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Note:
The syllabus will be revised periodically
Read
Jim Pryor’s
Philosophical Terms and Methods
How To Read a Philosophy Paper
THE TURING
TEST
A.M. Turing, "Computing Machinery and Intelligence" Mind 49: 433-460. (This article is widely available in somewhat degraded
form on the internet but I have linked to the actual journal issue.)
B&J “Behaviorism and Beyond”, 29-41
B&J,
“Blockhead”, 111-121
Ned Block, "The Mind as the Software of the Brain", section 1.1 and 1.2
Dan Dennett, “Can
Machines Think?”
Stuart Shieber, "Lessons
from a Restricted Modern Turing Test"
Communications of the Association for
Computing Machinery, volume 37, number 6, pages 70-78, 1994.
Hugh
Loebner, "In
Response" (reply to Shieber)
Stuart
Shieber, “On
Loebner’s Lessons,” Communications of the Association for
Computing Machinery, volume 37, number 6, pages 83-84, 1994.
Drew
McDermott, "How intelligent is Deep Blue?" long version of an
op.ed. article in New York Times, May 14, 1997
Katie
Hafner “In an
Ancient Game, Computing’s Future”, or here
New York Times, August 2002. If
the link to the New York Times website requires payment, the article is
available by doing a search on
Lexis-Nexus for
Hafner as author. If you are having trouble from outside NYU, click
here.
Suggested:
Online
ELIZA Program, or here, or download here
The Turing Test Page (a compendium)
The Alan Turing
home page
Jason
Hutchens, "How to Pass the Turing Test by Cheating"
Ned
Block, “Psychologism
and Behaviorism” the Philosophical Review LXXXX, No. 1, January
1981, 5-43
SEARLE'S CHINESE ROOM ARGUMENT
Alex
Byrne, “Intentionality”,
In Philosophy of Science: An
Encyclopedia, ed. J. Pfeifer and S. Sarkar
(Routledge, forthcoming)
John Searle, "Minds, Brains and Programs” (or here)
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3,
1980, p.417-424
Paul Churchland and Patricia Churchland, "Could a Machine
Think?" Scientific American,
1993 (Xerox)
Comments on Searle by John Haugeland, Douglas Hofstadter,
William Lycan, John McCarthy, and Marvin Minsky, from Behavioral and Brain Sciences,
1980 (Pages 425-6,432-5,439-40)
(Xerox)
B&J,
“Three Challenges to Functionalism”, 104-111
Ned Block, "The Mind as the Software of the Brain", section 1 (after 1.2) and section 2,
John Searle, "Is the Brain a Digital Computer?" APA Presidential Address
THE FUNCTIONALIST VIEW OF
THE MIND
Ned Block, "What is functionalism", Encyclopedia of Philosophy Supplement
(Macmillan)
B&J, “Common Sense Functionalism”, 41-59,
B&J, “Empirical Functionalisms”, 79-90,
MIND-BRAIN IDENTITY
B&J “The Identity Theory”,
91-103
Daniel
Stoljar, Physicalism,
Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy
Kim
Sterelny, “Reductionism in the Philosophy of Mind”. If
you are having trouble accessing this item, click here.
Brian
McLaughlin, "Emergentism",
MIT Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science
INTERLUDE ON CONTENT
B&J, “Theory of Reference” 59-78.
Kent Bach, “Content: Wide and Narrow” If you are having trouble accessing this item,
click here..
MENTAL REPRESENTATION
Murat Aydede, “The Language of
Thought Hypothesis,” Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy
B&J,
“About Content”, 159-235
Ned Block, "The Mind as the Software of the Brain", section 3
Daniel Dennett, "Mind Writing and Brain Reading"
(Xerox)
INSTRUMENTALISM
Dan
Dennett, “Intentional Stance”, MIT Encyclopedia of
Cognitive Science
B&J,
“Instrumentalism and Interpretationism”, 144-158
FUNCTIONAL ROLE SEMANTICS
Mark
Greenberg and Gilbert Harman, “Conceptual Role
Semantics”, draft for The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language,
to be edited by Ernest Lepore and Barry Smith
P.
Johnson-Laird , “Procedural
Semantics”. Cog. 5
3 (1977), pp. 189– 214
Jerry Fodor, "Tom
Swift and his Procedural Grandmother" Cognition Volume 6, Issue 3, 1978, Pages
229-247.
For
the Tom Swift allusion, click here.
Jerry Fodor, “Having Concepts; A Brief Refutation Of The
20th Century”, Mind
and Language, February 2004, Vol. 19, 1. If you have trouble with this link, go to
the journal issue here
and click on Fodor’s paper. There
are a number of responses to Fodor in this issue and Fodor’s reply.
Suggested but not required reading
Ned Block, "Semantics, Conceptual Role", Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Ned Block, "Holism, Mental and Semantic" , Routledge
Encyclopedia of Philosophy
MENTAL
IMAGERY
Michael Tarr, “Mental Rotation”,
MIT Encyclopedia of
Cognitive Science
Stephen
Kosslyn, Image and Brain, Ch
1 (The password for this is the same as
for the slides)
Ned Block, "Mental
Pictures and Cognitive Science" (or
here) Philosophical
Review
Mazyar Fallah and John Reynolds, “Attention!
V1 Neurons Lining Up for Inspection,” Neuron 31,5, 2001
Stephen
Kosslyn, Giorgio Ganis and William Thompson, Neural Foundations of Imagery,
or here,
Nature Reviews Neuroscience 2, 9/2001
Zenon
Pylyshyn, Return
of the mental image: Are there pictures in the head? In press, Trends in Cognitive Science (March,
2003)
Stephen
Kosslyn, William Thompson, Giorgio Ganis, “Mental
Imagery Doesn’t Work Like That”, Behavioral
and Brain Sciences, 2002
Stephen
M. Kosslyn, Giorgio Ganis, William L. Thompson, Mental
Imagery: Against the Nihilistic Hypothesis, Trends in Cognitive Science, in press (March, 2003)
In
addition, there is a very much longer version of the Pylyshyn paper which
will not be discussed in class, "Mental Imagery: In Search
of a Theory", Behavioral and
Brain Sciences, 2002. Kosslyn,
Thompson and Ganis, above, is a reply to that paper.
The
Fallah article referenced above summarizes Roelfsema and Spekreijse, “The
Representation of Erroneously Perceived Stimuli in the Primary Visual Cortex”
in the same issue of the journal. We
won’t be discussing the details, but you might want to have a look at this
paper in order to fully understand the summary given by Fallah and Reynolds.
CONSCIOUSNESS
Ned
Block, “Some Concepts of Consciousness”
Daniel Dennett, "Quining Qualia" (Web)
Daniel Dennett and Marcel Kinsbourne, "Time and the Observer: The Where and When of
Consciousness in the Brain" and reply (Web)
Nancy
Kanwisher, "Neural
events and perceptual awareness". Cognition ,pp 89-113
of Volume
79, Issues 1-2, (April 2001)
Daniel
Dennett, Are
we explaining consciousness yet?, Pages 221-237 of Cognition Volume
79, Issues 1-2, (April 2001)
Ned
Block "Paradox
and Cross Purpose in Recent Work on Consciousness" Better to read
this than the version in Cognition.
Andy
Clark,
"Visual Experience and Motor Action: Are the Bonds Too Tight?"
Phil Review Oct 2001.
Koch,
C. and Crick, F.C. The zombie within. Nature (2001) 411,
893-893
SLIDES
Access to slides is limited to
students in the course and requires a password that was given out in
class. If you don’t know the password,
send email to ned.block@nyu.edu or
Slides from:
January 20,
22,
27,
29
February 10,
12,
17,
19,
24,
26
March 2,
4,
9,
11,
23,
25,
30
April 1,
6,
13,
15,
20,
22,
27
REFERENCES
Philosophers use often use
ordinary terms in a technical way. If you are having any problems
understanding anything, ask or email Professor Block or Erica Roedder. There
are also some reference works that you might also look at:
MIT
Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science
Routledge
Encyclopedia of Philosophy
S.
Guttenplan, A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell 1994
T.
Honderich, The Oxford Companion to Philosophy Oxford 1995
R.. Audi, The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Cambridge
1995
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: A
'dynamic' encyclopedia, where each entry kept up to date
Dictionary of
Philosophy of Mind
Contemporary Philosophy
of Mind: An Annotated Bibliography
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ATTENTION: The final
examination will be in class on Thursday, April 29th, the last
class.
Remember, no late papers. If
you miss the deadline for one assignment, just do another.
Read Jim Pryor’s advice on writing a philosophy paper, Guidelines on
Writing a Philosophy Paper