Hume’s Morality is a most useful and agreeable book. It contains a wealth of analysis, argument, and insight about many of the most central elements of the moral theory of one of the greatest moral philosophers in human history: David Hume. The book is well-conceived, well-argued, stimulating, informative, clear, precise, thorough, balanced, nuanced, and ingenious, while evincing—especially in its concluding chapter, when considering possible extensions of Hume’s theory—a certain subtle but pleasing “warmth in the cause of virtue.” As Hume would be the first to recognize, these traits of the book are indications of the personal merit of its author: Cohon Cohon. Indeed, if Cleanthes is the ideal son-in-law, then Cohon is the ideal philosophical colleague: curious (i.e., having “a love of truth”), deep, clever, wise, sensitive, benevolent, cooperative, conscientious, fair-minded, prudent, and fun to be around, with a due degree of pride in her excellence work but also exhibiting a gracious gratitude: among her many acknowledgements, the first is to the Hume Society as whole. It is an honor to participate in the Hume Society’s symposium on Cohon’s outstanding and important book.

As Cohon has explained, her book has two parts, corresponding to the two terms of her subtitle: ‘feeling’ and ‘fabrication’. Each of the two parts begins by introducing a triad of propositions that structures much of the subsequent discussion in that part. Although it requires passing over in silence many excellent discussions of other topics, I will organize my comments in what follows around these two important triads of propositions, indicating where I agree with Cohon’s interpretation of Hume and where I do not. Happily, I agree
more often than not; where I do not (yet) agree, I will aim to pose questions for Cohon’s interpretation.

I. Feeling: The Common Reading

The first part of Cohon’s book is organized around the three elements of what she calls the “Common Reading” of Hume. These are: (i) “ethical non-cognitivism,” the doctrine that moral judgments have no truth-value; (ii) “the logical fact/value gap” (aka “Hume’s Law”), the doctrine that evaluative propositions cannot be properly inferred from purely factual propositions; and (iii) “the Motivational Inertia of Belief,” the doctrine that belief alone cannot cause (voluntary) actions.

*Ethical Non-Cognitivism.** Cohon and I have long agreed in rejecting the interpretation of Hume as an ethical non-cognitivist,¹ and we generally read the key passages in much the same way, emphasizing the analogy he draws with secondary qualities (as they are conceived by what he calls “the modern philosophy”) and recognizing a crucial distinction between *feeling moral sentiments* and *making moral judgments.* When it comes to the moral epistemology behind Hume’s cognitivism, I share Radcliffe’s worry about Cohon’s prediction-based explanation of *why* we adopt the “common [i.e., “general”] point of view” as a standard of moral judgment. I also have a question, however, about Cohon’s account of Hume’s moral metaphysics—specifically, her description of him as a “moral anti-realist,” on the grounds that he regards moral properties as “reaction-dependent” relational properties, so that “the viciousness of an action or character is a property that depends for its existence on human beings’ experiencing a feeling of disapproval when they contemplate it” (115).²

Certainly Hume holds that the *concept* of “vice”—and so also the “attribute,” in the eighteenth century sense of “a quality that is attributed”—depends on the existence of human
moral sensibility; but I am less confident about his view of the property itself. To be sure, Cohon quotes passages in which Hume says that vice and virtue, like beauty and deformity and also like various secondary qualities (again “according to the modern philosophy”) are only feelings or perceptions in the mind of an observer (115, 121). But as she acknowledges, these passages do not say that vice and virtue are relational reaction-dependent properties; quite the contrary, the passages describe them as fully intrinsic properties or contents of a mind. So what is going on? Locke and many other proponents of “the modern philosophy” regularly and quite explicitly treat color terms as ambiguous—terms like ‘warm’ or ‘white’, for example, can designate for Locke either a color “as it is in the body” (that is, as a power or physical structure and movement of corpuscles) or “as it is an idea.” In cases where a feature of a thing produces an impression that does not resemble it, Hume seems quite willing to follow this Lockean lead, using the same term to designate either the categorical causal basis for the impression or the impression itself. He notably asserts that causal “power,” too, is “only in the mind”—but this does not prevent him from regularly ascribing causal powers to bodies, nor from asserting forcefully that the causal “operations of nature” that rely on these powers are in fact “independent of our thought and reasoning” (T 1.3.14.29; SBN 168).

The Logical Fact/Value Gap (“Hume’s Law”). Cohon rightly states that Hume’s famous paragraph (T 3.1.1.27; SBN 469-70) about deducing ‘ought’ from ‘is’ does not deny that moral judgments concern matters of fact, and she quite rightly observes that he allows inferences from factual judgments about moral sentiments to moral judgments.

The Inertia of Belief. A key premise in Hume’s argument that moral distinctions are not derived from reason is his famous and oft-repeated dictum that “reason alone can never produce any action.” This dictum is often interpreted as entailing that a belief must interact
with a previously existing occurrent passion—even if the passion is only the “calm” one of desire for pleasure or aversion to pain—in order to produce action. Cohon argues convincingly against this common interpretation. Hume regularly treats beliefs about future pleasures or pains as motivating, and it is implausible, both textually and philosophically, to suppose that one is always already feeling the calm desire for pleasure, the calm aversion to pain, or some other passion whenever this occurs. In support of Cohon’s interpretation, let me add two further considerations that she does not mention. First, pleasure-seeking and pain-avoiding actions are ubiquitous; but any single occurrent passion that persisted through one’s entire life would run afoul of Hume’s claim, in discussing personal identity, that “there is no impression constant and invariable” through “the whole course of our lives” (T 1.4.6.2; SBN 251). Second, Hume explicitly states that the mere thought of sex—“the reflecting on it,” especially, but not exclusively, in the observed presence of beauty—can excite the appetite of lust in the absence of any previously felt occurrent passion; and that appetite or desire, in turn, can move the will to action (T 2.2.11.6; SBN 396).

Cohon goes further, however, to argue that while Hume regards reason alone as unable to produce action, he does regard belief alone as able to do so. She proposes that this is because reason, or reasoning, is for Hume a process that has belief—rather than passions, volitions, or actions—as its proper or defining outcome, and any process “alone”—i.e., without another process—can “produce” only its defining outcome. Hence, “reason alone,” on this interpretation, cannot produce action, even though its defining outcome, belief, can by itself be causally sufficient for action by first producing an intermediate desire or other motivating passion.

I have three main worries about this interpretation. The first I share with Radcliffe: it seems to make Hume’s famous dictum too weak to support the edifice he means to erect on
it. Indeed, it threatens to make the dictum true simply by definition; Cohon herself says that it can be known “a priori,” on her interpretation, that reason cannot produce actions unless actions are beliefs (85). Yet Hume’s main argument for it in *Treatise* 2.3.3 (“Of the influencing motives of the will”) invokes the need for a motivational “impulse” that only passion (as what he calls a further causal “principle”) and not reason can provide. This, as Cohon remarks earlier, certainly looks like an empirical argument for a substantive causal conclusion (16). Second, the interpretation requires Hume to accept and tacitly rely on a controversial thesis about the non-transitivity of causal production for the special case of processes; Cohon argues inventively for this thesis; still, the arguments are hers and not Hume’s. Third, it does not seem to fit well with Hume’s repeated claim that moral distinctions are unlike reason in the relevant action-producing respect. Cohon interprets this as the claim that “the process of drawing moral distinctions” does produce action. But since she also claims that Hume treats the qualifier ‘alone’ as unnecessary (because implicitly understood) in specifying what a process produces (76), this seems to commit her to interpreting Hume as claiming that the process of making moral distinctions produces action as its defining outcome. Moreover, it seems that she must interpret Hume this way in order to render valid her reconstruction of Hume’s argument as one about the non-identity of processes (82). *Prima facie*, however, the process of moral distinction-making just has a moral distinction (i.e., a moral evaluation) as its defining outcome; action is at best something sometimes later produced by that outcome—just as it is also sometimes produced by belief, the outcome of reasoning, on Cohon’s account.

I think it would be better to interpret Hume as claiming that reason as a *faculty* is always by itself causally insufficient to move the will, since “the passions,” as a *separate* faculty, must always be involved as well (in order to provide, as he argues, a motivational “impulse”
of “concern”). This does not require that the faculty of the passions already have produced a passion *antecedent* to the belief; it only requires that it must make some distinctive contribution of its own, via the production or reproduction of a passion, before the action can occur. This is clearly a causal claim: in the absence of a passionate nature (i.e., the capacity to have any passions) normal exercises of the faculty of reason could not give rise to any voluntary action. (Compare: the faculty of opening one’s eyes is not causally sufficient for reading, since one must also have the faculty of focusing—even if one was not actually exercising that faculty before opening one’s eyes.) Furthermore, it is a causal claim for which Hume at least suggests some evidence in his “impulse” argument of *Treatise* 2.3.3: we find a lack or diminution of motivation to particular acts in the absence or diminution of the capacity to feel passions of concern relative to those actions. This straightforwardly causal claim requires no controversial doctrines about the transitivity of causation.

II. Fabrication: The Puzzle of Honesty

The second part of the book prominently features what Cohon calls a “puzzle” about honesty—meaning by this latter term *respect for property*, which Hume more frequently calls “justice” and also calls “equity.” The puzzle consists of three jointly inconsistent propositions that, Cohon claims, Hume seems to accept in the course of his so-called “Circle Argument,” his main argument for the conclusion that honesty is an artificial virtue (T 3.2.1)—that is, a virtue depending on an “artifice or contrivance.” The three elements of the puzzle are (i) that honesty is a virtue; (ii) that there is in human nature a virtuous non-moral motive to any kind of virtuous action; and (iii) that there is no virtuous non-moral motive to honest action. A *non-moral* motive, in this context, is one that—unlike the motive of duty—does not “have a regard to the morality” of the action. Cohon argues that Hume avoids the
joint inconsistency of these three doctrines by accepting the first and the third but rejecting the second—the requirement of a virtuous non-moral motive in human nature for every kind of virtuous action. On her interpretation, he grants that this requirement applies to natural virtues but denies that it applies to artificial virtues. Because Hume gives a parallel argument for the artificiality of fidelity (i.e., promise-keeping) as a virtue, Cohon notes a parallel puzzle for fidelity, for which she gives a parallel solution.

**Honesty as a Virtue.** David Gauthier and (arguably) Knud Haakonssen have interpreted Hume as accepting the second and third elements of the puzzle and as denying the first: that honesty is a genuine virtue. I agree with Cohon that this proposal is implausible. Hume’s lists of the virtues consistently include “justice” (what Cohon calls “honesty”) and “fidelity,” and at no point does he show any inclination to revise his classification of them; indeed, the penultimate appendix to *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals* (his last exclusively moral work) is devoted to them specifically as virtues.

**The Motive Requirement.** Cohon’s remedy, however, seems to me to be no less desperate in its own way; it is to interpret Hume as rejecting the second element of the paradox specifically on the grounds that *some* kinds of virtuous action can after all be virtuous without reference to any virtuous non-moral motive. She proposes this despite the fact that the requirement of such a motive is a key premise in his argument for the artificiality of honesty (and again, a few sections later, of fidelity); indeed, she remarks that Hume himself characterizes this second element of the puzzle as something that, in his words, “may be establish’d as an undoubted maxim.” Interpreting Hume as rejecting something that he calls an “undoubted maxim” is problematic enough; but it also requires (as Cohon fully acknowledges) interpreting Hume as rejecting what we may call his “Core Virtue Ethics Thesis”: namely, that the moral merit of an action is derived entirely from the moral merit of
the virtuous “motive” of which it is a sign. For it is directly from this thesis that Hume derives the requirement of a virtuous non-moral motive to honesty at the outset of the Circle Argument (T 3.2.1.2-4; SBN 477-8). On Cohon’s view, we somehow come to morally approve honest acts, because of their useful tendency, prior to morally approving any motive producing them; the only virtuous motive to their performance is thus duty itself, contrary to both the Core Virtue Ethics Thesis and the requirement of a virtuous non-moral motive to honesty that he derives from it.

Cohon’s strategy for mitigating the implausibility of this interpretation is to argue that Hume recognizes two “concepts” of virtue. One of these is a “natural” concept, applicable only to the natural (i.e., non-artificial) virtues, for which the Core Virtue Ethics Thesis and the requirement of a virtuous non-moral motive to honesty hold. The other is Hume’s own more inclusive concept, for which they do not hold. Perhaps because Hume continues to argue from these two doctrines in his discussion of fidelity, even after he has concluded his discussion of honesty, Cohon asserts that Hume regards us as subject to an “irresistible illusion” that the “natural” concept is correct, so that we continue to insist on the requirement of a virtuous non-moral motive to honesty and fidelity even when we see that no such motives exist. When Hume seems to be insisting repeatedly on the truth of this principle, on Cohon’s reading, he is really only expressing its continuing attraction to us as a result of the “natural” concept of virtue.

I confess that I do not yet find this “two-concept” view in Hume’s text. His two official definitions of ‘virtue’ are both clearly definitions that include artificial virtues within their scope; I see no signs of any more limited concept. And I am unsure who the “we” are who are supposed to be subject to the illusion. Hume seems to regard both the Core Virtue Ethics Thesis and the consequent requirement of a virtuous non-moral motive to any virtuous kind
of action as philosophical discoveries; as far as I can see, he does not attribute them to the
vulgar at all. On Cohon’s interpretation, he himself clearly recognizes their falsity, and there
is thus no obvious reason why we his readers should not be able to do the same, even if we
have not previously understood the conventional origins of honesty and fidelity that Hume
explains.10

Nonetheless, I agree that Hume rejects the second element of the puzzle as Cohon
actually formulates it; for her formulation conflates two distinct claims that Hume makes.11

The first claim, derived from the Core Virtue Ethics Thesis, is what we may call the First
Virtuous Motive Principle:

The first virtuous motive, which bestows a merit on any action, can never be a
regard to the virtue of that action, but must be some other natural [i.e., non-moral]
motive or principle. (T 3.2.1.4; SBN 478)

The second claim, which he derives from the First Virtuous Motive Principle, is what he
actually calls an “undoubted maxim”:

No action can be virtuous, or morally good, unless there be in human nature some
motive to produce it, distinct from the sense of its morality. (T 3.2.1.7; SBN 479)

Hume does not claim that for any kind of virtuous action the same motive must always be
both the original non-moral motive in human nature and the first virtuous non-moral motive;
in the case of honesty (and also of fidelity), he does not think they are.

The Motive to Honesty. Cohon argues persuasively that self-interest, even when
“enlightened” by knowledge of the benefits of conventions of property, cannot be the “first
virtuous motive other than duty” to honest action: acting from prudence is not the same thing
as acting from the virtue of honesty, and self-interest is, in general, hardly a virtuous motive
at all. But it does not follow from this (i) that self-interest is not the original motive in human
nature to honest action, nor does it follow (ii) that there is no virtuous non-moral motive to honest action other than duty. On the contrary, Hume’s detailed account of the origin of honesty is the account of how self-interest (i) motivates honest action when it “restrains itself” through motivating adoption of the conventions of property, uniform conformity to which one sees to be in one’s own interest; and (ii) creates in the process a “new motive” (in a phrase that Hume uses in relation to fidelity at T 3.2.5.10; SBN 521) that is virtuous and non-moral, but not “original in human nature” because dependent on a convention. This new motive is the desire and subsequent disposition to regulate one’s behavior by the rules of justice as what he calls a “scheme” or policy, without weighing assessments of individual acts for their individual costs and benefits (T 3.2.2.22; SBN 497–8). Self-interest can successfully “restrain itself” to the convention of justice only by creating this new motive. This new motive is not a motive of moral duty—the thought that honesty is a virtue at all arises only after the disposition arises and is seen to be beneficial to society as well as oneself and one’s circle—but it is a virtuous motive nonetheless, for anyone who acts on a desire to follow the rules of justice as a policy or scheme is useful to the public, with whom we sympathize, and thereby receives our moral approbation. Thus, the proper solution to the “puzzle of honesty” requires that we also reject its third element: the claim that there is no virtuous non-moral motive to honest action.

There are three main reasons, I believe, why Cohon—and others as well—have not recognized this solution, despite its many advantages as an interpretation of the text. The first lies in the conflation of the First Virtuous Motive Principle with the Undoubted Maxim, which prevents them from distinguishing between the original motive in human nature (self-interest) and the virtuous artificial motive (desire and disposition to adhere to the conventions of property as a policy) that it creates. The second lies in two passages Cohon cites (167) as
supporting the third element of the puzzle—that is, as denying that there is any virtuous non-moral motive to honesty. One of these passages, from the Treatise, was originally cited by Gauthier; the other, from the essay “Of the Original Contract,” was originally cited Stephen Darwall. In fact, however, neither passage denies that there is any virtuous non-moral motive to honesty. The first says only that there is no natural—i.e., non-artificial—non-moral motive to honesty; the second states only that honesty is motivated by a sense of obligation—which, in context, clearly includes what he calls the “natural obligation of self-interest” that first gives rise to the desire to act in accordance with the conventions of property, and not just the “moral” obligation that later attends it.

The third reason why Cohon and others have not recognized the simpler solution lies in their rejection of the possibility that Hume would recognize the virtuous non-moral motive that I have just described—the desire and disposition to regulate one’s actions by the rules of property as a “scheme” or policy. Darwall himself mentions this potential motive, but claims that Hume cannot consistently recognize it because it is incompatible with Hume’s hedonic (pleasure-and-pain-based) conative psychology. Cohon endorses this claim of Darwall’s largely without discussion (189). But—and this is my final question—where exactly is the problem? Hume’s explanation of why we make it a policy to follow the rules of property without weighing the consequences of individual acts of honesty and dishonesty (he later calls this “fixing an inviolable law to [one]self” [T 3.2.2.27; SBN 501]) is one that is itself driven by desire for pleasure and aversion to pain: it is because the policy of honesty will lead to greater benefits for oneself than any other policy, including that of trying to act on the weighing up of individual consequences, that one adopts it. No doubt making oneself into the kind of person who can consistently follow honesty as a policy is a challenging psychological task involving strength of mind, selective direction of attention, training, and habit. No doubt,
too, the separate motive of duty can usefully concur with this disposition, which is not a natural one to human beings. But none of this is to say that the desire and disposition to regulate one’s actions by the rules of property as a scheme or policy is not the first virtuous non-moral motive to honesty—the one that vindicates the core thesis of Hume virtue ethics.

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2 Presumably she doesn’t mean that the viciousness of a token action or character depends on someone’s actually noticing it and feeling disapproval, but only on the existence of human beings disposed to have that kind of feeling for that kind of action or character.


5 She nevertheless reads Hume’s claim that it “seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation [ought or ought not] can be a deduction from others [is or is not], which are entirely different from it” as meaning that it really is inconceivable (26); whereas I think it at least possible that he thinks of his own forthcoming account as explaining for the first time (against “vulgar systems of philosophy”) how such deductions are possible, when they are. This is a minor disagreement, however.

6 It may be true that we never experience a complete incapacity to feel desire for pleasure or aversion to pain in general. We can, however, reason causally about its consequences both (i) by analogy with desires for and aversions to other things and (ii) from the different effects on action of different degrees of desire or aversion to pleasure and pain generally.

7 It should be noted that Cohon argues against the idea that, when a belief about “pleasure or pain in store” occurs in the absence of an already occurring passion, Hume can distinguish a separate standing element within the mind as a necessary causal contributor to action. This seems to me to underestimate Hume’s capacity to conceive, infer, and distinguish unexperienced causes by means of the thoroughgoing causal determinism he accepts on inductive grounds. The project of “mental geography” that he proposes in section 1 paragraph 13 of *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding* (The Clarendon Editions of the Texts of David Hume, ed. Tom L. Beauchamp [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000]) is precisely one of “delineation of the distinct parts and powers of the mind” (emphasis added).


10 Hume does invoke our ignorance of the conventional origins of fidelity in order to explain the attraction of the view that promising is an act of the mind; but this is quite different from saying that we are irresistibly compelled to accept the requirement of a virtuous non-moral motive to fidelity.

11 Here is Cohon’s official formulation of the second element of the puzzle:
For every virtue there is in human nature some non-moral motive … that characteristically produces actions expressive of that virtue, and that, by eliciting our approval, renders virtuous the actions that are so motivated. (167)

The text offered as explicit support (166) for attributing this view to Hume is just Hume’s own statement (quoted above) of the “undoubted maxim,” which does not mention a virtuous motive.

12 Op. cit. The passage reads:

From all this it follows, that we have naturally no real or universal motive for observing the laws of equity [i.e., the rules of justice], but the very equity and merit of that observance; and as no action can be equitable or meritorious, where it cannot arise from some separate motive, there is here an evident sophistry and reasoning in a circle. (T 3.2.1.17; SBN 483)

The term ‘naturally’ did not appear in the first edition version of this passage, but Hume clearly intended it, since he added it to his own personal copy. Gauthier also cites a similar passage about the motive to fidelity from the parallel argument about fidelity (T 3.2.5.6; SBN 518-19). However, attention to both the context of the argument and its logical structure show that an implicit limitation to natural motives is clearly intended. Hume often states the restriction explicitly (while also occasionally leaving it tacit to avoid tedium) in surrounding sentences, and the argument makes no sense without it. See the discussion of this argument in my “The First Motive to Justice: Hume’s Circle Argument Squared,” cited previously.


All moral duties may be divided into two kinds: The first are those, to which men are impelled by a natural instinct or immediate propensity, which operates on them, independent of all ideas of obligation ….

The second kind of moral duties are such as are not supported by any original instinct of nature, but are performed entirely from a sense of obligation, when we consider the necessities of human society, and the impossibility of supporting it, if these duties were neglected. It is thus justice or a regard to the property of others, fidelity or the observance of promises, become obligatory, and acquire an authority over mankind. For as it is evident, that every man loves himself better than any other person, he is naturally impelled to extend his acquisitions as much as possible; and nothing can restrain him in this propensity, but reflection and experience, by which he learns the pernicious effects of that licence, and the total dissolution of society which must ensue from it. His original inclination, therefore, or instinct, is here checked and restrained by a subsequent judgment or observation.

The case is precisely the same with the political or civil duty of allegiance, as with the natural duties of justice and fidelity. Our primary instincts lead us, either to indulge ourselves in unlimited freedom, or to seek dominion over others: And it is reflection only, which engages us to sacrifice such strong passions to the interests of peace and public order. A small degree of experience and observation suffices to teach us, that society cannot possibly be maintained without the authority of magistrates, and that this authority must soon fall into contempt, where exact obedience is not payed to it. The observation of these general and obvious interests is the source of all allegiance, and of that moral obligation, which we attribute to it. (David Hume, “Of the Original Contract,” in Essays Moral, Political, and Literary, edited by Eugene F. Miller [Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, Inc., 1978]: 479-80)