5. RATIONALLY JUSTIFYING POLITICAL COERCION

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ABSTRACT. The central problem of political philosophy is how to justify coercion by government. For political theories that are based in a rational accounting of the interests of the polity, citizens must have consented at least indirectly to coercion. Such indirect consent to coercion is plausible for ordinary contexts such as, for example, submitting to legally enforceable contracts. Unfortunately, however, Hobbesian mutual advantage, contemporary contractarian, and Lockean natural rights theories, all of which ground the state in rational interests at least in large part, can justify government coercion only in principle. They cannot justify coercion by actual states. In practice, these theories are morally indeterminate.

Without coercion government would fail. Hence, the central problem of political philosophy is how to justify coercion by government. A common justification is that the results of coercion, properly determined, would be good or right and therefore the coercion would be right. Two classes of political theory with especially broad appeal in our time ground their claims, at least in large part, in the interests of citizens. To that extent, they may therefore be called rational choice theories. The two classes are contemporary variants of contractarianism and Lockean natural rights theories.

Both of these are consensualist theories at base. The consensual basis of contractarianism should be clear—it cannot start without consensus. For Lockean natural rights theories, consent to exchange and alienation of property are typically the principle concerns. Hence, derivations of justified coercion from these theories might be supposed to depend on claims of prior or in-principle consent to coercion, indeed, rational consent. If such a theory cannot ground specific instances of coercion in rational consent, its appeal must be hollow.

Could consent to coercion be rational? Yes, at least indirectly. Consider how it might be in both a Lockean theory of rights and the typical contractarian the-
ory. The arguments turn on standard understandings of the logic of dyadic exchange and of its many-person variant in the logic of collective action.

First, consider the ordinary problem of dyadic exchange. We regularly engage in exchanges more or less on the spot or through promising to fulfill later. In more difficult circumstances, we might readily consent to allow our future selves to be coerced in order to enable us to enjoy the benefits of contractual exchange. For example, I am currently under legal pledge to repay a mortgage on my family's home. I am glad there is a coercive legal system that makes such mortgaging possible. I fully consent to the threat that now hangs over me. I would not like it in the moment when it might be invoked because I had defaulted in my contractual obligation. But even then I would be able intellectually and probably even morally to acknowledge the general benefit of having such a system. Indeed, modern society seems to me inconceivable without a system of coercive backing of contractual relations. And I am inconceivable outside modern society. If I am rational, therefore, I am bound to consent to my coercion under my mortgage contract.

Now consider the larger-number problem. We would all benefit from a collective provision of some kind. Yet no one of us would benefit from her own contribution to that provision enough to overcome the cost of her contribution. In order to secure successful provision, therefore, we agree or contract to provide ourselves our collective good. This is simply an n-person exchange.\(^1\) We engage in exchange almost daily in dyadic contexts, more rarely in larger-number contexts. But most of us probably have some experience of modestly larger-number agreements or contracts for joint exchange to produce collective benefits. To cite a trivial but commonplace example, most of us have participated in group picnics and pot-luck dinners. We would go further to support coercive devices to compel our joint cooperation in certain contexts. For example, many of us bind ourselves under multi-party contracts that govern cooperative or condominium properties, most of us would readily grant that a system of enforced traffic control is to our individual benefit even at the risk of our being penalized for violations, and most of us approve the coercive collection of taxes to pay for collective benefits. Although the simple model of legal contracting does not fit contractarian political philosophy,\(^2\) the core of a contractarian justification of political coercion must turn on a moral analog of the account of legal enforcement of contracts.

A remarkable feature of such an argument from interest, from mutual advantage, is that it seems to require very little recourse to extra-rational moral considerations. If such an argument succeeds, it allows political theory to skate over moral theories with hardly any contact. One might object to a mutual advantage political theory that it is inadequately attentive to some putative moral principle but one can hardly object that it makes excessive moral demands on us. Rationality is almost enough to make it go.

This inherent rationality of many rights and contractarian theories of political order must contribute to their great appeal. It should be brought to the fore in analyzing such problems as the justification of coercion under these theories. That is my
program here. I will first discuss Hobbes's theory of political order and its justification of coercion because it is the first of major political theories to focus on coercion as the central element and because it stands in the background of most of contemporary political philosophy. His theory is in two parts. The first part offers only an in-principle justification of coercion, and the second offers an actual justification. I will then turn to contractarian and Lockeian rights theories. These apparently offer justifications for coercion that turn on rational consent. But these theoretical conclusions are essentially ideal and cannot be applied to instances of coercion within an actual state. They do not offer actual justifications. I will conclude with brief comments on an apparent confusion of justificatory and explanatory arguments of these theories. For comparison, in passing I will comment on how a welfare or utilitarian theory might handle some of the issues.

**HOBESIAN MUTUAL ADVANTAGE**

Although there are elements of rational theory in many early works, such as Plato's *Republic*, Hobbes is the first resolutely rational choice theorist, and his theory of absolute sovereignty is the first of the modern rational choice theories of political order. From Hobbes's psychology of fairly extensive egoism, we can derive that, *in principle*, we would rather have coercive government that protects us from each other and helps us overcome our quotidian Prisoner's Dilemma interactions than not have government. It follows that we think coercive government can be justified if we are welfarist. Hobbes's psychology means, of course, that we are individually welfarist even though we are not necessarily (for Hobbes, not at all) utilitarian, that is, universally welfarist.

Hobbes goes on to give an argument for the creation of an absolute sovereign from the state of nature by covenant, that is, by consent. His story is fundamentally silly and of no real interest. Indeed, one wonders why he gives it at all. Hume ridicules the story of "the original contract" in terms that virtually everyone seems to find compelling. Still the story lives and often seems to dominate discussion. For example, in two recent, very good books, Jean Hampton and Gregory Kavka clearly find the story crazy but nevertheless base much of their own normative analyses of Hobbes's contractarianism on it. There is magic here that wants understanding that, unfortunately, I cannot give. The genuine and driving focus of Hobbes's concern was surely not the initial creation of a sovereign but the maintenance of an extant political order in the face of seemingly plausible arguments for reform and even revolution.

Hobbes's story of the creation of a state and an absolute sovereign from the state of nature is immediately motivated by his supposition that life without government would be grim and unproductive. He thinks everyone stands to be made better off with government than without, no matter what government, so long as it is stable. This belief is grounded in large empirical claims with which one might disagree. At times Hobbes does not accept the extreme empirical claims and supposes that some might not benefit from some governments.
Unfortunately, even if we agree with his position, we do not have a justification for any particular government or any detailed form of government. This is finally the basic question we want to answer: What justifies an instance of coercion by this particular government? This is a much more complex issue than the in-principle justification of coercion by some government. Any credible and compelling answer to it must address alternatives other than the state of nature. If our initial motivating value is welfarist, then we must compare the effects of other possible forms of government to the effects of this one. If this one is already in place, we must include in the effects of any alternative the welfare effects of making the transition from this government to the alternative. If there would be sufficient opposition to the change, we might expect the grievous costs to each person of transition to outweigh any prospective benefits from living under the alternative over living under the present government. Hence, with Hobbes, we would have to conclude in favor of the maintenance of the present government.

**CONTRACTARIANISM**

Genuinely contractarian government might seem to avoid these difficulties. Because we would all be consenting to our government, we might suppose we are consenting to coercion by it, just as I consent to the potentially coercive implications of my mortgage. Such a justification would be rationally compelling.

In an actual government, however, we must expect two things to change our original optimism about the rationality of adherence to the government we have created. First, as is trivially obvious and as has been noted for three centuries by critics of Locke's contractarianism, we will not be a fixed population but will change over time as some die and others are born. The newcomers may not accept the original contract because it need not be in their rational interest to do so. We might presume that the consent of the original contractors was evidence of their interest in the regime to which they were consenting, even evidence of their interest in being coerced if need be to make it work. We have no ground for such a presumption with respect to the newcomers.

But the more complex and perhaps more important problem for the contractarian justification of coercion is that the original contract will not in fact determine what government we have. It will be an enabling agreement at least as much as it will be a constricting one. Locke himself recognizes this problem. He writes, "agreeing to unite into one Political Society...is all the Compact that is, or needs be, between the Individuals, that enter into, or make up a Common-wealth." He supposes that, in entering a compact to form a community or government, we make "one Body Politick". Then, by a flimsy analogy to physical bodies, he deduces that that political body must move as the majority of its constituent parts move. Hence, we enter political society by choice and out of our interest, but in doing so we cede any further claims to the interests of the majority.
This leaden move resolves many problems for Locke but at the cost of wrecking the appeal to his consent theory. To cede further decisions to the majority on the belief that that would work best and most beneficially might make great sense—but that is a welfarist justification for majority rule. To do it on analogy with physical bodies is intellectually destitute. This is a move that cannot be passed off as a necessary step in a consent theory. Without this step, however, Locke has not advanced beyond Hobbes's claim that we would rather have some government than no government. What Locke needs is a causal claim that majority rule or some variant serves mutual advantage. As superficially plausible as such a claim might be, recent efforts to argue for it are, as is true of many results in social choice theory, discouraging at best.  

There have been very few actions even vaguely like what contractarian theory requires if it is to be actual contractarianism. Perhaps the nearest such action in any major nation of the modern era was the US Constitution of 1787-88. That constitution got a government started. Immediately, however, various interests were at work to influence the nature of that government. The changes even in the first decade or so include many that stretched the understandings of anyone who was an actual party to the original constitution. One can tell a history of how the US governments of 1832, 1860, 1917, 1945, or today came to be from the beginnings in the constitutional agreement. But one could not deduce those stages in the development from the content of the agreement. Some of the changes, many of them morally and rationally supportable by many contemporary citizens, were extra-constitutional. The presidencies of Jefferson, Lincoln, and Franklin Roosevelt are often especially admired by students of American history. They were also especially given to extra-constitutional actions that changed the nature and reach of US government. There are important parts of that government today that therefore have no clear grounding in the Constitution. Not to speak of many things that have been licensed by constitutional amendment, such as the abolition of slavery and the universalization of the franchise, we now enjoy (or revile) such radical changes as judicial review of legislative actions, independent regulatory agencies, the extraordinary scale of contemporary government, and much of the current budgetary procedure.

One's reaction to any one of the changes that have occurred might be outrage, or at least disapproval. One need not be a John Calhoun to deny one's consent to such changes. Imagine telling a German who happily approved the Weimar constitution that she had consented to the coercions of Hitler's government. The distortion of her consent differs at most only in degree from what occurs in other constitutional histories.

Yet, even a constitutionalist must grant that history inherently works that way. It is a series of changes that may partially mirror present factional interests in altering past agreements or institutions. There is no one in control. The changes overall and the eventual nature of a government will be unintended consequences of many uncontrollable actions to which there is not general agreement, not even at the level of agreement that the constitution might specify, such as majority rule. Any consensual agreement that produces a government or a policy of the moment cannot long
hold sway. If we are to justify coercion by associating it with the interests of those being coerced, then, we cannot expect to find that justification in any contractual or consensual action of the past.

The difficult issue here is that we may not easily apply the contractarian justification of coercion to any actual government. The mutual advantage claims of, for example, John Rawls, go only so far as to establish that we want government. This much Hobbes establishes, perhaps more crudely but also more forcefully. But, as with the traditional Pareto criteria of economic choice, this conclusion leaves us standing before a potentially vast frontier of possible choices. All of these choices may be justified by our too simple criterion, which does not justify the choice of some one out of the vast set. If we leave our focus on original formation of government and concern ourselves instead with where we should go from here and now, then we may have a relatively straightforward Pareto criterion that would delight every conservative prepared to veto any change. However, this criterion might not be one of genuine mutual advantage, because some might reasonably expect to benefit from a revolutionary change that brought grievous harm to many others.

If actual coercions, the sine qua non of government, cannot be rationally justified by contractarian consent, then actual governments cannot be either. Contractarian mutual advantage arguments are inherently defective for virtually logical reasons of their being incomplete when applied to initial creation of government and being empty when applied to a current government. It is hard to imagine more compelling reasons for the rejection of an otherwise superficially plausible theory. If contractarian mutual advantage theories have any interest for us, therefore, that interest is in some ideal sense, not in application to, or in genuine justification of, what is or what might be made of what is.

NATURAL RIGHTS TO PROPERTY AND EXCHANGE

Among the major contemporary alternatives to supposedly contractarian justifications of government are natural rights justifications. Many strands of rights theory are Lockean in their grounding in mutual advantage. Some libertarian rights theories are posed as wholly deontological and intuitionist. In a subtle move, the latter may be used to justify government that arises in the right way as a presumably unintended consequence of voluntary exchanges that are themselves protected by right. Some of my remarks may not apply to such theories if they do not depend on the individual or mutual advantage of having rights of property and exchange because such theories may not include any justification for coercion by government. I will generally refer to rights theories that are based in concern for mutual advantage as Lockean. Locke seems to agree with Hobbes that everyone gains from entering civil society, that is, from having government. Extreme libertarian rights theories may also descend from Locke, but they abstract from this fundamentally important aspect of Locke's own account.
Consider three difficulties for a Lockean rights theory of coercion, without which there can be no meaningful Lockean government. The first difficulty is merely implicit in the complexity of considerations of mutual advantage. The second difficulty is analogous to the historical problem that undercuts contractarian justification. Historical states cannot have arisen without rights violations, so that coercion based on contemporary considerations must likely be based on violations of rights. The final difficulty is conceptual. It implies indeterminacy in rights theory analogous to that in Hobbesian mutual advantage theory. The indeterminacy afflicts all rights theories, whether grounded in mutual advantage or not.

First consider the complexities of mutual advantage in Lockean rights theories. Although they sometimes write as though they do not think so, most natural rights theorists in the tradition of Locke are concerned with welfare somehow conceived, with individual advantage through individual, dyadic, and collective action. Hence, we may call their theories rational choice theories. More generally, these theorists commonly seem to assume that voluntary exchange leads to mutual advantage and one might suppose that it is for this reason that exchange should also be protected by right. This set of views constitutes a sensible position because, if people did not want or care about controlling property and exchange, these could not plausibly be seen as the central subject of rights. It is reasonable to make them the subject of rights just because we want them very strongly and urgently.

What happens when our rights of property and exchange are protected? In many and important ways we are all made better off because we all produce more, as in the arguments of Smith, Mandeville, and other early economists. (On these arguments, a welfarist might, prima facie, wish to support rights of property and exchange.) We want these rights because they conduce to our welfare. This is true at the very least in the purely formal sense that they satisfy our preferences, but on most psychologies—not only that of Hobbes—our welfare is a major determinant of our preferences. Hence, any rights theory worth its salt is fundamentally based in considerations of welfare enhancement for the individual.

Now, if our background concern is welfare, we must worry about a process that builds exclusively out of dyadic and small number interactions. Such a process ignores the external welfare effects of such interactions and it also fails to incorporate larger welfare effects that can come from collective action at a scale far beyond dyadic and small-number exchanges. It is prima facie odd to say we want to produce x because it is mutually advantageous and then to say, now that we've decided for x, we want to stick by it even when doing so is mutually disadvantageous. It may not be impossible to give a compelling argument for such a conclusion in some circumstances. For example, this is analogous to Rawls's argument for having institutions created on act-utilitarian principles while requiring actions by role-holders in the institutions to follow institutional rules rather than act-utilitarian judgments.

An analog of Rawls's argument would not work for a principle that proved to be systematically, rather than occasionally, disadvantageous. To the extent welfare stands in the background of the justification of their supposed rights, this is the prob-
lem for contemporary rights theorists. They evidently determine what should be right from welfare considerations and then posit the right as itself a virtually deontological principle that must be inviolate, that, in particular, must not be subject to correction by greater welfare considerations. Nozick argues forcefully that, even though I may benefit from the provision of a collective good, I am not obligated to contribute to its provision and may not be coerced to do so. This seems to be a necessary conclusion from a theory that turns on actual consent. But the conclusion supports free-riding and thereby systematically undercuts any hope of achieving mutual advantage beyond dyadic interactions. It contributes, with apparent moral force, to the creation of negative externalities of dyadic exchanges while helping to block their correction, which would require coercion at the collective rather than the dyadic level.

Turn to the second difficulty in a rights theory justification of government coercion. If rights are grounded in mutual advantage, there is an obvious analog of the problem that afflicts contractarianism. No actual state can have arisen without rights violations, so that coercion may not be directly justified in any actual state on such a theory. To complete the fully procedural or historical justification of a rights theory, we would require a theory of rectification for correcting wrongs along the way. Robert Nozick's proposal for such a theory would generate a tree-like structure of possible choices that could not be credibly constructed if it required going back more than a few steps or more than a generation. Peripherally, in a footnote, Nozick allows the possibility of letting end-state principles of distributive justice and equality play a decisive role in rectification when calculations backward along the branches of his tree are questionable. In any known contemporary society, which is uncounted generations from any initially just state of affairs, this seems tantamount to letting principles of distributive justice and equality determine almost everything. The rights theory gets lost in the rectification. This problem afflicts any credible rights theory.

These first two difficulties are merely problems in the working of a rights theory. There is a far more important, because fundamental and conceptual, problem in such a theory analogous to the indeterminacy problem of Hobbesian mutual advantage theory. This problem does not depend on the mutual advantage aspect of a Lockean theory of rights, but it afflicts that and other theories as well. Recall Ronald Coase's account of positive legal rights. Coase supposes that two people have putative property rights that conflict. If rights to use the land are of one form, I am better off. If they are of another form, you are better off. But, he argues, social efficiency will be the same regardless of which of us has the legal right, because the more productive use of the land will prevail through selling of rights if necessary. It seems clear that Coase thinks it must often be difficult to decide at common law in favor of one rights allocation over an alternative because there will be no governing precedent or statute. Hence, the choice may often be arbitrary even though it might have substantial distributive implications.

The arbitrariness of rights assignments that motivates Coase is legal. Coase's argument, however, poses not only a legal but also a moral issue: How do we establish a baseline for determining which of two conflicting property interests is protected by right from external effects of fulfilling the other interest? Just as we could con-
clude, with Hobbes, that in principle we would rather have government than not have it, so we may conclude that we would rather have a definitive rights regime than not have one. And just as we could not conclude from our in-principle preference for government that any particular government was therefore justified as best or right, so also we may not conclude, from our argument in principle for a rights regime, that any particular regime is the right one.

Unfortunately, this conclusion may gut the supposed consent basis of a natural rights theory of property and exchange. Since the very definition of property is at stake and is inherently conflictual, we cannot expect consensual resolution of it. Nor can we credibly maintain that there is a deontologically correct choice of rights regimes. Indeed, we cannot even expect ex ante understanding of what issues may later arise in any initial and likely primitive property regime. We will be like the common law, we will learn only from experience what any rights mean and what they fail to regulate. Or, more accurately, we will invent new meanings in the face of experience. For Coase this problem can be handled arbitrarily and coercively by the common law courts because his concern is with efficiency independently of distribu-
tional implications. In a rights theory, to combine such arbitrariness and coercion in determining distributions is unappealing.

Hence, as is an argument from contractarian consensus, an argument for a regime of supposedly natural rights is incomplete and ill-defined. If there is no deontological reason for selecting one set over all others, the deontological rights theorist has yet to begin to construct a theory. If welfare implications of various sets are to determine our choice of one, our rights theory is not deontological and is only derivatively a rights theory, one in which the choice of rights is contingent on their consequences. Even then, we will not have a rational or mutual advantage principle for the selection of one rights regime over another.

JUSTIFICATION FROM RATIONAL ORIGINS

David Schmidt argues that the modern rights and contractarian schools of thought typically use a confused combination of justifications: functional and emergent. A functional, or end-state, argument justifies political institutions in terms of what they accomplish. An emergent, or historical, argument justifies them in terms of the processes by which they arise, from their origins. Nozick in particular and, on some readings, Rawls seem to think their own theories turn essentially on procedural justifications: We justify that state or form of government that arises from a particular rational process.

Again, many forms of government with quite varied levels of coercion might be sufficient for serving mutual advantage through protection of, especially, dyadic rights, as rights theorists demand, or for serving mutual advantage considered more extensively, as contractarians demand. Therefore no one of these forms of government can be uniquely selected on rational or mutual advantage principles. When we
argue for government in principle, at most we establish that any government from this large set would be better than or preferred to the status quo of no government.

The selection of a particular government cannot be done in principle from Hobbesian or variant mutual advantage arguments, such as those that underlie contractarian and libertarian rights theories. That selection can, however, simply happen through no singular design or vision but through varied kinds of resolution of manifold conflicts. The various resolutions need not—indeed, surely would not—fit consistently with any deontological or other procedural principle. If we are to conclude that any actual state has moral license to coerce, we must therefore base that conclusion on more than the steps through which it has come to power. The Hobbesian and rights theories are indeterminate at base in that they cannot select a particular one of many regimes of government or rights; contractarian and rights theories are indeterminate in actual practice in that it is inconceivable they can have fit the development of any real government.

In the face of such indeterminacy is it plausible that historical process per se adds anything to our justification of a particular regime? Yes. It may well be that emergence constrains our opportunities in important ways. But then, because ought implies can, it may directly follow that what government we ought to have is restricted by what can emerge more or less naturally, even unintendedly. There is no grand architect to set our government in place, it must grow through manifold interactions. Recall the example of how such growth proceeded in the case of American national government after its original creation by the Constitution of 1787-88.

It is here that historical explanation enters, as a constraint on the possible. In a strictly welfarist justification of the maintenance of an extant regime or of the revolutionary replacement of it by another, history also biases the case in favor of the present regime, although not always decisively. There is in moral-political justification an analog of the legal doctrine of stare decisis: What has once been settled has become partly right therefore. History matters, but primarily because welfare matters first.

Why do emergent and functional explanations get run together in many justifications of government coercion as Schmidtz asserts? Possibly merely because we are equivocal in our commitments to consequentialist and deontological moral principles and we tend to fall back on one or the other in unsystematic ways, even opportunistic ways. But part of the reason may be simply a pragmatic slip: We explain the emergence of any particular state’s coercive power and justify state coercion only in principle—likely from functional considerations. We then illicitly conclude for the particular state’s license to coerce.

For whatever reason, those whose moral starting point is consensus or mutual advantage have yet to justify political coercion by an actual government in the rational terms in which they ground their theories. Some kinds of political theorists, such as utilitarians or welfarists, may well be able to justify actual instances of coercion by introducing moral arguments rather than relying merely on rational accountings of the interests of those coerced. But contractarian and libertarian rights theorists of mutual
advantage cannot justify major classes of political coercion by actual, as opposed to in-principle, governments.

ENDNOTES

* This paper grows out of a conference at the Institute for Humane Studies, George Mason University, 16 March 1989. I wish to thank Jeremy Shearmur, Emilio Pacheco, and especially David Schmidt for stimulating the paper and, along with other conference participants, for enlightening discussion.


2 I think there are major conceptual problems in the very notion of a contract for creating government, but I will not address those here. See further, Russell Hardin, "Contractarianism: Wistful Thinking", *Constitutional Political Economy* 1 (1990) forthcoming.


5 I discuss this issue much more extensively in "Hobbesian Political Order", paper presented at the Central Division meetings of the American Philosophical Association, Chicago, April 27-9, 1989.


8 Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, II, §95.

9 The most interesting effort is still that of James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, *The Calculus of Consent* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1962). Also see several papers in Brian Barry and Russell Hardin, eds., *Ratio-


12 David Friedman partly defines government as an institution that has not arisen this way (Friedman, *The Machinery of Freedom: Guide to a Radical Capitalism* [La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1989, 2nd edition], pp. 112-3).

13 May find the supposed lack of coercion in such theories a definitional move. They commonly countenance potentially extensive use of force.

14 Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, II, §94.


17 Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* (New York: Basic Books, 1974), pp. 90-95. This negative argument is virtually all Nozick has to say about the difficult problem of providing collective goods other than the minimal state. Contractarian mutual advantage theorists and economists in the tradition of Adam Smith generally give enormous scope to provision of collective goods.


20 Of course, we might suppose, with Geoffrey Brennan and James Buchanan, that despite conflicts in the eventual application of our rights laws, we could readily enough have agreed on general rules for later resolution of specific conflicts. For example, we might unanimously agree to use majority rule for legislative enactments (Brennan and Buchanan, *The Reason of Rules* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985]), pp. 29, 107, 150; also see James M. Buchanan, "The Constitution of
Economic Policy*, Science 236 [12 June 1987]: 1433-6, p. 1433). Against that optimistic hope we need only look at the deep conflicts over historical creations of actual constitutions.

21 David Schmidtz, "Justifying the State", Ethics, forthcoming.

22 I think it more plausible to read Rawls's theory as rationalist. There is no genuine contracting in it, there is only deduction of what would be the best form of government according to certain largely individual-regarding principles.