A Fairly Comprehensive Reading List

Burte T., [77] ‘Kaplan, Quine and Suspended Belief’, Philosophical Studies 31, 197-203.
Crimmins M., [98] ‘Hesperus
Donnellan K., [90] ‘Belief and the Identity of Reference’, in ‘Propositional Attitudes’ (eds. Anderson
Dummett M., [73] ‘Frege: Philosophy of Language’, London: Duckworth. [chap. 2 & 516-7].
Dummett M., ‘Frege’s Distinction between Sense and Reference’, article 9 of ‘Truth and Other
(1975), 149-88.
Fine K., [84] ‘A Defence of Arbitrary Objects’, Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 57
(1983), 55-77.
Forbes G., [89] ‘Cognitive Architecture and the Semantics of Belief’ in ‘Contemporary Perspectives in
the Philosophy of Language II’ (ed. P. A. French et al), Notre Dame.


Higgenbotham J., [91] ‘Belief and Logical Form’, Mind and Language 6, 244-69.

Hornsby J., [77] ‘Singular Terms in Contexts of Propositional Attitudes’, Mind 86, 31-48

Jacob P., ‘Thoughts and Belief Ascriptions’, Mind and Language 2, 301-5.


McDowell J., [77] ‘On the Sense and Reference of a Proper Name’, Mind 86, 159-85, reprinted in


Recanati F., [97] ‘Can we Believe what we do not Understand’, Mind and Language 12, 84-100.
Richard M., [99] ‘Propositional Attitudes’, chapter 9 of ‘A Companion to the Philosophy of

Reiber S. D., [92] ‘Understanding Synonyms without Knowing that they are Synonyms’, Analysis 52, 224-8.

Reiber S. D., [94] Erkenntnis 41(1), 103-16.


Sainsbury R. M. [83] ‘On a Fregean Argument for the Distinctness of Sense and Reference’, Analysis 43, 12-14


Soames S., [87] ‘Direct Reference, Propositional Attitudes and Semantic Content’, Philosophical Topics 15, 47-87, reprinted in Salmon [88], 197, 239,


Stalnaker R., [87] ‘Semantics for Belief’, Philosophical Topics 15, n. 1, 177-90.


Taschek W., [?] ‘Frege’s Puzzle, Sense and Information Content’, Mind.


‘Philosophical Perspectives, VIII’ (ed. Tomberlin J.).


