Selecttive Guide to the Readings

Variables

[Develops an ‘algebraic’ semantics for first-order logic.]

[An account of Frege’s approach to quantification.]

[Introduces and defends the notion of an arbitrary object.]

[All over the place, but fascinating in its discussion of problems that have since been neglected.]

[Tarski’s original paper on the definition of truth. Heavy-going but worth the slog. Many textbooks on logic will provide a definition of truth-in-a-model.]

Names and Frege’s Puzzle

Ackermann D. [79] ‘Proper Names, Propositional Attitudes, and Nondescriptive Connotations’,
Philosophical Studies 35, 55-69.
[posits nondescriptive connotations for names.]

[Defense of the Fregean argument for the distinction between sense and reference.]

[Original statement of the puzzle. A classic.]
   [Classic statement of the new theory of reference in application to demonstratives.]

   [Classic statement of the new theory of reference in application to names and kind terms.]

   [Suggests that cognitive significance may be linguistic.]

   [Invokes logical form to solve the puzzles.]

   [A book-length treatment. Defends the direct reference theory.]

Names and Belief Reports

Boghossian P., [94] ‘The Transparency of Mental Content’, in Philosophical Perspectives VIII (ed. Tomberlin J.,)


   [A recent article summarizing some of the responses to the puzzle.]

   [A recent book-length treatment.]


[Argues against the appeal to modes of presentation.]

[A very recent book-length treatment by a defender of direct reference]

Kripke’s Puzzle Concerning Belief

[Argues that the puzzle concerns belief, not just reports of belief.]


Moore’s Paradox of Analysis

[appeals to indirect senses to solve the paradox.]
