Interest	Hispanic Voters		Anglo Voters	
	Predicted Kerry Share of Vote <sup>a</sup>	Predicted Increase in Kerry Share of Vote <sup>b</sup>	Predicted Kerry Share of Vote <sup>a</sup>	Predicted Increase in Kerry Share of Vote <sup>b</sup>
Baseline	60.0	–	45.0	–
Taxes Most Important Issue	60.2 (0.6)	0.2 (0.2)	45.2 (0.2)	0.2 (0.1)
Economy Most Important Issue	57.6 (0.7)	-2.4 (0.3)	43.3 (0.3)	-1.7 (0.2)
Education Most Important Issue	59.5 (0.6)	-0.5 (0.2)	44.8 (0.2)	-0.1 (0.1)
Iraq Most Important Issue	58.9 (0.7)	-1.1 (0.3)	43.1 (0.3)	-1.8 (0.2)
Terrorism Most Important Issue	62.7 (0.7)	2.7 (0.4)	47.3 (0.3)	2.3 (0.2)
Moral Values Most Important Issue	62.2 (0.7)	2.2 (0.3)	46.1 (0.3)	1.1 (0.1)
Health Care Most Important Issue	59.4 (0.6)	-0.6 (0.1)	44.4 (0.2)	-0.6 (0.1)

<sup>a</sup>Entries not in parenthesis in the second column are the estimated share of the two-party vote for Kerry under the counterfactual condition listed for the row: that all voters who actually chose the row variable as the most important issue were randomly assigned to other issues. Standard errors in ().

<sup>b</sup>Entries not in parenthesis in the third column are the predicted increase (or decrease) in Kerry's share of the two-party vote under the counterfactual scenario listed for the row. Standard errors in ().

All entries computed based on 1000 draws of parameters from the model in Table 3.

Table 6: Aggregate Predicted Vote Share for Different Counterfactuals

Scenario for all voters	Hispanic Voters		Anglo Voters	
	Predicted Kerry Vote Share <sup>b</sup>	Predicted Increase in Kerry Vote Share <sup>b</sup>	Predicted Kerry Vote Share <sup>b</sup>	Predicted Increase in Kerry Vote Share <sup>b</sup>
<i>Most Important Issue is...</i>				
The Economy	69.5 (1.6)	9.5 (1.5)	53.7 (7.8)	6.6 (0.7)
Education	65.3 (2.2)	5.3 (2.0)	51.3 (1.2)	4.2 (1.3)
Iraq	64.9 (1.8)	4.9 (1.7)	52.7 (0.7)	5.6 (0.6)
Terrorism	51.3 (1.7)	-8.7 (1.5)	38.0 (0.8)	-9.0 (0.8)
Moral Values	49.6 (1.9)	-10.4 (1.8)	42.2 (0.7)	-4.9 (0.6)
Health Care	71.6 (2.9)	11.6 (2.8)	60.0 (1.1)	9.4 (1.1)

<sup>a</sup>Entries not in parenthesis in the second column are the estimated share of the two-party vote for Kerry under the counterfactual condition listed for the row: that all voters list the row variable as the most important issue (or, for the last row, all voters evaluate their personal finances as ‘better’).

<sup>b</sup>Entries not in parenthesis in the third column are the predicted increase (or decrease) in Kerry’s share of the two-party vote under the counterfactual scenario listed for the row.

Entries in ( ) are standard errors.

All entries computed based on 1000 draws of parameters from the model in Table 3.

## References

- Abrajano, Marisa, Jonathan Nagler & R. Michael Alvarez. 2005. "A Natural Experiment of Race-Based and Issue Voting: The 2002 City of Los Angeles Election." *Political Research Quarterly* 58:203–218.
- Abramowitz, Alan I. 1995. "It's Abortion, Stupid: Policy Voting in the 1992 Presidential Election." *Journal of Politics* 57:176–186.
- Abramson, John R., John Aldrich & David Rohde. 2002. *Change and Continuity in the 2000 Elections*. CQ Press, Washington D.C.
- Aldrich, John H., John L. Sullivan & Eugene Borgida. 1989. "Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting: Do Presidential Candidates 'Waltz Before a Blind Audience?'" *American Political Science Review* 83:123–141.
- Alvarez, R. Michael & Jonathan Nagler. 1995. "Economics, Issues, and the Perot Candidacy: Voter Choice in the 1992 Election." *American Journal of Political Science* 39:714–744.
- Alvarez, R. Michael & Lisa Garcia Bedolla. 2003. "Similar Yet Different? Latino and Anglo Party Identification." *Journal of Politics* 63:31–49.
- Cain, Bruce & D Roderick Kiewiet. 1984. "Ethnicity and Electoral Choice: Mexican American Voting Behavior in the California 30th Congressional District." *Social Science Quarterly* 65:315–327.
- Carmines, Edward & James Stimson. 1980. "The Two Faces of Issue Voting." *American Political Science Review* 74:78–91.
- de la Garza, Rodolfo O & Luis DeSipio. 1992. *From Rhetoric to Reality: Latino Politics in the 1988 Elections*. Westview Press, Boulder, CO.
- de la Garza, Rodolfo O. & Luis DeSipio. 1996. *Ethnic Ironies: Latino Politics in the 1992 Elections*. Westview Press, Boulder, CO.
- de la Garza, Rodolfo O & Luis DeSipio. 2000. *Awash in the Mainstream: Latino Politics in the 1996 Elections*. Rowman & Littlefield, Boulder, CO.
- de la Garza, Rodolfo O & Luis DeSipio. 2005. *Muted Voices: Latinos and the 2000 Elections*. Rowman & Littlefield, Boulder, CO.
- de la Garza, Rodolfo O. 2004. "Latino Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 7:91–123.
- DeSipio, Louis. 1996. *Counting on the Latino Vote: Latinos as a New Electorate*. University Press of Virginia, Charlottesville.
- Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper Collins.

- Enelow, James M. & Melvin J. Hinich. 1985. *The Spatial Theory of Voting*. Cambridge University Press, New York.
- Falcon, Angelo. 1989. "Puerto Ricans and the 1989 Mayoral Election in New York City." *Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences* 11:245–258.
- Fiorina, Morris P. 1981. *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Garcia, F. Chris, John A. Garcia, Rodolfo O. de la Garza, Angelo Falcon & Cara Abeyta. 1991. *Latinos and Politics: A Select Research Bibliography*. University of Texas Press, Austin.
- Garcia, F. Chris & Rodolfo O. de la Garza. 1977. *The Chicano Political Experience: Three Perspectives*. North Scituate, MA, Duxbury Press.
- Garcia, Maria Cristina. 1996. *Havana USA: Cuban Exiles and Cuban Americans in South Florida, 1959-1994*. University of California Press, Los Angeles.
- Graves, Scott & Jongho Lee. 2000. "Ethnic Underpinnings of Voting Preference: Latinos and the 1996 U.S. Senate Elections in Texas." *Social Science Quarterly* 81:226–236.
- Hajnal, Zoltan, Elisabeth Gerber & Hugh Louch. 2002. "Minorities and Direct Legislation: Evidence from California's Ballot Proposition Elections." *The Journal of Politics* 64:154–177.
- Hero, Rodney & Kathleen M Beatty. 1989. "The Elections of Federico Pena as Mayor of Denver: Analysis and Implications." *Social Science Quarterly* 70:300–310.
- Hill, Kevin A., Dario Moreno & Lourdes Cue. 2001. "Racial and Partisan Voting in a Tri-Ethnic City: The 1996 Dade County Mayoral Election." *Journal of Urban Affairs* 23:291–307.
- Kiewiet, D. Roderick. 1983. *Macroeconomics & Micropolitics : the Electoral Effects of Economic Issues*. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press.
- King, Gary, Michael Tomz & Jason Wittenberg. 2001. "CLARIFY: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results." Version 2.0 Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, June 1. <http://gking.harvard.edu>.
- Markus, Gregory B. 1988. "The Impact of Personal and National Economic Conditions on the Presidential Vote: A Pooled Cross-Sectional Analysis." *American Journal of Political Science* 32:137–154.
- Moreno, Dario. 1997. The Cuban Model: Political Empowerment in Miami. In *Pursuing Power: Latinos and the U.S. Political System*, ed. F. Chris Garcia. Notre Dame, IN, Notre Dame University Press.

- Page, Benjamin L. & Richard A. Brody. 1972. "Policy Voting and the Electoral Process: The Vietnam War Issue." *American Political Science Review* 66:979–995.
- Pycior, Julie. 1997. *LBJ and Mexican Americans*. Austin, University of Texas Press.
- Rosenstone, Steven J. 1984. *Third Parties in America: Citizen Response to Major Party Failure*. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
- Schmal, John P. 2004. "Electing the President: The Latino Electorate (1960-2000)." *La Prensa San Diego*, <http://www.laprensa-sandiego.org/archieve/april30-04/elect.htm> .
- Tufte, Edward R. 1978. *Political Control of the Economy*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Welch, Susan & Lee Sigelman. 1993. "The Politics of Hispanic Americans: Insights from National Surveys." *Social Science Quarterly* 74:76–94.