

The consequences of party systems

G. Bingham Powell (1982)
Contemporary Democracies

Wealth and Heterogeneity are associated with *more* Fractionalization, Presidentialism and SMDP with *less*.

DV	Social environment in mid-1960s					Constitution Arrangements	
	Small Pop	Econ Dev	Heterogeneity			Pres.	Smdp
Fractionalization	-.02	.33**	.45**	.59**	.22**	-.32**	-.67**

Development is associated with *Strong* Party-Group Linkages, SMDP is associated with *Weak*

DV	Social environment in mid-1960s					Constitution Arrangements	
	Small Pop	Econ Dev	Heterogeneity			Pres.	Smdp
Party-Group Links	.03	.37**	.08	-.27	-.13	-.22	-.52**

Large and heterogeneous populations are associated with *more* Extremist voting support, Presidentialism and SMPD with *less*

DV	Social environment in mid-1960s					Constitution Arrangements	
	Small Pop	Econ Dev	Heterogeneity			Pres.	Smdp
Extremism	-.29**	.10	.27**	.62**	.04	-.14**	-.53**

Presidentialism and Heterogeneity are associated with *more* Volatility of party representation, Economic development with *less*.

DV	Social environment in mid-1960s					Constitution Arrangements	
	Small Pop	Econ Dev	Heterogeneity			Pres.	Smdp
Volatility of Party Representation	-.06	-.33**	.14	.22*	-.08	.16*	.02

Strong party-group links and compulsory laws encourage Turnout

DV	Party-system			Environmental conditions			
	Multi-Party Links	Party-Group Links	Extremism	Small Population	Econ Dev.	Compulsory laws	Ethnic Homogeneity
Turnout	-.35	.68**	.12	.11	.03	.43**	

Extremism inhibits Executive durability

DV	Party-system			Environmental conditions			
	Multi-Party Links	Party-Group	Extremism	Large Population	Economic Dev.	Compulsory laws	Ethnic Homogeneity
Executive durability	-0.13	-0.19	-0.70**	-0.08	0.02		

↑
↑
Surprising!

Fractionalization reduces the likelihood of Majority control of the legislature

DV	Party-system			Environmental conditions			
	Multi-Party Links	Party-Group	Extremism	Small Population	Economic Dev.	Compulsory laws	Ethnic Homogeneity
Majority control	-0.62*	0.34	0.14	-0.10	-0.19		

Large populations and extremism encourage Rioting, fractionalization discourages rioting

DV	Party-system			Environmental conditions			
	Multi-Party Links	Party-Group	Extremism	Large Population	Economic Dev.	Compulsory laws	Ethnic Homogeneity
Rioting							
1958-1967	-0.36*	-0.00	0.35**	0.72**	0.21*		0.06
1967-1976	-0.24	-0.15	0.27*	0.67**	0.06		0.02

Why might large populations encourage rioting?

- Threshold model of participation.
 - People participate in large scale political events if they think a critical number (*T*) of others will also participate.

Economic development and homogeneity are associated with fewer Violent political deaths, large populations, more

DV	Party-system			Environmental conditions			
	Multi-Party Links	Party-Group	Extremism	Large Population	Economic Dev.	Compulsory laws	Ethnic Homogeneity
Violent political deaths							
1958-1967	-0.13	-0.07	0.07	0.26*	-0.32**		-0.37**
1967-1976	-0.29	-0.01	0.17	0.18	-0.53**		-0.09

Effect of Electoral system and Presidentialism

