

Presidential Government

Chief Executive:

- a) Is Popularly elected
- b) Serves a fixed term

Announcement

- No Class on Thursday – treat it as a study period
- Readings on Bureaucracy for Tuesday
- Review Session – next Thursday – come with questions!

Presidentialism is thought to

- Provide a check on parliament
- Elect a leader that is responsible to the entire nation
 - Provide a leader that can discipline particularistic tendencies of legislators
 - Fuses symbolic attributes of the “head of state” with the pragmatic powers of the “head of government”

Consequences of Presidentialism

1. Concentration of power over policy
 2. Pattern of recruitment may lead to inexperienced leaders being chosen
 3. Difficulty in making policy quickly
 4. Difficulty in locating responsibility for policy
 5. Difficulty in making comprehensive policy
- Note: Most of these are not “good” things

But, most are not unique to presidentialism

- Difficulty in making policy quickly, locating responsibility for policy, and making comprehensive policy are all true of highly fractionalized parliamentary systems.
- In fact, presidentialism is often thought of a response to these problems in parliamentary systems.
 - Ex. French 5th Republic as a fix for the French 4th Republic
 - When the number of coalition members is large, a collective action problem ensues and a prime minister may not have enough power to distribute the selective incentives required to get them to cooperate. A strong president might help?

Is Presidentialism more stable than Parliamentarism? Stepan and Skatch argue that:

While the essence of parliamentarism is mutual dependence, the essence of presidentialism is mutual *independence*.

- Parliamentarism encourages *reconciliation*, while presidentialism encourages *antagonism*

This antagonism between the branches of government...

- Contributes to the danger of deadlock
 - Makes it likely that politicians look to military to break the deadlock
- (in contrast, if deadlock occurs under parliamentarism, there are constitutional means for resolving the crisis: a) vote of no confidence; b) PM dissolves Parliament and calls new elections.

Regime type of the 93 Countries of the world that became independent between 1945 and 1979

Parliamentary N=41		Presidentialism N=36		Semi- Presidential N=13		Monarchy N=13	
Bahamas	Malta	Algeria	Madagascar	Lebanon	Sudan		
Barbados	Mauritius	Angola	Malawi	Senegal	Burundi		
Botswana	Nauru	Benin	Mali	Zaire	Cambodia		
Burma	Nigeria	B. Faso	Mauritania		Jordan		
Chad	Pakistan	Cameroon	Mozambique		Kuwait		
Dominica	Papua New Guinea	Cape Verde	Niger		Lesotho		
Egypt	St. Lucia	Cent. Af. Rep.	Philippines		Libya		
Gambia	St. Vincent	Cyprus	Rwanda		Maldives		
Ghana	Sierra Leone	Comoros	Sao Tome		Morocco		
Grenada	Singapore	Congo	Seychelles		Oman		
Guatemala	Solomon Islands	Djibouti	Sri Lanka		Qatar		
India	Somalia	Equ. Guinea	Togo		Tonga		
Indonesia	Sri Lanka	Gabon	Taiwan		UAE		
Israel	Sudan	Guinea	Tunisia				
Jamaica	Suriname	Burkina Faso	Vietnam (N)				
Kenya	Swaziland	Ivory Coast	Vietnam (S)				
Kiribati	Tanzania	Korea (S)	Yemen (S)				
Laos	Trinidad and Tobago	Korea (N)	Zambia				
Malaysia	Tuvalu						
	Uganda						
	W. Somalia						

Continuous Democracies from 1980-89

Parliamentary 15/41		Presidential N=0/36	Semi- Presidential N=0/3	Monarchy N=0/12
Bahamas	Nauru			
Barbados	Papua New Guinea			
Botswana	Guinea			
Dominica	St. Lucia			
India	St. Vincent			
Israel	Solomon Islands			
Jamaica	Trinidad and Tobago			
Kiribati	Tuvalu			

Universe of 53 Non-OECD Countries that experience democracy between 1973 and 1989

	Regime	
	Parl	Pres
Dem for at least 1 year	28	25
Dem for 10 consec. years	17	5
Dem survival Rate	61%	20%

Coups are twice as common in the set of countries mentioned above

	Regime	
	Parl	Pres
Dem for at least 1 year	28	25
# that experienced a coup	5	10
Coup susceptibility rate	18%	40%

But, maybe there are other factors that causes democracies to fail, and maybe those factors are correlated with Pres/Parl

- This would suggest the need to control for these other factors

Stepan and Skatch attempt to do so by analyzing the residuals created by another study

- Tatu Vanhanen examined the correlation between an Index of Democratization and an Index of Power Resources
 - Degree of decentralization of non-agricultural resources
 - % of agri land owned as family farms
 - % of population
 - In universities
 - In cities
 - Literate
 - Non-employed in agriculture

Vanhanen found that....

- 73.6 % of the countries that were above 6.5 on his Index of Power Resources scored high on his Index of Democracy, but
 - 36/147 countries had negative or positive residuals greater than 1 standard error.
 - Countries with large positive residuals were “democratic over achievers”
 - Countries with large negative residuals were “democratic under achievers”

Parliamentary regimes are more likely to be “Democratic Overachievers” (1980-1988)

	Democratic	
	Underachievers	Overachievers
Parliamentary (37)	6 (16.2%)	31 (83.8%)
Presidential (22)	12 (54.6%)	10 (45.5%)

So, the evidence suggests that Parliamentary systems survive longer than Presidential systems

- But, remember, one justification for Presidentialism is that it is a way of overcoming the problems of highly fractionalized parliamentary systems
Difficulty in:
 - making policy quickly,
 - locating responsibility for policy,
 - making comprehensive policy

So, as one of your predecessors last year conjectured....

- Maybe presidential democracies fail at higher rates than parliamentary democracies because presidentialism
 - That is, maybe presidentialism is like a “hospital” for ailing polities and you wouldn’t want to say that “hospitals kill people” just because they have higher mortality rates than hotels do.

Scott Mainwaring argues, however, that Presidentialism is *particularly* bad for ailing polities

Liabilities of Presidentialism

1. Difficulty in handling crisis -
 - "there are no neat means of replacing a president who is enormously unpopular in the society at large and has lost most of his/her support in the legislature.
2. Greater likelihood of executive/legislative deadlock
 - " more apt to have executives whose program is consistently blocked by the legislature, and less capable of dealing with the problem when it arises."
3. Direct election of president allows individuals with little experience in dealing with the legislature to get elected.

Mainwaring agrees with these criticisms of presidentialism, but they are not sufficient to block successful democratic consolidation

US and Costa Rica and Venezuela stand out as having strong democratic institutions. So we know there are cases of stable democracy that use the presidential system, the question is, what separates these from the unsuccessful presidential systems?


They have a small number of legislative parties (ENPS)

Country (year)	ENPS
Costa Rica (1986)	2.21
USA (1984)	1.95
Venezuela (1983)	= 2.42

In fact, consider the following about countries that sustained democracy for 25 years

Regime type	Success	Rate
Multiparty Presidential	1/15	.07
Two party Presidential	5/10	.50
Parliamentary	11/21	.52

Why is multipartism difficult for presidential systems?



Stepan and Skatch also provide supporting evidence

	Number of Effective Legislative Parties	
	Fewer than 3	Greater than 3
Parliamentary	23	11
Semi presidential	0	2 (France, Portugal)
Presidential	5 (USA, Columbia, Dom. Rep. Costa Rica, Venezuela)	0


But in recent years,

- there have been a number of new democracies in Eastern and Central Europe and Latin America with the “difficulty combination” that appear fairly resilient. Could it be that the “difficult combination” is no longer a difficulty?

Pzeworski, et.al. present data that partially confirms Mainwaring


Eff Parties	Trans from Parl to Aut			Trans from Pres to Aut		
	Years	Trans	Hazard rate	Years	Trans	Hazard rate
0-2	250	6	2.40	95	3	3.16
2-3	394	2	0.51	191	7	3.66
3-4	246	1	0.41	74	8	1.08
4-5	134	2	1.49	50	3	6.00
5-	103	1	0.97	55	1	1.82

Figure 4. Hazard rates for parliamentary and presidential democracies by effective number of parties



So, recent data seems to only partially substantiate Mainwaring, but....

But Recall: There is a Strong Relationship between wealth and democracy



Source: Przeworski and Limongi (1997)

So,


- Substantial evidence that in the past, it was extremely difficult to consolidate multiparty presidential democracies

One other consequence of Presidentialism:

- It *decreases* the number of legislative parties if the number of presidential parties is large
- It *increases* the number of legislative parties if the number of presidential parties is small

it can either *increase* or *decrease* the number of legislative parties

The effect of presidentialism on legislative fractionalization depends on the number of presidential coattails



Example: South Korea and Costa Rica are both single-member district countries with homogenous cultures, but

- South Korea has 4.22 effective parties in its 1988 election
- Costa Rica has 2.49 effective parties in its 1986 election

Why? South Korea has 3.55 effective parties in its presidential system while Costa Rica only had 2.07