There are many aspects of migration that provoke hostile responses to it. These include residency, employment, welfare benefits, and citizenship. Many of these issues are essentially economic: opponents of immigration want to protect some interest of their own that they think will suffer from the competition or demands of new arrivals. Such issues may raise great problems for political theory, but I wish to leave them aside and to focus on another issue. Migration often provokes the deeply negative, exclusionary side of community against those who, in some sense, do not fit with the native population of the receiving community. I will address the exclusion that such a misfit provokes in the light of communitarian thought and potential liberal responses to it.

Proponents of communitarianism commonly take community to be good as such despite its often exclusionary values. Suppose that community commonly is good, but that exclusion may be necessary for the maintenance of its value. It follows that we might be able to defend communal exclusions as essentially moral or as serving a moral purpose. This is presumably the argument communitarians would make, but they do not generally address the exclusions that are the dark side of community. I wish instead to consider the ways in which such exclusions may work at the individual level in order to determine to what extent we need not call on values to justify them. If the conflicts are strictly of values, we may not be able to overcome them easily. Often at the core of such conflicts, however, are relatively small-scale interests, not moral values. To recognize this fact draws the sting of many communal conflicts, especially of those involving a few immigrants to a community. Strangely, the communal members might readily suppose that the motivations of the immigrants are primarily to secure their interests in a better world than that which they have left. But communal members may see their own responses to the immigrants as strictly motivated by values.

Even a limited unpacking of the issues at stake at the individual level suggests that it must often be false to claim that there are serious value conflicts. Interests are often arguably the main obstacle to integrating newcomers into a community. Moreover, the interests at issue are relatively minor but, because they are quotidian and pervasive, they might seem to mount up. Communities are often simply uncomfortable with newcomers. Community members have a natural interest in comfort, ease, and efficiency, all of which are well served by familiarity. These are all simple matters of interest, and newcomers, therefore, entail a conflict of interest and community members might tend to exclude newcomers.
merely for this reason. Although this is not a matter of deep value conflict, still, both the communal members and the newcomers might tend to see the other side as motivated by hostile values. Hence, their interactions may become unnecessarily difficult.

I will address various obstacles to the entry of a newcomer into a community. After canvassing the general nature of the problem of exclusion of newcomers, I will turn to a simple normative issue that partially defines a community. A newcomer will not have come to share a communal norm of cooperativeness and will therefore initially be a misfit with the community. This will generally be true of all newcomers or outsiders. After laying out this problem, I will briefly discuss the differences between such genuinely communal norms and the normative problems of dyadic interaction.

Given the normative structure of community, I will discuss more difficult obstacles to inclusion of newcomers. A newcomer will also typically have some misunderstandings with long-time members of the community. These can result from, for example, the lack of shared experience or from divergent linguistic usage. I will then turn to more profoundly difficult misfits, such as speaking different languages, that are still matters primarily of interest rather than of values, although people may often tend to think of their language as somehow morally right or superior. Finally, I will turn to misfit values, such as religious and cultural values. The problems in inclusion of people who speak different languages or who have different religious or cultural values goes beyond merely the problems of receiving communities and raises policy issues of what should be done with respect to groups of such newcomers, or immigrants.

The first of these obstacles—not sharing a communal norm of cooperativeness—is normative, but it is important not especially therefore but because it is typically definitive for membership in a community. The problems of misunderstanding and differences in language are merely matters of interest, and they may often be central to the problem of including a newcomer in a community and the reason for exclusion. Only the last of these obstacles, misfit values, is genuinely a matter of conflicting values, and even much of the problem with it is in how it affects interests.

The Nature of the General Problem

It is an important fact that exclusion is often and perhaps even usually definitive of community. And even when it is not definitive, exclusion is typically an important causal consequence of community. Hence, communities of all kinds and at all levels often have norms of exclusion to push or keep some people out. I will argue that there is an additional norm that often defines a community: the norm of generalized cooperativeness within the community (Cook and Hardin 1999). It is the pairing of norms of exclusion with a norm of cooperativeness that often defines who is excluded from a community and who is included in it. Unfortunately, the norm of cooperativeness itself may often be the basis for a norm
of exclusion against newcomers, including newcomers who are not by their ascriptive characteristics obviously misfits with the communities they enter. A newcomer cannot yet—or maybe even soon—have lived up to the norm of cooperativeness.

In order to show that apparent exclusion is not restricted to fundamental problems of fit, we may start with the simplest case of internal migration from one town to another within the same society. Citizenship is not an issue in this case and many of the other apparently economic issues might not be critical. But fit with the community might still matter. Among the dimensions of fit are such things as language, ethnicity, religion, and manners. Suppose that none of these is divergent and that we still find negative responses to a newcomer. Perhaps then the only significant issue is merely that of familiarity and the existence of already ongoing relationships that ground communal norms of cooperativeness. Now we might compare the newcomer in a community to a new person in one’s personal relationships.

Suppose I have many friends in the local community, my neighborhood, or my workplace, people with whom I have long-standing relations, whose interests are tied up with mine on many issues, and whose reliability to me in relevant contexts is secure. Now you come to my neighborhood or workplace without any ongoing relationships with the rest of us. Nevertheless, you will depend on us in some ways and you would be well-served if you could depend on us in many additional ways. Moreover, you might be very open and might readily accept your share of reciprocal dependencies. The obvious asymmetry in our initial relationship is that we likely have no need of depending on you but you may have a substantial need of depending on us. Your life may be relatively barren and isolated without modest relations with us. We have lots of alternative local individuals on whom to depend; you have none. As a dyad, you and I are not like two strangers in similar straits. I am solidly ensconced in a full life with no need of you. You are a marginal member of our community and you have, in many ways, an initially restricted life.

My friendships and even my less-than-friendly ongoing relationships with members of the community have, in large part, been the by-product of a long association with them through many local activities. You cannot depend immediately on building a life with us as a by-product of interactions that naturally happen. You have to be relatively deliberate about building relationships or you have to live among us for a relatively long while before such relationships come as a by-product. If you do the latter, you may be a stranger among us for a long time. But deliberate cultivation of us might not work well either. At some level, it is unnatural for people to build relationships deliberately. Ordinarily, they just happen. And if you set about deliberately building relationships, you may come across as phony, as though you were trying to sell yourself—which is something the rest of us never had to do. Part of the phoniness that we sometimes associate with people in business is their deliberate cultivation of relations with us. When you as outsider deliberately cultivate relations with us, you seem to be a cousin
of the used car salesperson who is an instant friend to any potential customer and an instant rejecter of anyone who turns out no longer to be a potential customer.

Communal Norms

If we are a close, well-defined community with our rich array of ongoing relationships, we are likely to have specifically communal norms. Among the most important such norms is likely to be a norm of generalized cooperativeness and helpfulness within the community. Although some of us may go so far as to have a personal norm of universalistic cooperativeness, our communal norm of cooperativeness will typically be specific only to others in our community and will not be universalistic. It will be communitarian. It is membership and your own adherence to our communal norms that earns you our normative commitments to you.

Our norm of cooperativeness is not dyadically reciprocal or specific to individuals. For example, I might frequently help you and never be in a position to expect you to help me. The communal norm, therefore, will not be a norm of reciprocal fairness. Rather it will be specifically about cooperativeness or helpfulness and its application will be restricted to our community’s members. That is, I will not be sanctioned by the community for failure to cooperate in relevant ways with a stranger or outsider but only for failure to do so with a fellow community member.

Nevertheless, the specifically communal norm will be exclusionary in the sense that it will not be invoked to benefit those who do not act as though they are bound by it, such as strangers and people within the community who violate the norm. To some extent, therefore, those outside the norm will be outside the community. They may even be shunned or entirely excluded (Hardin 1995, chap. 4). This is a group-level characteristic of the norm and it will be enforced by the group, not only by the individual who fails to get the cooperation that the norm specifies. Indeed, that individual might be in no position to sanction me if I fail to fulfill the duties of the norm because that individual might be expected to have little or nothing to offer me, and hence nothing that could be withheld or withdrawn from me as a sanction. Our norm is therefore a genuinely group-level, quasi universal norm and not a dyadic or reciprocal norm. It stands somewhere between universalistic norms and norms of exclusion (Hardin 1995, chaps 4 and 5). It is universalistic in a highly circumscribed universe, a universe from which defaulters can be excluded.

One might attempt to defend such a norm as rational for each individual in the society much the way Immanuel Kant defended a norm of altruistic aid to those in need on the argument that one could not will a universe in which no one acted that way (see Herman 1993, chap. 3). Unfortunately, this argument is specious, because a Nietszche could very well will a universe in which the strong are not obligated to help the weak even at the risk of not getting aid from the weak in moments of personal difficulty.
Although the variation of communal norms across communities must be substantial, I will simply assume henceforth that a community is characterized by something that we could call a group-level norm of cooperativeness or helpfulness. In the vocabulary of social psychology, such a norm is not generalized, because it does not cover our actions toward everyone. It is group-generalized, because it covers our actions toward everyone in a particular group. We need not assume that every member of a community will feel equally bound by such a norm. Indeed, some may succeed in sustaining life in the community without being particularly helpful to the needy, but they may commonly suffer exclusions that make life less full of camaraderie with many people in the community.

What judgment should we pass on such communal norms? To the extent that they are exclusionary, they may sound bad. But this is what they must be if they are to be made to work at the communal level. Norms that cover a large group, rather than dyadic or small-group interactions, suffer a severe problem of the logic of collective action. This can be overcome by inflicting costs specifically on those who fail to contribute to the collective action of abiding by the communal norm of cooperativeness. And if our communal norms of cooperativeness do work, our communal life is likely to be better than it would be without such norms.

Exclusion by shunning is one of the few costs that can be imposed spontaneously by all other members of the community. We could imagine other sanctions, but the actual fact of most norms is that the sanctions used to enforce them are some variant of shunning or exclusion. If you violate a dyadic norm of, say, promise-keeping or truth-telling in your relations with me, the best, most directly relevant device available to me to redress your action is to withdraw from at least the specific kind of interaction in which you violate the norm. For the communal norm, that means virtually to withdraw from communal interaction with the violator, which means shunning and exclusion to some degree. Hence, it seems sensible to argue that such norms are generally good and that the unfortunate shunning that they may entail is merely a cost of their working for the general benefit.

Communal Norms and Dyadic Relations

Compare the problem of integrating a new person into an established group to that of establishing a one-on-one relationship with respect to some activity or project. In a dyadic interaction with you, whom I may not have known before, I typically have some interest that would be served well by cooperation with you in some way. I therefore have an immediate interest in developing at least a limited relationship with you, although, if I soon discover that you are not reliable in this relationship, I may conclude that I have no interest in developing it further. If, on the other hand, my gamble of interacting with you pays off, I may then go on to develop a stronger and maybe even a far richer relationship with you. Ours would then be a dyadic relationship grounded in interests we have in each other’s actions and commitments. It would therefore be a dyadic trust relationship with respect to certain ranges of matters (Hardin 2002).
The newcomer to our community might soon establish such dyadic trust relationships with certain members of the community as a result of dealing with them on relevant matters, perhaps especially on matters in which the newcomer has a special competence that cannot be matched by members of the community. In the end, a rich enough collection of such relationships might even bring the newcomer into our community as a relatively full member. But the relationship between any dyad in the community is likely to involve something other than this kind of dyadic trust relationship, indeed, something that may not even include such a trust relationship. It will involve norms generalized in the community that govern relations in the community, such as the norm of generalized cooperativeness toward others in the community, as discussed above (Amato 1993; Cook and Hardin 1999). The hurdle for integrating into the group norm is likely to be higher than that for integrating into a typical dyadic exchange relationship or even for integrating into one dyadic relationship after the other.

Even for the class of reciprocal dyadic cooperative relations there is an asymmetry in the opportunities that established members of the community and a newcomer may face. In such cooperations members of the community already have experience of each other’s reliability and will more readily choose to cooperate with them, if possible, than with a newcomer whose reliability is less sure. Hence, as a newcomer I will have fewer opportunities to demonstrate my reliability in being cooperative than would a typical member of the community. There might be a relatively explicit and articulate norm of reciprocity for such dyadic interactions, but there might not be, because the more general norm of cooperativeness might simply cover such cases as well as the non-reciprocal cases. In any event, there may be blurring of these two quite different categories.

Note how difficult the norm of generalized cooperativeness is for a newcomer. There is almost nothing that you as a newcomer could readily do that would establish your adherence to this norm. You might have an unusual opportunity to do something of great value to others in the community—for example, you might happen to rescue someone’s child from harm at great risk to yourself. Short of such actions, however, it would take a long period of your responding in relevant ways to the needs of others in the community before you could be thought to follow the communal norm of cooperativeness. You could be responsive and helpful in various ways that convince others of your fit with the group. But even then, you would not typically be in a position to help in a particular case, so that most members of the community could never learn of your commitment from your actually helping them. They would have to learn of it from your general reputation.

Oddly, there might be an asymmetry in our reputations in that our failures would become more widely and readily known than would our positive actions under the norm. Note the nature of this asymmetry between violating and following the communal norm. It is not merely that bad news will be more forcefully communicated than good news, although that might be true. The more important difference is this. Our acts of violating the norm will elicit exclusions while our acts of complying with it will be taken as simply normal and, there-
fore, no specific act of conforming will make much difference to the way we are treated. Violations generate responses that, in effect, signal new information about us.

Even without this asymmetry, however, a newcomer will likely find it hard to establish a reputation for commitment to the community and its norms because doing so takes many opportunities for interactions over a long period of time.

There may also be many other communal norms, whose content might include such things as expectations about how all of us will behave in many realms, including expectations about manners, speech, religion, and so forth, some or all of which might suggest conflicting values. Hence, these norms may implicitly be directed against some of the things that distinguish newcomers to the community so that, in effect, they are simple norms of exclusion (Hardin 1995, chap. 4). Such norms suggest more complex problems of fit than have been discussed so far. Let us approach such problems with a misfit—linguistic difference—that might initially entail no value differences but only, as in the discussion so far, problems of conflicting interests.

**Mere Misunderstanding**

Now add other differences, so that you are not different from all of us merely by virtue of being a newcomer arriving from somewhere else. You are also different in other ways, say of religion, of language or accent, or of manners. Some of these differences will reduce the frequency of your structured interactions with us—for example, you will go to a different church, mosque, or temple. Such differences will therefore reduce your opportunities for building relationships as a by-product of certain interactions, such as those of religious worship or related activities. Some of the differences will have a further, very different effect; they will make us less comfortable in dealing with you. For example, if you speak a different language or have a heavy enough accent as to make it hard for us to understand you, we will find it moderately burdensome even to communicate with you. And for some of our activities, that will be a serious barrier to including you. Consider two forms of barrier.

One kind of barrier is suggested by the question: Who wants to sit around the bar telling jokes to which some of the group are constitutionally unable to respond? We are often like that apocryphal group who tell jokes efficiently by merely calling out the relevant number, such as 51, at which everyone laughs because they all know the joke with that number. As Ted Cohen notes, jokes often include subtle cultural cues that the listener must understand before hearing the joke, without first being told the meanings of these cues (Cohen 1999). When a newcomer joins us, letting them in on our jokes radically undercuts our efficiency, because now we have to spell out the jokes in full—and still the jokes will not often work for the newcomer. Alternatively, we laugh away the evening while the newcomer sits in idle curiosity, excluded from the humor. A critic might think we are being unfair if we exclude the newcomer rather than bearing the group cost of inefficient humor. But any newcomers presumably only want to improve their
well-being in some way when they move into our group and it is not clear why we should bear costs merely in order to reduce their costs of assimilation when their move is only to their benefit and not clearly to ours. If the new person is lucky, some of us might actually enjoy coming to know new people and even new kinds of people, so that we might find that any costs are outweighed by benefits.

The second kind of barrier is suggested by the question: How will we keep straight whether your failure in some context was merely one of misunderstanding rather than one of ill will? I once heard an English woman tell of her move to the United States. Upon arrival in her new community, she and her family were invited to dinner by a neighbor. The neighbor’s young teenage daughter handled all of the serving at the meal and did it with grace and apparent pleasure. As she parted later, the English woman said, with a smile, “Your daughter is so homely and charming!” Her hostess heard that, in American English, as “Your daughter is so dull and unattractive that it’s a good thing she at least has charm.” The English woman had actually said, “Your daughter is wonderful in doing things around the house and is also very charming.” The two women were neighbors for many years and never became friends despite the genuine effort they had made initially. It was a couple of years before the English woman discovered the divergent meanings of “homely,” and by then it was too late to make right a relationship that had gone wrong for so long.

To a neutral observer the general effect of these problems of interaction might suggest that we in the community are cold to newcomers. But, if we are viewed more sympathetically, they suggest merely that we are not ready to take on special burdens on behalf of others with whom we have no extant relationship. To some degree, this fault, if it is one, afflicts virtually all of us. It takes both time and effort to integrate a new person into our group. Often it may be the case that our group stands to benefit very little from including a new person, while that person stands to benefit substantially. We might therefore suppose it is to some degree only reasonable that the new person should carry most of the burden of coming to be included. To a substantial extent, our friendship groups, our neighborhoods, and our entire communities are exclusionary, as cliques, teenage gangs, many religious and ethnic communities, and whole nations commonly are. And we make the costs of admission to these very high, sometimes prohibitively high. But those costs are not necessarily invidious. They may merely reflect the burden the group bears in adding a new member. Of course, one might suppose we have a utilitarian or other moral duty to assist and befriend a newcomer to our world, but the members of many communities may not accept any such moral charge.

**Misfit Language**

The brunt of these arguments is that norms of community, with their exclusion of outsiders, can be in large part essentially matters of personal interest in making the daily life of interaction with others work well—indeed, matters of
usually minor personal interest. This is clearly true for norms of community as applied to newcomers who are not significantly different in values, manners, beliefs, and so forth. In such cases, the norms lack any other moral force than the comfort of dealing with those whom one already knows very well. Much of the contemporary normative claim for the special values of community is therefore irrelevant to the exclusionary aspects of community in such cases. When there is some other source of misfit than mere lack of prior relationship, there may then be normative concerns and not merely matters of interest. But even in these cases, the simpler urge to exclude—or at least not to include—is apt to be reinforced by personal interest in making daily life work well.

Consider the problem of fitting newcomers who speak a different language from that of their new community. The United States is a nation in which reputedly at least 213 languages are currently spoken as first languages (Reese 1999). Most of these are spoken by very few people. But Spanish is the first language of millions of U.S. citizens and immigrants and Chinese and a few other languages are the first languages of large concentrations of people in certain communities. In recent decades, many communities, including the entire state of California, have stopped allowing the use of languages other than English in schools or government. This means that teachers and government officials are not required to accommodate non-English speakers, although informally they may often do so. The wave of opposition to official use of other languages, or the “English only” movement, is sometimes attributed to hostility to immigrants. Many people, however, genuinely seem to believe that immigrants and especially their children will remain second class citizens with unnecessarily restricted opportunities if they do not master English. And many others object merely to the costs of making extra efforts for non-English speakers, who, it is apparently thought, should bear their own costs.

At some point it is merely a pragmatic matter whether a linguistic group should get special recognition and have access to education and government services in their language. For example, most of the 231 linguistic groups in the United States could not plausibly be given such recognition and treatment. Hence, it is not only a normative matter that most of them do not. This fact raises the obvious question: At what point do we draw the line between pragmatic and supposedly normative issues and give some group such treatment? How many of the 231 non-English groups can practically get such treatment? Somewhere in the range from none to several, but not, say, a dozen or two dozen. Given that no non-English group is even ten percent of the population of the United States, many might readily suppose that the number zero stands out as the prominent, most natural choice. Or we might conclude that anywhere there is a large enough community to support entire schools, then we should create schools that teach in their language.

Separate status for linguistic groups raises two pragmatic concerns, one about the children of a small minority language group and one about the creation of separate groups per se. Children who are educated primarily in a minority
language will, in the long run, face essentially minority opportunities within the larger society. They will pay the costs of protecting their parents’ use of their native language. If their parents migrated in order to improve their own opportunities, it seems odd for them then to want to restrict the opportunities of their own children in the new context. If adult speakers of an immigrant language gain political sanction for that language, they effectively get the state to enforce reduced opportunities for their children for the benefit of the adults. This is not a politically unusual move, but it is one that should not be made without great concern.

In the United States, courts have gone so far as to impose severely restricted opportunities on children in order to protect their parents’ ability to sustain a nearly autarkic religious community, as in the case of Wisconsin v. Yoder. In Yoder, the Old Order Amish of Wisconsin were given the right to remove their children from school at age fourteen, which is two years earlier than other children in Wisconsin are allowed to leave school (see further Hardin 1995, 200–203). Many constitutional scholars in the United States hold that this decision, which might seem deplorable on other grounds, is nevertheless justified by the special status of religion in the U.S. Constitution. Some of the central arguments of the U.S. Supreme Court in Yoder suggest that it is acceptable for parents largely to impose a particular religion on their children by making it extremely difficult for them to survive outside the religious community in order to keep them within the community. This view does not have constitutional warrant. In any case, language clearly has no such special status, so that a parallel decision in favor of blocking English language education for children in order to keep them within their language community might be widely seen as unconstitutional. Defenders of education in other languages argue almost exclusively at the level of the community and, as do Yoder and apparently the U.S. Constitution, they ignore concern for the life chances of the children who are used by such programs to make life somewhat more comfortable for their parents.

Concern with the second issue, the creation of separate groups, is less often articulated but is pragmatically and politically critical. Educating the children of non-English speakers in a language other than English in the United States is apt to create a separate community within the larger nation. The story of the United States is of assimilation of many and varied communities. Indeed, the third generation of most immigrant groups speak English as their first language and commonly do not speak their forebears’ language. Teaching future generations in the native language of their immigrant forebears creates a separate group within the society, sometimes even a nearly autarkic group that maintains itself almost entirely separated from others in the society, as the Amish do. If all the groups that came to the United States over the past three centuries had maintained themselves in this way as separated from the larger society, there would be dozens of major groups and politics would be substantially fractured. The economy might also be substantially fractured and the nation would not now be serving the interests of later generations very well. Indeed, we might wonder if it could be a nation
if it had a large number (perhaps hundreds) of linguistic enclaves. What has changed—other than rhetoric—that suggests a new immigrant group today should have its language recognized in a way that, say, Polish was not recognized at about the beginning of the twentieth century?

There is essentially a collective action problem of special recognition for each group. My group might benefit from special recognition, at least in the current generation of immigrants and maybe into the next generation. But my group would not benefit from the enduring special recognition of each and every group. Rather, my group would be best served by free-riding on the benefits that come from having all other groups attempt to fit into the larger culture, at least linguistically and economically. The opportunities open to individuals of the second and later generation in the larger society, if they speak English, are sure to be greater than the opportunities in the much narrower community of their own language group.

The arguments here have been framed in the American context only because it is so evidently difficult to deal with language when the groups are as numerous as they are in a fundamentally immigrant nation. But most of the issues are similar in any nation in which there are immigrant groups that speak languages different from the national language, even though those groups might be less numerous in, say, European nations in which there are now significant numbers of immigrants.

**Misfit Values**

Now turn to differences that at least superficially entail a more difficult misfit than merely a conflict of interests. For example, suppose your religion is different from that of our community. Perhaps we would spurn you and your family merely, therefore, because we judge your religion to be wrong. But even this is partially merely a matter of conflicting interests. If your children wish to be married within our community, they may have to cross religious lines to do so. When they do, they may therefore take some of our children out of parts of our lives, so that we suffer genuine losses. True, we may rail against your odd beliefs, but we may be saddened rather than the partial loss of our own children. In the deeply conflictive context of the Palestinian-Israeli West Bank and many other parts of the world, religious differences might provoke even stronger reactions because they are profoundly disruptive in the local experience of them.

If you merely have different cultural practices, we may feel ill at ease when our families mingle with their differences. If my child switches allegiance to your culture after marriage to your child, I may feel something even worse than merely ill at ease; I may actually feel a severe loss. It would be odd, when viewing them from the outside or in general, for us to suppose that cultural practices are either right or wrong. They are merely conventions. Still, we may begin to think ours are morally right. To some extent they are, merely because they enable us to interact sociably—that is to say, they serve the good end of sociability, so that they
seem good as a means. Indeed, we might even conclude that some cultural prac-
tices are better than others because they are better means to various ends or
because they are means to better ends. They are not good or bad, right or wrong,
per se, although the seemingly common tendency to infer an ought from an is
may lead many people to hold that their cultural practices are good or right
per se.

If your immigrant group maintains its separate language and cultural prac-
tices, it may seem to pose a conflict of values with the community into which it
moves. It virtually defines itself as different. Even though this need not entail any
invidious judgment on its part, it may be hard for the local community to react
without supposing there is an invidious judgment against them. Still, in cooler
moments, we might be able to recognize that there is no invidious judgment at
issue, that there is merely a problem of fitting our interests together when these
are partially in conflict.

Finally, of course, a newcomer might have genuinely different values that
make it hard for us to include them fully in our community. Some immigrants to
the United States wish to continue their practice of female genital mutilation or
infibulation and might not allow their sons to marry women who have not been
subjected to that treatment. Given general American values, we cannot expect
such a practice to be legalized within the United States. Nor would we legalize
the Arab-Islamic practice of murdering women family members who are sus-
pected of having extra-marital relations (Jehl 1999), although not very long ago
murdering a spouse (and the spouse’s partner) caught in flagrante was often not
treated as a crime in some American jurisdictions, such as Texas. Nor might we
legalize coercive marriage at a very young age or countless other practices that
have been held as right in various communities historically. Our rejection of those
practices might not stand any objective test of moral rightness, but it does pose
a potentially severe value conflict that makes inclusion of some newcomers in
our communities very difficult. We may well exclude them independently of any
simple norm of cooperativeness.

Concluding Remarks

A community is likely to be defined by a pair of norms: the norm of gener-
alyzed cooperativeness within the community, and the norm of exclusion from it.
One of these, in a sense, defines who is positively included or what is expected
of those who are included. The other defines who is actively excluded and what
are the grounds for their exclusion. Each of these norms might better be seen as,
rather, a cluster of norms. For example, there might be many norms of exclusion
that work in quite varied ways by excluding more or less and in reaction to quite
varied behaviors. Minor infractions of our norm of cooperativeness might
prove only minor sanctions of mild disapproval; more substantial infractions
might provoke public shunning; and very serious infractions might provoke vir-
tually total exclusion from the community.
Similarly, there might be many norms of cooperativeness, depending on the issues they govern, and these may vary in the intensity or exactitude with which they apply and they may require quite different forms of cooperation. For example, in a very close community some might specifically be expected to supply food to someone in need while others would be expected to supply specific services within their special competence. When a family suffers an illness or a death, you might fulfill your duty under our communal norm of cooperativeness by sitting with members of the family or by taking them some kind of food while I fulfill mine by driving people around or by mowing the family’s yard or giving them money to pay a bill. Few Americans live in such close communities although in many historical eras most people did (for an account of the restricted communal life of French villagers around the tenth century, see Leijonhufvud 1995).

One of the things that endears my fellow community members to me is not merely that I can rely on them for many things but that I actually do rely on them. Our friendships are in large part built up out of the experience of such acts of reliance. Indeed, this is not merely a fact of our community but a fact of friendship and of mutual love. Hence, it would be wrong to suppose that being relied upon is exclusively a burden or a cost.

In this discussion, the community has sometimes been exaggerated in an important respect. It is characterized as small, ongoing, and tightly integrated. In some ways, this is the ideal of communitarian theorists of our time. But it is an ideal that is seldom real in advanced states, because in such societies few of us are genuinely bound up in small communities with relatively separate existences. The Amish, the Lubavitchers of Brooklyn, and many small ethnic groups around the United States have some of the character of the communities characterized above. Some Indian tribal groups on isolated reservations may be such nearly autonomous, close communities. Established old towns with little or no mobility, as still exist in the highly developed nations of Europe and North America, also have some of this character. These groups constitute, however, a small minority of the populations of these nations. The problems of immigrants to an established society go beyond such highly exclusionary communities to include somewhat less exclusionary and less pervasively controlling communities as groups at work, in a neighborhood, or other less than holistic settings. And the demands that some immigrant groups make on their new societies—especially demands for special treatment—may provoke a quasi-communal response from the larger society.

Some communitarians recognize the fact of the disappearance of small communities and argue not that the world should be changed but that the changes it has gone through are sad. This seems to be the position, for example, of Alasdair MacIntyre (1981), who might ideally wish to live in a medieval community. Others seem not to recognize the facts of these changes, or at least not to take them as seriously as any causal analyst should, and they insist on the actual existence of communal life and norms, as Michael Sandel (1982) seems to do, or on a restoration of these, as does, for example, Amitai Etzioni (1993). These latter
communitarians typically do not themselves live the life of community that they expound, and one doubts that they would choose to even if they could easily do so.

I am inclined to say that any wish such as that which MacIntyre might have to live in a medieval community is incoherent. But I am chastened in that claim by an encounter many years ago with another lover of medieval culture. In an undergraduate course on existentialism, Professor Richard Kroner said he was not at home in the twentieth century, that his real home was medieval times. In my brashness, I responded without being called upon to say, incredulously, that that was intellectually impossible: He could not have been in medieval times; there could have been no one like him then. To wish to be in that time was to wish not to be at all. He very sweetly and calmly replied that ours was the difference between someone who was at home in his own time and someone who was not. A sincere communitarian in our time is like Richard Kroner, someone who yearns for the impossible.

Contemporary communitarian debate threatens to intensify intercommunal conflict by recasting it as a deep and meaningful conflict of values. Although there is sometimes success in policies of toleration and the prospect of changing someone’s mind, such value conflicts may often be intractable. Many conflicts of interest, especially of minor interest, are far more tractable. As Albert Hirschman (1977) argues, it was the success of the growing economy and of the arguments of its theorists, such as Adam Smith (1776/1976) and Bernard Mandeville (1714/1924), that shifted English politics from a destructive focus on conflicts of values, to a potentially constructive focus on conflicts of interests. John Locke (1689/1950 and 1690/1988) had hoped to isolate religious conflicts over values and salvation from politics over social order. Smith and Mandeville supposed rather that the blandishments of a market economy and its great potential for creating earthly prosperity would simply lead people individually away from or distract them from religious and other value conflicts. In our time, Ayatollahs, Old Order Amish, and many other religious fundamentalists in a sense understand the seductive and invigorating allure of the vision of Mandeville and Smith to their peoples, and they strive to break the hold of that vision in order to enforce the grip of religious constraints.

In market and many other contexts, conflicts of interest can commonly be transmuted into potential coordination on mutual benefit, so that the element of residual conflict is swamped by the potential for benefit. Conflicts over values typically cannot be transmuted in this way. They cannot be coordinated in some way to produce gains. They can commonly be resolved, if at all, only through suppression or rigid isolation of at least one of the relevant groups. Academics’ elevation of communitarian claims that communal norms, with all their exclusions, are good is likely only an intellectual game. But if, as seldom happens with philosophical arguments, it gains great influence over real communities, it will be a perverse and destructive game of heightening conflicts. Immigrants, including many who have emigrated from communities where their lives have been
brutalized to other communities where they have hopes for better lives, would be among the chief victims of the group solipsist communitarian ideology.

References


