G83.3010
Consciousness, Action and Attention
Thursday 3:30-5:30, Philosophy 2nd floor
Seminar Room, 5 Washington Place (Note the change to the 2nd floor)
Attendance by those who are not PhD
students in a philosophy department requires permission of Professor Block
Requirements: A 10 page mid-term paper is due
March 13th and a longer term paper is due May 1st. The term paper can be a revised version
of the mid-term paper
Assignments for the remainder of the term
May 1: Sensorimotor 3
No‘ PPR (2008) prŽcis, No‘, Magic Realism, Block review,
Hurley, ÒVarieties of ExternalismÓ.
No‘Õs ÒMagic RealismÓ and HurleyÕs paper require the password given out
in class. If you donÕt remember
it, send me an email. Those 2
articles will be the main focus of the class.
Reading List
Note: some of the links below are linked to the NYU Library
web site. (They start with
ÔezproxyÕ.) If you do not have an NYU
email account, you can access the articles via your own library. If you do not have any library account
at all, contact Professor Block about the articles you cannot access.
Ned Block, ÒWittgenstein and QualiaÓ, Philosophical Perspectives 21, 1, 2007:
73-115, edited by John Hawthorne.
Alex Byrne, ÒInverted QualiaÓ, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Daniel Simons & Ron Rensink, Change Blindness: Past, Present, and Future
Trends in Cognitive
Sciences, 9: 16-20. 2005
Christof Koch & Naotsugu Tsuchiya, Attention and Consciousness: Two
Distinct Brain Processes. Trends in Cognitive Sciences
(2007) 11,
16-22
Chris Mole, ÒAttention in the Absence of
Consciousness?Ó forthcoming in Trends in Cognitive Sciences
Chris Mole, ÒAttention and ConsciousnessÓ,
Journal of Consciousness Studies. A new draft of this paper has been posted as of January
30th
The
Relation between Consciousness and Attention
Jesse Prinz, ÒA
Neurofunctional Theory of ConsciousnessÓ,
or here in A. Brook and K.
Akins (Eds.) Philosophy
and neuroscience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003
Eric Lormand, Comments
on ÒA Neurofunctional Theory of Visual ConsciousnessÓ Pages 260-266
Anthony Marcel, On a Neurofunctional Theory of Visual Consciousness:
Commentary on J. Prinz,
Consciousness and Cognition 9, 267–273 (2000)
Jesse Prinz, A Reply to Lormand,
Consciousness
and Cognition Volume 9, Issue
2, June 2000, Pages 274-278
Jesse Prinz, A
Reply to Marcel, Consciousness and Cognition 9, 279–287 (2000)
Consciousness
and Cognitive Access
Ned
Block, ÓConsciousness,
Accessibility and the Mesh between Psychology and Neuroscience,Ó
forthcoming in Behavioral and
Brain Sciences, 2008
Replies
by Balog, Burge, Byrne Hilbert & Siegel, Clark & Kiverstein, Gopnik,
Grush, Harman, Hulme & Whitely, Izard Quinn & Most, Jacob, Kentridge,
Koch & Tsuchiya, Kouider, Gardelle & Dupoux, Lamme, Landman &
Sligte, Lau & Persaud, Laureys, Levine, Lycan, Malach, McDermott, Naccache
& Dehaene, OÕRegan & Myin, Prinz, Rosenthal, Sergent & Rees,
Shanahan & Baars, Snodgrass & Lepisto, Spener, Tye and Van Gulick
(Accessing this file requires a password that will be mentioned in class)
Ned
Block, ÒOverflow,
Access and Attention,Ó responses to the 32 replies
Is the
Conscious Will Epiphenomenal?
Dan
Wegner, ÒWho is the controller of controlled processes?
In R. Hassin, J.S. Uleman, & J.A. Bargh (Eds.) The New Unconscious (pp.
19-36). New York: Oxford University Press.
Richard Holton, review of Wegner, The Illusion of
Conscious Will, Mind
113 (2004) 218-21
Tim
Bayne, Phenomenology and the Feeling of Doing:
Wegner on the Conscious Will, In S. Pockett, W.
P. Banks and S. Gallagher (eds.) Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, pp. 169-186, 2006
Terry Horgan, John Tienson, George
Graham, ÒThe Phenomenology of First Person AgencyÓ,
(or here)
In S. Walter and H-D Heckmann (eds) Physicalism and
Mental Causation: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action. Exeter, UK: Imprint
Academic (pp. 323-40), 2003.
Tim Bayne. 2007. The Phenomenology of
Agency. Philosophy Compass.
Tim Bayne. & Elisabeth Pacherie,
Forthcoming. Narrators and
Comparators: The Architecture of Agentive Self-Awareness,
Synthese.
Susanna
Siegel, The
Phenomenology of Efficacy" Philosophical Topics Vol. 33, No 1, Spring
2005.
Elisabeth Pacherie, The
phenomenology of action: A conceptual framework, Cognition 2008, in press.
Phenomenal Concepts
David
Chalmers, The Content and Epistemology of
Phenomenal Belief. In (Q. Smith & A. Jokic,
eds) Consciousness:
New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press, 2003
Jesse Prinz, Mental Pointing: Phenomenal Knowledge Without
Concepts, Journal of Consciousness Studies 14, 2007
David
Papineau, Conceptual
Dualism, Chapter 2 of Thinking about Consciousness, Oxford
University Press, 2002
Michael
Tye: draft of forthcoming book, Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without
Phenomenal Concepts, MIT Press, 2008
The
Sense of Ownership of the Body
Manos Tsakiris & Patrick Haggard, ÒThe Rubber Hand Illusion
Revisited: Visuotactile Integration and Self-Attribution,
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 2005, 31,
1, 80-91
FrŽdŽrique de Vignemont, Habeas Corpus: The Sense
of Ownership of OneÕs Own Body, Mind & Language 22, 4, 427-449,
September 2007
H. Henrik Ehrsson, ÒThe Experimental
Induction of Out-of-Body ExperiencesÓ
Science 317, 2007, p. 1048.
Greg Miller, ÒOut-of-Body Experiences
Enter the Laboratory,Ó Science 317, 2007, p. 1020a
Bigna Lenggenhager, Tej Tadi, Thomas Metzinger & Olaf
Blanke, ÒVideo Ergo Sum:
Manipulating Bodily Self-Consciousness,Ó
Science 317, 2007, p. 1096.
Angelo
Moravita, Atsushi Iriki, ÒTools
for the body (schema)Ó, Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8, 2, 2004
The Timing of Conscious Experiences
Patrick Haggard, Conscious
intention and motor cognition,Ó Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9, 6, 290-295,
2005
Alfred Mele, Chapter
2 of Free
Will and Luck, OUP 2006
Hakwan Lau, Robert Rogers & Richard Passingham, ÒManipulating the
Experienced Onset of Intention after Action ExecutionÓ, Journal of
Cognitive Neuroscience 19:1, 1-10, 2007
Alfred Mele, ÒProximal
Intentions, Intention-Reports, and Vetoing, forthcoming
Peter
Carruthers, Higher-Order Theories (Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy)
David
Rosenthal, "Explaining Consciousness," in
Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, ed. David J. Chalmers,
New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 406-421
David
Rosenthal, "How Many
Kinds of Consciousness?", Consciousness and Cognition, 11, 4
(December 2002): 653-665
Uriah
Kriegel, The Self-Representational Theory of Consciousness.Ó
Introductory chapter of Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory
Further readings on this topic in: U. Kriegel and K. Williford (eds.), Self-Representational
Approaches to Consciousness (pp. 143-170). Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2006
Sensorimotor Theories of Consciousness
Susan Hurley and Alva
Noe, "Neural plasticity and consciousness."
Biology and
Philosophy 18, 1, pp 131-168
Ned Block, "Spatial
Perception via Tactile Sensation,"
(or here)
Trends in Cognitive
Sciences Volume 7, Issue 7
, July 2003, Pages 285-286. (Note: the journal incorrectly reversed the
noun phrases in the title.)
Susan Hurley and Alva
No‘, Neural plasticity and consciousness:
Reply to Block Trends in Cognitive
Sciences Volume 7, Issue 78,
August, 2003 issue.
Alva
No‘, Precis of Action in Perception, Psyche 12,1,
2006, p. 1-34
Alva No‘, ÒPrŽcis
of Action in Perception: Philosophy
and Phenomenological ResearchÓ, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
LXXVI, 3, May 2008
Commentaries
in the same issue of Psyche
Andy
Clark Vision as Dance?
Pierre
Jacob - Why Visual
Experience is Likely to Resist Being Enacted
Jesse Prinz - Putting the
Brakes on Enactive Perception
William Lycan
- Enactive
Intentionality
Ned Block, Review of Alva
No‘, Action in
Perception, The Journal of
Philosophy, CII, 5, May 2005, 259-272
Alva No‘, "Experience
without the head", in Perceptual Experience, eds. by TS Gendler &
J. Hawthorne.
Alva Noe and Evan Thompson, "Are There Neural Correlates of Consciousness?", Journal of Consciousness Studies, Vol 11/1, 2004.
Susan Hurley, "Varieties of Externalism", in The Extended Mind, ed. Richard Menary, in press Ashgate. (This link requires a password. If you donÕt remember the password, send an email to Professor Block)
Alva No‘, ÒMagic Realism and the Limits of Intelligibility: What Makes us ConsciousÓ (This link requires a password. If you donÕt remember the password, send an email to Professor Block)