State Political Culture and Welfare Reform

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I investigate the link between the general features of state governments and their ability to reform welfare. The best indicator of governments’ characteristics is Elazar’s political cultures. I define what successful welfare reform means, drawing on implementation research and experience. My criteria stress process, the avoidance of political and administrative problems. I then test the link between the Elazar cultures and successful reform using recent case studies of state implementation of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families. Elazar’s “moralistic” states perform best, and the association holds, even controlling for other influences. Results depend, however, on how welfare reform is defined.

Introduction

This article addresses how the general features of state governments shaped their ability to implement welfare reform in the late 1990s. The American states recently conducted the most radical reform of welfare since the advent of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) in 1935.

AFDC has been controversial for 40 years, chiefly because of rising rolls and the social problems that many blamed on the program. The rolls grew rapidly in the 1960s and early 1970s to over 11 million people, then jumped again in the early 1990s to exceed 14 million people. Liberal proposals to raise benefits and coverage were made in the 1960s and 1970s but were mostly defeated. Instead, in the 1980s and 1990s Congress adopted conservative proposals to limit eligibility and require adult recipients to work.

In 1996 a newly Republican Congress enacted the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), which renamed AFDC as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). It transformed the program from a federal entitlement to a block grant to states, limited families to 5 years on the rolls, and stiffened work requirements, among other changes. At the same time, it gave states unprecedented authority to determine much of welfare policy for themselves. States had always controlled benefit levels, but now they could also set many details of eligibility, work incentives, and work or other requirements bearing on the recipients.

Since 1994, the welfare rolls have fallen sharply to around 5 million people, due partly to PRWORA, but also to good economic conditions and rising subsidies for...
wages and child care. Congress is currently considering the reauthorization of TANF.

**Past Research**

How easily were states able to carry out the reforms implied by TANF? Little past research exists on this issue. At the federal level, the political science literature on welfare is mostly about the politics of reform in Congress (Moynihan, 1973; Teles, 1996; Weaver, 2000). The policy literature on welfare is mostly about the social and economic condition of the recipients, including the effects of reforms (Blank & Haskins, 2001; Danziger & Haveman, 2001). Much less is known about how local institutions run or change the program.

State politics scholars investigate how various features of states influence their welfare policies. Several studies show that states that are rich, urban, liberal, and with competitive parties tend to pay higher welfare benefits or spend more on welfare than those with the opposite characteristics (Barrilleaux, Holbrook, & Langer, 2002; Brown, 1995; Cnudde & Mccone, 1969; Dawson & Robinson, 1963; Hanson, 1983; Plotnick & Winters, 1985; Tweedie, 1994). But showing which states are generous does not establish which can perform the more complex task of reforming welfare—chiefly the task of promoting employment among recipients.

In response to TANF, few states changed benefit levels, but the vast majority strengthened work requirements, work incentives, or sanctions meant to move recipients into jobs (Gais & Weaver, 2002). Some recent studies seek to explain these new measures in the same way as benefit levels or spending, by relating them to the background features of state politics, government, or society, but again the focus is on the formal policies that states choose (Gais & Weaver, 2002; Lieberman & Shaw, 2000; Soss, Schram, Vartanian, & O’Brien, 2001; Volden, 2002; Zylan & Soule, 2000). My interest here, rather, is in how easily states made and implemented their decisions, whatever policies they chose. This focus requires a different research approach. One cannot gauge implementation using only statistical analysis conducted from a distance. One must also study the political and administrative process more directly using interviews and government documents.

For my purposes, the most useful literature is on the implementation of welfare work programs. That research is based on case studies of selected states, or sites within states, but it too has limitations. Some studies combine field research with analyses of administrative data to discover which type of program performs best (Chadwin, Mitchell, & Nightingale, 1981; Mead, 1985, 1997), but they cover at best a few states and say little about politics. Studies of reform that do address politics tend to describe state actions without assessing the concrete effects (Hagen & Lurie, 1994; Norris & Thompson, 1995; Winston, 2002). Conversely, evaluations of welfare work programs assess their impacts on clients but usually say little about either politics or administration (Gueron & Pauly, 1991). Fortunately, TANF has generated a large number of new state case studies, and these are the basis of the analysis I offer below.
I link the general features of state governments to their ability to reform welfare. I find that the best way to characterize states is Elazar’s theory of state political cultures. I also define what successful welfare reform means, drawing on past research and experience. My definition is oriented to process, to avoiding political and administrative problems, rather than policy choices or effects. I then test the link between the Elazar cultures and successful reform using the recent TANF case studies. I hypothesize that the states that Elazar called “moralistic” will perform best, and the results confirm that. I also show that the association holds even controlling for other differences among the states.

The Capacity to Reform

What features should we expect to influence states’ ability to reform welfare? Effective government could mean having institutions that in some general sense look capable. One line of research, for example, assesses whether state legislatures are well-developed. States often thought to be well-governed—such as California, Minnesota, and Wisconsin—rank high. But little tie has been shown between legislative development and policy outcomes (Carmines, 1974; Citizen’s Conference on State Legislatures, 1971; LeLoup, 1978; Patterson, 1996). One study linked states with professionalized legislatures to more generous welfare policies (Grumm, 1970, pp. 451–455), but again, making welfare generous is not the same as reforming it in the current meaning.

Administrative quality is tougher to define and measure. Studies suggest tentatively that quality runs higher in richer and more urban states (Barrileaux, Feiock, & Crew, 1992; Sigelman, 1976). Two recent studies rate the states in terms of public management capabilities (Barrett & Greene, 1999, 2001). Another study assesses states by the broader criteria of “accountability and information management,” “executive centralization,” “staffing and spending,” and “representation,” with each factor assembled out of multiple measures (Bowman & Kearney, 1988). But in general, research has not been able to show much connection between such institutional attributes and actual state policymaking (Howard, 1999, pp. 433–434). Accordingly, it is best to see capacity as embodied, not in specific institutional features but in how a state uses its structures to make and execute policy. Our focus must shift from a state’s institutional assets to the manner of its policymaking.

The most prominent research using this approach focuses on states’ capacity to innovate (Berry & Berry, 1990; Gray, 1973; Mintrom, 1997; Savage, 1978; Walker, 1969). Although TANF does test that ability, most of what states did to implement the act was not really innovation. By 1996, how to reform welfare in the current sense was reasonably well-defined by what leading reform states, such as California, Michigan and Wisconsin, had already done. The test was not so much to innovate as to govern well in a more general sense. That meant, first, taking difficult policy decisions and, second, executing them. Specifically, states had to decide how demanding to be toward the recipients and how much to spend on child care and other new services for them. Then they had to implement the required programs. These were difficult tasks given the controversy surrounding welfare, the risks of
change to the recipients and to state finances, and the administrative complexity of reform.

A broader indicator of governmental manner is political culture. I use *culture* here to mean widespread attitudes that shape how public institutions actually operate, as against their forms. Culture teaches leaders and citizens in a state the way things are in politics, and how they ought to be. What is the proper purpose for government, and how should one conduct public affairs? Political culture clearly differs among the states (Eckstein, 1988; Patterson, 1968). I anticipate that culture will shape states’ capacities to deal with welfare reform.

Daniel Elazar developed the best-known theory of state political culture. He divided the states into three types. In “moralistic” states, political positions are typically justified by appeals to the “public interest,” rather than narrower interests, and public administration is strong. In “individualistic” states, in contrast, government tends to serve more specific interests. Parties are strong, each standing for coalitions of groups seeking advantages from government. Bureaucracy is well-developed but less enterprising than in the moralistic culture. Finally, in the “traditionalistic” culture, chiefly in the South, government is limited largely to defending traditional values (originally the racial caste system). Parties count for less than in the other cultures and the bureaucracy is underdeveloped and distrusted (Elazar, 1984, chap. 5).

Below, I will take the Elazar categories as our best characterization of how states govern. Of course, how we rate their capacity is relative to the goals they seek, and these clearly differ among the three cultures. Moralism is the most oriented to achieving community-minded purposes. Indeed, it approximates the earnest but often rigid “good government” style of anti-machine, “reform” politics (Banfield & Wilson, 1966). Moralistic politics stresses problem solving, not partisan rivalry. In the individualistic style, goals are less high minded, but there is also more tolerance for disagreement, and often more willingness to compromise. Both moralistic and individualistic states tend to have well-developed bureaucracies. In the traditionalistic style, social policymaking and administration are less developed (Elazar, 1984, chap. 5).

Elazar based his scheme on his own observation of the politics and historical development of the states, but other scholars using more systematic methods have produced parallel results (Johnson, 1976; Lieske, 1993; Morgan & Watson, 1991). Elazar found all three cultures to be present throughout the United States, yet each state was dominated by one of them. Table 1 lists the states Elazar placed under each heading, plus subgroupings that he identified within each culture. The scheme is shown as of 1984, the last revision Elazar published. This is just before serious welfare reform begins in the late 1980s. The contrasts he specified are consistent with my own experience consulting and doing research on welfare reform in a dozen states.²

The Elazar cultures are distinct from other political differences among the states, for example, in political ideology or partisanship (Erikson, Wright, & McIver, 1993, pp. 150–176). At the same time, the cultural types are linked to many other features of state politics and government. Moralistic states tend to show high political par-
participation, competitive parties, strong merit personnel systems, and liberal and innovative programming. Traditionalistic states show less of these things. Individualistic states tend to fall in the middle in these respects while showing strong parties and more centralized administration than the moralistic group (Fitzpatrick & Hero, 1988; Johnson, 1976, pp. 499–507; Morgan & Watson, 1991, pp. 36–47; Sharkansky, 1969).

One criticism of Elazar is that his categories appear to capture the beliefs of political elites and activists better than those of the voters (Kincaid, 1980, pp. 6–11, 13–14; Welch & Peters, 1980). But that is appropriate for the case of welfare, in which the views of leaders seem to matter a good deal more than those of ordinary citizens (Tweedie, 1994; Uslaner & Weber, 1975). Another criticism is that moralism and traditionalism may capture little more than the differences between northern and southern states. Some also suggest that the moralistic states differ from others chiefly in showing less ethnic and racial pluralism (Hero & Tolbert, 1996). Whether such differences really account for the apparent role of culture is addressed further below.

There is no suggestion in Elazar that one culture fosters greater capacity to govern than another. That is because he valued all the goals emphasized by the cultures. All three styles, he suggests, contribute something to American politics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moralistic (17)</th>
<th>Individualistic (17)</th>
<th>Traditionalistic (16)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colorado #&amp;</td>
<td>Individualistic/moralistic</td>
<td>Traditionalistic/individualistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>Alabama #</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan #&amp;</td>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>Arkansas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota #&amp;</td>
<td>Massachusetts #</td>
<td>Florida #&amp;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Dakota</td>
<td>Nebraska</td>
<td>Georgia &amp;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>New York #&amp;</td>
<td>Kentucky</td>
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<tr>
<td>Utah &amp;</td>
<td>Ohio &amp;</td>
<td>Louisiana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermont</td>
<td>Rhode Island &amp;</td>
<td>New Mexico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin #&amp;</td>
<td>Wyoming</td>
<td>Oklahoma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moralistic/individualistic</td>
<td>Individualistic</td>
<td>Texas #&amp;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California #&amp;</td>
<td>Alaska</td>
<td>West Virginia &amp;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>Indiana</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>New Jersey #&amp;</td>
<td>Traditionalistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas &amp;</td>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>Mississippi #&amp;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Montana</td>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>South Carolina</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
<td>Individualistic/Traditionalistic</td>
<td>Tennessee &amp;</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Dakota</td>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>Virginia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington #&amp;</td>
<td>Hawaii</td>
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<tr>
<td>Missouri &amp;</td>
<td>Maryland</td>
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<td>Note:</td>
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<tr>
<td>States included in the case study analysis are shown in bold. # Indicates states from the Urban Institute Assessing the New Federalism study. &amp; Indicates states from the Rockefeller Institute State Capacity Study.</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Traditionalism celebrates timeless moral ideals, individualism the values of compromise and freedom, moralism the quest for the good society (Elazar, 1984, pp. 141–142). Other scholars, however, think that governments with traits that Elazar would call moralistic do tend to govern best, at least if the criteria emphasize “good government,” meaning the honest and efficient carrying out of public programs. Robert Putnam showed that regional governments in Italy’s northern, more civic regions were markedly more effective and responsive than those in the less civic South (Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1993). An analysis paralleling Putnam’s showed that civic culture was similarly related to government performance among the American states (Rice & Sumberg, 1997).

The Welfare Test

These analyses, however, are highly generalized, not focused on specific policies. How the three cultures govern may be better shown by how they handle a particular program, such as welfare. In the past, moralistic states have treated welfare as an occasion for generosity, individualistic states as a political issue, and traditionalistic states as an object of suspicion (Hanson, 1994). At the outset, it is unclear which style might fare best at reforming welfare. In part, reform involves pursuing new conceptions of the public interest, as the moralistic culture emphasizes; in part, it requires compromising intense political differences, a strength of the individualistic style; in part, it involves affirming traditional norms such as the work ethic, a strength of traditionalism.

Nevertheless, I expected that the moralistic states would tend to handle welfare reform best because of the meaning that reform currently has. The clearest demand TANF makes of states is to raise work activity on the rolls. Thus reform chiefly means crafting and implementing complex regimes of requirements and support services that will move the dependent into jobs. That endeavor should come easiest to the moralistic states, due to their problem-solving approach to legislation and especially their strong public administration. In comparison, the individualistic culture should display a more interest-centered and conflictive political style and a less enterprising bureaucracy, in welfare as in other matters. Among the traditionalistic states, we should find less interest in reforming welfare and also less ability to do so, chiefly because of administrative weaknesses.

Such patterns appeared in welfare reform prior to PRWORA. Successful mandatory work programs in welfare first developed in the 1980s, when the federal government allowed states to experiment with more demanding work requirements than allowed previously. Evaluations of some of these programs, principally by the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation (MDRC), showed that they had positive effects on the employment and earnings of their clients. These findings justified the expansion of mandatory work programs under the Family Support Act of 1988 (Wiseman, 1991). The positive evaluation of later work programs, in turn, promoted their further expansion under PRWORA, although that reform was also driven by Republicans’ desires to curb welfare, devolve control to the states, and promote marriage (Weaver, 2000).
Moralistic states led in the development of these programs. That is not surprising, as the constant refinement of policy based on past experience fits the moralistic style. The most noted early programs appeared in San Diego and Riverside Counties in California. Other exceptional local programs appeared in Colorado, Iowa, Oregon, and Utah (Pavetti, Holcomb, & Duke, 1995; Scrivener et al., 1998). The leaders in efforts to rebuild welfare around work on a statewide basis were Michigan and Wisconsin. The Wisconsin reform, which combines severe work tests for welfare adults with generous support services, reflected a bold design to totally redesign welfare (Mead, 2000). All these states fall within Elazar’s moralistic grouping.

This is not to say that these states made no mistakes, or that all of their localities were equally competent. The biggest cities were not leaders of reform in any state. But something about the moralistic style caused politicians and administrators in these states to tackle welfare as a problem that they could solve. The moralistic states held 48 waivers of normal federal rules to conduct experiments with welfare prior to PRWORA, compared with 30 for the individualistic states and 26 for the traditionalistic states, although all three groupings contain 16 or 17 states (data from the U.S. Administration for Children and Families).3

Conversely, states that encountered problems during the early phases of reform tended to come from the other cultures. In Chicago, an attempt to enforce job search on AFDC adults failed to achieve any clear impact on their employment or earnings, probably because of weak administration (Friedlander, Freedman, Hamilton, & Quint, 1987). In Florida, a work program of the early 1990s recorded only small impacts, probably due to inadequate child care funding (Kemple, Friedlander, & Fellerath, 1995). In Massachusetts, the much-touted Employment and Training Choices (E.T.) program failed to gain enduring influence because its evaluation was not experimental and the state failed to rebuild the bureaucracy around work (Hill & Main, 1998; Nightingale, Wissoker, Burbridge, Bawden, & Jeffries, 1991). All these states are individualistic or traditionalistic.

Thus, I hypothesized that the moralistic states would also lead in the implementation of TANF in the mid-1990s. This era of reform is a better test of governing capacity than the earlier phases. The demands on state governments were larger. Washington demanded tougher work tests and other changes while it also offered states new latitude to set welfare policies for themselves. States thus had to make and implement more welfare policy than ever before.

They did so, furthermore, in remarkably similar and favorable settings. The earlier developments occurred in different states under varying conditions over more than a decade. All the states, however, implemented TANF in the mid-to-late 1990s. Even Wisconsin, which started to reform earlier than most states, carried out its most radical changes in this period. Economic conditions were also unusually propitious almost everywhere. And, although TANF allowed states some latitude in work policy, virtually all states chose the goal of moving adult recipients rapidly into jobs. Because of this unusual parallelism in timing, conditions, and goals, more of the differences in outcomes among states should reflect differences in background governmental style than would normally be the case.
The Meaning of Successful Implementation

What concretely did successful welfare reform mean? In this analysis I define it in process terms, as the avoidance of harmful political and administrative problems. I assume that process can be judged successful or not apart from policy content. Possibly, a state could smoothly implement a version of welfare policy that Washington or an outside observer regarded as misconceived, but I do not make such judgments here. Indeed, it is in the spirit of TANF to accord states wide leeway. (Meanings more oriented to policy content are discussed in the conclusion). My criteria draw mostly on research prior to TANF (especially Hagen & Lurie, 1994; Norris & Thompson, 1995) and on my own experience researching and consulting about welfare reform in the states mentioned above. The result was these six standards.

Political Performance

Policymaking. Did a state government frame its own policy and legislate sensibly to achieve it, in light of experience? Conversely, was it pushed into reform by Washington, or did it make mistakes that could have been foreseen? Policymaking means taking a real decision of one's own about welfare, not simply passing enabling legislation required by TANF.

Consensus. Did a state enact reform with enough agreement so that the key changes were largely accepted in and outside government? That implies avoiding divisive opposition either in the legislature or among outside lobby groups. Without consensus, policy can be hostage to the next election, and it is more difficult to motivate the bureaucracy to change. The more polarized a state is over welfare, the more difficulty it will have meeting this criterion.

Resources. Was the state willing and able to fund the programs implied by its goals, such as additional bureaucracy, child care, and other support services? The focus here is on funding adequacy rather than the detailed capacities of the bureaucracy (considered below). Funding need not necessarily be generous, but only sufficient to support the policies a state has chosen.

Administrative Performance

Commitment. Were senior administrators implementing reform committed to it? Or were they pushed into reform by politicians? Other commitment dimensions include morale among lower-level staff, union acceptance of reorganization in the bureaucracy, and the degree of cooperation between the state and local government.

Coordination. Were the units or agencies charged with implementing welfare reform able to work together smoothly? Or were there serious divisions, conflicts, or communication problems among them? Such problems could occur either within the welfare department or between it and other agencies involved in reform.

Capability. Did the welfare bureaucracy have the expertise and facilities needed to implement reform? Such as the capacity for case management and adequate
reporting systems? The focus here is on the skills and equipment of staff, as against funding for reform or bureaucratic divisions.

I assume that the six criteria are largely independent of one another, that satisfying one need not predict satisfying others; that assumption is supported by the results, which show widely varying patterns of criteria met and failed. The three political and the three administrative criteria run roughly parallel. **Policymaking** and **commitment** express the political direction of reform, the goals that policymakers or administrators choose. **Consensus** and **coordination** express the degree of unity that officials succeed in building around their decisions, either in the political arena or during the administrative process. **Resources** and **capability** express at two levels whether a state “has the horses” to get the job done.

### Case Studies

We now need evidence to test the connection between the Elazar cultures and these performance criteria. Two national projects have tracked the implementation of TANF in some depth in about two dozen states. The Assessing the New Federalism (ANF) study at the Urban Institute, in Washington, DC, covers 13 states. The State Capacity Study (SCS) at the Rockefeller Institute of Government, at the State University of New York, covers 21 states. The two together cover 23 states. I have added a 24th—Oregon—using other sources. The cases cover the years from immediately prior to TANF through the first several years of implementation, or about 1995–2000.

This evidence has obvious limitation for rating state performance. The samples were not drawn to test state capacity in my sense. According to project leaders, the ANF states were chosen chiefly to be large and to be diverse in terms of child well-being, fiscal capacity, and spending on AFDC and Medicaid prior to TANF (Kondratas, Weil, & Goldstein, 1998). The SCS states were chosen to be large states that would face serious management and institutional challenges implementing TANF, and also to be regionally diverse (Gais, personal communication, April 29, 2003, and May 8, 2003). The studies are not all by the same authors. The evidence is second-hand. The authors did not explicitly assess state performance by my criteria, or indeed any criteria. Rather, they give accounts of the reform process in the states, and I infer performance from these. Substate details are based on only some localities, which may not be representative.

To minimize uncertainty, I attempt only to judge whether a state met a criterion or not; I make no judgment about degrees. I assume that success is more likely to go unmentioned than problems, so I assume that a state did meet a criterion unless the documents indicate otherwise. Also, a state was judged to fail a criterion if trouble was apparent on any one of the specific dimensions mentioned under that heading. Thus, for example, a state failed policymaking if it made no serious policy of its own in response to TANF or was pushed into reform by Washington or made hasty decisions that had to be reversed quickly.

On the other hand, there are reasons to trust the results. As to validity, the SCS research was focused on questions of state government adequacy similar to mine,
although the assessment is much less evaluative than the one I offer. ANF focused more on the content of state decisions, yet the case studies for both projects speak extensively about the political and administrative trials states faced with TANF, and usually in similar terms. As is shown below, the six criteria generate a remarkably even ranking of the 24 states; they thus capture real differences. That ranking is not inconsistent with my field experience or with anything I have read about welfare reform outside the case studies. The sample is also remarkably representative of the Elazar cultures and subcultures, as Table 1 shows, even though it was not chosen with this in mind.

As to reliability, a reason to trust my ratings is that I had multiple documents about all but two states in the sample; the number of reports ranges from one to six per state (see Appendix for details). The two national projects also overlapped considerably. Eleven states were covered by both, including most of the larger states and six out of nine of the moralistic states. The accounts from different documents and studies generally agreed closely. In no case did one source claim institutional prowess while another spoke of failure. At most, problems mentioned in one document go unmentioned in another. In these cases, I judged a state to have failed the criterion in question. Finally, my own ratings of the states based on these documents were stable over time, and they were supported by the leaders of the ANF and SCS projects.4

**Results**

I expected that the moralistic states would prove best at satisfying the performance criteria, followed by the individualistic states and then the traditionalistic states. Figure 1 largely confirms this. It shows where states from the three cultures fell in overall performance, with one point given for each of the six criteria satisfied. Generally, the moralistic states score high, the traditionalistic states low, and the individualistic states in the middle. However, there are exceptions and considerable variation within the groups, for reasons explained below.5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall score</th>
<th>Moralistic</th>
<th>Individualistic</th>
<th>Traditionalistic</th>
<th>No. of states</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>MN OR UT WI</td>
<td>KS MI WA OH TN</td>
<td>CA MO NJ NY RI AZ NC WV</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>KS MI WA OH TN</td>
<td>CA MO NJ NY RI</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>CA MO NJ NY RI</td>
<td>CO MA AZ NC WV</td>
<td>AL MS TX FL GA</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>CO MA AZ NC WV</td>
<td>AL MS TX FL GA</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>AL MS TX FL GA</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>FL GA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No. of states: 9 6 9 24

\[ X^2 = 25.6, p = 0.0040. \]

**Figure 1.** Association of culture with performance in welfare reform.
administration dimensions of performance, as I have defined them, were also significantly linked to each other. States that were high or low on one tended to be high or low on the other. But again, the association is far from straight-line.6

Table 2 gives more detail about how the sample states scored on the six performance criteria. States generally performed better politically than they did administratively.

**Political Performance**

_Policymaking._ Most states satisfied this criterion. Most took a significant decision about reform, and this decision was sensible in light of state goals and experience. Welfare work programs prior to TANF had stressed training recipients for well-paying jobs. Most states shifted toward “work first,” or placing recipients in available jobs, even if low-paid, as TANF also required. The distinction of the moralistic states was mostly that they had most often run experiments in welfare reform and thus had the most systematic evidence to go on. Ohio and Colorado delegated decisions heavily to their counties, but within a statewide framework.
A few states did not seriously make reform policy. New York was so deeply divided that it took no significant decisions about AFDC; it delegated how tough to be about work to the counties, but even this did not permit consensus in Albany. Alabama and Missouri were pushed into reform by federal action and appeared to have little welfare policy of their own. In several other southern states (Florida, Georgia, and North Carolina), policymaking appeared to be casual and personalized, with the governor or legislators advocating changes with, apparently, little inquiry or evidence behind them (a regional style noted by Key, 1949). Texas policymaking was incoherent; the state claimed to pursue work first but based its policy on an experimental program focused far more on education and training.

Consensus. On this standard, states had more trouble. Those in the leading two groups were able to form a majority behind reform that stretched behind the legislature. They came to terms with advocates who questioned reform. In the moralistic states, consensus was feasible because critics accepted that work requirements were inevitable; they questioned the details rather than the principles of reform. The moralistic style drives leaders to focus on solving a recognized problem rather than defending narrower interests. In individualistic New Jersey and Rhode Island, divisions ran deeper, but consensus was achieved using elaborate consultative processes. Ohio achieved some agreement at the center, in part through delegating other issues to its counties.

The other states had more difficulty. In Arizona, a proposal to privatize part of reform sparked acute controversy. In Alabama, efforts to consult with community groups became too contentious to support change. With its legislature unable to act, the state implemented reform chiefly through administrative means. In New York and in California, legislative debate on reform was bitterly partisan. In New York, and also in Georgia, Massachusetts, and Mississippi, advocates or civil rights groups rejected reform decisions as racist or illegitimate—the sort of hard-core opposition not seen in the moralistic states.

Resources. Most states devoted sufficient funds to afford the programs and services that their decisions required. A key issue here was whether they could or would fund sufficient child care to prevent long waiting lists for mothers seeking subsidized care, either to leave welfare or among the larger low-income population. Some states (Colorado, Florida, and Texas) failed do this due to fixed limits on state spending or revenues that were entrenched in state law or constitutions. These curbs evinced anti-government attitudes that overshadowed reform. In other cases (Alabama, Mississippi, North Carolina, and West Virginia), the documents suggest, states were simply unwilling or unable to “pay the piper” for political reasons.

Administrative Performance

Commitment. In the top two groups of states, the welfare bureaucracy was fully engaged in reform. Administrators accepted the goals as their own, at least at a senior level, and significant resistance lower down was absent. Indeed, in some cases, as in Utah and Wisconsin, local officials had worked with state leaders to create reform.
In Florida and Georgia, however, officialdom was dragged into reform from above and showed little commitment to it. In Arizona, the agency had been heavily committed to a skills-oriented approach to welfare and resisted the shift toward work first. In Texas, welfare reform was a lower priority to administrators than rebuilding nonwelfare employment programs and other initiatives. In Colorado and New Jersey, local agencies had a history of defiance toward the state government, and this prevented them from fully endorsing reforms decided in the capital.

*Coordination.* Bureaucratic divisions emerged as the most serious institutional problem faced by reform, at least in this sample. One important division, within the welfare agency, was between the income maintenance clerks that determined eligibility for benefits and the case workers who supervised clients in their search for work, either directly or through referrals to contractors. The other important divide was between welfare as a whole and nonwelfare employment agencies, to which welfare referred clients. The latter included the Employment Service (ES), a federally funded job placement agency, and training programs under the federal Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA).

Wisconsin’s solution to harmonizing the elements was the most radical. Inside welfare, the eligibility and case worker roles were merged in a single staff position. Externally, in most localities welfare kept control of the welfare work mission, using the outside employment agencies, if at all, only as contractors. New York and Tennessee also kept welfare in control of local implementation. In Oregon, Washington, and Minnesota, all the agencies worked collaboratively to implement reform, apparently with few differences. In Utah, welfare and employment programs had already been merged in a single agency.

All the other states encountered significant problems. In some instances (Arizona, California, Georgia, Kansas, Rhode Island, and West Virginia), there were troublesome divisions between the income maintenance and case worker or employment side of welfare itself. In California, for example, welfare work programs had been run almost apart from the eligibility operation, and this obstructed the implementation of work first policies under TANF.

More often, however, the problem was the interface between welfare as a whole and the nonwelfare work agencies. After national welfare work programs were first enacted in 1967, the ES had run them in collaboration with welfare, in practice dominating them in most localities. But because the ES’s routines stressed serving job seekers who came to it voluntarily, it generally performed poorly with welfare clients. These jobseekers came to it on a mandatory basis, as a condition of receiving aid. To succeed with them, the agency had to enforce work but also support employment with special services. The ES often found these roles uncongenial.

Welfare could better run work programs without the ES, many concluded. In the 1980s, Washington mandated that policy, and the ES was demoted to the role of contractor to welfare. With TANF, however, Congress lifted those restraints. Meanwhile, the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) of 1998 required that states merge the administration of the ES, JTPA, and other nonwelfare work programs. Local boards were supposed to create unified offices, or “one stop shops,” that would serve the clienteles of all the programs. Many states now thought that the welfare work
mission should be entrusted to this new structure, in part to avoid the cost of a separate welfare work operation. The change ignored the earlier experience.

In the majority of states in this sample (Alabama, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, and Texas), the attempt to place welfare work under the WIA structure created serious confusion. The problems included lack of clear procedures to refer clients to WIA, to serve them there, or to report results back to welfare. The attempt to use WIA was the one blemish on the performance of Kansas and Michigan, two of the moralistic states. In Florida and Texas, the state’s determination to turn welfare work over to WIA seems to have paralyzed welfare reform, at least in the short run.

**Capability.** In the top group of states, administrators appeared to have the talents and facilities they needed to cope with reform. Welfare staffs took on the employment role, sometimes unifying it with eligibility determination, and they had adequate information systems to run the new work programs. But in the bottom groups, the bureaucracy was often overwhelmed by the demands of reform. The states that had difficulty unifying case management included Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Washington, and West Virginia. Those where management information systems were inadequate included Florida, Georgia, and Tennessee.

One cause of these struggles in the South is a longstanding inability to draw many capable people into public service. This reflects the low prestige and low pay of public service in the traditionalistic culture. The belief that public agencies could not implement change adequately was one motivation behind attempts to privatize aspects of welfare administration in Arizona and Texas. In Mississippi, however, privatization only exacerbated administrative difficulties and had to be rescinded.7

### Controlling Other Factors

Some may suspect that the strong association between the Elazar cultures and successful welfare reform is spurious. Perhaps the moralistic states excelled because of advantages they had other than culture. These might include less divisive political patterns, greater funding for welfare reform, a less divided society, or better administration. Especially, northern states that are often moralistic have usually also been rich. Due to their high benefit levels under AFDC, they also received more funding per recipient from the TANF block grant than did low-benefit southern states. The northern states also have relatively small minority populations, hence lower dependency on AFDC, so they may have been more willing and able to transform welfare.

I tested these possibilities by treating states’ overall score on TANF implementation as a variable (the scale ranging from 1 to 6) and seeking to explain it with a wide range of measures for state differences of these kinds, chiefly drawn from the state politics literature.8 These included many measures of the attributes of state institutions that were mentioned above. Explainers were positioned to the extent possible in 1996, the year that PRWORA passed. With limited degrees of freedom, I could not estimate all possible measures. As a rule, I adopted only measures that
were significantly correlated with state performance at a bivariate level and that were still significant in a model that also included dummy variables for whether a state was moralistic or individualistic (traditionalism was the reference category). Remarkably few measures were significant, reflecting the weak tie between institutional specifics and policy outcomes mentioned earlier.

Table 3 shows the results. The first model, containing only the culture dummies, estimates that moralistic states score 2.7 points higher, and individualistic states 1.6 points higher, than the average of the traditionalistic states. Over half the variation is explained using culture alone. The second model controls, as well, for government ideology, the only one of several indicators of state political patterns to pass my tests. It suggests that liberal states did worse at welfare reform, perhaps because TANF imposed conservative changes that these states found unwelcome. The third model finds, as expected, that implementation ran more smoothly in states with more fiscal resources; the influence of personal income, unexpectedly, is negative.9 In the fourth model, the shares of a state’s population that were black and Hispanic

### Table 3. Regression models of government performance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Models</th>
<th>1</th>
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<th>5</th>
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<td><strong>Culture</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>State is moralistic</td>
<td>2.67***</td>
<td>2.51***</td>
<td>2.68***</td>
<td>2.01***</td>
<td>2.12***</td>
<td>1.01*</td>
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<tr>
<td>(0.495)</td>
<td>(0.478)</td>
<td>(0.554)</td>
<td>(0.566)</td>
<td>(0.460)</td>
<td>(0.539)</td>
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<tr>
<td>State is individualistic</td>
<td>1.56***</td>
<td>1.64***</td>
<td>2.12***</td>
<td>1.09*</td>
<td>0.984*</td>
<td>0.747</td>
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<td>(0.553)</td>
<td>(0.528)</td>
<td>(0.705)</td>
<td>(0.541)</td>
<td>(0.485)</td>
<td>(0.507)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Government ideology</td>
<td>-0.016*</td>
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<td>-0.021***</td>
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<td>(0.009)</td>
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<td>(0.007)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Economics</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>State/local revenues per capita</td>
<td>0.540*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.624***</td>
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<td>1996 (1,000s)</td>
<td>(0.316)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.181)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Personal income per capita</td>
<td>-0.234**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.127*</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996 (1,000s)</td>
<td>(0.098)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.070)</td>
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<td><strong>Social conditions</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent of state pop black</td>
<td>-0.051*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-0.053**</td>
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<td>(0.028)</td>
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<td>(0.023)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent of state pop Hispanic</td>
<td>-0.064**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.063**</td>
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<tr>
<td>(0.027)</td>
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<td>(0.023)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Government quality</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Executive centralization score</td>
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<td>(0.210)</td>
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<td>(0.196)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Information technology grade</td>
<td>0.486*</td>
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<td>0.424**</td>
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<tr>
<td>(0.262)</td>
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<td>(0.168)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Adjusted R²</strong></td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.88</td>
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</table>

**Note:** The top figure in each cell is an unstandardized regression coefficient; the bottom figure is its standard error. Significance levels: *: $p \leq 0.10$, **: $p \leq 0.05$, ***: $p \leq 0.01$.

are negative as expected. In the fifth, executive centralization and information technology operate to raise performance, as one might expect. But in none of these models is the influence of the cultural indicators seriously weakened. The coefficient for individualism falls somewhat, but both terms remain significant.

Only if all these terms are combined with the cultural variables, as in the sixth model, do the latter no longer dominate. But even here, moralism remains significant and is still worth one point on the performance scale. The models also treat determinants other than culture as if they had nothing to do with it, as if high or low values on these terms were as likely to occur in states of any culture. The case studies summarized above suggest otherwise. Many of the factors helping or hindering successful reform tend to run together. The moralistic states tend to excel because they have developed capable and well-funded administration over generations. Culture pervades how each group of states does things, and that in turn shaped their ability to implement welfare reform. Thus, the strong bivariate results seen in Figure 1 must still be taken seriously.

Discussion

These results support the idea that moralistic governments implemented TANF most smoothly. And yet culture was not sufficient. California and Colorado are two moralistic states that, despite clear administrative talent, were pulled down by their internal divisions, at both the policymaking and administrative levels. Conversely, Tennessee, although a traditionalistic state, scored high. Culture clearly matters for the performance of American states, but less than it did in Putnam’s Italy. That is because variation in civic capacity around the United States is smaller than among the Italian regions (Rice & Sumberg, 1997, pp. 109–110). All states have some potential to govern well. Much depends on how well they are led.

One might object that the assessment is too focused on welfare and too short-term. If one examined some other policy area, or judged over a longer period, the verdict might be different. If the criterion were success in general employment policy, for example, states that chose to combine welfare reform with WIA would get credit for that, rather than being penalized. And over the longer term, some of the problems that afflicted the first implementation of TANF might get solved. The lower-performing states might close the gap on the leaders. Administrative problems as severe as those seen in Florida or Texas, for example, are bound to improve.

This assessment is oriented to process, to how the states went about reform. In this study, I do not address the substantive policies that states chose, nor show that these had good or bad effects on the society. However, it is likely that states that implemented TANF well have also done well in these terms. Nationally, welfare reform appears to have promoted higher work levels among single mothers while reducing welfare receipt and poverty, but the exact role of reform alongside good economic conditions and new benefits is unclear (Blank & Haskins, 2001). Among the ANF sample, the moralistic states appear to be doing well. The five states with the highest work levels among low-income single parents in 1999 were, in order, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Michigan, Florida, and Colorado. The five states with the
lowest child poverty rates in 1998 were Wisconsin, Minnesota, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Colorado (Urban Institute, 2000). All these states except Florida and Massachusetts are moralistic. The reason could be effective reform implementation, or the content of reform policies, or simply the relative affluence of the moralistic states. Most likely, all three factors are involved.

Most important, my results depend critically on how government capacity and welfare reform are defined. The ability to launch and administer complex social programs is not the only meaning effective government might have. It may simply be the meaning favored by the current shape welfare reform. On other welfare issues, the meaning of success could be different, as could the style of government likely to promote it. This is apparent if one connects state culture directly to welfare policy outcomes, as I have done in other research (Mead, 2003). High benefits, for example, are associated with moralistic but also individualistic states, low benefits with traditionalistic states. Similarly, states can choose how tough to be in sanctioning clients (that is, reducing their benefits) for noncooperation with work requirements; individualistic states typically are lenient, traditionalistic states severe. Typically, the individualistic style is to subsidize single-parent families without asking much of them in return. The traditionalistic style is to deny aid for fear of promoting dependency. In contrast to either, the moralistic states try to be both generous and demanding. They typically pay high benefits, but they also insist that recipients work and also that absent fathers pay child support.

If one focuses on the content of welfare policy, then, the meaning of successful reform changes, and the moralistic approach is not necessarily preferred. Good government in the moralistic sense, however, still has a certain primacy. For the combination of generosity with demands seems to be the welfare policy that most ordinary Americans favor. In surveys, large majorities of respondents say that they want welfare to help needy families while assuring that the adult recipients work (Gilens, 1999, chaps. 2, 8). Perhaps for this reason, as well as the dictates of PRWORA, most states are moving in that direction. This combination of aid with demands is what requires the development of elaborate welfare work programs. This is the meaning of welfare reform where the moralistic states excel. To pursue reform in this sense, the other states may well have to become more moralistic over time.

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**Appendix: Sources for Welfare Case Studies**

After each state, I indicate whether it was included in the Urban Institute or Rockefeller Institute of Government samples and then the specific sources used to estimate its performance. Sources other than UI or RIG are used for Oregon. Both
UI and other sources are used for Massachusetts. Many of the RIG reports appeared in two edited volumes:


Alabama

Urban Institute state.


Arizona

Rockefeller Institute state.


California

Urban Institute state, Rockefeller Institute state.


Colorado

Urban Institute state, Rockefeller Institute state.


Florida

Urban Institute state, Rockefeller Institute state.
Mead: State Political Culture and Welfare Reform


Georgia

Rockefeller Institute state.


Kansas

Rockefeller Institute state.


Massachusetts

Urban Institute state.


Michigan

Urban Institute state, Rockefeller Institute state.


Minnesota

Urban Institute state, Rockefeller Institute state.


Mississippi

Urban Institute state, Rockefeller Institute state.


Missouri

Rockefeller Institute state.


New Jersey

Urban Institute state, Rockefeller Institute state.


New York

Urban Institute state, Rockefeller Institute state.


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North Carolina

Rockefeller Institute state.


Ohio

Rockefeller Institute state.


Oregon


Rhode Island

Rockefeller Institute state.


Tennessee

Rockefeller Institute state.


Texas

Urban Institute state, Rockefeller Institute state.


Utah

Rockefeller Institute state.


Washington

Urban Institute state, Rockefeller Institute state.


West Virginia

Rockefeller Institute state.


Wisconsin

Urban Institute state, Rockefeller Institute state.


**Notes**

1. In other research (Mead 2003), I also found the concrete features of state government to be weakly related to state welfare reform policies, other than benefit levels. The features most closely linked to work or child support requirements, are in fact measures of political culture such as the Elazar categories, just as in the current analysis. See the conclusion.

2. These states include California, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.

3. I regressed a state’s number of waivers on two dummy variables for whether the state was moralistic or individualistic (traditionalistic was the reference category). Running both terms at once, moralism had a coefficient of 1.2, significant at 0.097; individualism had a coefficient of 0.14 and was nonsignificant.

4. I first read the cases in 2001, then reassessed the ratings in May 2002 and again in May 2003. Each assessment involved six ratings of 24 states, or 144 decisions. At the first rerating, I changed three decisions, at the second, two. Effects on the quantitative results reported below were negligible. I also asked Alan Weil and Thomas Gais, the leaders of the ANF and SCS projects, to review my ratings, and they did not differ with them (Gais 2003; Weil, personal communication, May 5, 2003). This does not imply that they would make the same ratings if they reviewed the same documents in the same detail that I did, only that they did not find my judgments unreasonable based on their knowledge of the states. I emphasize that the criteria I use and the conclusions drawn from them are entirely my own; they should not be attributed to Gais or Weil, or to their projects, funders, or institutes.

5. For political performance alone, $X^2 = 12.1, p = 0.061$. For administrative performance alone, $X^2 = 10.0, p = 0.124$. Results are weaker than for the separate dimensions because these performance scales are only 3-point and there is less variation across the sample.

6. The association between political and administrative performance was: Gamma = 0.54, S.E. = 0.22, $p = 0.014$; Tau b = 0.39, S.E. = 0.17, $p = 0.019$. These tests use asymptotic standard errors. Using a more conservative upper-bound estimate, Gamma’s S.E. = 0.246, $p = 0.029$.

7. In Wisconsin, welfare reform was privatized in Milwaukee and several other counties, but the motivation was more to “reinvent government” and instill bureaucratic competition than to question public administration in principle.

8. Chiefly to aid interpretability, I construed the scale as interval-level so that regression could be used. However, I reran the equations using ordered probit, which assumes only an ordinal scale, and the results were substantively unchanged.

9. Federal TANF funding per recipient and revenues per capita were both positive and significant explainers of performance on a bivariate basis, but neither was significant when combined with the culture terms. Revenues, however, was significant when combined with personal income as well as culture in the model shown; TANF funding was not. I included revenues because of its importance as a competing explanation of performance.

10. Percent of state population black was a significant and negative explainer of performance on a bivariate basis. It was significant alongside the cultural terms, however, only if percent of state population Hispanic was also included, which is the model shown. Again, I included it because of its importance as a competing explanation of performance.

11. In models 2–5, the culture terms explained more variation in performance by themselves than did the other variables in these models when run without the culture controls.
12. In the models shown, moralism is negatively correlated with percent population black (−0.52) and positively with information technology (0.44). Individualism is positively correlated with revenues per capita (0.38) and personal income (0.57). These correlations are significant are 0.10 or better.

References


Mead: State Political Culture and Welfare Reform


AUTHOR QUERY FORM

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During the preparation of your manuscript, the questions listed below have arisen. Please answer all the queries (marking any other corrections on the proof enclosed) and return this form with your proofs.

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