

Afro-Cuban music' (p. 166) and that 'I do not deal with music that has any ethnic classification. I deal with what I call biological music, or human music. If you deal with that, you deal with everybody. Because we are all ethnically mixed' (p. 174).

For Graves, whose eclectic interests include various forms of non-Western medicine and creating music from the sound of the human heart, this is not simply a matter of the priority of culture over race. Rather, his concept transcends the idea of cultural difference and even of a mind/body split: 'A massage therapist or acupuncturist is no different than a drummer; if a patient is sick and out of balance, the healer has to make him vibrate properly, the healer has to make him dance . . . [W]hen people sit down to hear some music, you have got to make sure that you have them vibrating right. Certain music might have vibrations that set off bad reactions' (pp. 174–5). Graves is evidently an interesting thinker as well as an extraordinary musician, but Austerlitz's decision simply to present his words (or some version of them) rather than to provide a critical interpretation points to a bigger problem: a refusal to interrogate cherished ideas, which the reader is asked to accept as a matter of faith. There is value in this, of course, but it's a value that's difficult to assess in the context of an academic book: interviews with a mentor and too-little-known musician, which might have been presented better in an appendix, take on in Austerlitz's volume too great an importance, as a defence or even an underpinning of his own argument.

In *Jazz Consciousness*, Paul Austerlitz contributes importantly to a subject that has experienced a boom in recent jazz scholarship: the global spread of African-American musics, from the early period up to the present day. (Among recent books have been E. Taylor Atkins's edited volume *Jazz Planet* (Jackson, Miss., 2003) as well as his own *Blue Nippon: Authenticating Jazz in Japan* (Durham, NC, 2001) and Andrew F. Jones's *Yellow Music: Media Culture and Colonial Modernity in the Chinese Jazz Age* (Durham, NC, 2001).) This diasporic approach is proving powerful in analysing both the musical transformations that take place across borders and the unexpected significances the music sometimes takes on. In particular, Austerlitz has fascinating insights into jazz's intersection with other 'black' musics in the African diaspora and specifically the Caribbean. On another level, the book represents a personal journey for the author, as well as a tour of the world. But Austerlitz

pushes too hard in my opinion in trying to theorize a new global psyche created through jazz; his appeal to the 'universal', albeit 'strategic', hides more than it reveals. Thus while the material is frequently fascinating and the research often meticulous, as a book *Jazz Consciousness* is uneven, and conceptually somewhat flawed.

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*Musical Representations, Subjects, and Objects: The Construction of Musical Thought in Zarlino, Descartes, Rameau, and Weber.* By Jairo Moreno. pp. xii + 236. Musical Meaning and Interpretation. (Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 2005, \$44.95. ISBN 0-253-34457-3.)

When we think about the experience of closely 'listening' to music, it turns out to be an extraordinarily complicated matter. For most of us trained in music, listening is not a passive process of pure sensory stimulation; our thoughts actively intervene in the process by imagining things within (or beyond) the acoustical waves impinging upon our ears. Among other possibilities, we might impute tendencies in tones, interpolate notes in harmonies and melodies, and imagine functions in chords. We might parse the music into melodies, phrases, themes, and motifs. We also can project rhythmic patterns or anticipate thematic or tonal events while simultaneously recalling past events. All this is not even to consider whatever historical information or hermeneutics we may bring to musical listening that can also complicate and enrich our hearings in incalculable ways. The bottom line is that the musical experience is a complex, multifaceted phenomenon in which our mind—our imagination—actively takes part through a creative intellectual process that Kant called representation (*Vorstellung*).

According to Jairo Moreno, however, our capacity for sophisticated musical representation has a relatively recent history. It emerged—along with other forms of modern self-consciousness and early forms of critical reflection—only in the seventeenth century, and attained full maturity in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In this provocative book, Moreno seeks to flesh out the history of this musical imagination and the transcendental subject in whom it is situated. As is probably evident from this ambitious agenda, the story is a heavily philosophical one,

and it is not surprising that at times (and through many pages) the book reads like a learned primer on early modern epistemology and metaphysics (with frequent glances backwards to classical philosophy, as well as occasional nods towards more contemporary, postmodernist developments). But it is also—and most crucially—a story of music theory, for if the emergence of a rational subject in music (distinct from the acoustical ‘object’ perceived by the subject) becomes an emblem of early modern self-consciousness, it is music theory that offers the ‘historically contingent organizing principles and semiotic protocols’ by which the object of musical experience may be ‘re-presented’ in the imagination of the subject-agent (p. 6).

To tell this story, Moreno focuses on four key thinkers of Western music theory. Over four densely argued and richly footnoted chapters, he takes us through some seminal moments in the writings of Zarlino, Descartes, Rameau, and Gottfried Weber to elucidate the evolution of modern musical consciousness. But first he launches a weighty prolegomenon to his study outlining some of the intellectual issues at stake, and justifying much of the critical apparatus he will bring to bear upon his topic. It seems that the French intellectual historian Michel Foucault will offer the major paradigm within which Moreno will fit his theoretical subjects, especially the early Foucault of *Les Mots et les choses* (1966; trans. as *The Order of Things*), in which the notion of historical ‘epistemes’ is famously articulated. (And lest any reader miss the foundational role Foucault will play in this book, the publishers have provided one of the most curiously aphoristic (and potentially backfiring?) advertising blurbs I have ever seen on a dust jacket. It reads, simply: ‘A provocative application of Foucault’s ideas to music theory.’)

It turned out, to my surprise and relief, that Foucault played less of a heavy-handed role than I expected. ‘Renaissance’ and ‘Classical’ epistemes or various forms of ‘archeological knowledge’ indeed appear, but Moreno does not apply them slavishly or uncritically, and his discussion quickly moves beyond the confines of Foucault’s rigid structuralist schemas (more on this below). There are also cameo appearances in this introduction by a bevy of other formidable twentieth-century thinkers, including Heidegger, Derrida, Latour, Feyerabend, Barthes, and Kuhn, foreshadowing the intellectual breadth and style of argumentation encountered in subsequent chapters.

Having outlined some of the epistemological stakes in the delineation of the subject and object in early modern thought, Moreno turns to the realm of music theory. We begin in chapter 1 with the writings of Gioseffo Zarlino, or rather a few passages from *Le istituzioni harmoniche* of 1558 and *Sopplimenti musicali* of 1588. Such a choice is typical of his method throughout the book: it is not his intention to offer comprehensive analyses of the writings of his four chosen theorists, but to show, via extracts selected for close exegesis, how their thought illustrates deeper themes of musical agency and representation.

Moreno chooses Zarlino as a representative of a Renaissance world view in which subject and object are not yet separate, as his first subject for study. Here, music is perceived as not something ‘out there’ separate from the mind listening to it, but as part of a semantic web of harmonic identity in which the subject participates. Music not merely signifies a Neoplatonic notion of world *harmonia*, it is itself coextensive with it; the proportions of the musical *senario* are found reflected in innumerable correspondences (or ‘affinities’) in nature, a network of simulacra that Foucault famously characterizes using the Renaissance episteme of resemblance. Zarlino’s ideal musician, then, is not an autonomous agent who reflects at a distance upon music as such but, rather, a participant who recognizes immediately and almost by intuition the identity of the musical microcosm with the greater macrocosm.

For the purpose of Moreno’s argument, Zarlino is probably as good a starting point as any. After all, no music theorist seems more ideally to embody the aesthetic and theory of Renaissance universal knowledge. And surely no sixteenth-century theorist produced a body of literature that proved more consequential for the history of music theory. But one could question whether Foucault’s model of the Renaissance episteme is ultimately the most revealing one by which to read Zarlino’s writings. A number of cultural historians have rightly criticized the totalist sweep of Foucault’s epistemic models. (See e.g. the collection of essays in John Neubauer (ed.), *Cultural History after Foucault* (New York, 1999), especially those by George Rousseau (pp. 3–36) and Ian Maclean (pp. 163–76).) But Moreno seems to acknowledge this too, for at the end of this chapter he acknowledges that Zarlino’s own corpus of theoretical writings can hardly be taken as a fully unified and coherent whole, given the number of ‘strategic cognitive compromises’ he had to make in his teachings,

most notably involving the apperception and ranking of consonances (p. 38). Perhaps the notion of a pure Renaissance episteme of musical cognition is more an idealized fiction than reality, since we might well presume that centuries before Zarlino there were musicians who were intellectually innocent of the Neoplatonic underpinnings of world harmony but who pursued their *métier* with a degree of cognitive self-consciousness.

Still, it is quite clear that something new is afoot when we reach the seventeenth century. Scattered throughout the philosophical and social sediments of its culture, we find evidence of a new self-consciousness that we have come to identify with early modern man. Moreno is quite certain that in the realm of music theory, a glimpse of this new cognizant individual is to be found lurking in the pages of Descartes's early manuscript, the *Compendium musicae* (written in 1618 when he was just 22, but not published until 1650). Now there is no need here to debate the categorical role that Descartes played in early modern philosophy. No single thinker did more to frame the epistemological conditions of rational self-inspection by which the possibility of real and certain knowledge might be attained and certified. But we are not talking about Descartes's 'Rules' or the 'Meditations' here, but about the modest *Compendium musicae*. I fear it is to set great store by this little treatise—most of its more 'practical' content drawn from Zarlino—by holding it up as a harbinger of an epistemological seismic shift that would soon shake Europe.

Moreno does a convincing job, however, in telling us why we might wish to do so. If the critical turning point in Western thought in the seventeenth century was the emergence of a cognitive ego ('cogito ergo sum'), in music theory it was similarly the emergence of the cognitive listener—the perceiver subject who could reflect rationally and critically on the sensory impressions of the musical object. And in an extended close reading of the *Compendium* (particularly the 'Preliminaries'), Moreno comes close to persuading me that such an early modern ego is indeed suggested by Descartes, even if, obviously, the full epistemological and psychological details of this figure are not fleshed out. This is a treatise, after all, that opens with the portentous announcement 'The object of [music] is sound' (Zarlino, following the long-established Platonic ontology, would have insisted that the object of music is not sound, but number). Moreno seeks to show that by changing the

ontology of music from number to sound, Descartes effects a profound epistemological shift in which music is now separate from the mind that reflects upon and imagines it.

To support this argument, Moreno expends much energy in chapter 2 explicating Descartes's general epistemology and 'cognitive aesthetics'. At times, this chapter reads more like a philosophy text (one of the virtues of Moreno's book is that his understanding of philosophy is remarkably sophisticated and thorough). At times, though, I felt that he gets somewhat bogged down in exegeses of Cartesian thought and expression; and his many digressions on Greek and Latin philosophical terminology and disquisitions on Platonic or Aristotelean thought, while usually informative, sometimes border on the tendentious and may irritate a few readers as pedantry.

If, however, we accept Moreno's argument that it was with Descartes that we first encounter a musical thinker upon which all subsequent music theory is predicated, then perhaps all this effort is worthwhile. Certainly, I would agree that Descartes the philosopher provided the groundwork for this early modern figure; but I am not sure that Descartes the music theorist—at least as found in the *Compendium*—is quite as consequential as Moreno tries to suggest. After all, the pay-off in the *Compendium* is rather meagre, with its unoriginal pronouncements on counterpoint and mode.

At the least, I wonder what would have happened had Moreno chosen to look at some other writers who dealt more fully and originally with music. I am thinking particularly of Descartes's friend Marin Mersenne, who would seem to be an ideal figure to test this hypothesis, standing as he does so clearly (or ambiguously?) between a Neoplatonic world view and an early modern world of mechanistic science and acoustics. I feel that someone like Mersenne would have made the boundaries between Foucault's Renaissance and Classical epistemes far more blurred, and the 'new listener' a much more complex character. But it is clear that it is not Descartes the music theorist in whom, ultimately, Moreno is interested. The extensive tilling of philosophical groundwork in chapter 2 bears real music-theoretical fruit in chapters 3 and 4, where we can finally see what kinds of 'musical knowledge' may be accrued in the imagination of our early modern subject adumbrated by Descartes.

For in chapter 3 we arrive at the figure of Jean-Philippe Rameau, who, in just about anybody's account, did make original, long-lasting contributions to music theory. It is he who is the

true hero of Moreno's book, not so much through any attempt to vindicate his theory of the fundamental bass or the *corps sonore*, but by the sheer humanity of his struggle to negotiate the phenomenological space between musical object and attendant subject. In Rameau's music theory, following Foucault, we now have the musical object 'presented clearly and directly through a semiotic model of signification'. (This constitutes Foucault's characterization of the classical episteme of 'representation'.) In music theory, such signification takes place notationally: theorists attempt through their various notational 'signs' to make conspicuous their interpretations of musical phenomena, such as Descartes with string lengths representing harmonic and arithmetic proportions, or Rameau with his fundamental bass and Weber with roman numerals. But unlike the classic episteme of representation in which there is an unmediated identity between the object signified and the sign representing it, Moreno argues that Rameau splits open this pairing by inserting a third, intervening element: the imagination. Despite his attempts to cling to a transparent, naturalized semiotics in which the fundamental bass can be heard to 'represent' the harmonic substructure of all music constituted by the natural phenomenon of the *corps sonore*, Rameau finds that he must ask the listening musician for more, to add a 'supplement' (in Derrida's famous formulation).

To clarify this idea, Moreno examines in detail the problem of Rameau's theory of 'imputed dissonance'. The idea of an imputed or inferred dissonance (what Rameau called 'sous-entendre') constitutes a small but important element of the theory of the fundamental bass as outlined in the *Traité de l'harmonie* (1722). Briefly put, Rameau had argued that certain dissonances (primarily the minor seventh) needed to be present above certain triads in order to identify them as dominant functions. Only with the motivating dissonance of the seventh can the progression move on to the consonant tonic, which is characterized—and paradoxically defined—by its lack of destabilizing dissonance. Now it is possible to describe this relationship in a variety of ways. In my own writings, I have suggested a historical-mechanistic model in which the seventh forms a kind of causative agent impelling the dominant harmony towards a tonic stasis, while Moreno (following Brian Hyer) seems more drawn to a semiotic retelling, in which the seventh signifies the presence of the (non-sounding) tonic (p. 109). In either case, if a dominant harmony lacks the characteristic

dissonance in the actual (figured-bass) notation of the music, Rameau insists that we imagine the dissonance to be there. (Whether a performer is meant in fact to play that dissonance is another matter, although I share Moreno's scepticism on this question.)

The 'implication' of this dissonance is for Moreno a paradigmatic case of the musical imagination acting upon the musical object, and he elevates this detail in Rameau's thought to a critical watershed in the history of music theory that indeed 'marks the entry of music theory into the modern era—one defined by the emergence of the human subject as an autonomous agent of cognition of musical objects and by the music-theoretical construction of the subject as listener' (p. 88). Now whether or not our poor, imagined dissonant note can actually carry the momentous epistemological burden that Moreno seeks to place upon it, there is no question that Rameau here brings explicitly to the fore the necessity of 'cognitive intervention' on the part of the listener as no one had yet done in the realm of music theory. Henceforth, in Moreno's picture, the mutual, unmediated identification of the sign with the signified object that characterizes classical representation is now in the domain of music theory pried open to make room for the musical imagination.

It is easy for us to think of 'imagination' as mere fancy, something opposed to the concrete reality of empirical knowledge. But it is just such a simple binary opposition that Moreno seeks to deconstruct. Of course he does not carry out this weighty philosophical task alone; once again he spends considerable time reviewing theories of the imagination going back to Plato, showing how it becomes progressively emancipated as a faculty of the mind. By the eighteenth century, far from being something irrational, the imagination is seen to generate productive knowledge in manifold Enlightenment texts (and contexts). Hence we can find a cluster of intersecting concepts positively reified by writers contemporaneous with Rameau such as Rousseau, Montesquieu, Condillac, Sulzer, and Hume that appeal to a kind of internal imagination in one's mind (including such concepts as *bon goût*, *esprit de finesse*, *sensibilité*, *Einfühlung*, fancy, wit, and so forth).

It is in this way, then, that the *basse fondamentale* is something to be 'imagined' underneath the figured bass. Rameau truly was teaching us to hear music anew. Imagination mediates practice and theory, or, as Moreno tersely expresses it, 'between the incomplete

given and the complete created, between uninformed fact and informed possibility' (p. 124). It is the key for understanding the signs of figured bass notation in which the fundamental bass is encoded in early eighteenth-century musical practice, and more broadly, the key to musical understanding in the Enlightenment.

When we arrive in chapter 4 at the writings of Gottfried Weber we encounter the full maturation of the musical ego, one that relies upon neither the intersubjective, universal values of order and measurement as in Descartes nor the values of natural science and nature through linguistic representation to which Rameau appealed. Our mature musical ego now recognizes the limitations in the structure of representation and thereby achieves a kind of cognitive emancipation by which 'the subject itself becomes object of its own representation' (p. 132). Here is a true Romantic hero worthy of Byron (or at least a Schlegel).

We find our Romantic listening subject in his full idealist glory in the *locus classicus* of Weberian musical hermeneutics: the famous analysis of the opening bars of Mozart's 'Dissonance' Quartet in C, K. 465. Weber's remarks on 'a particularly remarkable passage' of Mozart in the third edition (1832) of his *Versuch einer geordneten Theorie der Tonsetzkunst zum Selbstunterricht* has emerged in recent years as probably the most closely raked-over passage of historical music analysis in the literature—and for good reason. It offers one of the most compelling and self-conscious attempts at a phenomenological analysis of a notoriously rebarbative passage of chromatic music. Weber tracks a hypothetical musical ear (*das Gehör*) as it contemplates from one note to the next the tonal anxieties it faces in making sense of the music. Using his well-known concept of 'Mehrdeutigkeit' (literally, 'multiple meaning'), Weber tries to show, through a kind of 'slow-frame' analysis, how at any given moment in the opening bars, it is possible to hear a number of tonal ascriptions.

The key here (and in stark contrast to Rameau) is the subjective temporal space within which *das Gehör* operates, a temporal space asynchronous with the musical experience of hearing K. 465 that can only be explicated in transcendental, Kantian terms. At the same time, the multiple tonal vacillations that the ear is subjected to at any given moment are read by Moreno allegorically as manifestations of a Romantic trope of 'irony.' Weber's *das Gehör*

becomes the ironic prototype of the Fichtean absolute ego. But the arrival at cognitive transcendence comes at a cost; the excess of tonal disorientation and temporal dislocation narrated by Weber is symptomatic of an existential crisis of identity that will mark the onset of modernist 'separation between knowing and being' (p. 163).

Moreno does not pursue this particular history, although one could imagine ways that this could be done congruent with the premisses of his book. Perhaps we could follow Foucault again in considering the social and institutional constraints upon our newly liberated listening subject. How, in other words, did the mature, autonomous agent of musical self-knowledge and imagination described in Weber's *Versuch* become subjected in the course of the nineteenth century to various disciplinary pressures that coerced, redirected, and even abrogated his hearing? (It was, after all, just when Weber was writing his *Versuch* that the many conservatories and *Hochschulen* that codified musical pedagogy for generations of music students were founded.) As Foucault famously explored in his writings on mental health and sexuality, Western societies throughout the nineteenth century developed sophisticated means of surveillance and discipline to regulate the body. It could be argued plausibly that a similar process of regulation and surveillance was taking place in the realm of the ear. (In fact, such a Foucauldian critique of music theory has been made by Kevin Korsyn, in a book that can be revealingly read in the company of Moreno's book: *Decentering Music: A Critique of Contemporary Musical Research* (New York and Oxford, 2003; reviewed in *Music & Letters*, 85 (2004), 418–23 (eds.)). But Korsyn is more concerned, as the title of his book suggests, with the contemporary state of music academia. Still, he does cast some provocative glances at historical moments of music theory—including, incidentally, the same Weberian analysis of K. 465 looked at by Moreno.)

But enough is enough. We have in Moreno's book much to think about and to be thankful for. In vivid and learned prose, he tells a profoundly important story that amounts to no less than the history of *Gehörbildung* in Western culture. For many readers this may not be an easy book, given its weighty philosophical baggage; yet, as I hope this review has suggested, to read it is well worth the effort. I know of few other examples of such musicological literature that

deal so competently—and even elegantly—with such a difficult yet critically important topic of musical epistemology. And if the story we learn is of the conflicted emergence of the general musical imagination in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, we also find in this book the emergence of a more recent moment of musical imagination that equally deserves our notice and celebration: the acute mind and lively pen of Jairo Moreno.

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*Mozart* By Julian Rushton. pp. xii + 306. The Master Musicians. (Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, 2006, £17.99. ISBN 0-19-518264-2.)

For more than a century, the Master Musicians series has provided readable and reliable guides to the 'life and works' of the major composers. The series format calls for the biography and music to be treated in separate chapters, sometimes interspersed and sometimes in discrete sections, with the musical works generally organized by genre. Appendices include a calendar, work-list, personalia, and select bibliography. Quite naturally, over the years the volumes in this series are revised and replaced as new information comes to light and as opinions and perspectives change, along with the expectations and requirements of readers. Eustace J. Breakespeare's *Mozart*, first published in 1902, is hardly remembered today, but its replacement, by Eric Blom, has been with us since 1935, periodically reprinted, corrected, and updated. In his preface, Blom explained somewhat cryptically that 'for various reasons the book originally contributed to the first edition of the "Master Musicians" was found to be no longer adequate', so perhaps it was out of discretion that he avoided mentioning his forerunner's name. Of his own effort, Blom rather modestly confided that 'it is doubtless too much to hope that in another quarter of a century or so it will not in its own turn have grown out of date'. As it turned out, he considerably underestimated his book's longevity. If Breakespeare's biographical account was largely dependent on Otto Jahn, Blom had the benefit of Hermann Abert's revision of Jahn (1919–21) and Ludwig Schiedermair's edition of Mozart's letters (1914), among other resources. Of course, Mozart bibliography has expanded

enormously since then, fed by a steady and seemingly ceaseless stream of discoveries, including even some newly discovered musical works. Replacing Blom's *Mozart* was thus long overdue, and in doing so Julian Rushton has done a magnificent job.

Rushton brings all of the requisite skills to the task. He knows the scholarly literature and primary sources exhaustively, and incorporates the very latest findings into his biographical narrative. For example, courtesy of Michael Lorenz, he is able to report that Mozart's so-called 'Jeunehomme' Concerto, K. 271, was composed for the French piano virtuoso Victoire Jenamy. He also displays a comprehensive knowledge and deep understanding of Mozart's music and communicates a passionate love for it. As he points out in his Preface: 'The works themselves—not only the operas—appear inexhaustible, inspiring new insights that change their meaning with the passing of time' (p. vii). Rushton's insights, the fruits of many years of living with, listening to, and thinking about this repertory, are yet another justification for this new book. In addition, he is an elegant writer, effortlessly imparting an enormous amount of information, but without giving the impression that he is producing an encyclopedia entry. He never gets bogged down by minutiae or resorts to lists. This is no small feat, given that his subject was so prolific and well travelled.

Rushton's biographical account pretty much sticks to the facts. He does not titillate by quoting instances of Mozart's scatological humour from his letters and bawdy canons, nor does he psychoanalyse the composer's relationship with his father or torture the complexities and apparent ambiguities of his personality. These are deliberate choices and are probably the right ones, given the size and nature of this book. Limitations of space, he explains, mean that he cannot 'report more than briefly on what we know of [Mozart's] lifestyle, beliefs, income, and most controversial of all, the cause of his death. I can only state what I believe on present evidence to be the case' (loc. cit.). But Rushton's stance derives as much from conviction as from necessity: 'It is Mozart's present misfortune that the popularity of his music, in an age of intrusive journalism, has led not only to fictional constructions such as Peter Shaffer's *Amadeus* but to speculations about his character and health that go well beyond the accessible data,