



## 11 Subnational groups and globalization

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Far too much of the concern with subnational groups, either long established (and even indigenous) or recently immigrated, is with abstract principles of justice. Far too little of it is about making societies work at all well to give prosperity to everyone and to do so through democratic procedures. Many of the ostensible principles of justice erect barriers between various groups, minority and majority. Assimilationist arguments, pro and con, typically assume assimilation of the minority or new group into the majority or established group. American, Canadian and Australian experience during the twentieth century clearly shows that assimilation goes both ways. Those from Northern European backgrounds in these nations have substantially assimilated with the newly arriving groups of Asians, Latinos and others. There is a substantial shortfall in the assimilation in both directions of blacks in the USA and of indigenous peoples in all three of the former colonial outposts.

Brian Barry (2001) is among the few writers who have forcefully taken on these issues with a main eye out for the workability of contemporary societies, especially liberal societies. It would be easy to read him as merely aggressively supporting liberalism over all-comers. But one of his main concerns is with making the societies he addresses reasonably good places. I wish to take up this problem as it is affected by the massive movement of globalization of the past few decades, a movement that is still on the rise.

It is a seeming anomaly of our time that, just when economic progress seems to work well for remarkably many nations and when advanced nations are increasingly part of a global economy, demands for autonomy of numerous ethnic groups are shrill. There are numerous explanations for the explosion of ethnic conflicts, most of which seem to focus on claims that peoples are motivated by values or group identity. Some argue that globalization, with its supposed imposition of world – or

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Western – standards on many nations, stimulates a reaction against uniformity, against the West. Ethnic movements, however, seem to be quite diverse in origin and apparent intent. Indeed, they are at least as diverse as the historical range of nationalist movements.

Except for international radical Islam, most cultural groups appear to focus their hostility on neighbouring or intermingled groups, not on the supposedly hegemonic West. Globalization frees subnational groups from economic dependence on their larger nations while perversely making it less relevant that they gain independence. Indeed, independence is likely to be costly to the individual members of a society because it is apt to focus on issues of linguistic, cultural and religious control of the polity rather than on economic development. It is the perversity of religious and other conflictual issues in the larger societies of which such groups are a part that the groups want autonomy. But globalization pushes nations either to opt out of the global economy or to focus politically on economic opportunities and integration into the larger world economy. Globalizing deflects their attention from social issues that are exacerbated by economic conflict that, without development and growth, is virtually zero-sum. For example, the dreadful conflicts in Burundi and Rwanda are essentially based on zero-sum conflicts over resources, especially the resource of government employment, that can be used to benefit one group over another.

I begin with a thumbnail sketch of nationalism and its origins and later variants and compare these to the commonplace nationalism that is essentially subnationalism in our time. The subnational groups of interest are those that are internally defined; that is, they define themselves as a distinct group. Some of the groups might also be externally defined by others to their detriment, as was true for African-Americans in the days of Jim Crow legal discrimination. But the concern here is with groups that want some degree of group decision over their common fate – a kind of subgroup autonomy in a sense akin to national sovereignty. Nationalism is a political issue only if it is intentionalist for at least many of the relevant group. A national group is, indeed, an imagined community (Anderson 1991). At the extreme, a group may want to be autonomous and to have its own state. In Hugh Seton-Watson's loose definition, there is such a group when 'a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation, or behave as if they formed one' (Tamir 1993: 65). Unfortunately, this is very loose, because there are few clear indicators of such a desire unless there is a referendum or a very broad struggle. The activities of a small band, such as the Irish Republican Army, is not sufficient evidence to qualify the Catholic population

of Northern Ireland as a nation in this sense, although that population might be.<sup>1</sup>

It is sometimes supposed that the political and national or cultural unit should be congruent (Hobsbawm 1990: 9). The USA, France and Italy, among others, attempted to bring about such congruence by making Americans, Frenchmen and Italians out of varied stocks within the national boundaries of these political states. Later movements, and especially many of the contemporary subnationalist movements, strive to make a political unit that matches some supposedly already extant cultural or national unit. In part, this has been the programme since Woodrow Wilson's proposal for self-determination of former colonial peoples after the First World War. In the earlier cases, the view was that it is the state that makes the nation, as Colonel Pilsudski said of Poland. As Massimo d'Azeglio proclaimed upon the success of the Risorgimento, 'We have made Italy; now we have to make Italians' (Hobsbawm 1990: 44). In the later view from Wilson forward, it is the nation that should make the state, as in the programmes of many subnationalist movements. The early movements for nationalism were inclusive; the later movements have more commonly been exclusive. Indeed, later national movements have, because of the exigencies of geography, sometimes encompassed groups that were not welcome as citizens of the new nation.

### **Original nationalisms and contemporary subnationalisms**

In an earlier age in Europe, the idea of the nation was associated with monarchical families, not with peoples. The French nation 'resided wholly in the person of the King.' International relations were relations between kings and princes. The doctrine of sovereignty, which often seems confused today, makes sense as a reference to the sovereign monarch. International law was a set of rules governing relations of rulers and a treaty was a contract between sovereigns that was based on personal good faith. Economic policy was commonly mercantilist because its purpose was to augment the power of the state, because the interest of the nation was identified with the interest of its ruler. There was a common misconception of trade as a zero-sum matter; our trade could increase only if yours decreased. Hence, rulers fought over markets (Carr 1945: 2–6; Morris 2000).

<sup>1</sup> There have been an estimated 500–600 active IRA members in Northern Ireland (Taylor 1999: 363).

With the rise of industrialism in England and of large-scale international war in the era of Napoleon, states needed people as workers and soldiers. Napoleon was therefore the first advocate and missionary of popular nationalism. Ernest Gellner's (1987) theory of nationalism is about nationalism during a stage of expansive economic development in England and then in the USA, France, Germany and Italy. Gellner supposed that the core of all of these was the need for a national language to make factories work (especially in England) or to make armies more effective (especially in France). His argument for England is that nationalism was a more or less unintended by-product of the industrial revolution and the creation of a factory workforce.

Gellner's explanation is functional in the following sense. *An institution or a behavioural pattern X is explained by its function F for group G* if and only if:

1. F is an *effect* of X;
2. F is *beneficial* for G;
3. F maintains X by a causal *feedback* loop passing through G.

The pattern X is linguistic homogenization; its function F is productivity for the society under industrialism; G is the industrial society (or the society moving toward industrialization).

1. Now productivity (F) is an effect of homogenization (X), that is, productivity is enhanced by homogenization.
2. Productivity (F) is good for the members of the society (G).
3. Productivity (F) maintains homogenization (X) by a feedback loop passing through the members of the society (G). This happens because firms seek interchangeable, same-language speaking workers or because workers become same-language speakers on the job.

Hence, Gellner's theory is functional (Elster 1979: 28; Hardin 1980; Hardin 1995: 82–6).<sup>2</sup>

In creating Englishmen and women to fit into the industrial organization of the economy, England created the very possibility of nationalism. The industrial economy sparked and seemingly required growth, which entails constant innovation, which requires mobility, which, in the limit, requires a national language and universal literacy. The result for the individual is to bend one's culture into the national mould. The idiom in which one is trained and within which one is effectively employable is one's ticket to full citizenship and social and political participation. As Gellner (1987: 16) says, culture 'becomes visible' and the 'age of

<sup>2</sup> There is still a seemingly bad (or at least unpacked) functionalist argument in Gellner's claim that the decline of religion contributes to the growth of reverence for the nation (Gellner 1987: 16).

nationalism is born'. Old cultures, if they survive, take on a new, literate underpinning.

The industrial state was virtually required for early nationalism, because it created a far more nearly homogeneous culture. Agrarian societies, with their relative stability and immobility, allow for great cultural and even linguistic diversity. It is the growth of the industrial economy within a state that forced cultural homogeneity and made nationalism plausible. In this account, if industrialism ever starts, it is likely to take off – and nationalism with it. Hence, although it is perhaps correct to say, as Benedict Anderson (1991: 6) does, that nationalism is in a category with kinship and religion rather than with liberalism or fascism, still, nationalism originated in and was fed by liberal, capitalist societies.

Gellner's theory is of the rise of nationalism, even the unintentional rise. In Jon Elster's (1979: 28) view, a functional explanation requires that the nature of the feedback relationship should not be recognized by members of the group that benefits from the functional feedback. But once the idea of nationalism is available and is understood, it can be used, even intentionally. Hence, follower nations or their potential leaders can deliberately seek to make the functional feedback account fit, as was done in Italy, France and Germany. For example, in the latter part of the nineteenth century the national French government successfully replaced a large number of regional languages and dialects with French (Weber 1979). To do this required national control of the schools, widespread education and a couple of generations. The government of France therefore deliberately achieved linguistic homogenization while England had achieved it to some (lesser) degree without deliberate intent. Moreover, the French government pushed for linguistic homogenization for functional reasons, especially for military service, while in the USA arguably it simply happened as polyglot immigrant languages faded from use.

Once productivity is high, we might expect some people could be persuaded that other values now matter enough to trump slight advantages in productivity, as, for example, in the Basque, Welsh, Lombard and other contemporary cases. For successful national *leaders* of these groups, economic benefits of separatism trump those of remaining in a larger nation, although it might be hard to show whether the typical citizen benefits or loses from separation. These leaders in some cases deliberately struggle to reinforce or even reintroduce the languages of various ethnic minorities in order to heighten commitments to the subnational groups.

In the European separatist movements of today, some of the people who are affected are hampered by drawing the boundaries of culture more narrowly while others are made more comfortable. For example,

in the very close 50–50 split in a vote on some degree of Welsh autonomy within the United Kingdom,<sup>3</sup> many English-speaking Welsh evidently were bothered by the possibility that an autonomous government would impose the Welsh language on non-Welsh speaking citizens of Wales.

Hence, we might want a theory, such as Gellner's, of the discovery and happenstance creation of nationalism, and also a theory of how nationalism can be put to use. The early nationalisms served the goal of economic advancement and military effectiveness in national defence. Contemporary subnationalisms are very different. Such nationalisms serve the goal of separating groups from their larger nations. They probably often also serve the goal of giving certain nationalist entrepreneurs political offices and power, as in the careers of Franjo Tudjman and Slobodan Milosevic, who led the break-up of Yugoslavia.

Again, the original nationalisms of England, France, Germany, Italy and the USA were programmes for creating a national group or identity, either spontaneously or intentionally. Contemporary nationalism is typically a programme of *internally* defined groups who – or whose leaders – insist on autonomy or separate nationhood for the group. That is, they are defined by membership *ex ante*.

There are two quite different general visions of nationalism. One supposes that there is a transcendental 'right' of a group to enforce its own norms. The other supposes that there is an individual right to participate in a particular culture. Some of the early literature is cast at the group level and is of no interest here. In much of the more recent literature, *including most of the critical literature*, arguments for justification are cast at the individual level. Most of the critical literature is essentially liberal in the individualist liberal tradition. Hence, there is a relatively recent programme of liberal nationalism or group liberalism, which combines the liberal tradition of personal autonomy, reflection and choice with the national tradition of belonging, loyalty and solidarity (Tamir 1993: 6).

In some ways, however, the term liberal nationalism is incoherent. Liberalism has generally been about freeing individuals from various constraints, especially the constraints of government. The group rights implicit in a programme of liberal nationalism must almost always constrain individual members of the group that is being protected. Yael Tamir (1993: 4) therefore takes liberalism as prior, so that her project is to justify nationalist principles as fitted with liberalism, and she does not defend any nationalism that suppresses individuals.

<sup>3</sup> Just 51.3 per cent of the electorate voted and just 50.3 per cent of these voted for devolution: *The Economist*, 27 September 1997, 62.

For example, consider the protection of an immigrant group's use of its language in its dealings with government and in the education of its children. In the USA, such protection probably makes the first generation speakers of Spanish, Korean or Vietnamese better off. But it might partially cripple the next generation because, typically, it means making sure that the next generation is educated in the minority language and plausibly made less able to assume a full role in the larger community or economy. Hence, protecting the supposed group interest requires action against the interest and incentives of some group members. At the very least, this makes group liberalism a very complex version of liberalism. It can hardly be defended either on standard welfarist or autonomy grounds. As a variant of liberalism, group liberalism is very odd in that it somehow elevates the relevant group above its members by protecting the group, commonly *against its own less than fully committed members*.

John Dewey argued in the 1930s for what he called institutional and social liberalisms. These were programmes to protect individuals from the oppressions of big, especially economic, institutions and against crippling social norms and customs (Dewey 1987; Hardin 1999a: 322–8). Group liberalism all too often must work against Dewey's social liberalism. It virtually enforces group norms and customs on group members and, especially, on the young. If the state were asked to enforce religious conformity on the children of various believers, that would clearly be a violation of all traditional senses of liberalism, and yet an analogue of such a policy is the enforcement of the mixture of religious and secular norms of a group on its members. For example, the United States has permitted the Old Order Amish of Wisconsin to enforce its beliefs and norms on future generations in *Wisconsin v. Yoder*.

The anthropologist Unni Wikan says that a Moroccan Muslim woman forcibly taken from Norway and married was 'sacrificed on the altar of culture' (Wikan 2000: 74). That woman was allowed by her family to return to Norway later only because she was *de facto* a visa for her forced husband (Wikan 2000: 72). Indeed, in Pakistan, marriageable girls in Norway are called visas; in Morocco they are called gold-edged papers (Wikan 2000: 73). Those who insist that culture is the source of personal autonomy face a difficult task of explaining the way in which such girls are used as a resource for the benefit of others, not as persons. That their treatment is a product of a culture does not seem to rescue it from a charge of enforced prostitution. All that it can do is elevate enforced prostitution to the status of a cultural principle.

Traditional political and economic liberalisms were directed at government intrusions, which were to be blocked. Group liberalism often requires government intrusions to make relevant things happen. It is a

saving grace of the demands of the Amish, which were met in the Supreme Court's decision in *Wisconsin v. Yoder*, that they were to opt out of the state's provision of education. They were not asking for the state to expend resources or to use its coercive powers on behalf of the Amish, but to spare its resources in allowing Amish children to leave school at age fourteen rather than age sixteen, as was mandated by Wisconsin law.

The Amish are a subnational group that seemingly can survive on its own, just as many religions survive on their own, without substantial support from the state. Some subnational groups and practices may not be able to survive on their own. They pass, just as religious sects sometimes do. It is constitutionally prohibited for the USA to intervene either to oppose or to support a religious group as such. This constraint on the state is at the heart of the American pluralist liberal vision. One might suppose that a similar policy would be right for cultural groups as well. The state should not enforce on, for example, children of a culture that they continue in that culture. The state should allow exit from cultures just as it allows exit from religions.

Will Kymlicka argues that the Inuit of Canada have to expend resources on securing their cultural membership, while non-aboriginal Canadians get their cultural membership for free. He therefore argues that the Inuit should not only be protected through the enforcement of group rights but that they should also be subsidized to help them achieve their cultural values (Kymlicka 1989: 187; see also Tamir 1993: 146–8). For example, to maintain control over their land, they have to outbid non-aborigines just to ensure that their location-dependent cultural structure survives, and that leaves few resources to pursue any other goals (Kymlicka 1989: 189). The historical cultural values of the Inuit included virtually total autarky and subsistence hunting and gathering. Maintaining such values would require no subsidies but would entail poverty and perhaps ill health. Hence, respecting the supposed cultural values of the Inuit would drop them from the Canadian economy as well as from the effects of globalization, which would be of no concern to the Inuit leaders.

Kymlicka further argues that, in fact, it is the situation of aboriginals such as the Inuit that is relevant for understanding issues of protection of minorities in most of the world (Kymlicka 1989: 257). This claim is implausible. Canada's Inuit (1) are a tiny group (2) who are segregated from the rest of Canada, (3) who can be almost autarkic, and (4) who live where few others would want to live. Many important minority groups are not proportionately tiny and cannot be segregated, autarkic, or where others do not wish to live – as in the majority of all states to which Kymlicka refers (1989: 135). The arguments for the Inuit are essentially

irrelevant to almost all other cases with the possible exception of aboriginal peoples living in the Australian desert.

To provide the Inuit with the group autonomy that Kymlicka commends could be accomplished by giving Nunavut, the new quasi-province of Canada, full autonomy as a nation completely independent of Canada. In keeping with their long history, that would make the Inuit impoverished or it would lead them to enter the world economy and, from their own incentives, leave much of their past culture behind them. Perversely, they might be able to sustain their historical culture only as a subnational Canadian group dependent on Canadian protection. In that state, they could escape poverty only through subsidies or through abandonment of their historical economic structure of hunting and gathering. But, in any case, escaping poverty is escaping their culture. That is a strange vision of group or subnational autonomy.

Tamir (1993: 146) argues that states should not disbenefit a group just because 'it holds a particular conception of the good'. She calls this principle 'causal neutrality'. It potentially runs aground on cultural practices that involve abuse of group members. This can be a very complicated issue, as is suggested by debates over the female genital mutilation that is practised in some societies (see, e.g., Okin 1999; Shweder 2000; also see Mackie 1996). She also argues for 'outcome neutrality', which rules out policies that result in disbenefit. This principle is plausibly incoherent, because every significant economic policy of a state must result in disbenefit to some. Adopting Adam Smith's market economy can penalize many of those who were doing very well under mercantilist arrangements that gave them monopoly over some provision. If a subnational group is disproportionately involved in some sector to the economy, its fate is tied to policies that affect that sector.

### **Democracy and nationalism**

We are accustomed to thinking democratically in the context of a working democratic constitutional order in which the decisions are generally about marginal issues and are subject to easy reconsideration. For example, we vote on candidates to hold office for the next few years and we decide such issues as the level of taxation or welfare supports or the extent of regulation of some activity – and we can readily change our choices on all of these in the not very distant future.

Many contemporary nationalisms are about taking a whole population in a dramatically different way and then keeping it that way for the indefinite future. Mere democratic majorities may decide such questions. But we should not jump from the fact of such a decision to the conclusion that

the relevant nationalist sentiment is definitive for the whole population. In several recent examples (the Welsh vote on devolution, the Quebec vote on autonomy, and the suspended Algerian election of a fundamentalist Islamic regime) the margins of support for a nationalist vision were virtually within the margin of error in democratic counting of votes – and well within the margin of error for Florida. In American elections, 60 per cent is a landslide, but there are still 40 per cent left out of the decision even in such a landslide.

This nationalist vision often involves a fallacy of composition in the meaning of self-determination. The argument for national autonomy is that individuals of a group require collective arrangements of some kind to make the lives of all of them better in some sense. This can be a coherent vision only if all wish simply to coordinate on common purposes or values. Typically, however, even the most adamant nationalist movement has commitment to nationalism as at best a major or foremost goal, not as the only social goal of those who share the nationalist vision. And even the most encompassing of nationalist movements often leaves out cosmopolitans, such as those Irish who are part of the larger economic and other culture of greater Great Britain, or those Algerians, often secular, who are part of the larger French society, in which they formerly might have been citizens.

Once in place, a government has other causal implications that go far beyond mere nationalist coordination. Many people in the twentieth century may have strongly supported the creation of nationalist, fascist and socialist regimes, which then went on to be among the most oppressive governments ever known. Soviet suppression of the arts and dictatorial determination of biological theory, for example, were not entailed by socialism. But strong government was, and such government effectively had licence to do many things other than pursue socialist economic policy. After a burst of remarkable creativity in the 1920s, the Soviet regime, by then under Stalin's rule, was brutal in its attack on the arts (Berlin 2000) and, under Lysenko, on biological science. While Stalin demonstrably had talent for gaining power, he just as demonstrably lacked the intellect to judge the arts or sciences (and, one might add, economics). The commonplace egotism of autocratic rulers that they should decide all such things gives depressing meaning to the claim that absolute power corrupts absolutely.

Finally, even in the best of cases of a group's having some control over its members' choices, there are likely to be severe intergenerational issues, as in the case of *Wisconsin v. Yoder*, in which present adults determine what choices their children will even be capable of making.

### **Towards autonomy and nationhood**

There are at least three classes of reasons for seeking group autonomy or separate nationhood:

- (1) satisfaction of interests that the group's members have in the ordinary kinds of policy that more or less all persons have interests in;
- (2) self-expression of a group or protection of its racial, linguistic, religious or other purity;
- (3) capacity to participate reasonably fully in politics, as in the case of some linguistic groups (this is essentially a concern grounded in the nature of democracy).

The first of these reasons makes sense in many contexts because, as minorities, many groups are excluded from, or at least disadvantaged in, the quest for the benefits of national organization of economic rewards. The civil rights movement in the USA was directed at getting equal political treatment and equal economic opportunity for blacks. The programme was merely to gain the status of white citizens. Use of a constitutional, liberal nation state may be the most workable device for achieving welfare even for a minority group. Indeed, the age of liberal individualism has also been the age of nationalism, because liberal practices have required states for their realization (Tamir 1993: 207). Furthermore, the age of ardent nationalism is a product of democracy. Such nationalism was not often an issue before the possibility of a group census vote. A liberal state might be able to take for granted the existence of subnational groups that have their own social orders in many respects, so that such groups are fully included in the polity and the economy. This is clearly done in the perhaps limited context of including diverse religious groups in the USA and many other nations. It would be difficult for broader aspects of cultural differences only if these are essentially illiberal or are organized in ways that block economic integration in the larger society (see further discussion below).

In roughly similar conditions, some groups seek greater independence within their states. By gaining autonomy, such groups might then finally at least participate more fully in the economy and the polity not as individuals but as corporate groups. Note how different seeking group autonomy is from the nationalism of industrializing England. In the latter case, nationalist moves (many of them spontaneous rather than matters of policy or political choice) created individual opportunities to participate more fully in the developing economy and, at the same time, increased the prospects for development by giving that economy a broader base. Increasing the economic base required *inclusion of groups*.

The second reason for seeking autonomy – self-expression of a group or protection of its racial, linguistic, religious or other purity – fits President Wilson’s vision of nations at the end of the First World War. This was a vision of homogeneous groups that could be given their own states through self-determination. It is odd that this citizen of a culturally diverse and not at all homogeneous society with its own remarkably successful state put forth such a programme, as though its tenets were a matter of logic. The implicit assumption of his programme was that such groups could not prosper without their own states. If prospering requires cultural stagnation without change, then perhaps separate states were necessary. But even with separate states, the benefits of economic participation in the world economy in our time make the seeming isolation of such groups into independent states virtually impossible without severe economic costs that would be visible to their peoples. The lesson of virtually all of the most prosperous societies in the twentieth century is that homogeneity is not necessary for economic life and may be harmful to the autonomy of individuals who might enjoy dealing with diverse others.

For a subnational group to seek autonomy is arguably contrary to the mere demand for equal treatment. It is, as Tamir (1993: 71) says, likely to be a yearning not for freedom or civil liberties, but for status. But autonomy that includes economic organization, as in the case of the Amish in the USA, may entail economic losses from reducing the base and hence the opportunities for beneficial exchange through division of labour and industry.

Groups that seek protection of their racial, linguistic, religious or other purity or even merely their domination of their societies are often majority groups within nations, as in the case of the majority Sinhalese of Sri Lanka or the ‘Aryan’ Germans of Nazi Germany. Often, however, they are minorities, such as the Amish of the USA, many native peoples of various settler states, or ethnic enclaves within larger states. Subnationalist movements, whether of minority or majority groups, typically involve exclusions of other groups in order either to keep themselves separate and pure or to control what resources there are for the relevant subnational groups.

One can imagine groups that wish to maintain their culture while their members participate fully in the economy. But many of these groups wish to have partially separate economies, as the Amish do. In such cases, their impact is contrary to what happened in the early nationalisms, which, again, were inclusive. But they impose no noteworthy direct costs on others in the larger society when they are so nearly autarkic, so that their choice of self-abnegation costs only themselves and not others. However, if they receive subsidies to help them sustain their separate

cultures, as Kymlicka and others recommend, they do impose costs on others.

Perhaps the strangest case is of groups that wish to bear costs to sustain (or revive) their culture and wish to have others share those costs. The European Union has an office to encourage the preservation and revival of ethnic languages (Tamir 1993: 152) ('Ethnic' here should read 'dying' or 'dead'). It is implausible that children of, say, South-western England wish to be forced to learn Cornish, more than a century after the language died, or that any court appointed agent on behalf of any child there would accept such a requirement on the child. But Europeans generally may be required to subsidize the teaching of a revived Cornish language and the next generations of children in Cornwall may have their prospects in the world diminished by their need to expend a great deal of their educational effort in learning that essentially useless language (useless even for speaking with their own parents at this point).

In such a programme of salvaging a very minor language, the concern with a cultural language may hamper people's participation in the world economy. As E.J. Hobsbawm (1990: 178) remarks, 'the sort of provincial middle classes who once hoped to benefit from linguistic nationalism can rarely expect more than provincial advantages from it today'. In some cases, such as in the Basque and Catalan lands of Spain, the result may be that children learn Basque or Catalan but also learn English, which will then be their currency for entry into the broader world. For previous generations there, Spanish would have been the international currency, as well as, for many, the main or only language. In many of these cases, many children of the next generations will be culturally rescued by the force of globalization, which will give them opportunities for access to the larger world. Globalization will save them from being sacrificed on the altar of culture, in particular, the altar of their parents' culture (see further, Hardin 1995: 65–70).

Finally, consider the third reason for a group's seeking some degree of autonomy within its nation. For some linguistic groups, capacity to participate reasonably fully in politics requires that the state allow the use of their language as an official language. This can be essentially a democratic rather than a nationalist demand. Major linguistic groups in India could hardly be expected to participate in orderly ways at all if they cannot have candidates for public office who campaign in the local language and government officials who can deal with locals in their language. This may be the only credible claim for why government ought, as a matter of liberal democratic principle, expend resources for a subnational group as such rather than through welfare and other programmes directed at individuals (Hardin 1999b).

### **Globalization and subnational groups**

If globalization is genuine, its effect is to mock the earlier nationalism by including more groups in the larger world economy in order to increase its base in order to make it generally more productive to the mutual benefit of all. Globalization is the old nationalism of England and the USA writ large across the globe. Globalization does not strictly work against subnationalism, because a subnational group might participate fully in the larger economy even while gaining autonomy from its national government. But it seems typically to be true that subnationalisms today are focused not on economic issues, but rather on cultural, religious and ethnic issues. Their programmes of separation and autonomy are often inherently contrary to the openness and inclusiveness of economic development.

A subnational group might gain autonomy and then be entirely open in participating in the larger economy. This may be the future of some of the European moves for regional autonomy. But then these moves begin to seem like little more than book-keeping devices to put legislation and administration at a more nearly local level. If they are accompanied by genuine efforts to control culture and other values, they are likely to get in the way of full participation in the global economy and therefore not to be economically as beneficial for their citizens as remaining in their original nations might have been. But that just means that autonomy has little to offer while it runs the risk of diminishing economic prospects. Oddly, therefore, the globalization that finally makes it feasible for subnational groups to opt out of their 'home' nations without loss of economic opportunity also makes it less worthwhile to be autonomous.

In grimmer cases, such nations as Rwanda may be incapable of genuinely participating in the world economy. Their own economic development is very primitive. Indeed, their economies are virtually subsistence economies in which there is very little production for the market. Their economic units are like the peasants described by Marx (1963: 123–4) as so many homologous masses, like potatoes in a sack, all alike and not interacting. The contest between Hutus and Tutsis in both Burundi and Rwanda is a virtually zero-sum conflict over the basic resource of land and over the limited number of jobs in government. Because these jobs can be assigned by whichever group gains political hegemony, politics gets focused on groups and their share of these resources rather than on economic development and individuals in it. For these economies, globalization is an irrelevance. If they cannot even generate internal trade, they are unlikely to have external trade unless they have commodities

that can be exploited without much need of local labour or economic institutions.

Edward Said argues that an immigrant group need no longer assimilate in its new nation because its prior world remains readily accessible with relatively cheap international travel, telephone and Internet connections. Indeed, while immigrants earlier in the twentieth century could even forget their past, today's immigrants cannot so readily forget (Tamir 1993: 86). Oddly, therefore, globalization of communications makes the maintenance of national ties after immigration possible and even, perhaps, inescapable, so that globalization may often contribute to maintaining group ties.

### **Concluding remarks**

In some respects, globalization is merely a global version of the earlier English nationalism in response to industrialism. It is unintentional because there is no one in control. It simply happens. The question for many societies that are *de facto* participating in globalization is: how much can economy and culture be kept separate? If fast food is part of culture or an attack on culture, then they cannot be kept entirely separate, but this seems like a trivial consideration despite the volume of commentary on the issue from, especially, French sources. For some relatively undemanding cultures, there might be no deep conflict, so that economic change could happen without concomitant cultural change to fit the mostly Western globalizing forces. Some cultures fit better with a liberal market economy.

For fundamentalist cultures, such as those of the Amish and fundamentalist Islam in much of the Arabic world, Afghanistan and Pakistan, there may be enormous conflict. These societies can only lose economically if their cultures do not yield. For the Amish, this conclusion does not appear to be bothersome because their leaders apparently do not want the benefits of economic change. For some Islamic nations, their roles in international relations will suffer if they do not liberalize and open up their economies. For example, in the conflict between Palestinians and Israelis, secular Israelis are in the forefront of modern economic developments with the result that Israel has a prosperous modern economy. The ultra-orthodox Jews and many of the Palestinian Arabs, however, have stayed out of the modern economy, along with fundamentalists in many other places.

With their women suppressed and blocked from full participation in the economy, many Islamic states must finally be poorer per capita, all else equal, than states with more liberal cultures. Similarly, such subnational

groups as the Amish and the ultra-orthodox Jews must be poorer per capita than are the secular citizens who dominate their societies. The ultra-orthodox Jewish males of Israel spend their years studying Talmud rather than working productively. They are a heavy drain on the national economy because they are subsidized in various ways (in keeping with the seeming recommendations of Kymlicka for such minority groups) from the wealth of more productive Israelis. Even with those subsidies, however, they still live in relative poverty.

The conflict between economics and culture is, of course, ancient. In medieval times, the Catholic Church had strictures on usury, which meant merely lending at interest, even very low rates of interest, that were a drag on economic possibilities. The rise of Jewish bankers enabled developments that might otherwise have been blocked. Similar strictures on so-called usury in Islam have spawned numerous subterfuges to enable banking at all. But the transaction costs of borrowing and lending are likely to be higher in such a system and to burden entrepreneurial efforts.

It is relatively common to suppose that globalization bulldozes cultures around the world. In many ways, however, it has heightened attention to subnational cultures that were long moribund. Its consequences for the autonomy of cultures, therefore, are multiple. Its consequences for individual autonomy seem likely to be generally beneficial. It is perhaps especially likely to affect cultures negatively through its positive effects on individuals. And the demand for cultural protection in the face of globalization seems far more to be a demand for strictures on individuals and individual actions within subnational groups than for strictures on outsiders. It is ironic that much of the concern with the supposed consequences of globalization is relatively paternalistic concern by wealthy Westerners for 'protections' of cultural groups, many of them in the Third World or otherwise still outside the main flood of the global economy, and that those protections would generally be strictures on members of those groups, strictures that the proponents of protection would adamantly refuse for themselves.