References

- Bourget, D. *Forthcoming*. ‘Consciousness is Underived Intentionality.’ *Noûs*.
Byrne, D. 1997. ‘Some Like It HOT: Consciousness and Higher Order Thoughts.’ *Philosophical Studies* 86: 103-129.


• Kriegel, U. *Ms.* ‘Two Notions of Mental Representation.’
• Kroon, F. *Forthcoming.* ‘Phenomenal Intentionality and the Role of Intentional Objects.’
• Lesson, S.B. *Ms.* ‘Why Transparency is not For-Me.’


- Pautz, A. *Forthcoming.* *The Intentional Structure of Consciousness: A Primitivist Account.*


• Slors, M. 1996. ‘Why Dennett Cannot Explain What It is to Adopt the Intentional Stance.’ Philosophical Quarterly 46: 93-98.
• Smithies, D. Ms. ‘The Mental Lives of Zombies.’
• Thompson, B. Forthcoming. ‘The Spatial Content of Experience.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
• Wilberg, J.R. Forthcoming. ‘Consciousness and False HOTs.’ Philosophical Psychology.