Ned Block
Room 405
New York, NY 10003
tel: (212) 998-8322
fax: (212) 995-4179
or (212) 475-2338
e-mail: ned.blockATSIGNnyu.edu
NED BLOCK (Ph.D., Harvard), Silver Professor of Philosophy, Psychology and Neural Science, came to NYU in 1996 from MIT where he was Chair of the
Philosophy Program. He works in philosophy of mind and foundations of
neuroscience and cognitive science and is currently writing a book on
consciousness. He is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, has been a Guggenheim Fellow, a
Senior Fellow of the Center for the Study of Language and Information, a Sloan Foundation Fellow, a faculty member at two National Endowment for the
Humanities Summer
Institutes and two Summer
Seminars, the recipient of fellowships from the National Endowment for the Humanities the American Council of Learned Societies and the National
Science Foundation; and a recipient of the
Robert A. Muh Alumni Award in Humanities and Social
Science from MIT. He is a past president
of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, a past Chair of the MIT Press Cognitive Science Board, and
past President of the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness. The Philosophers' Annual selected his papers as one of the "ten best" in 1983, 1990, 1995 and 2002. He is
co-editor of The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates (MIT Press, 1997).
The first of two volumes of his collected papers, Functionalism, Consciousness and Representation, MIT Press came out in May, 2007. There was a workshop ÒThemes from Ned BlockÓ
at the Australian
National University in 2003. In 2008-2009,
he will be Distinguished Visiting
Professor, University of Hong Kong; Townsend Visitor,
University of California at Berkeley; Hilgard
Visiting Professor, Stanford; Smart Lecturer at
Australian National University; Efron Symposiast, Pomona College; and
Distinguished Visitor, University of Warwick. In 2010, he will give the Josiah Royce
Lectures at Brown University, the Royal Institute of Philosophy Annual Lecture,
and he will give lectures to the Japanese
Neuroscience Society and the National
Institute for Physiological Sciences in Okazaki. Some of his recent papers are available below.
Click
here (or to download a
Quicktime version here)
for Section 1 of the 1995 ÒBlock PanelÓ interview of W.V. Quine on the inverted
spectrum and related issues. Section 2, Section 3
(in which Quine gives a qualified endorsement of an inverted spectrum)
Articles in Handbooks or
Encyclopedias
Articles in Handbooks or Encyclopedias
"Consciousness"(in R. Gregory (ed.) Oxford Companion
to the Mind, second edition
2004) Russian version here
"Qualia"
(in R. Gregory (ed.) Oxford Companion to the Mind, second edition, 2004)
"Consciousness" (in Encyclopedia of
Cognitive Science, edited by Lynn
Nadel. New York, NY, Nature Publishing Group, 2003.)
"Holism, Mental and Semantic" (in The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1998)
"Semantics, Conceptual Role" (in The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1998)
"What is Functionalism?" (a revised version of the entry on functionalism in The Encyclopedia
of Philosophy Supplement, Macmillan, 1996)
"The Mind as the Software of the Brain" (An
Invitation to Cognitive Science, edited by D. Osherson, L. Gleitman, S.
Kosslyn, E. Smith and S. Sternberg, MIT Press, 1995)
"Qualia"
from S. Guttenplan (ed) A Companion to Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell: Oxford
ÒComparing
the Major Theories of Consciousness,Ó forthcoming in The Cognitive Neurosciences IV, Michael Gazzaniga (ed.) MIT Press
Argues
that the existence of the explanatory gap provides a reason to believe a
biological account of consciousness rather than a global workspace account or a
higher order account.
ÒFunctional ReductionÓ, forthcoming in a festschrift for Jaegwon Kim, Supervenience in
Mind, edited by Terry Horgan, Marcelo
Sabates and David Sosa.
This paper argues that the functional reduction picture of reductive
explanation, a picture shared by proponents such as David Lewis and
opponents such as Jaegwon Kim, David Chalmers and Frank Jackson,
misses an important insight in the reductionist point of view
ÒConsciousness
and Cognitive AccessÓ, Proceedings
of the Aristotelian Society, 108, Issue 1 pt 3 (October 2008), p.
289-317. This is a much
shorter version of the paper below, aimed more at philosophers than scientists,
and incorporating improved formulations and replies to some of the commentators
listed below.
ÓConsciousness,
Accessibility and the Mesh between Psychology and Neuroscience,Ó in Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30, published in 2008 but backdated to 2007, 481-548,
along with 32 commentaries (available here)
by Balog, Burge, Byrne Hilbert & Siegel, Clark & Kiverstein, Gopnik,
Grush, Harman, Hulme & Whitely, Izard Quinn & Most, Jacob, Kentridge,
Koch & Tsuchiya, Kouider, Gardelle & Dupoux, Lamme, Landman &
Sligte, Lau & Persaud, Laureys, Levine, Lycan, Malach, McDermott, Naccache
& Dehaene, OÕRegan & Myin, Prinz, Rosenthal, Sergent & Rees,
Shanahan & Baars, Snodgrass & Lepisto, Spener, Tye and Van Gulick; and authorÕs
replies.
How can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the
neural machinery of the cognitive access that underlies reports of phenomenal
consciousness? We can see the problem in stark form if we ask how we
could tell whether representations inside a Fodorian module are phenomenally
conscious. The methodology would seem straightforward: find the neural
natural kinds that are the basis of phenomenal consciousness in clear cases
when subjects are completely confident and we have no reason to doubt their
authority, and look to see whether those neural natural kinds exist within
Fodorian modules. But a puzzle arises: do we include the machinery
underlying reportability within the neural natural kinds of the clear cases?
If the answer is ÔYesÕ, then there can be no phenomenally conscious
representations in Fodorian modules. But how can we know the answer?
The suggested methodology requires an answer to the question it was
supposed to answer! The paper argues for an abstract solution to the problem
and exhibits a source of empirical data that is relevant, data that show that
in a certain sense phenomenal consciousness overflows cognitive accessibility.
The paper argues that we can find a neural realizer of this overflow if
assume that the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness does not include the
neural basis of cognitive accessibility and that this assumption is justified
(other things equal) by the explanations it allows.
ÒWittgenstein and QualiaÓ, Philosophical Perspectives 21, 1, 2007:
73-115, edited by John Hawthorne. The
version linked to here is a substantially revised version that is coming
out in a volume edited by Maria Baghramian in honor of Hilary Putnam as part of
Oxford University PressÕs Mind Association Occasional Series. The
published version is here
Wittgenstein (in notes published first in 1968) endorsed one kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis and rejected another.
This paper argues that the kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis that Wittgenstein
endorsed (the ÒinnocuousÓ inverted spectrum hypothesis) is the thin end of the wedge that
precludes a Wittgensteinian critique of the kind of inverted spectrum
hypothesis he rejected (the ÒdangerousÓ kind). The danger of the dangerous kind is that it provides an
argument for qualia, where qualia are (for the purposes of this paper) contents
of experiential states that cannot be fully captured in natural language. I will pinpoint the difference between
the innocuous and dangerous scenarios that matters for the argument for qualia,
give arguments in favor of the coherence and possibility of the dangerous
scenario, and try to show that some standard arguments against inverted spectra
are ineffective against the version of the dangerous scenario I will be
advocating. I will also agree with
what I think is WittgensteinÕs position that the kind of inverted spectrum
hypothesis he rejected lets qualia in the door. At one crucial point, I will rely on a less controversial
version of an argument I gave in Block (1999). WittgensteinÕs views provide a convenient starting point for
a paper that is much more about qualia than about Wittgenstein.
"Max BlackÕs Objection to Mind-Body Identity", in Oxford Studies
in Metaphysics, II, edited by Dean Zimmerman with
replies by John Perry and Stephen White, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 3-78. WhiteÕs reply here.
Table of Contents here. Also in Torin
Alter and Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge, Oxford University Press, 2006, 249-306. (Amusingly, the
simultaneous OUP publications of this article were copy-edited by different
copy-editors, leading to slightly different versions.)
The mind-body identity theorist says phenomenal property Q = brain property
B. But in stating or thinking this identity claim, donÕt we have to have a
further, unreduced, phenomenal property that serves as a mode of presentation
of Q? This paper argues that this suspicion underlies both JacksonÕs Knowledge Argument
and the famous glimpse of an argument that J. J. C. Smart
ascribed to Max Black. The
argument is presented, dissected and refuted.
"Bodily Sensations as an Obstacle for
Representationism", in Pain: New Essays on Its Nature and the Methodology of
Its Study, edited by Murat
Aydede, MIT
Press, 2005, 137-142
Review of Alva No‘, Action in
Perception, The Journal of Philosophy, CII, 5, May
2005, 259-272.
"Two Neural Correlates of Consciousness" This is a longer version of a paper in Trends in Cognitive Sciences, vol (9), 2, February 2005 The shorter published version
is here. This
paper was the top download from
the Trends in
Cognitive Sciences web site
of 2005 and was on ScienceDirectÕs list
of the Top 25 Hottest Articles of January-March, 2005 in the category of Neuroscience.
Review (or click here) of Patricia
ChurchlandÕs Brain-wise, Science 301,
2003, p. 1328
"Mental Paint" in Reflections and Replies, a book of essays on Tyler
Burge, with replies by Burge, edited by
Martin Hahn and Bjorn Ramberg and published by MIT
Press, 2003. Here is Burge's reply to this paper (perhaps slightly different from the published version).
"Do Causal Powers Drain Away?" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol.
67, No. 1 (July 2003), pp. 110-127, with a reply by Jaegwon Kim, "Blocking Causal Drainage and other Chores with
Mental Causation".
"Spatial Perception via Tactile Sensation", (or here) Trends in Cognitive Sciences Volume 7, Issue 7,
July 2003, Pages 285-286. This is a reply to Susan Hurley and Alva No‘, "Neural plasticity and consciousness". (Note: the journal incorrectly reversed the noun phrases
in the title.) Hurley's and No‘'s reply to me, "Neural plasticity and consciousness: Reply to
Block" from the August, 2003 issue.
"The Harder Problem of Consciousness", PDF version, from The Journal of
Philosophy XCIX, No. 8, August 2002, 1-35. The version that came out in The Journal of
Philosophy was shortened considerably because of space limitations in the
journal. Some of the cuts have been restored in the version here. (This version
appeared in Disputatio 15, November 2003.) For critiques, see Brian McLaughlin, "A Naturalist-Phenomenal Realist Response To Block's
Harder Problem", Philosophical Issues, 13, (2003):163-204
(The version linked to here may be slightly different from the published
version.), and Jakob Hohwy, "Evidence, Explanation, and Experience: On the
Harder Problem of Consciousness" Journal of
Philosophy, Volume CI, Number 5, May 2004 pp. 242-254 (Again, the version
linked to here may be slightly different from the published version.)
"Some Concepts of Consciousness" In Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary
Readings, David Chalmers (ed.) Oxford University Press, 2002.
"Paradox and Cross Purposes in Recent Work on
Consciousness". This is an expanded and revised version
of a commentary on all the papers in a special issue of Cognition (April, 2001) on the state of
the art in the neuroscience of consciousness. (The special issue has come out
separately: Stan Dehaene, ed., The Cognitive Neuroscience of Consciousness, M.I.T. Press, 2001) Two philosophers–Dan Dennett
and I–were asked to comment on all the scientists' papers. (We both made
some comments on each others' papers as well). Dennett's paper is available by
clicking here. If you want to
see the papers that Dennett and I commented on, see Cognition, Volume 79, Issues 1-2, Pages
1-237 (April 2001)
"Behaviorism Revisited".
This is a comment on J. K. O_Regan. and Alva No‘, "A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual
Consciousness" The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2001
(24:5).
"Sexism, Racism, Ageism and the Nature of
Consciousness", in The Philosophy of
Sydney Shoemaker, Philosophical Topics, 26, 1 and 2, 1999. Edited by Richard Moran, Jennifer
Whiting, and Alan Sidelle.
"Conceptual Analysis, Dualism and the Explanatory
Gap" (with
Robert Stalnaker) The Philosophical Review, January, 1999.
"Is Experiencing Just Representing?" (in a symposium on Michael Tye in Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, September, 1998).
"How Not to Find the Neural Correlate of
Consciousness" (in a volume of Royal
Institute of Philosophy lectures edited by Anthony O'Hear, 1998).
"Anti-Reductionism Slaps Back" Appeared in Mind, Causation, World, Philosophical
Perspectives 11, 1997, 107-133.
"On a Confusion about a Function of
Consciousness" (link to uncorrected
proof on BBS web site) The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1995. There is a more up to date version of
this in Block, Flanagan and G|zeldere, The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates (MIT Press, 1997) The
replies to the second round of critiques, "Biology versus computation in the study of
consciousness", Behavior and Brain Sciences 20:1,
159-165, 1997, are available here. The critics in
this round are Joseph Bogen, Selmer Bringsjord, Derek Browne, David Chalmers,
Denise Gamble, Daniel Gilman, GŸven GŸzeldere and Murat Aydede, Bruce Mangan,
Alva No‘, Ernst Pšppel, David Rosenthal, A.H.C. van der Heijden, P.T.W. Hudson
and A.G. Kurvink. Their critiques are available here.
"How Heritability Misleads about Race" (Cognition 56, 1995: pp. 99-128).
Shortened version of "How Heritability Misleads about
Race", "Race, Genes and IQ", or here (Boston Review, 1996).
"What is Dennett's Theory a Theory of?" (Philosophical Topics 22, 1 and 2, 1994, pp.
23-40).
"An Argument for Holism", in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New
Series, Vol XCIV, 1995, p.151-169.
"Mental Pictures and Cognitive Science" (The Philosophical Review, Volume 92, 4, Oct.
1983, pages 499-541.) Accessing this paper requires a password. The paper is
available without the password from JSTOR, although you may not be able to get it without a university account or
a paid subscription.
"Psychologism and Behaviorism", PDF version; from The Philosophical Review LXXXX, No. 1,
January 1981, 5-43.
Courses
Consciousness, Fall 2007
Minds & Machines,
Spring 2009
Philosophical
and Empirical Issues about Consciousness, Fall 2008 (joint Columbia/NYU
course with Hakwan Lau)
Consciousness,
Action and Attention, Spring 2008
Percepts and Concepts,
Fall 2005
(with Michael Strevens)
Research Seminar on Language and Mind: Consciousness, Spring 2005 (with Thomas Nagel)
Advanced Introduction to Philosophy of Mind, Fall 2003
Philosophy of Mind: Consciousness, Fall 2001
Research Seminar on Language and Mind: Consciousness, Spring 2000 (with Thomas Nagel)
Research Seminar on Language and Mind: Concepts, Spring 1998 (with Paul Boghossian)
Research Seminar on Language and Mind: Consciousness, Spring 1997 (with Thomas Nagel)
Metaphysics: Causation,
Fall 1997
(with Hartry Field)
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