A Tutorial on Using Web of Science via NYU

I do not know an easy link from the library webpage to web of science. Here are instructions on how to get to there. While the screen shots are using the web browser safari on my mac, the same things works in explorer or other web browser on a PC. First go to library home page and click where you see the mouse:

This will take you to the articles via databases page:
Again, click on the link to social sciences where you see the mouse. This will take you to the social sciences database webpage:

Again, click on the S where you see the mouse. This will take you to the page for S:

Click on connect to Social Sciences Citation Index where you see the mouse. Note that the dates here are incorrect, it gives you more coverage than this.

If you are trying this off campus now you will see the login page for proxy access, if on campus you should skip this page. If you work regularly at home, then this is the page to bookmark.
After login or if on campus you now see this page. If you have a machine on campus, this is the page to bookmark there:

Click on the type of science you want and then click on general search, where you see the mouse.

This will take you to the page below:
Notice that I have entered in Ting M* to get articles by Michael Ting, I’ve checked social sciences, and all years. I then click on search, where the mouse is. This takes me to the following page:

I see the article I want, where the mouse is. I could click on NYU underneath the article to take me to a link to the article if it is available. Also note that it shows the times cited.
and if I click on that number, it will take me to those articles that cite it. But I want to see more about the article first. So I click on the title, which takes me to:

On this page I see the abstract, references, that I can click on for more information, and on the right a link that says NYU. There I click. Which takes me to:

Here I see that I can get the article from Cambridge, I click on Go and get:
Bargaining in Bicameral Legislatures: When and Why Does Malapportionment Matter?

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Abstract

Malapportionment of seats in bicameral legislatures is widely argued, confers disproportionate benefits to overrepresented jurisdictions. A large empirical research has documented that unequal representation produces unequal distribution of government expenditures in bicameral legislatures. The theoretical foundations for this empirical pattern are weak. It is commonly asserted that this stems from unequal voting power per se. A noncooperative bargaining game based on the closed rule, infinite-Nelson model of Baren and Ferejohn (1986), assesses the conditions under which unequal representation in a bicameral legislature may lead to unequal division of public expenditures. Two sets of results are derived. First, when bills originate in the House and the Senate considers the bill under a closed rule, the equilibrium expected payoffs of all House members are, surprisingly, equal. Second, we show that small-state biases can emerge when (1) there are supermajority rules in the malapportioned chamber, (2) the Senate initiates bills, which produce malapportioned proposal probabilities, and (3) the distributive goods are “humpy.”

Here I can now just click on pdf and success!