

# **ALL THE POWER IN THE WORLD**

## **1. THE MYSTERY OF THE PHYSICAL**

1. A Brief Exposition of the Scientiphical Metaphysic
2. Three Kinds of Basic Property and the Denial of Qualities
3. The Denial of Qualities, Particles in Space and Spaces in a Plenum
4. When Limited by the Denial, How to Conceive a Particle's Propensities?
5. Can Particles Rotate, but Not Plenumate Bubbles?
6. Simple Attempts at Clear Conception May Highlight Our Mystery
7. Rejecting the Denial, but Postponing a Resolution of Our Mystery

## **2. A HUMANLY REALISTIC PHILOSOPHY**

1. I Am a Real Thinking Being and You Are Another
2. We Are Differentially Responsive Individuals
3. Against Descartes, We Are Intermittently Conscious Individuals
4. Our Realistic Response to Descartes Raises a Problem of Our Unconscious Quality
5. Against Hume's Restriction, Human Understanding Transcends Human Experience
6. We Are Experientially Varying Individuals
7. We Are Not Bundles of Experiences, Thoughts or Perceptions
8. We Substantial Individuals Are More Basic than Our Thoughts and Experiences
9. As We Communicate with Each Other, We Are Reciprocal Interaction Partners
10. There Is Perplexity Concerning How We Commonly Communicate
11. Much of the World Interacts with Us, But Doesn't Communicate with Us
12. We Often Choose What to Think About, and Even What to Communicate

## **3. DEMYSTIFYING THE PHYSICAL**

1. We Recall the Denial of Quality and the Mystery of the Physical

2. Spatially Extensible Qualities and Intelligible Propensities
3. Spatially Extensible Qualities Are Perfectly Pervasive Properties
4. Intelligible Physical Reality and a Principle of Constrained Contingency
5. Extensible Qualities as a Factor in the Development of Physical Reality: A Problem
6. The Problem of Influence for Extensible Qualities in Physical Reality: A Solution
7. Mutually Isolated Concrete Worlds and Distinct Eons of the Actual World
8. Mightn't the Recognized Physical Properties just Be Spatially Extensible Qualities?
9. The Identity Theory of Qualities and Dispositions
10. A Limited Identity Theory?
11. Can There Be Spatially Extensible Yellow Entities that Aren't Ever Propensitized?
12. Can an Extensible Blue Body be Attracted by Concreta that Aren't Blue-Attractors?
13. Can an Extensible Blue Body be Perceived to be Extensible Blue?
14. We Consider an Antinomy of Spatially Extensible Quality
15. The Ontological Parity of Qualities and Propensities: By Contrast with Hume
16. The Ontological Parity of Qualities and Propensities: By Contrast with Lewis
17. What May We Learn from Our Demystification of the Physical?
18. Remarks on What's been Done and on What's to Come

#### **4. A CORNUCOPIA OF QUALITY**

1. The Qualities Most Available to Me Are My Own When Consciously Experiencing
2. Our Power to Experience Promotes Our Conceiving Concrete Individuals
3. Our Power to Experience Visually Promotes Our Conceiving Concrete Spatial Things
4. Might Our Idea of Spatially Extensible Color Be Our Most Central Concept of Color?
5. Our Power to Experience Auditorally Can't Promote Such Full Spatial Conceiving
6. Might an Extensible Red Object be Qualitatively Like an Experiential Red Subject?
7. The Great Range of Color for Spatially Extended Concreta
8. Contrasting Quality Families and a Sketchy Speculation
9. Transparently Colored Bodies and Opaquely Colored Bodies: A Neglected Distinction
10. Is this Neglected Distinction Philosophically Significant?
11. Conscious Perceiving as an Aid to Fuller Conceiving
12. Full Conceiving of Concreta is both Experiential and Intellectual
13. Extrapolating from the Highly Experiential in Conceiving Spatial Individuals
14. Conceiving Concreta All Qualified Uniformly, but Propensitized Quite Variously
15. Are Felt Bodily Qualities Well Suited to Conceiving Nonmental Individuals?

16. How Well Do We Conceive Insensate Bodies as Pervaded with Tangible Qualities?
17. Extensible Qualities, Experiential Qualities and Powers to Affect Experientially
18. Why Our Idea of Spatially Extensible Color May Be Our Most Central Idea of Color
19. We Focus on Substantive Metaphysics, not Natural Languages or Conceptual Relations

## **5. A PLENITUDE OF POWER**

1. The Idea that All Propensities concern Something as to Quality
2. Power-directed Powers (Propensities with respect to Propensities)
3. Power-directed Powers May Distinctively Distinguish Among Other Powers
4. Propensity, Possibility, Accident and Probability
5. Power-directed Powers and Probabilistic Propensities of Very Low Degree
6. Powers are Nonconditional, including Powers to Acquire, and Powers to Lose, Other Powers
7. Standard Scientific Thinking and Generalistically-directed Propensities
8. Individualistically-directed Propensities
9. Individualistically-directed Propensities and Cartesian Dualism
10. Individualistic Propensities and the Intellectual Aspect of Our Conceiving
11. Self-directed Propensities: A Special Case of Individualistically-directed Propensities
12. A Human's Self-directed Propensities with respect to Her Own Experiencing
13. Can There be Any Concrete Entities that Aren't Ever Propensitized?
14. Scientiphicalism, Self-directed Propensity and Experiential Awareness
15. Temporal Monotony and Temporal Change
16. Propensity for Monotony and Propensity for Change
17. Possibility, Accident, Probability and Self-directed Propensity
18. Basic Concreta, Propensity for Annihilation and Propensity for Continuation
19. Self-Directed Propensities with respect to Propensities: The Basis of Stable Monotony
20. Thinking about OTHERONS: A Good Long-Term Investment for Substantial Dualists?
21. The Confused Idea of a World's Default Setting
22. Time Without Change
23. Do Our Reciprocal Propensity Partners Present a Cosmic Miracle?

## **6. IS FREE WILL COMPATIBLE WITH SCIENTIPHICALISM?**

1. A Few Points about Real Choice
- 2. Free Will and Determinism, Real Choice and Inevitabilism:  
Not an Urgent Issue**

### **3. A Widely Disturbing Argument Presents a More Urgent Issue**

#### **4. Real Choice (Free Will) Is Incompatible with Inevitabilism (Determinism)**

5. Is Real Choice Incompatible with the *Denial* of Inevitabilism?

6. Our Scientiphical Metaphysic and the Currently Dominant Conception of Ourselves

#### **7. Simple Physical Entities and Their Basic Properties**

#### **8. Reciprocal Propensities and Physical Laws**

#### **9. Objective Probabilities, Random Happenings and Real Choices**

#### **10. Can Inhering in a Field Help Us Have Real Choice?**

#### **11. Can an “Infinitely Deep Hierarchy” of Physical Powers Help Us Have Real Choice?**

#### **12. Radically Emergent Beings with a Radically Emergent Power to Choose**

13. Physical-and-Mental Complexes with a Radically Emergent Power to Choose

14. The Scientiphically Supposed Causal Closure of the Physical: How Much a Side-Issue?

15. Are Physically Effective Choosing Souls Compatible with Physical Conservation Laws?

16. Are Physically Effective Choosing Souls Compatible with Other Physical Principles?

17. Radically Self-Directed Power

18. An Exemption from Natural Law Is Required for Real Choice

19. The Real Reason Why an Exemption from Natural Law Is Required for Real Choice

20. Apparent Scientiphical Incompatibilisms and Further Philosophical Explorations

### **7. WHY WE REALLY MAY BE IMMATERIAL SOULS**

1. Recalling the Problem of the Many

2. A Couple of Comments on that Comparatively Uninteresting Problem

3. The Experiential Problem of the Many

4. How the Singularity of Experiencing May Favor Substantial Dualism

5. Many Overlapping Experiencers, but only One of Them Now Experiencing?

6. Some Cases of Singular Causal Resolution

7. An Immaterial Experiencer’s Causally Resolved Singularity Is a Relevant Singularity

8. These Are Metaphysical Matters, Transcending All Purely Semantic Issues

9. These Problems Transcend Questions of Spatial Boundary: On Complex Complexes

10. Problems of Propensitively Redundant Propensitive Contributors
11. Our Experiential Problem Doesn't Presuppose any Suspicious Identifications
12. The Problem of Too Many Real Choosers
13. Wholly Immaterial Souls Favored over Emergentist Physical-and-Mental Complexes
14. A Singular Physical Manifestation of Many Choosers's Powers to Choose?
15. Do These Problems Favor Substantial Dualism over Its Most Salient Alternatives
16. Some Less Salient Options to a Quasi-Cartesian Substantial Dualism
17. Aren't Immaterial Souls Really Just Elimidable Middlemen?
18. Wholly Immaterial Souls Are Generated Abruptly, Not Gradually
19. Our Own Souls and the Wholly Immaterial Souls of Nonhuman Animals
20. Metaphysically Material Ruminations about Extraordinarily Different Gestations
21. People and Nonhuman Animals Again: Might All Souls be Equally Powerful Individuals?
22. Bodily Flexibility as regards Individualistically-directed Soulful Propensity
23. Taking Stock and Moving On

APPENDIX: Beyond Discriminative Vagueness, Safe from Nihilistic Sorites

## **8. WHY WE MAY BECOME DISEMBODED, BUT TO NO AVAIL**

1. Why We May Become Disembodied Souls, with the Deaths of Our Brains and Bodies
2. Even while You may be an Immaterial Soul, Are You really an Existential OTHERON?
3. Immaterial OTHERONS are just as Problematic as Material OTHERONS
4. Metaphysical Asymmetries and Further Forms of Substantial Dualism
5. Some Questions about Disembodiment, and about Reincarnation
6. Prospects for Disembodiment
7. Even if We Disembodied Souls Last for Eons, What Are Our Prospects for Experiencing?
8. What are Our Prospects for Reincarnation?
9. The Question of Disembodied Souls and the Question of an Almighty Creator
10. Why Our Long-Term Prospects May Be Very Bleak Prospects

## **9. THE PROBLEM OF OUR UNCONSCIOUS QUALITY**

1. Physical Objects Aptly Qualified, Experiencers Differently Qualified Just as Aptly
2. Every Individual Is Qualified, Including You and Me
3. We Reconsider the Problem of Our Unconscious Quality
4. We Notice How Heroically Descartes Heroically Denies this Problem
5. A Quasi-Humean Substantial Dualist May Heroically Deny the Problem

6. A “Compositist” Substantial Dualist May Similarly Deny the Problem
7. Will Unconscious Experiential Quality Provide a Less Heroic Dualistic Answer?
8. How Fully May Dualists Offer a Speculative Answer to the Problem?

## **10. HOW RICH IS CONCRETE REALITY?**

1. Sameness and Difference of Concrete Individuals
2. Conceiving Nonspatial Simultaneous Souls, Always Precisely Alike
3. Berkeleyan Idealism: Even if just Modestly Grasped, It might Be True
4. Cartesian Dualism: Even if just Modestly Grasped, It also might Be True
5. Substantial Individuals and Our Conceptions as to Such Concrete Particulars
6. We Prepare an Analogy between the Properly Spatial and the Relevantly Spacelike
7. The Hypothesis of Spacelike Extension: An Analogical Speculation
8. The Deflationary Approach: An Apparent Alternative
9. An Hypothesized Dimension Far More Like Space than Like Time
10. Our Fullest Conceptions of Spatial Bodies
11. An Analogical Conception of Nonspatial Souls
12. Our Hypothesis Allows More Fully Conceivable Substantial Dualist Views
13. NonDualistic Forms of this Hypothesis: Integrated and NonIntegrated Dimensions
14. How Might We Nonspatial Souls Precede even Our Initial Physical Embodiment?
15. Do Immaterial Souls Ever Change Propensitively?
16. A More Complex Quasi-Emergentive Dualism: A Constitutional View of Souls
17. Drawbacks of this Constitutional View
18. Fusional Dualism
19. Our Hypothesized Dualism and the Mental Problems of the Many
20. Our Hypothesized Dualism and the Problem of Our Unconscious Quality
21. Recalling and Addressing the Question of Nicely Matched Propensity Partners
22. Our Hypothesized Dualism and the Question of Nicely Matched Propensity Partners
23. Does Our Hypothesized Dualism Make My Current Quality Too Inaccessible?
24. Two Cartesian Arguments for Some Spacelike Substantial Dualism
25. Is Reality’s Temporal Aspect Uniquely Distinctive?
26. Why Are Our Concrete Conceptions of Such Limited Variety?